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Abstract 
Identity Theft could be currently considered as a significant problem in the modern 
internet driven era. This type of computer crime can be achieved in a number of 
different ways; various statistical figures suggest it is on the increase. It intimidates 
individual privacy and self assurance, while efforts for increased security and 
protection measures appear inadequate to prevent it. A forensic analysis of the digital 
evidence should be able to provide precise findings after the investigation of Identity 
Theft incidents. At present, the investigation of Internet based Identity Theft is 
performed on an ad hoc and unstructured basis, in relation to the digital evidence. 
This research work aims to construct a formalised and structured approach to digital 
Identity Theft investigations that would improve the current computer forensic 
investigative practice. The research hypothesis is to create an analytical framework to 
facilitate the investigation of Internet Identity Theft cases and the processing of the 
related digital evidence.  
This research work makes two key contributions to the subject: a) proposing the 
approach of examining different computer crimes using a process specifically based 
on their nature and b) to differentiate the examination procedure between the victim’s 
and the fraudster’s side, depending on the ownership of the digital media. The 
background research on the existing investigation methods supports the need of 
moving towards an individual framework that supports Identity Theft investigations. 
The presented investigation framework is designed based on the structure of the 
existing computer forensic frameworks. It is a flexible, conceptual tool that will assist 
the investigator’s work and analyse incidents related to this type of crime. The 
research outcome has been presented in detail, with supporting relevant material for 
the investigator. The intention is to offer a coherent tool that could be used by 
computer forensics investigators. Therefore, the research outcome will not only be 
evaluated from a laboratory experiment, but also strengthened and improved based on 
an evaluation feedback by experts from law enforcement. 
While personal identities are increasingly being stored and shared on digital media, 
the threat of personal and private information that is used fraudulently cannot be 
eliminated. However, when such incidents are precisely examined, then the nature of 
the problem can be more clearly understood.    
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In this chapter the reader can find 
► the definition and extension of ID theft; 
► the research aims and objectives; 
► the research methodology; 
► the outline of the thesis. 
1.1 Identity and Identity Theft 
The fraudulent use of another person’s personal details has become an 
increasingly significant concern. One million Internet shoppers were Internet 
fraud victims on 2004 (Hinde, 2004b), 8.3 million American adults victims in 
2005 (Goodin, 2007), while one in ten Britons was a victim in 2006 (Taylor, 
2006). Attacks on financial institutions have risen from 39% in 2003 to 83% for 
2004 (McKenna, 2004). In the UK fraud on plastic cards on 2003 cost £402 
million (Cybersource, 2004). According to the ITRC (2009), there was a 47% 
increase in data breaches comparing to them in 2007. In addition, Identity Theft 
was the first among a list of twenty consumer complaints in 2008 in the United 
States receiving 26% (FTC, 2009). While the British population is approximately 
61 million people, in March 2008 the number of National Insurance numbers was 
76.8 million. (CIFAS, 2009)  
The following sections examine the issues surrounding the techniques involved in 
the investigation of the theft of an individual’s identity from a computer system 
over the Internet. In order to comprehend the nature of this research, there are a 
number of important terms which need to be clearly defined. These are quoted 
below. The definitions’ meanings of the words that are of importance to this thesis 
are indicated first.    
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct or 
more uncertain in its success than to take the lead in the introduction of a 
new order of things.  Niccolo Machiavelli "The Prince" 1532 1 
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Identity is defined as: 
[noun (pl. identities)] the characteristics determining who or what a 
person or thing is (The Oxford Dictionary of English) 
Theft is defined as: 
[mass noun] the action or crime of stealing: he was convicted of theft 
(The Oxford Dictionary of English) 
The growth in identity related fraud resulted in the need for the establishment of 
specific terminology in order to identify this particular type of crime. Identity 
Theft is defined by the Home Office (2009) as:  
Criminals can find out your personal details and use them to open 
bank accounts and get credit cards, loans, state benefits and 
documents such as passports and driving licenses in your name. 
A paraphrased definition could be:  
Identity theft is the use of your personal identity in the form of 
personal information by another individual for their financial gain.  
However, it may be argued that the gain is not necessarily always financial. 
Identity Theft may be aimed at satisfying some other objective; espionage, 
terrorism, revenge, illegal immigration or assuming a new identity to avoid 
criminal charges (Newman and McNally, 2005). However it is generally accepted 
that the end objective of Identity Theft is usually some form of financial gain as 
suggested by Gerard G. J. et al. (2004a), who defined it as:  
Identity theft is the criminal act of assuming the identity of another 
person with the expectation of gain. The gain is normally financial as 
a result of improperly extending credit, allowing banking transactions, 
establishing cellular telephone or other utility service, or gaining 
governmental benefits. 
The ITRC (2003) argued amongst others that Identity Theft is a high profit, low 
risk, low penalty crime.  
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The FTC (2007) describes it as: 
Identity theft occurs when someone uses your personally identifying 
information, like your name, Social Security number, or credit card 
number, without your permission, to commit fraud or other crimes. 
Therefore, based on the above and for the purpose of this thesis, ID theft can be 
defined as someone’s action of using any sort of distinct personal private 
information with fraudulent intention; mainly for financial gain.  
ID theft is part of the broader term Identity Fraud. The terms are quite often 
confused and used improperly. Sproule and Archer (2006) differentiate the terms 
and give the following definition for Identity Fraud: 
Identity fraud is the subsequent crime when a false identity is used in 
order to gain goods, services, benefits or avoid obligations. 
ID theft engages the actual theft of someone’s identity and often leads to Identity 
Fraud that deals with the actual fraudulent action. The Home Office (2009) gives 
the following definition for Identity Fraud 
…the use of that stolen identity in criminal activity to obtain goods or 
services by deception. Stealing an individual’s identity does not, on its 
own, constitute identity fraud and this is an important distinction. 
The ACPR (2004), defines Identity Fraud as 
the gaining of money, goods, services or other benefits through the use 
of a false identity.  
The above definitions include both individuals and corporations. The theft of 
corporate identity, while arguably resulting in a larger financial loss, is less 
frequent than the theft of an individual’s identity; Smiley (2004) defines it as: 
Corporate identity fraud is the wrongful taking of the identity of a 
corporation. 
Moreover, any type of crime that deals with forged identities is referred to as 
Identity Crime. According to the Home Office (2009), Identity Crime is  
a generic term for identity theft, creating a false identity or committing 
identity fraud.  
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The above definitions aim to distinguish the fine line between ID theft and ID 
fraud. Identity Theft is the main interest and purpose of this research and it should 
not be confused with Identity Fraud. Based on the above definitions, the theft of 
someone’s private information usually leads to fraud.   
1.2 Legislation and Identity Theft 
In 1999 CIFAS recorded 9,000 Identity Fraud cases in the UK, in 2001 there were 
24,000 cases, in 2003 46,000 and in 2007 the number increased to 77,500 cases 
(CIFAS, 2009). As the number of incidents has increased, a number of countries 
have enacted legislation in relation to ID theft in an attempt to protect potential 
victims and deter the fraudsters. One current problem is that there is considerable 
variation in the legislation, so an action that is considered as legal in the U.K. 
might be illegal in China (Mintz, 2002). Another difficulty is the rapid 
transformation of technology and methods that are used from cybercriminals.    
The following paragraphs discuss the legislative measures in the UK and the US 
and the recent legislative addition of the E.U. Both the UK and the US present 
extensive research and statistical results in literature concerning ID theft. For this 
reason, data and the law from the US are chosen for comparison and discussion in 
addition to the UK, where the research takes place, and so is the main focus for 
the research.  
Personal information is protected under the Data Protection Act 1998 in the UK. 
This Act deals with the manipulation of personal information from an 
organisation.  
An Act to make new provision for the regulation of the processing of 
information relating to individuals, including the obtaining, holding, 
use or disclosure of such information. (Data Protection Act, 1998) 
Potentially, it protects personal information that could be used in an ID theft 
incident. The legislation has been adopted in a way to cover and protect victims of 
ID theft. The Fraud Act 2006 is a criminal offence in the UK since January 2007. 
The purpose of this Act as stated in its introduction is:  
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An Act to make provision for, and in connection with, criminal liability 
for fraud and obtaining services dishonestly. (Fraud Act, 2006) 
It is the first UK anti-fraud legislation and the sentences for the offences can lead 
to a maximum of ten years imprisonment. The Act is divided into three sections 
that explain how fraud is committed:  
· Fraud by false representation  
· Fraud by failing to disclose information and  
· Fraud by abuse of position.  
In addition, the Act creates offences for possession, making or supplying articles 
for use in frauds, participating in fraudulent business and obtaining services 
dishonestly. 
Furthermore, the UK introduced the Identity Cards Act 2006 that aims to limit the 
number of fraudulent identities.  
An Act to make provision for a national scheme of registration of 
individuals and for the issue of cards capable of being used for 
identifying registered individuals; to make it an offence for a person to 
be in possession or control of an identity document to which he is not 
entitled, or of apparatus, articles or materials for making false identity 
documents; to amend the Consular Fees Act 1980; to make provision 
facilitating the verification of information provided with an application 
for a passport; and for connected purposes. (Identity Cards Act, 2006) 
The offences under the Identity Cards Act include the possession of false identity 
documents, unauthorised disclosure of information, providing false information 
and tampering with the Register. This Act not only makes law the Identity Cards, 
but also refers to the use of any type of personal identification document that 
could be used fraudulently.  
However, the identity card scheme was abandoned on May 2010 for the UK and 
European Union nationals. The intention is to reduce the control of the state over 
decent, law-abiding people and hand power back to them (Identity and Passport 
Service, 2010). 
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Nonetheless, ID theft is a global problem. The majority of countries around the 
world have enacted laws in order to protect their citizens from ID theft and punish 
fraudsters at the same time.   
In the United States, it is considered a standalone crime since 1998 as defined in 
the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (1998) and belongs to federal 
crimes, where the establishment of the Offence is made as follows:  
knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a means of 
identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or 
abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of federal law, 
or that constitutes a felony under any applicable state or local law.  
In the H.R. 2622, Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, the 
American Identity Theft legislation provides the state approach of combating ID 
theft and protecting the consumers. Based on the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission’s (FTC) report for National and State Trends in Fraud and Identity 
Theft (2004), of the 635,173 complaints received, 246,570 were ID theft reports. 
The most common form of reported ID theft was credit card fraud, followed by 
phone or utilities fraud, bank and employment fraud. It is very important to note 
that only 30% of victims notified a police department. It can therefore be assumed 
that the majority of people are either reluctant to contact law enforcement 
agencies preferring not to make their ID theft incident known or they are not 
aware of the crime at all.  
The European Union adopted the Stockholm programme in 2009 that among 
others includes the criminalisation of ID theft. The legislation is planned to 
become active in 2012. The same programme will review the 1995 EU Data 
Protection Directive that handles data protection and security in Europe (European 
Commission, 2010). Because the legislation is not active yet, there is not enough 
information published about it. 
The E.U. consists of countries with different legislative backgrounds and some of 
them only recently joined the Union. This fact urges the need of creating a 
European-wide legislation for protecting the member countries. At the same time 
it shows that ID theft is a problem that needs to be covered by law also for the 
citizens of the E.U.     
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The US due to its large population and high ID theft incidents number designed an 
ID theft specific Act. It shows the importance and the severity of this type of 
crime that it needs specialised treatment and is considered as a standalone crime. 
The number of Identity Fraud victims in the US was over 11 million people in 
2009 (Javellin Strategy and Research, 2010) showing a rise from previous years. 
Even though the US attempted first to punish ID theft with a maximum 
imprisonment period of 15 years, it didn’t manage to regulate it while the number 
of incidents continued to increase.  
On the contrary, the UK aims to control the situation by initially embedding ID 
theft in legislation for data protection. This was an attempt at controlling ID theft.  
It only became a criminal offence a few years ago with the Fraud Act 2006. 
However, the intensity of the problem required legislation that concentrates on its 
control by forcing stronger measurements against it.   
It seems appropriate to find out how ID theft occurs and how the era of the 
Internet-based world has resulted in an increase. This will lead the reader to 
understand how the evidence traces that may be left behind after an ID theft 
incident should be used and the role of the computer forensics investigator.  
1.3 The extent of the problem 
Some statistical data that influence the financial value of transactions on computer 
systems are listed below in order to represent the severity of the situation: 
· An average bank robbery can be about $5000, while a computer identity 
thief can extract more than 10 times this amount daily, without leaving 
evidence and the crime is usually discovered months later. (Hammond, 
2003)  
· ID theft can take to victims up to 300 hours attempts for dealing with 
banks and credit cards. (Porter, 2004) 
· Fraud is estimated to cost the UK at least £13.9 billion a year. (Levi et al., 
2007) 
· The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) received about 215,000 complaints 
for ID theft in 2003 that is the largest consumer complaint category (42%) 
and represents 249% growth from 2001. (CyberTrust, 2005) 
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· During December 2008 there were 31,173 web sites detected that were 
infecting computers with password stealing malware. At the beginning of 
the same year, January 2008, this number was 827% lower. (APWG, 
2008) 
· In 2007 losses from plastic card fraud cost the UK £535.2 million, while 
£34.1 million was related to card identity theft. (CIFAS, 2009) 
· The Identity Fraud Steering Committee (2008) estimated that ID Fraud 
costs the UK economy £1.2 billion or £25 per adult each year.     
It is fairly difficult to prevent ID theft incidents. Saunders and Zucker (1999) 
describe it as a neoteric crime (new crime) and emphasize its magnitude. ID theft 
has a significant human component being strongly influenced by the way people 
treat personal information. When an individual discovers he/she is an ID theft 
victim, their personal details have been already used fraudulently (Dwan, 2004). It 
also seems that most fraudsters of this kind of crime are not acting individually, 
but rather organised and well equipped. Indeed ID theft is nowadays directly 
linked to drug trafficking, money laundering and terrorism. (Collins, 2003) 
The research presented in this thesis is directed towards: 
· developing a detailed  understanding of ID theft and its key characteristics; 
· distinguishing computer and Internet related crime investigations 
according to their nature; 
· the creation of a computer forensics investigation framework that focuses 
on the handling of ID theft incidents. 
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1.4 The Research Hypothesis 
ID theft increasingly has the potential to have a significant impact on people and 
requires a specific method of analysis, therefore: 
It is proposed to create an analytical framework to facilitate the 
investigation of Internet Identity Theft cases and the processing of the 
related digital evidence.  
This will enable the investigator / forensic analyst to: 
· Successfully identify evidence related to Identity Theft cases. 
· Assess the capabilities required from the perpetrator. 
· Effectively assess the ongoing threat to the victim.  
The construction of a formalized and structured approach that would assist the 
investigative practice is considered valuable, as this would enhance the 
identification and preservation of evidence. The practitioners could modify the 
examination procedure of ID theft with a focused crime specific framework.   
When an ID theft crime is discovered, the case will need supportive and structured 
guidance to be resolved promptly and mitigate further problems. The research 
outcome of this work is an analytical framework for digital investigation of online 
ID theft intending to inform and guide the practice of the computer forensics 
professional. In the existing literature such a framework has not been identified.  
1.4.1 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to develop a framework for the forensic investigation 
of ID theft incidents. In order to achieve this, the following key objectives have 
been constructed: 
1) Analyse the state of the art in order to identify and investigate the different 
types of Identity Theft. 
2) Develop a conceptual framework for analysing the process of Identity 
Theft investigation and assess the digital evidence. 
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3) Evaluate the framework based on case studies and expert opinion in order 
to assess the proposed framework’s impact on processing online Identity 
Theft cases. 
1.5 The Research Methodology 
1.5.1 Discussion on research approaches  
This section briefly describes the various research approaches that were 
considered for this project. It clarifies how to acquire the required knowledge and 
design programme of work to ensure the successful completion of the project. It is 
imperative then to refer to some areas that surround research methodology theory 
and combine them with practice.  
The preparation of a research should be based on a proposal of work method 
(Hughes and Cotterell, 2002). Wilson (1999) points out research methods as the 
observation of science. Hughes and Cotterell (2002) declare that methodologies 
and methods are rather confused and overlapped terms; however “methodology is 
the set of methods that are used on a project”. Methodology is studying methods 
and argues about philosophical theories of the research process; whereas, method 
is an exact procedure of data collection concerning these philosophical theories.  
There are two wide methodological approaches; the logical and the empirical 
positivism (see Hughes and Cotterell (2002)). Based on the methodological 
approaches, we are lead to the two main research methods, the quantitative and 
the qualitative. The following paragraphs provide briefly the characteristics of 
each one and compare them in order to decide the appropriate one for this work.  
The quantitative method is related to positivism that claims a scientific approach 
is ideal for explaining and exploring physical and human events. It is designed for 
collecting data proper for statistical analysis and is mostly linked with 
experiments and questionnaires. The qualitative method is related with the anti-
positivist that rejects the scientific approach, the hermeneutics that attempts to 
interpret and phenomenology that studies the event. The qualitative method relies 
on observation and unstructured interviews. It is actually called so in order to be 
distinguished from quantitative. (Wilson, 1999).  
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Qualitative and quantitative are different perspectives, have 
different assumptions, and look at different things. (Ratcliff, 2004) 
In many occasions the researcher needs to adopt a combination of both methods; 
the mixed method that involves aspects of collection and analysis of both types 
(Creswell and Clark, 2006). To include only quantitative and qualitative methods 
falls short for the major approaches being used today (Creswell, 2002). Several 
publications defend the mixed method research, Creswell et al. (2002), 
Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2006), Rocco et al. (2003), Spratt et al. (2004), Chatterji 
(2004), are only an indication to provide the principles that need to be followed in 
such an approach.  
Mixed research is supported by the ‘compatibility thesis’, where quantitative and 
qualitative methods are compatible and the ‘philosophy of pragmatism’, where the 
researcher is allowed to use any method that is proven useful for the research 
despite any assumptions (Johnson and Christensen, 2004).  
The nature of this research work requires data collection and analysis that belong 
in both qualitative and quantitative methods. In order to reach the desired results 
data from both approaches should be connected and those are described on the 
following section, where the research plan is introduced after the study of the 
research methods and their applications occurred. 
1.5.2 The research plan 
The research methodology that is planned for this work consists of four major 
parts and is based on the mixed methods research. Each part follows, is linked 
with and is focussed on fulfilling the proposed objectives of the project: 
1) The first part of the research raises the need to comprehend the different 
aspects of ID theft in relation to the way personal information can be stolen. 
This is achieved by using the data retrieved as key-findings of a hard disks’ 
case study – observation of facts. The author took part in a 265 hard disk drive 
case study (Jones et al., 2006). The results of this analysis provide the 
essential information concerning the types of the personal data that can be 
stolen when stored in digital systems. This raises the need for extended 
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research in the area of ID theft incidents in order to assist the work of the 
computer forensics investigator.    
2) The second part examines the state of the art in relation to current practice in 
the investigation and analysis of ID theft. The research findings justify the key 
terms and satisfy the need to comprehend the methods used to accomplish ID 
theft. The areas of concern are:   
i) The types of ID theft that exist on the real world; 
ii) The ID theft techniques that are used by the fraudsters; 
iii) The issues that are raised from detecting and investigating ID theft. 
3) The information obtained from investigating and analysing the nature of the 
attacks assists in the creation of a conceptual framework for analysing the 
process of ID theft. The procedure can acknowledge the information that can 
be stolen and the way the fraudster can achieve this.   
4) The validation of the research is achieved in two parts: 
Part A:  
Applying the conceptual framework on an experimental analysis of 
residual data from hard disk drives that will be accomplished by: 
i) The researcher will behave as the fraudster in a closed network attack 
in the laboratory (case study experiment);   
ii) The researcher will use the residual evidence and act as a forensic 
examiner, analysing the hypothetical victims’ and fraudster’s hard disk 
drives. 
Part B: 
Using law enforcement expert advice and feedback:   
i) Feedback of the application of the investigation framework on a real 
case received by the Gwent Hi-tech Crime Unit; 
ii) Open-ended interview with a Gwent Hi-tech Crime Unit detective 
(qualitative results). 
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The case study research uses a qualitative method, aiming to emphasise on the 
phenomenon in its initial stage by collecting data (Benbasat et al., 1987). The full 
page graphical representation of the research methodology followed can be found 
in Appendix A2. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The second chapter of this thesis summarises the key aspects of ID theft and the 
investigation of this type of crime. It analyses the state of the art concerning ID 
theft and describes the extent of the problem. It discusses the existing computer 
forensic investigation frameworks and outlines the need for further attention on 
the area based on existing hard disk study analysis. Moreover, the relationship 
between computer crime, digital evidence and ID theft is discussed and the 
detailed requirements for this research are set. In the third chapter, the 
differentiation of ID theft towards other computer crime incidents and the design 
of the proposed investigation framework can be found. The fourth chapter 
presents in detail the implementation of the ID theft investigation framework and 
its functionality. Chapter five describes the evaluation methods used for this work 
by applying theory in practice, while the sixth chapter demonstrates the 
experiment that took place and the results of the evaluation processes. The 
seventh and final chapter highlights some of the problems encountered during the 
lifetime of the research and outlines suggestions for further research on the 
subject.       
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This chapter reviews 
► Computer Crime and Digital Evidence; 
► ID theft and Modus Operandi; 
► issues concerning detecting, preventing and investigating ID theft; 
► existing Computer Forensics investigation frameworks. 
Overview 
This chapter examines and reviews the existing literature relating to Identity 
Theft. In particular, literature that is essential for the integration of the research to 
the real world. 
It is necessary to explore areas that are involved with the problem, as described in 
Chapter 1 and endorse the hypothesis of the research. Therefore, the following 
subject areas are going to be reviewed: 
· Computer crime: An examination of general issues that are related to 
computer crime. 
· Identity Theft: A discussion on the different types of ID theft, as these 
influence the development of the proposed framework. 
· Computer forensics: A discussion on the existing frameworks and methods 
that are used in digital investigations. 
· Digital evidence: A review of issues that influence digital investigations and 
are related to digital evidence. 
· Other issues that refer to the actual research outcome, as this will be 
presented in the following chapters.  
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, is the immediate jewel of 
their souls: Who steals my purse steals trash; ’t is something, nothing; 
’t was mine, ’t is his, and has been slave to thousands; but he that 
filches from me my good name robs me of that which not enriches him 
and makes me poor indeed. Shakespeare, Othello, act iii. Sc. 3 2 2 State of the Art  
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Parts of this chapter were presented and published in the proceedings of the 2nd 
International Conference of Global E-Security 2006 (Angelopoulou et al., 2006), 
1st Annual Workshop on Digital Forensics and Incident Analysis 2006 (Fragkos 
et al., 2006) and the International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital 
Forensics 2007 (Angelopoulou et al., 2007). 
2.1 Computer Crime, Computer Forensics and 
Digital Evidence 
The following sections provide background information concerning significant 
areas related to this research. Computer crime, computer forensics and digital 
evidence are defined and some significant affirmations from the literature are 
provided.  
2.1.1 Computer Crime  
Those types of crime where a computer or any other electronic device is involved 
in order to perform the crime or as the target of it are considered as computer 
crimes (Parliamentary Office, 2006). Stephenson (1999) on the other hand defines 
it simple as “crimes directed at a computer or a computer system”. The term 
appears in a number of alternatives or subcategories such as cybercrime, 
electronic crime (e-crime) and high-tech crime.   
Criminals are becoming increasingly adept at taking advantage of technology both 
to perform the criminal act and to avoid detection. Mohay et al. (2003) comments 
that 
…computers will probably be involved in crimes that no one has 
ever imagined. New kinds of computer-related or assisted crimes 
emerge constantly…  
Based on Mohay et al. (2003) while the use of computers and the Internet become 
even more popular, at the same time fraudsters’ take advantage and increase their 
ways of attacking systems. The computer can be used in three different ways in 
order to assist a crime. It can be used as the ‘tool’ that the fraudster uses for 
performing the crime, the ‘target’ that the fraudster manages to attack and 
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penetrate and the ‘storage area’ that he can use in order to save information 
involving the crimes. (Shinder and Titel, 2002). 
The term Computer Crime covers a number of offences: copyright theft, child 
pornography, fraud, malware, and harassment. They can be categorised in 
different ways, according to the methods used in order to prevent them. Icove et 
al. (1995) approach this categorisation by grouping them into the following 
computer crime breaches: 
· Physical security breaches 
· Personnel security breaches 
· Communications and data security breaches 
· Operations security breaches 
The perpetration of a particular crime or ‘breach’ involves a number of stages or 
actions; each one with a specific purpose. This suggests that an analytical 
investigation based procedure will enable a more straightforward, focused and 
speedier analysis as the investigator will follow a based-on-crime process. The ID 
theft investigation framework could assist on this as a specialised crime specific 
framework for ID theft.  
2.1.2 Computer Forensics 
Forensic science is used to give insight to the chain of events that occurred during 
a crime. The Oxford English dictionary defines the word forensic as 
1. relating to or denoting the application of scientific 
methods to the investigation of crime. 
2. of or relating to courts of law. 
Therefore, according to Schweitzer (2003), computer forensics is 
the science of acquiring, retrieving, preserving, and presenting 
data that has been processed electronically and stored on 
computer media.   
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Caloyannides (2001) defines it as 
the collection of techniques and tools used to find evidence in a 
computer.  
The above definitions are supplementary one to another and both useful for the 
appreciation of computer forensics. 
Computer forensics encompasses all aspects of the investigation of computer 
related crime in dealing with a number of situations from industrial espionage to 
damage assessment. Mohay et al. (2003) mention the first computer forensic 
practices back in the 1970s with mainframe computer systems. However, it was 
not until the 1980s that the need for computer forensics started to develop from 
the law enforcement side (Mohay et al., 2003). Nevertheless, it is only the last few 
years that terms like computer forensics and digital evidence along with the 
internet revolution have been made widely known to the public along with the 
expertise that is demanded in the industry (Sheetz, 2007). 
Residual data on digital media can provide evidential information for a variety of 
different crimes. There has been a body of on-going work examining the need for 
standardising the computer forensic investigation. Valuable attempts for 
formalising procedures have been published from both the law 
enforcement/industry and the academia (see section 2.5). These are discussed in a 
later section on this chapter, as they are considered part of the core of this 
research.  
2.1.3 Digital Evidence 
Digital evidence originates from evidence; the Oxford English dictionary defines 
it as 
- information or signs indicating whether a belief or proposition 
is true or valid.  
- [Law] information used to establish facts in a legal investigation 
or admissible as testimony in a law court.  
Therefore, digital evidence is any kind of digitally processed information that is 
stored in any sort of digital media. The data strengthens or negates the assumption 
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of an electronic crime in the terms of the investigation process. It can be therefore 
presented as supportive proof in a court of law. (Carrier B.D., 2006b)   
In the late 20th century Dr.Edmund Locard, director of Lyons Institute of Forensic 
Medicine, defined an important theorem for the foundation of the forensic science 
that is widely known as the Locard Exchange Principle: 
Any action of an individual, and obviously, the violent action 
constituting a crime, cannot occur without leaving a mark. What is 
admirable is the variety of these marks. Sometimes they will be 
prints, sometimes simple traces, and sometimes stains (Chisum 
W., J.,and Turvey B.E. (2006) from Locard, 1934).  
The theorem has been transformed and misinterpreted during the years aiming to 
cover the science needs (Chisum, Tervey, 2006). The simplest form that can be 
found in literature is “with contact between two items, there will be an exchange” 
(Thornton, 1997).  
Casey (2003) has noted that this theory is relevant to the digital world as a digital 
exchange between two devices results in an exchange of information. For 
example, a request to view a web page from a client may be logged on the server 
and the web page, if downloaded, may then reside temporarily on the client. As 
Palmer (2002) argues, the purpose of digital evidence is to provide consistent, 
relevant data that could be presented in a court of law or a public forum and it 
does not only fall under law enforcement. 
The digital evidence in ID theft investigations is determined by the nature of the 
crime. When digital devices are involved in ID theft incidents, there is going to be 
significant residual data following the criminal act that can be retrieved by 
applying computer forensic techniques. The digital investigation of computer 
based ID theft requires the expertise of a computer forensic investigator to ensure 
that critical evidence is presented with accuracy. The understanding of the 
importance of the delicate digital evidence for computer forensics will assist the 
design of the ID theft investigation framework. 
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2.2 Identity Theft in the Digital Environment  
Personal identity is increasingly being stored and used in a range of digital forms. 
This can leave individuals exposed to possible threats as a result. Examples 
include; phishing e-mails, web spoofing and numerous other techniques. This 
emerging and developing trend in crime can result in complex investigations that 
involve information technology, both as a medium for analysis and as evidence at 
the same time (Shinder and Cross, 2008, Kovacich and Boni, 1999). Fraudsters 
are obtaining more sophisticated technological ways and manage to conceal their 
crimes. 
Traditional ID Theft 
Techniques 
Innovative ID Theft  
Techniques 
Stolen wallets or bags  Phishing 
T
ec
hn
ic
al
 S
ki
lls
 R
eq
ui
re
d 
High 
Stolen mail  Web-Spoofing High 
Deceased people Pharming High 
Dumpster diving Social Engineering Low to high 
Burglars Malicious Software and Keyloggers Medium to very high 
Shoulder surfing  Storage Devices and Media Low to high 
Social Engineering Card Cloning Low 
 
Biometrics High 
CCTV Cameras Medium to low 
Data Retrieval Low to high 
PDA’s, Mobile Phones and 
Bluetooth 
Low to high 
 
Table 1 summarises all different methods by which ID theft can be performed. 
They are divided into two main categories: the traditional techniques, commonly 
found prior to the widespread use of IT and the innovative, computer-aided 
techniques, supported by technology. The technical skills required by the attacker 
are noted on the table as well, related with the work of Owen (2005); a detailed 
categorisation matrix can be found on Appendix C based on Owen (2005) and 
Sproule and Archer (2006). The types of threats have been combined against 
online identities and the ways to achieve illegitimate profit as they result from the 
literature. It is an attempt to identify and record any digital evidence that may be 
Table 1: Summary of the ID theft Techniques 
State of the Art 
 
 
20 
found per category. Other factors of concern for an investigation are also 
recorded, such as the required skills and capability profile of the fraudster. The 
detailed categorisation matrix (Appendix C) is a concentrated table that includes 
all necessary information per ID theft technique. It appears as a valuable tool 
considered for the design and implementation of the ID theft framework, because 
of the concentrated information it contains.  
The traditional, non-computer related techniques are briefly discussed on the 
following paragraphs although they are not the main interest and purpose of this 
research. It is reasonable to assume as in some cases non-computer and computer 
based techniques may both appear. The digital ID theft techniques are then 
examined. 
2.2.1 Traditional ID Theft  
ID theft can be perpetrated in a number of ways. Discarded documents containing 
personal details can provide a rich source of personal identity information with 
dumpster diving (Wall, 2007). Another popular traditional way of obtaining 
personal identity information is the shoulder surfing, spying someone while 
entering a PIN number or password (Peltier, 2006). Simple forms of deception can 
also be used to extract the information from the victim; an example would be an 
attacker poses as a legitimate government official or business person collecting 
personal data door to door (FTC, 2003). Other methods include the so called brute 
force techniques such as the stealing of wallets and purses containing 
identification and credit and bank cards or the removal of personal documents 
during a burglary. In particular stolen mail, where the fraudster may have access 
to bank and credit card statements, pre-approved credit offers, checks and tax 
information, can be used to gather information for an ID theft (Biegelman, 2009).  
This may be followed up by social engineering. The fraudster contacts the person 
who has lost his card claiming that they found it, asks for personal details and then 
uses this information fraudulently (Dwan, 2004). He may apply for and get a new 
credit card using someone else’s personal details and never react on a demand for 
payment, resulting in an offence against the legitimate owner. The fraudster may 
comprise a phone service or a bank account; replicate checks or even acquire 
properties in the same way. Other cases may include the bankruptcy of the victim 
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or criminal records by giving stolen personal details in case of an arrest (FTC, 
2003).  
There are also a number of cases which appear in literature, where a deceased 
person’s identity is used to purchase a property, apply for a loan or a credit card or 
to obtain other financial services. According to CIFAS (2007), the UK’s fraud 
prevention service around 70,000 families; have found out that their deceased 
family member has been a victim of impersonation.  
The ITRC (Foley, 2003) reports that the information about the deceased person 
can be obtained from a number of sources: obituaries, death certificates or the 
Death Index that in the UK is available from the General Records Office. In 
addition, the financial institutions are not notified instantly after someone’s death 
that leaves the fraudsters with plenty of time for action. The redirection of the 
dead person’s mail to another address, a birth certificate request or even a national 
insurance number could help the ID thief not only commit financial fraud, but also 
build a new identity using another’s identity. These cases usually involve people 
that are about the same age as the deceased or in some cases from the same 
family. HALO is the deceased fraud prevention system in UK; its extensive 
database contains 7m records of deceased people and gets updated monthly in 
order to provide early notification of a possible identity fraud for those businesses 
that subscribe to the service (HALO, 2010). 
2.2.2 Innovative ID Theft  
This section analyses the different ID theft techniques and methods of 
perpetration that are based on technology. An understanding of each of these 
techniques and how they are applied by ID thieves in order to achieve their goal is 
essential in understanding how the digital investigation should proceed. The 
section is divided into two subsections, the online and the offline techniques of 
innovative ID theft.  
Both online and offline techniques involve digital media and devices. Therefore, 
they can retain digital residual data that can be used as evidence when retrieved 
with computer forensic methods. As mentioned in chapter 1 (see section 1.4), the 
purpose of this research is the digital investigation of online ID theft. For this 
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reason the online techniques are discussed in more detail than the offline. Some 
additional information on the technical aspects of the online techniques has been 
added on Appendix D based on the background research undertaken.     
2.2.2.1 Online ID Theft Techniques 
The online ID theft techniques are applied over the use of the Internet. The 
fraudsters have developed technologically sophisticated ways in order to attack 
their target. Online ID theft leaves evidence behind onto the victim’s side and 
potentially on the fraudster’s system; the individual who has developed and 
applied the technique. The understanding of how each different technique works 
will assist to its detection and investigation. The online techniques are discussed 
individually in the following paragraphs. 
Phishing 
As stated in Kruck and Kruck (2006) the etymological root of the word 
phreaking1 has been used in order to transform the word fishing to phishing 
(APWG, 2003). The hacking magazine alt.2600 first introduced the term on 
January 1996. (Hinde, 2004a) 
Phishing is a method that is used to gain users’ personal identity information in 
order to achieve ID theft with the use of deceitful e-mail messages that are 
supposed to be sent from trustworthy businesses. It was rated as among top ten 
frauds in 2004 (Forman, 2004) and has been highlighted in the front page of The 
Times (2005). Phishing attacks involve the mass distribution of spoofed e-mail 
messages in which the reply addresses, links, and branding appear to come from 
banks, insurance agencies, retailers or credit card companies. It existed in the 
early internet period as carding or brand spoofing (James and Stewart, 2005). 
Initially, it was classed as social engineering, by malicious crackers that achieved 
it over the phone. As fraudsters become more sophisticated, it was transformed to 
spam e-mail messages and forged web pages. (Russell, 2004) 
                                               
1 Phreaking refers to the unauthorized use of the public phone systems for making free 
calls.(Shinder and Titel, 2002)   
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The messages appear authentic by using all corporate logos and formats similar to 
those that are used by the official companies. The threat lies in the request of 
personal identity information, for instance account numbers, passwords and other 
private information, supposedly for auditing, security or confirmation purposes.  
One example would be a case in the UK dealt with by the National Hi-tech Crime 
Unit. In April 2004, an unemployed 21 year old British man from Lytham St 
Anne's was arrested for a Phishing attack against the Co-operative bank and 
targeting the Smile Internet Bank. (Anon, 2004) 
Phishing attempts can make use of a combination of techniques (see Appendix D 
– The method of Phishing) in order to trick the user into revealing private 
information. This usually can include the following combination: spoofed e-mails 
that use social engineering to convince users to be redirected to spoofed web 
pages on private or anonymous web servers (Berghel, 2006). In addition, zombie 
machines are used (Jakobsson and Myers, 2007), the result of bot infected 
computers. They can control a system through a communication channel 
(Symantec, 2007). Phishing, malware and spyware can involve bot infections and 
lead to ID theft. 
More information about phishing and an analysis on a phishing e-mail can be 
found on Appendix D.  
Web-spoofing 
Spoofing attack is considered any attack that leads the victim in a correct decision 
for an imaginary environment, with misleading effects for the real environment 
(Felten et. al, 1997). An FBI Press Release (2003) mentioned among others that 
spoofing was then considered as: 
The hottest and most troubling, new scam on the Internet … 
contributing to a rise in Identity Theft, credit card fraud, and other 
Internet frauds.  
Web Spoofing is the method by which the users believe that they are on the 
original website, while they visit a counterfeit one and is the alternative to 
phishing. “Web Spoofing is pretending to be somebody else’s web site” (Johnson, 
1998). It requires high-skilled fraudsters, in order to redirect the user to the 
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deceiver’s web site. When any personal identity information is entered, it is going 
to be stored and used for malicious reasons. 
Web pages can be duplicated by skilled web designers or reuse of the original 
code they are exact copies of the original with all the content correctly linked to 
the original web page. The main difference is that there are minor changes that 
allow for user information to be stored on the fraudster’s servers. The ID thief 
impersonates a respectable corporate identity and aims to replicate the company’s 
website, where the potential victims’ information is stored. Therefore, any credit 
card numbers, bank accounts, and other personal and private information entered 
by the user are managed by the ID thief.        
There are some cases where a fraudster will copy a complete website and bring up 
the website clone on to a website with a similar name e.g. 
www.goglobaltech.com, may become www.goglobaltechs.com (note the 
additional ‘s’). 
More information about web spoofing can be found on Appendix D. 
Pharming 
Pharming is the rather recent similar to phishing, but more complicated and 
technically demanding (Brody et al., 2007). It intercepts a client-server 
communication and redirects the user to the fraudulent destination. The user 
doesn’t have to click on any e-mail link, as she/he has been already redirected to a 
malicious web page that appears as legitimate. This is achieved by DNS hijacking 
and cache poisoning. The fraudsters exploit a vulnerability of a DNS server, 
modify the domain name server of a legitimate web site and redirect to the 
fraudulent. (Ollmann, 2005)  
Man-in-the-middle attacks are involved with pharming as with phishing and web-
spoofing (see Appendix D). However, DNS cache poisoning is a rather advanced 
method used by the fraudsters and it does not only serve the pharming attacks, e-
mail or SSL session hijacking. It also redirects the user to a different IP address 
that can cause Denial-of-service (DOS) attacks or plant malware/ spyware on the 
computer and block antivirus updates (Yuan et al., 2006).  
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Hallam-Baker (2005), explains DNS spoofing attacks. Stamm et al. (2006), 
provide an example that concerns pharming involving home routers and a browser 
that runs Javascript and Java applets. The popular secure e-mail provider 
Hushmail has been a pharming victim. On April 2005, the Hushmail users were 
redirected to a spoofed web site, as the company’s DNS records had been altered 
(Leyden, 2005). 
Malicious software and Key Loggers 
According to Skoudis and Zeltzer (2003), malicious software or malware is  
...a set of instructions that run on your computer and make your 
system do something that an attacker wants it to do.  
It includes computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses, spyware and adware.  
Various types of malware are developed on a daily basis, including malware 
developed for information gathering. A Trojan horse is one example of code used 
to penetrate a system, possibly with the objective of obtaining passwords and 
personal details. Trojan software can keep a log from keystrokes or take a 
screenshot when a customer is visiting a financial web site and e-mail the 
information to the fraudster (Unknown, 2005). The Trojan PWSteal.Bancos 
(Symantec, 2005) disguises itself in different formats and if the user runs it, it acts 
as a key logger, sends back bank information and displays bogus bank web pages. 
Panda Security (2009b) reveals that on an average of 37,000 security threats they 
receive daily, 71% of them are Trojans mainly created for ID theft. 
Spyware, another form of malicious software, is designed for exploiting infected 
computers basically for marketing purposes. Therefore, the activity of the web 
browser is monitored resulting to routing of HTTP requests to the web sites that 
are advertised through the spyware. Pop-up advertisements are delivered and theft 
of personal identity information is achieved, including obtaining financial 
information from users. There are cases that spyware was used by ID theft rings in 
order to retrieve and store user information remotely. The information Sunbelt 
Software, an antispyware firm, revealed after research on a spyware that is part of 
the CoolWebSearch (CWS) browser hijacking tools would concern any online 
user. There was remotely personal saved information that was retrieved, including 
State of the Art 
 
 
26 
chat sessions, user names, passwords and bank information (Vijayan, 2005). A 
recent report from Panda Security (2009a) mentions twelve important malware 
types that can capture personal data.   
Keyloggers can be used to capture data entered by the user. They can be hardware 
or software. The hardware version is usually installed as an extension between the 
keyboard and the port. An executable file needs to be installed on the system for 
the software key loggers and can be kept perfectly hidden from the potential 
victim.  
They can be installed as part of another program, or manually by an installer with 
a user interface. They can track keystrokes on specific programs or the entire 
activity on a system. Keyloggers are considered as a threat that cannot be easily 
prevented for personal identity information (Chahrvin, 2007). They belong on the 
malicious software category and can be part of a Trojan horse, which may be used 
as well for collecting information on a phishing attack. Subramanyam et al. (2003) 
have tested and reviewed a number of different keyloggers and concluded to how 
simple it is to buy or even write them. In 2007 there were six known key-loggers 
that are able to capture banking details (Bonner, 2007). Heron (2007) mentions 
that there was a 1300% increase on the use of keyloggers between 2002 and 2005 
and analyses the different types of hardware and software keyloggers and how 
they function. 
Data Retrieval 
Personal information is nowadays stored extensively on computers from 
authorities’ records to home computers. Furthermore, when extended to the online 
world personal information is stored from online registration forms to online 
communities and databases.  
People tend to share personal identity information on the Internet, e.g. social 
networking or recruiting web sites. They are inclined to widely disclose personal 
identity information on social networking web sites such as Facebook, MySpace, 
Hi5 and LinkedIn that as a result leaves them vulnerable to fraudsters. The 
procedure of retrieving information of a potential victim is straightforward when 
there is access to his online profile. However, Bilge et al. (2009) describe more 
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sophisticated ways that an ID thief could gain access to social network profiles 
with profile cloning and cross-site profile cloning.  
A number of different databases store great amounts of personal information; 
from utilities providers to electoral register entries and from insurance policies to 
previous addresses (Newman and McNally, 2005). The databases are portable and 
extensively employed online. A persistent ID thief could recover the past and 
present of an individual by exploring hacking techniques. Though, a more 
frequent case for ID thieves to steal personal identity information is to hack into 
corporate databases and obtain clients’ personal identity and financial 
information.  
One of the latest examples is the case of an American, Albert Gonzalez, who 
employed servers around the globe and with SQL injection attacks1 managed to 
steal 130 million credit and debit cards from multiple corporations (Gross et al., 
2009). Apparently he committed the largest ID theft that ever occurred in the U.S. 
(Kerber and Herbst-Bayliss, 2009). Another example involves the California State 
University at Chico found out that a computer including names, addresses and 
Social Security numbers had been compromised by hackers and had to alert 
59,000 students, faculty, and staff (Greene, 2005). Furthermore, the recruiting 
company’s Monster database was recently penetrated and ID thieves managed to 
retrieve names, phone numbers and e-mail addresses (Cohn, 2009). 
Online Social Engineering  
Social Engineering is the manipulation of individuals for retrieving sensitive 
information and the intention is usually fraudulent. Some old-fashioned methods 
that are linked with ID theft are traditionally used, such as dumpster diving, 
shoulder surfing and direct theft (Lively, 2004).  
Computers are usually a secondary tool for the social engineer, as communication 
skills appear more useful. However, the combination of technology, the internet 
and persuading expertise appear advantageous for the fraudster. The naivety of the 
                                               
1 SQL injection exploits security vulnerabilities on databases.  
State of the Art 
 
 
28 
end users concerning security issues in the online environment is the advantage of 
the social engineers that aim to mislead their victim (Marshall and Tompsett, 
2005). Online social engineering is any type that involves the internet and the 
misleading of the user. It is used in a variety of forms, such as phishing and 
malware (as discussed above); spear phishing and Nigerian scam (see Appendix 
D). A phishing e-mail for instance is an effort to convince an end-user to follow a 
provided link and supply financial details.  
Social engineering is a psychological method of attack and an acting charisma can 
be an asset for the social engineer, even when performing online. The aim is to 
convince the potential victim willing to disclose any information the attacker 
needs to retrieve. Attacks can be conducted either by influencing the victim 
psychologically to provide the requested data or by having physical access. ID 
thieves occasionally may act as network administrators and request passwords 
online or even sent malicious e-mail attachments pretending to come from a 
legitimate sender (Granger, 2001).  
More information for the types of social engineering can be found on Appendix 
D.  
The current online ID theft techniques were discussed in the previous paragraphs 
as a result of the Internet misuse. The fraudsters have discovered multiple ways 
for stealing their victim’s identity online; phishing, web spoofing, pharming, 
malicious software, keyloggers, data retrieval and online social engineering. The 
importance of studying these techniques in relation to this research is the 
understanding offered of how they can be achieved. This will assist the design and 
development of the ID theft framework, where the online techniques play a 
fundamental role.    
2.2.2.3 Offline ID Theft Techniques 
The methods that are mentioned in the following sections are not penetrated 
online. However, they are computer-aided and have been developed and advanced 
due to the extensive use of information technology.  
These techniques of achieving ID theft usually reside at the fraudster’s premises 
or the fraudster should have physical contact with the piece of equipment. They 
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are mostly devices that when the appropriate methods are applied, they will allow 
the ID thief to achieve his intention.  
Storage Devices and Media 
As the demand for storage devices grows, so will the theft of personal data from 
such devices. Storage devices and media include the following items: hard disks, 
USB flash drives, floppy disks and CDs and they are widely used on a daily basis. 
They can act as a fraud and theft tool as they can hold user sensitive information; 
this information can be extracted from either stolen or sold storage devices / 
media, where files, personal identity information, e-mail messages, logs, Internet 
activity, etc. are stored.  
A study conducted at the University of Glamorgan (Jones et al, 2006) showed that 
out of 105 hard drives, 57% of them contained sensitive personal identity 
information. Poor end-of-life disposal practices and the lack of encryption make 
data easy to retrieve. This threat increases as more and more commonly used 
devices, like media players, are capable of storing large amounts of data in them, 
with very short transfer times. McKinley (2004) provides as an example an 
industrial spy that uses a USB flash drive to store a rival’s information on.  
A variety of storage devices and media have been involved in scandals concerning 
lost data, such as hard disks, laptops, compact disks and flash drives. There is 
much recent discussion in the news regarding the loss of personal and private data 
of the British government and the threat of the data being sold to ID thieves 
(Oates (2007), Stratton (2008)). A hard disk that was sold on eBay containing one 
million customers’ bank details is another remarkable incident (Newling, 2008).    
Card Cloning 
Card Cloning can be broken down into two parts: the credit card information 
retrieval process and the credit card cloning process. The retrieval of credit card 
information does not require a technically skilled person; the credit card cloning 
process is carried out by a person with basic technical skills in order to manipulate 
a card replication machine and reproduce credit cards. This is due to the fact that 
credit cards still use re-writable magnetic stripes, even though they have been 
replaced with Chip & PIN technology over the last few years. Card cloning is a 
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very important part of ID thieves’ work. PINs and passwords can be retrieved 
with the use of cameras or card readers on tampered bank cash point machines. 
This is a growing threat, as more and more often tampered cash point machines 
are discovered. Another worrying fact is the illegal use of swipe handheld devices 
by store employees in order to gain customers’ personal identity information. 
(Gerard et al., 2004b)  
Biometric 
Biometric identification has been proposed as a counter measure for ID theft. It is 
a method that aims to replace vulnerable passwords; however fraudsters have 
discovered numerous ways to breach a biometric system. It is possible to deceive 
biometric technology by tampering with machines that read biometric data or 
altering the records that are contained within them. Residual fingerprints left 
behind on scanners can be re-used by breathing on the glass, cooling down the 
sensors to give false information, using graphite powder to dust the fingerprint 
and then copy it to a “jelly finger”. Facial recognition can also be duped in some 
cases by playing someone’s video at the reader and gaining access to a system. 
(Hamadi, 2004) 
It is often that someone has physical access to such devices and since these 
devices transform physical information into digitized information, special loggers 
can store the information being sent from the device to the authentication 
machine. This information can then be replayed and the un-authorised person can 
gain access. Biometrics can be dangerous if they allow an ID thief to acquire 
information about a person’s physical features (e.g. finger), which can permit 
him/her to create a replica and use at will.  
Surveillance systems 
CCTV and RFID cameras (Engberg et al., 2004) monitor the behaviour of people; 
therefore they could follow the steps of a specific person. An individual may be 
unaware that a camera is recording him. The motive is often a PIN number 
collection and this method is widely used from fraudsters on cash machines 
(Masters and Turner, 2007).  
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A potential fraudster may take advantage of a system vulnerability to gain access 
on surveillance systems, which are now used in various locations from 
commercial stores to public streets. As Engberg et al. (2004) mention this could 
give the ID thief the privilege to monitor the behaviour of a potential victim and 
copy his daily life and habits.  
In addition, the wide spread of free open access wireless networks and the 
increase of IP enabled camera equipment, is an easy and inexpensive method to 
install a wireless camera. When connected to the Internet it can be remotely 
accessed and controlled (Fischer and Green, 2004).  
PDA’s, Mobile Phones and Bluetooth 
Fraudsters have discovered a number of deceptive techniques in order to take 
advantage of the wide use of PDAs and mobile phones. Both devices can provide 
a variety of personal identity information when stolen, such as contact numbers, 
pictures and personal files. However, some knowledge on technology is required 
when forensic data extraction is needed.  
Access on a Bluetooth device is related to ID theft as the fraudster gains complete 
access of the device and personal data can be stolen. A number of exploits have 
been identified, such as Bluesnarfing that is able to retrieve the calendar, the 
address book, contacts and multimedia files from a mobile phone. An old 
technique (Ward M., 2003) used a flaw in the Bluetooth implementation in certain 
phones, in order to acquire the address book. Since the majority of mobile devices 
(e.g., mobile phones, PDAs, PCs, etc) have Bluetooth capabilities and users tend 
to leave them operational, they can disclose personal data. 
The offline ID theft techniques on this section; storage devices and media, card 
cloning, biometric, surveillance systems, PDA’s mobile phones and Bluetooth, 
describe briefly the computer-aided, but not Internet based techniques that ID 
theft can be achieved. A fraudster can take advantage of any of these techniques 
and leave digital evidence behind. Their study was essential, as with the online 
techniques, in order to be able to identify and later examine how they can be 
achieved. The ID theft framework needs to incorporate them as additional to the 
online techniques.  
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2.2.3 Internet Fraud, Identity Theft and its Forms 
Internet fraud refers to any deceptive method that takes advantage of online 
services and includes e-mail spam, spoofed web pages, ID theft and web banking. 
Research in the first half of 2010 (UK Statistics Authority, 2010) has shown that 
73 per cent of homes in the UK have internet access. This is an increase of 5 
million households since 2006, A comparison with previous years shows that the 
percentage was 57 per cent of households in 2006,  49 per cent in 2004 and just 13 
per cent of homes in 1999 (UK Statistics Authority, 2006).  
31 million people used the Internet for purchases in 2010 equivalent to 62 per cent 
of all adults. 87 per cent of Internet users confessed their concern about online 
fraud (UK Statistics Authority, 2010).  
As the number of Internet users worldwide continues to grow, so 
too will the accounts of cyber-related criminal activity. (Schweitzer, 
2002) 
The wide use of broadband connections promotes the user being online all day, a 
longer duration of exposure to malware or other possible attacks.  
Pfleeger (2000) suggests four potential motives for the computer fraudster: power, 
fame, money and ideology. May (2004) indicates three motives: financial gain, 
revenge, fresh start. Nevertheless, almost everything in today’s world involves the 
power of money. It is undoubtedly that the financial motive is the strongest and is 
directly linked with the purpose of offences related to ID theft. As Biegelman 
(2009) effectively mentions:  
…all of these motives point to a need or desire for money.  
In the literature there are multiple ways of distinguishing the motive of ID theft 
crimes, based on the viewpoint of the author. However, there is limited discussion 
on the subject. The research on ID theft is based mainly on the threat itself and the 
methods the fraudsters can gain access to confidential data (see Marshall and 
Tompsett (2005), Granova and Eloff (2004), Long (2005)). Several sources 
examine ID theft, based on the intended target; the individual or the corporate (see 
Copes and Vieraitis (2007), Sproule and Archer (2006), Wilding and Parker 
(2002), BusinessLink (2008)). As individual ID theft is related with those 
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incidents that involve any personal data retrieved in order to obtain profit in 
someone else’s name. On the other hand, corporate ID theft concerns stealing a 
corporate identity that may be achieved by fraudulently abusing the company’s 
information and submitting forms such as the change of the business’s registered 
address. In addition, there could be also a combination of the above in which case 
the fraudster uses the identity of a person that works for a corporation and applies 
for a corporate account (credit or debit cards).   
However, it is imperative to examine some interesting classifications of ID theft 
types that appear in literature based on the foundation of the crime. The 
understanding of how ID theft can be classified will lead to a proposed 
classification that can later be inherited in the ID theft investigation framework. 
Finch (2003) categorises ID theft in total and partial. Total concerns cases that the 
ID thief takes up permanently someone else’s identity in order to begin a new life 
in his name. On the contrary, partial occurs when the fraudster uses the personal 
details of another person temporarily.    
The American Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (APRC) (2006), categorises ID theft 
in two forms, the Account takeover and the Application fraud. In such a 
classification, the account takeover takes place when the fraudster uses the 
existing private information of the victim in order to acquire goods and services, 
while the application fraud concerns the cases where the fraudster uses the 
personal details of the victim in order to apply for financial services in that name. 
This type of ID theft takes longer for the victim to discover it, as they do not 
receive any statements concerning those transactions.  
Tipton and Krause (2004) identify the threats as inside and outside, where an 
inside attack concerns those incidents where the fraudster has a wide knowledge 
of the target. It is usually related to corporations, when a member of the staff that 
knows exactly the organisation’s vulnerabilities decides to take advantage of his 
knowledge for his own profit. The identical situation exists on ID theft as well, 
considering these attacks that come from inside; cases when the victim and the 
fraudster are related, giving him the advantage of treating the information 
respectively, either concerning an individual or a corporation. According to 
Denning (1999) the greatest risk to information security are the internal users who  
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unintentionally reveal secrets to contractors, partners, customers, 
visitors, or outsiders requesting information.  
Many computer security sources state that the majority of network administrators 
fear the ‘threat from within’ as more often the internal users of a company may 
imply a greater security risk than the external threats. Unsuspected employees 
may give a company’s private information rather straightforwardly to smart 
fraudsters. Then, these imposters are going to find the appropriate way to target 
the business and extract the information they need. In addition, research has 
proved that 70% of the total ID thefts start with an employee who steals personal 
data from the company he works for (Hinde, 2004d). 
On the other side, the outside attacks deal with those cases that the attacker selects 
a target and tries to identify the Achilles heel of the system and gain access. The 
cases that the victim is chosen at random are usually those where he happened to 
have exposed his personal identity information on the wrong place, the wrong 
moment, either because he didn’t have the awareness to protect himself, or wasn’t 
cautious enough.  
Particularly interesting is the study of the ITRC (2007), where ID theft is 
classified in four forms: financial, criminal, identity cloning and business or 
commercial.  
1. Financial ID Theft: This type of case typically focuses on your 
name and Social Security number (SSN). This person may apply 
for telephone service, credit cards or loans, buy merchandise, 
lease cars or apartments.  
2. Criminal ID Theft: The imposer in this crime provides the 
victim's information instead of his or her own when stopped by 
law enforcement. Eventually when the warrant for arrest is issued 
it is in the name of the person issued the citation- yours.  
3. Identity Cloning: In this crime the imposer uses the victim's 
information to establish a new life. They work and live as you. 
Examples: Illegal aliens, criminals avoiding warrants, people 
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hiding from abusive situations or becoming a "new person" to 
leave behind a poor work and financial history.  
4. Business or Commercial Identity Theft: Businesses are also 
victims of identity theft. Typically the perpetrator gets credit cards 
or checking accounts in the name of the business. The business 
finds out when unhappy suppliers send collection notices or their 
business rating score is affected. (ITRC, 2007) 
However, it is interesting to mention that the ‘Identity Theft: The Aftermath 2003’ 
report was only distinguishing ID theft in three categories: financial, criminal and 
identity cloning (ITRC, 2003). The commercial appears faintly for the first time in 
the Aftermath 2004 with minimal discussion on this type. This indicates that 
corporate identity fraud is becoming an area for increasing concern (Murray 
(2006), This is Money (2006), Wilding and Parker (2002)). The Aftermath 2003 
study takes as examples real victims and drawing upon these cases those three 
forms are defined. Ultimate purposes for ID theft could be either financial and 
other resource and privilege gains or protection of one’s real identity and 
masquerading behind another, mostly legitimate entity. ID thieves can also take 
advantage of an organisation’s good name in order to attract individuals and hence 
then there is a case of a double ID theft, the corporation’s and the consumer’s 
(Dwan, 2004). 
The ITRC appears as the most systematic classification among the examined. 
However, it seems like criminal and identity cloning forms are quite similar, while 
business or commercial embed both. Therefore, based on the background research 
so far, ID theft cases can be distinguished in two main types: financial, where the 
fraudster has financial potential and identity, where the fraudster steals an 
identity.  
By parting evidence in two categories, the collection can be easier and more 
structured, as the main prospect for ID theft is mostly financial. However there are 
numerous cases that the fraudster aims to create a new picture of him/her on 
someone else’s name in order to create a new life. This raises the need to 
distinguish the evidence search in two categories, while both include potential 
criminal and fraudulent activity.  
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This extent to which the different types of ID theft are going to influence the 
investigation process needs to be determined. In such an approach, whenever the 
investigator has to deal with financial ID theft cases, he can first focus on credit 
history, transactions made on the victim’s name, applications for bank account 
opening, loans and credit cards, and the way they were done, phone companies 
that the offender had accounts, tax records and bankruptcy records. Based on the 
ITRC (2007) report, these accounts and records are involved with financial ID 
theft and could provide information. 
On the other hand, concerning identity ID theft cases the investigator will need to 
take under consideration financial evidence, as well as national insurance 
numbers, driving licence records, employment records, passport records, business 
records, property records and criminal records. These records could provide 
evidential information of an identity ID theft. Table 2 represents the classification 
of ID theft as it appears in literature. 
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1 Total Account 
Takeover 
Inside Financial Financial 
2 Partial Application 
Fraud 
Outside Criminal Identity 
3    Identity Cloning  
4    Business-
commercial 
 
Table 2: ID Theft classification as appears in literature 
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2.3 Identity Theft Response   
Financial organisations obviously have an interest in reducing the risk of ID theft 
on their customers’ accounts. In the majority of cases the end users discover that 
they are ID theft victims only after their personal details have already been used 
fraudulently (Dwan, 2004). On the other side, most fraudsters of this kind of 
crime are not alone, but rather organised and well equipped. As Collins (2006) 
mentions, technology drives crime and even though IT security is important it still 
cannot solve ID theft.  
This section aims to provide the recommendations that can be found in the 
literature concerning the prevention and detection of ID theft, as well as issues 
that arise in the detection and investigation. The purpose of these paragraphs is to 
present the current situation and later contemplate the effect of this study in the 
design of the framework, intending to facilitate computer forensics. There are 
multiple sources that recommend protection measures to the individuals; however 
the situation seems that these are not taken into further consideration. Then, the 
complexity of the ID theft investigations is discussed.  
2.3.1 Recommendations for Prevention and Detection 
There may be some time between the perpetration of the ID theft and the victim 
realising that his personal data has been stolen. Even though, ID theft is a familiar 
term to the majority of people in technologically advanced countries, users may 
not be sure whether they have been victims or not. According to FTC (2003) the 
majority of people discovered they were victims by monitoring their accounts. 
The fact is only fifty per cent of the victims finally find out how thieves retrieved 
their personal data (DeMarrais, 2003). Both individuals and organisations need to 
be proactive, protect their personal assets and prevent them from being stolen and 
used for malicious reasons. Only in such a way could the risk be minimised. 
The FTC (2003) recommends protection methods for consumers and 
organisations, such as ordering a copy of their credit report, creating passwords 
for their accounts, storing important documents in secure places, and getting 
informed about who has access and at what level, and about their personal identity 
information at work. While several laws are trying to limit consumers' liability 
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from ID theft, $48 billion loss came from businesses and financial institutions 
comparing to $5 billion loss of the consumers (DeMarrais, 2003). The situation 
shows that ID thieves have studied the ‘psychology of advertising’ as they know 
how to use the consumers’ trust. It may be assumed that ID thieves with the 
purpose of taking advantage of an organisation’s good name in order to attract 
individuals are performing a double ID theft, the corporations’ and the consumers’ 
(Dwan, 2004).  
Another prevention objective is to limit misinformation. Potential victims should 
be educated and aware of the situation. Albrechtsen (2006) performed a study 
concerning the users’ viewpoint of information security. This study revealed the 
majority of the interviewees were aware about their responsibility in security. 
However, they were unfamiliar and even confused with the actual activities they 
should carry out to protect their online activity. In addition, they believe that 
documentation, guidelines and media campaigns are of no influence on them and 
they need a user-involving approach.    
Furnell (2005) reveals a U.S. survey, where 67% of the correspondents appear to 
have either no antivirus installed on their system or an out of date one installed. In 
the same survey 72% of the users did not have a properly configured firewall. 
Symantec (2007) discloses that 95% of targeted attacks are directed to home 
users. A UK survey by BitDefender shows that less than 50% of the users have 
updated antivirus software. However, on the same survey over 80% of the 
respondents were worried about online ID theft (MJO Associates, 2008).   
The results of the surveys draw a picture of users that are highly exposed to online 
threats. Despite the fact that numerous efforts are made to inform the end users 
about online threats and computer security, they appear ineffective. Immediate 
precautions should be taken and educating the end users appears urgent, because a 
computer system without antivirus and/or firewall is open to ID thieves.  Small 
from Computer Associates (CA, Inc.), says about ID theft that the weakest point is 
people (Dwan, 2004). 
The lack of the user awareness in relation with industrial security flaws, position 
the end-users in a vulnerable situation about protecting themselves (TACD, 2007). 
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Clements et al. (2006) support with a survey the importance of education of end 
users for preventing ID theft.  
A recent research report from Lloyds TSB shows that 76% of citizens of the UK 
are worried about ID theft, while two in three are not aware of how to protect 
themselves. The financial organisation aimed to contribute by launching an 
advisory awareness service (Lloyds TSB, 2009). Organisations need to become 
even more active in how they will manage to assist the awareness of the users, 
while at the same time detect and prevent ID theft. When ID theft cannot be 
totally prevented, because of the human factor, then there should be an effort on 
detecting it immediately in order to minimise any possible loss.  
The detection controls in a corporate environment comprise authorisation, internal 
auditing and whistleblower hotlines that alert the employees of the company about 
committed fraud. There may also be automated detection systems that process 
large volume of transaction data based on a specific pattern. In the event of 
something suspicious arising, then this can be investigated further. However, 
fraud from the inside company couldn’t be detected with such a method (Porter, 
2004).  
It is vital for an organisation to be familiar with the background of an employee 
that is going to be hired, especially in case he/she is going to manipulate sensitive 
data. The verification of an employee’s references from previous employment 
should be carefully examined. Gerard et al. (2004a) give a very detailed 
description of internal controls and information security. A review of these 
controls can be found in Appendix D.  
However, it is important to treat information both personal and corporate with 
confidentiality in order to eliminate ID theft incidents. Because of the human 
factor, prevention can easily fail though; in such cases detection and investigation 
need to take action.  
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2.3.2 Issues on Detecting and Investigating ID Theft 
Cases 
When a security breach takes place, it has to be considered that there should be a 
law violation in order to consider it as a crime, therefore evidence to prove this is 
essential. Evidence can be defined as any proof that can support the actual process 
of the incident. 
The investigator of an ID theft incident has first of all to deal with and understand 
the motivation of the fraudster. A thief who targets unsecure systems is a 
relatively different case than someone who decides to attack an organisation in 
order to steal specific information. The impulse of the attacker can prove his 
knowledge, skills and intention (Casey, 2003). Fraudsters are cautious not to leave 
traces behind, mislead the investigator with anti-forensic techniques (Harris 
(2006), Smith (2006), Forte and Power (2007)) and remain undetected for a long 
period of time.  
The ID theft fraudster does not always need to have advanced technical 
knowledge. Persuading and deceptive skills are always an advantage, as for social 
engineering. For instance, a shoulder surfer needs to be quick and observant, 
while someone who performs phishing or pharming attacks needs to know how to 
clone a URL, programming and web designing in order to design a professional 
web-site and write malicious code.  
As mentioned earlier (see section 2.2.2.1), phishing emails can be often difficult 
to identify, although simple spelling mistakes usually give them away. A user can 
identify the unusual email if the email only contains a large image instead of text, 
which is linked to the spoofed web page. In some cases e-mails contain virus or 
have Trojan infected files attached.  
Spoofed web pages can be identified from spelling mistakes and omissions. For 
example, when a login web page is spoofed and the original has been updated. 
The spoofed pages are not maintained and consequently the changes are not 
conducted on the spoofed webpage. 
It is also important to understand how the fraudsters choose a target. Financial 
profit is their main objective. When targeting individuals the profit may be less 
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and when the target is corporate a large turnover may come at once. However, if 
someone targets and steals a large amount of money from a company or its 
clients, the loss will be easier to identify and more intensively investigated. For 
the individual on the other hand it can also take a longer period of time to find out 
that he/she is an ID theft victim. Meanwhile, the fraudster is free to hit other 
targets. 
In ID theft, a person takes control of and abuses someone else’s personal and 
private authentication information; it belongs to criminal offences. There are 
people who unfortunately act unethically and against laws in order to gain 
financial profit. The aim of controlling a type of e-crime with the extent of ID 
theft requires both ethical and legal issues to be taken under consideration. In the 
past it used to be loss of goods and properties, but now it has also come to loss of 
personal private data. (Pfleeger, 2000).  
In addition, individuals often do not often adopt any measures to protect 
themselves. They can provide personal identity information to anyone asked, 
carry their credit and debit cards in their wallets that might get stolen, they have 
their PINs and passwords written on pieces of paper that they carry in their wallet 
or they save them as records in their mobile phones. In addition, they visit 
unreliable web sites and purchase goods by entering their bank account details 
without considering online security.  
When records on an individual’s or in a company’s name are found, the fraudster 
can be identified as many of his movements are going to be revealed. Though, 
there might be a team of thieves, acting with the same identity on multiple 
locations, or one person that performs with more than one identity, or a 
combination of them. These can make the investigation more complicated; while 
at the same time reveal more information about someone’s activities.   
There are a number of problems that deter the preservation of evidence trail. The 
most important is that fraudsters tend to discover more and more sophisticated 
behaviour and manage to hide traces that can prove their guilt. It is a widely 
known that the majority of ID thieves do not work on their own, but in groups. 
This means that even when a case is revealed, the members of the group will still 
have the time to act undetected for a period of time. Furthermore, information that 
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involves personal data might be refused to the investigator in the first place, 
before the case is submitted to court aiming to personal data protection. There are 
also more technical difficulties such as the way the electronic devices used for the 
crime and how information can be retrieved from them. This requires the 
expertise of an investigator.  
Even though not all ID theft incidents result in prosecution, when this happens the 
investigator needs to represent the result of the evidence analysis in an appropriate 
manner. Evidence in the court of law needs to be factual and detailed. The 
information presented needs to be complete as a statement and unbiased. All 
original electronic media related to the case must be preserved, not only their data. 
It is required to record any relevant information related with the electronic source 
the data was created. (Pierce, 2003) 
The evidence from a computer system or network presented in the court needs to 
be based on the following standards: 
· Authenticity, the evidence can be related with the events of the incident; 
· Demonstrational, it can be presented in a form that can be submitted to the 
court;   
· Best Evidentially, to represent the evidence in the more complete form;   
· Probative, the information can be presented practically (Stephenson, 
2002). 
No matter the detailed investigation of the examiner it should be noticed that in 
the court hearing, the defence will try to dispute both the analyst and the evidence, 
e.g. Trojan defence (see Haagman and Ghavalas (2005)). Their job is to convince 
the jurists that there is not enough evidence and that the offender is not the 
criminal. For this reason, the material provided in the court should leave no doubt 
of their authenticity and need to be complete. It will enhance the professional 
scrutiny of the investigator when the case is represented without deficiency 
(Michaud, 2001). This thesis aims to develop a framework that could also support 
the accurate presentation of authentic data in court; because of its specialisation in 
this specific type of crime.    
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2.4 Forensic Investigation of Online ID Theft 
2.4.1 The Theory of ID theft investigation 
ID theft in its online form is considered a relatively new method of fraud and 
there is not enough guidance for forensic investigators. This is because of the 
commercial use of the Internet and the development of computer forensics only 
over the last twenty years. However, the wide use of broadband Internet 
connections is more recent and promotes the user leaving his computer constantly 
online (Saxby, 2004). In addition, the attention in computer forensics has been 
concentrated in creating formal guidance regarding the investigation of all types 
of computer crimes, rather than examining the digital media in relation to the type 
of the computer crime.  
The investigator will have to unfold the digital trail of evidence and try to present 
potential explanations of how such a crime occurred. This digital trail involves 
examining how a crime was committed using computers and the Internet. The 
investigation should identify how the leak of personal identity information 
occurred that made it possible to conduct a misuse of resources such as a credit 
card number. It should also include details of the misuse such as dates, goods 
purchased and amounts spent. If possible the fraudster should also be identified. 
The latter is perhaps one of the most challenging tasks as, unlike DNA evidence, 
computer records can identify user accounts that are logically, not physically, 
linked to individuals (Tryfonas et al., 2006). 
2.4.2 The Practice of ID theft investigation 
The background research confirms that the ID theft situation is becoming more 
intense (see sections 1.3 and 2.2) concerning the number of the ID theft incidents 
and the techniques used. Actual user data of how ID theft was achieved is difficult 
to obtain, however an analysis of approximately 260 second hand disks that was 
conducted in 2006 by the Information Security Research Group (ISRG) at the 
University of Glamorgan provided a body of test data.  
A third party organisation purchased the disks from the second hand market 
providing a degree of anonymity. The research was sponsored by British Telecom 
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(BT) (Jones, 2006) and the Life Cycle Services (LCS), where a number of hard 
disks were studied in order to identify and study the data that can be revealed 
from randomly purchased hard disks from different countries (U.K., Germany and 
North America). 
Such a research provides awareness concerning end-user and corporate knowledge 
regarding data exposure. The overall number of disks analysed led to important 
results, such as statistical reports concerning the users’ familiarity with techniques 
like wiping data from their hard disks. The capacity of personal identity 
information revealed that it can even lead to ID theft by thoroughly profiling the 
victim, as there were multiple cases where personal identification details could be 
retrieved.  
In the disk study the majority of the disks were between 500MB and 10GB. The 
chart below represents the disk capacity, from which it is possible to assume 
approximately the year which it was manufactured. This can lead the analyst to a 
simple deduction that the operating system would be most likely from around that 
period. This was validated since the majority of the systems contained older 
operating systems (e.g., MS Dos, MS. Windows 98, NT, 2000 and ME) (Fragkos 
et al., 2006). The chart on figure 1 represents the disk capacity: 
 
Figure 1: Disk Capacity percentages 
The actual sample size of hard disks was 259; while 124 were unreadable, 70 
wiped and finally 65 of them were investigated. 4 of them contained illicit 
material and were handled to the police. The table below represents the total 
number of disks provided and how these numbers decreased by excluding disks 
that matched certain criteria.  
Disk Capacity 
5.1 - 10 GB 
25% 
10.1 - 20 GB 
13% 
0.5 - 5 GB 
44% 
20.1 - 40 GB 
13% 
> 40.1 GB 
5% 
0.5 - 5 GB 
5.1 - 10 GB 
10.1 - 20 GB 
20.1 - 40 GB 
> 40.1 GB 
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Disk Category Excluding List 
Total Number of Disks 259 -124 Faulty / Unreadable 
Readable Disks 135 -70 Wiped 
Disks Containing Data 65 -4 Illicit material  
Final Disks Investigated 61   
Table 3: Disks obtained / analysed 
Comparing the total numbers of disk provided (259) with the number of the disks 
that has been actually investigated (61), it is clear that only 23.5% of the disks 
were processed. Thirty seven of those disks contained commercial data along with 
twenty eight that derived the presence of individual data, such as bank accounts 
and credit cards, lifestyle information, e-mail accounts and instant messenger 
discussions logs (see table 4).  In addition, family names, addresses and photos 
were retrieved. For example, a hard disk gave enough information to assume that 
it belonged to an ex-employee of a trucking company. Job applications, 
documents, letters written to the bank, a car insurance claim and account details 
were recovered from the disk.  
Disks Investigated Commercial Data Present Individual data present 
65 – 4 (illicit material) 37 28 
Table 4: Origin of disks investigated 
The findings in the 65 disks that were analysed revealed the following information 
by type of personal identity information that could be used maliciously (see table 
5). 
Type of Information Number  
of disks 
Names 44 
e-mail Addresses 34 
Business Disks 38 
Financial Data 12 
Personal User Information 10 
Username 4 
Full Address 3 
Date 28 
Table 5: Type of information on Residual disks 
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It is important to notice that of the above disks, those that contained a full address 
also contained a valid e-mail address in addition with other recoverable data, 
whilst 1 of them held financial information as well. Furthermore, 10 disks that 
belong to the business disks group contain financial data and e-mail addresses, 
which at the same time states them a feasible target of a potential ID thief. 
According to the literature research presented in this chapter (sections 2.2.2. and 
2.2.3.), an ID thief usually bases on specific information acquired by the victims. 
The motive is to achieve using the data for his personal and financial gain. Table 6 
below presents the information that could be retrieved from second hand disks and 
the fraudster would probably search for, in no particular order. 
 Type of Information  
1 Full Name  
2 Full Address and previous addresses 
3 Email Address 
4 Telephone numbers  
5 Credit Card details  
6 Other family details / names 
7 Bank Account Information   
8 Financial Evidence: Passport Number, Driving Licence,  National 
Insurance Number, Business, Property, Criminal Records 
9 Possible passwords 
10 Utility Bills  
11 Other Personal Information: Date of birth / marital status 
12 Occupational Information: Employment details, Monthly income 
Table 6: Personal identity information useful for identity theft 
The combination of some of the types of information from the above table could 
give the fraudster full control of the victim’s life. For example, the fraudster 
discovers a telephone number, occupational information and some bank details of 
a potential victim. He could probably phone him and with social engineering 
techniques claim that he calls from a bank or a financial organisation, provide the 
occupational information and request more personal details.  
Another example could be a phishing attempt, where the potential thief needs the 
victim’s full name, e-mail address, bank and/ or credit card account information 
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(such as the financial institution’s name). If providing some financial evidence as 
well, the other party could be easily convinced that the e-mail is not a scam. 
Obtaining a number of elements of the personal identity information in the table 
could assist the ID thief in more types of theft, such as registering for online 
services, requesting and obtaining loans and credit cards. No matter the potential 
of the theft, the victim is always harmed financially, while the fraudster will both 
‘steal’ money from the victim and cost money when the ID theft is discovered and 
he will try to recover his name.  
The results of the disk study enhanced and reinforced the need for researching ID 
theft further and aided in the construction of the initial hypothesis of the research 
as cited in chapter one (section 1.4.). The matter that any type of personal identity 
information revealed from a hard disk can be eventually used for committing ID 
theft proves the sensitivity of the situation.  
The background research confirmed that the only attempts of the current 
researchers concern guidelines of controlling and eliminating ID theft (Shaobo et 
al. (2007), Lepofsky (2004), Saunders and Zucker (1999), Jamieson et al. (2007)), 
while the investigation of ID theft incidents happens around the general computer 
forensic frameworks.  
The following section discusses the existing investigation methods. 
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2.5 Computer Forensics Frameworks and 
Methodologies 
As already mentioned in chapter one (section 1.4), there is no framework 
identified in the literature that investigates ID theft. The aim of the current 
implemented frameworks and methodologies is to create general procedures for 
digital investigations from data recovery to computer crimes. For this purpose, the 
generic term digital forensics is mostly used, broadening computer forensics and 
including all types of digital media that could be forensically examined. Palmer 
(2001) defines digital forensics as: 
the use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward the 
preservation, collection, validation, identification, analysis, 
interpretation, documentation, and presentation of digital evidence 
derived from digital sources for the purpose of facilitation or 
furthering the reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or 
helping to anticipate unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive to 
planned operations. 
In order to justify the need for developing an independent framework for 
investigating ID theft incidents, the existing frameworks need to be reviewed and 
their deficiency in investigating ID theft should be indicated. There is no specific 
framework or methodology for ID theft investigations in order to compare it with 
the proposed one. Therefore, the existing generic computer/digital forensic 
frameworks will be reviewed. 
There are over hundred (Ieong, 2006) different models that appear in literature 
concerning digital forensics investigations attempting to aid the analysis of 
computer crime incidents. A digital investigation relies both on the system and the 
human aspect (Beebe and Clark, 2005). This is a distinctive characteristic of 
computer crimes, because the human factor is involved. Current frameworks are 
broad and try to cover all different aspects of investigations; whereas computer 
crime incidents and ID theft in particular, as explained in the previous sections, 
have become targeted and sophisticated. Therefore, the investigation should also 
become targeted and sophisticated. 
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A framework can be defined as: 
- a supporting structure around which something can be 
built or 
- a system of rules, ideas or beliefs that is used to plan or 
decide something (Cambridge Advanced Learner's 
Dictionary) 
This is what the existing frameworks and methodologies provide. However, none 
of these focus on a specific type of crime in order to adjust the investigation to the 
set requirements and retrieve evidential data according to the suspected crime.  
For almost a decade now, a number of attempts have been made for creating 
standards for computer forensic investigations. Farmer and Venema (1999) gave 
general guidelines, focused on the UNIX platform and developed the Coroner’s 
Toolkit. Mandia and Prosise (2001) gave detailed instructions for specific 
platforms and focused on computer crime. Lee et al. (2001) studied the 
investigation of the crime scene, without analysing the entire investigative 
process. Ó Ciardhuáin (2004), attempted to process the investigation from the 
information flow side rather than simply focusing on the evidence. Also, efforts in 
the terms of published books have been made for formalising computer forensic 
investigations (Schweitzer (2003), Stephenson (1999), Marcella and Greenfield 
(2002)). These contributions can be described as field manuals and even though 
they provide valuable guidelines they lack in different areas. For instance, 
Marcella and Greenfield provide a comprehensive guide about tools, techniques 
and criminal profiling; however, they focus on legal aspects and keep the actual 
examination on a high level.   
The examination of the present frameworks and methodologies is intended to 
provide the base for designing the proposed framework. The literature shows that 
the majority of published examination models are based on their predecessors.  
Digital evidence and investigations consist of, and combine, numerous different 
aspects (e.g. technology, devices, systems, nature of the investigation). In such a 
case it is reasonable to suggest that a possible further improvement is to generate 
specific formalised approaches to the investigations, as they are always going to 
differ according to the perspective of the researchers that implement it.   
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The understanding of present works is going to support the development of a new 
framework that investigates ID theft. Therefore, the fundamental and most 
important, as they appear in literature, are discussed below. Their strengths and 
weaknesses are highlighted in order to give insight for considering the 
implementation of the ID theft framework.  
2.5.1 Carrier and Spafford 
Carrier and Spafford have a number of different publications concerning digital 
investigations; two of these were considered as more enlightening and are 
discussed herein. In their first published paper, Carrier and Spafford (2003) apply 
issues to the digital crime scene that are relevant to the physical crime scene. The 
Integrated Digital Investigation Model concentrates on the computer as the crime 
scene aiming to provide the digital evidence. The digital crime scene is therefore 
derived from the physical. This initial framework includes seventeen phases that 
are based on the existing to date frameworks and is organised in the following five 
groups: 
1. Readiness Phases 
2. Deployment Phases 
3. Physical crime scene investigation phases 
4. Digital crime scene investigation phases  
5. Review phase   
Carrier and Spafford (2003) have created a checklist of conceptual high-level 
phases. Their aim is to propose and describe the procedure required in the digital 
investigation research field. The phases have been applied on existing frameworks 
and demonstrate an alternative approach to this research area. They study the 
computer as an individual part of the physical crime scene and treat it accordingly. 
The model is aimed to be general, abstracted and apply to all types of computer 
forensic investigations. 
Later, in 2006, they introduced the Computer History Process Model, evolving the 
previous model. Carrier’s doctorate thesis (2006a) is based on it as well. The final 
framework is published including the following four phases:   
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1. Observation 
2. Hypothesis Formulation 
3. Prediction 
4. Testing and Searching 
They do not claim that the existing frameworks are not correct for specific 
processes. However, they declare that their proposed model focuses on a different 
perspective that contributes to them. 
The Observation phase observes states and events; the researcher needs to observe 
the field in order to create a clear picture about the processes and the activities that 
take place on the investigation. The Hypothesis Formulation focuses on the results 
of the observation phase and is able to categorise the techniques that will aid the 
analysis of the findings. The Prediction phase supports the Hypothesis 
Formulation as the results of this part will prove whether or not the Hypothesis is 
formed on a structured base and will lead the researcher to the last phase. In 
Testing and Searching, the tests and experiments that take place in a generally 
approved manner will probably result in new predictions and evaluate the 
Hypothesis the researcher has set.   
They effectively stated that the purpose of the forensic investigation is to 
reconstruct the ‘history’ of the digital media under investigation. They also argue 
that the history of the digital media is unknown to the investigator. Therefore, this 
is what he needs to investigate those events that resulted altering the state of the 
media. However, it is based on computationally complex models, a scientific 
approach that may not be easily comprehensive by the investigators. In addition, 
the authors argue that the framework’s aim is to assist the existing frameworks 
and has been tested. 
The Computer History Process Model will be further discussed in this chapter, 
rather than the Integrated Digital Investigation Model, as it is a more recent work 
and contributed as a research work towards a doctorate. 
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2.5.2 Casey 
Casey (2004) is considered to have published the epitome of computer forensic 
investigations (Kessler, 2007) on Digital Evidence and Computer Crime. He 
provides a general computer forensics framework that depicts the relationships 
among law, computer science, forensic science, and behavioural analysis. The 
model Casey presents consists of the following four phases: 
1. Recognition 
2. Preservation, collection, documentation 
3. Classification, comparison, individualisation 
4. Reconstruction 
The first two phases of the framework handle the crime scene, while the analysis 
of the evidence takes place in the following two phases. Based on Casey, the 
reconstruction phase can lead the investigator to identify additional evidence and 
revisit them. The framework contains tasks for the first responders and can be 
applied on both standalone and networked systems. The findings of the evidence 
examination are interpreted in a way that could stand in a court of law. 
2.5.3 Reith et al. 
Reith et al. (2002) attempted to extend the existing framework from the Digital 
Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) (Palmer, 2001) on a standardised 
process and aid the law enforcement and judicial systems. The Abstract Digital 
Forensics Model consists of the following nine phases: 
1. Identification 
2. Preparation 
3. Approach strategy 
4. Preservation 
5. Collection 
6. Examination 
7. Analysis 
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8. Presentation 
9. Returning evidence 
The first three phases of the framework involve the response to the incident, 
phases three and four the data collection and six and seven the examination of the 
digital media. In such a distinction of the phases the model becomes more 
complicated.  
The authors themselves admit that the proposed framework is not tested and does 
not maintain, but it is assumed that it will maintain the chain of custody; a rather 
important issue for the investigation of computer forensic incidents involving law 
enforcement and courts.  
2.5.4 Beebe and Clark  
Beebe and Clark (2005), present a flexible and usable framework that approaches 
digital investigations on a multi-tier basis; differentiating itself from existing 
approaches. The Hierarchical Objectives-based Framework extends on Carrier 
and Spafford’s (2003) single-tier approach (Tipton and Krause, 2004). It consists 
of six phases, but also includes sub-phases, principles and objectives. 
1. Preparation 
2. Incident response 
3. Data collection 
4. Data analysis 
5. Findings presentation 
6. Incident Closure 
Phases one and two respectively involve the preparation of the digital evidence 
and the response action towards incident. The data collection phase collects the 
digital evidence that is analysed on the data analysis phase. The second-tier of this 
phase is also discussed in their research paper. The findings presentation phase 
documents the findings of the data analysis and the incident closure phase closes 
the investigation and preserves the related information. 
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It aims at assisting general investigations rather than being crime specific. The 
authors claim that the framework is expandable and this was achieved by working 
on the advantages of existing works and combining different aspects.  
2.5.5 U.S. Department of Justice 
Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: a Guide for First Responders is the U.S. 
Department of Justice (2008), structured digital investigation framework. It is 
intended for responding to the digital crime scene investigation and applies to law 
enforcement officers. This is the updated version of the U.S. Department of Justice 
(2001) that failed to be all-inclusive, as commented in the recent version of the 
document. The updated model consists of the following phases: 
1. Preparation: recognize, identify 
2. Collection: seize, secure, evaluate, label, document the scene  
3. Preservation: package, transportation, storage  
4. Examination 
5. Analysis 
6. Report 
This generalised process does not differentiate the computer from other digital 
media and there is little guidance concerning the actual examination and analysis 
of the system (Carrier and Spafford, 2003). As it aims to concentrate on the first 
responders it basically refers on the physical crime scene and the traditional 
forensics.  
Even though, the method is rather systematic for the first three phases, it covers 
the examination, analysis and report in only one chapter. This effectively adjusts it 
to a guideline for the crime scene and not a framework that could efficiently assist 
the computer forensics investigator.       
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2.5.6 Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
The Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence provided by 
ACPO (2007) is accepted in both the public and the private sector. It is the UK 
standard that provides the procedure that should be followed by the practitioners 
and focuses on the collection of evidence. These guidelines are considered as 
essential instruction to computer forensic investigation and cover different aspects 
of computer crimes and electronic devices. It comprises of four fundamental 
principles that are further explained in the original document: 
Principle 1: No action taken by law enforcement agencies or their agents should 
change data held on a computer or storage media which may subsequently be 
relied upon in court. 
Principle 2: In exceptional circumstances, where a person finds it necessary to 
access original data held on a computer or on storage media, that person must be 
competent to do so and be able to give evidence explaining the relevance and the 
implications of their actions. 
Principle 3: An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to computer 
based electronic evidence should be created and preserved. An independent third 
party should be able to examine those processes and achieve the same result. 
Principle 4: The person in charge of the investigation (the case officer) has 
overall responsibility for ensuring that the law and these principles are adhered 
to. 
The guidelines in addition include the Recovery Process that consists of four 
processes/ phases for computer-based electronic evidence recovery: 
1. Collection Phase 
2. Examination Process 
3. Analysis Phase  
4. Report or statement 
The collection phase searches, recognises, collects and documents the electronic 
evidence. The examination process is examined the medium for evidential data, 
while the analysis phase tests the outcome of the examination for its relevance to 
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the existing case. The report or statement describes the findings on a forensically 
sound manner.  
The ACPO (2007) Recovery Process is a standard general approach that covers 
computer forensic investigations. As the guide aims to concentrate on the 
collection of evidence, limited information is provided for the overall procedure.   
2.5.7 Discussion on the existing frameworks and 
methodologies 
The existing computer forensic frameworks are attempts to formalise the 
procedure of computer forensic investigations, even if their generic nature does 
not approach the investigation in great detail. They all appear to have positive and 
negative features that will be discussed in the following paragraphs. This will 
assist to generate the properties that the ID theft investigation framework needs to 
contain. In addition, some investigation frameworks that do not only focus on 
computer forensics, but are related with computer crimes and ID theft contribute 
to this incorporation. They are discussed in this section as well.    
The Computer History Process Model (Carrier and Spafford, 2006) approaches 
the digital investigation from a different perception than others; the computer 
history. It is the aspect that the researchers approach the forensic investigation; the 
fact that it discloses the history of the computer system similar to the physical 
investigation. The four phases that constitute the Carrier and Spafford (2006) 
framework (section 2.5.1) are concentrated and descriptive to their content. They 
manage to verify the idea even though there is a differentiation between the 
physical and the digital world.  
It concentrates on mathematical theory aiming to act as the model that the 
practical computer forensic models could be based on. The model is highly 
theoretical with some practical implication (Carrier, 2008). This suggests limited 
applicability to actual investigations. It would appear that the actual purpose of 
this work is to assist the academic, rather than the practitioners. However, this 
framework is a model that the ID theft framework could be built upon. The 
authors have created a framework that comes from an academic perspective and 
can be applied to existing frameworks.   
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In Digital Evidence and Computer Crime (Casey, 2004) has presented a generic 
model to fit all computer crimes. The interesting part of his framework that is 
extensively analysed in his book is the evidence processing cycle that prompts the 
examiner to revisit a phase, when additional information is required. An element 
that is significant for an investigation and should also be contemplated for the 
design of the ID theft framework.  It is considered as a standard towards a forensic 
investigation (Ieong, 2006).   
Casey (2004) presented a framework that would be general enough to include all 
procedures of the computer forensics investigation. He even refers to the 
extraction of data from different digital media, different operating systems and 
mobile devices. However, it is not focused on a specific area. This positions it as 
an all-purpose guide and reference to computer forensic investigations.   
The book also applies the framework on both computer systems and network 
environments. This makes it a versatile tool that can be adopted from different 
investigations. The author has stated in the book that it is written with computer 
security professionals, law enforcement officers, attorneys and forensic scientists 
in mind. This book is an effort to formalise the procedure and refer to anyone 
involved in the computer forensics process. The knowledge acquired from Casey 
(2004) contributes to the design of the ID theft investigation framework, but due 
to its non direct link with formal academic research it was decided not to be used 
as the base model of the framework. 
The Abstract Digital Forensics Model (Reith et al., 2002) is a framework intended 
to be adjusted in the examination of all different, present and future, types of 
computer crimes and technology. It is descriptive, broad and developed in the 
terms of the evidence collection and the technology. In addition, it covers a wide 
range of digital devices.  
An interesting feature of this framework is the fact that the authors have tended to 
create a model that could be adopted for the development of specific 
methodologies based on a technology or type of e-crime (Ó Ciardhuáin, 2004). 
This approach strengthens the assumption of creating an ID theft specific 
investigation framework. Their model is considered, but it was decided not to be 
used as the base of the proposed framework. The purpose of this framework is to 
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be considered as a ‘standard’, a broad system that could embed all types of e-
crimes. The ID theft framework targets to serve as a tool for the investigator. 
Therefore, it needs to be focused and detailed concerning ID theft. 
The Hierarchical Objectives-based Framework (Beebe and Clark, 2005) proposed 
a multi-tier investigation framework. It is looking for evidence with more detail, 
on a lower level, unlike other frameworks and appears well structured overall. 
This approach is useful for the design of the ID theft framework. However, such 
an effort on a general investigation framework could also become the weakness of 
an approach that attempts to assist all types of computer crime investigations. It is 
easy to overlook some aspects when everything is attempted to be included.  
The authors comment that they tend to adjust their method in order to include 
different types of devices and operating systems. This could cause problems with 
applicability to future systems.    
The Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: a Guide for First Responders (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2008) published the American governmental guidelines of 
approaching computer forensic investigations. There is an interesting part of this 
framework that needs to be noted. It is the categorisation of evidence based on the 
type of crime and the potential locations that the investigator should focus his 
examination for evidential data. Among these crimes ID theft is also present and 
potential digital evidence is proposed to be found in 
computers, mobile devices, records of online purchases, removable media, 
external data storage devices, PDAs, address books, contact lists, online 
banking software, information regarding internet activity, financial asset 
records, electronic money transfers, laminators, calendars or journals, 
forged documents and false identification, victim information and credit 
card data, copies of signatures, printed e-mail, notes, letters, ID pictures, 
check cashing cards and scanners.  
An inconsistency appears for the term digital evidence and the highlighted terms. 
The above evidential types provided are not necessarily digital evidence. For 
example, laminators and printed e-mails refer to physical evidence and can be 
used as additional to the digital.   
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The list with the above digital devices can be useful for the design of the ID theft 
framework, as it states where related evidence can be found. However, the model 
is actually a first response and does not focus on the examination of the media. On 
the contrary, the objective of the ID theft framework is the examination of the 
media in order to provide relevant evidence with ID theft.  
Reith et al. (2002) and the U.S. Department of Justice (2008) separate the analysis 
and the examination in different phases in the framework. The analysis is about 
searching and extracting data for them, while the examination is about generating 
evidential data from the extracted source (Beebe and Clark, 2004). This could be 
confusing for the practitioners.     
The Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence (ACPO, 
2007) serves the purpose of a formal standard for the UK. It was designed by 
police officers for police officers and it is therefore a practical guide. Computer 
forensic investigators across the UK tend to adopt it. However, the guidelines 
state that digital evidence can be accepted under certain circumstances even when 
it does not comply with the guide.   
Even though it is a general procedure that tends to cover everything, the last 
edition of ACPO (ACPO, 2007) gives weight on volatile data, network forensics 
and the Trojan defence. Because of its structure and the fact that it is not an 
analytical framework it cannot be used as the base for the proposed work. 
However, it is an accredited guide and should be taken under consideration for the 
design of the ID theft framework. 
Table 7 is a diagram of the existing models and the proposed ID theft framework 
at a high level (see section 3.3). The table is also the first presentation of the 
proposed framework’s phases. It was decided to be placed here rather than in the 
next chapter, where the framework is explained and presented, because it keeps up 
the continuity of the discussion of this section.   
The existing models cannot be compared with the ID theft, due to the fact that 
they tend to serve different purposes. The table demonstrates where the ID theft 
framework meets the phases of the existing on the definition and the purpose of 
the corresponding phases. 
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 ID theft framework high level phases 
Media 
Analysis 
Evidence 
Analysis 
Scenario 
Construction 
Evaluation 
Carrier and Spafford 
(2003) 
    
Observation P    
Hypothesis 
Formulation 
 P   
Prediction   P  
Testing and 
Searching 
   P 
Casey (2004)     
Recognition P    
Preservation, 
collection, 
documentation 
P    
Classification, 
comparison, 
individualisation 
 P   
Reconstruction   P P 
Reith et al. (2002)     
Identification  P    
Preparation  P    
Approach strategy  P    
Preservation  P    
Collection  P    
Examination   P   
Analysis   P   
Presentation     P 
Returning evidence     P 
Beebe and Clark (2005)     
Preparation P    
Incident response P    
Data collection     
Data analysis  P   
Findings presentation    P 
Incident Closure    P 
USDJ (2008)     
Preparation P    
Collection P    
Preservation P    
Examination  P   
Analysis  P   
Report    P 
ACPO (2007)     
Collection Phase P    
Examination Process  P   
Analysis Phase    P  
Report or statement    P 
Table 7: Frameworks’ Comparison Table 
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2.5.7.1 Specific frameworks/ guidelines 
The increase of computer related crimes lead to the need for computer forensics. 
Over the last years this term became broader and includes more than computers as 
special guidelines are published concerning specific devices. Guidelines on PDAs 
(Jansen and Ayers, 2004), mobile phones (Jansen and Ayers, 2007), internet 
forensics (Sekar et al., 2004) are sub disciplines of computer forensics and 
common in the field. The requirement for the development of these specialised 
areas in computer forensics has demonstrated the need for more focused 
frameworks and guidelines.  
In the literature some research has been identified that has a similar philosophical 
approach to the one proposed in this thesis. Katos and Bednar (2008) propose a 
cybercrime investigation framework for developing investigation support among 
the stakeholders that influence the investigation. It is not a framework that 
provides guidelines for the investigation procedure, but rather an information 
system that acquires the information provided by those that take part during a 
forensics investigation. Their system is generic in order to cover all different types 
of computer crime, but can be adjusted to a specific type of crime. They mention 
ID theft as one type of crime to which their model is applicable. Their method 
aims to assist the forensic investigation in a flexible approach. It could be 
compared with the presented ID theft investigation framework only in the terms 
that approaches the investigation in the type of the offence.  
However, as a support system it aims before the actual investigations guidelines. 
It uses mathematical theories as a base standard, probabilities and open problems 
that make it complex and confusing in some areas. On the other hand, it is a 
presented system that could maintain the investigation based on the type of crime. 
Their work though, seems to be under development and their publication does not 
compare their proposed system with any other similar frameworks or computer 
forensic investigation frameworks.  
In a different aspect there is a call for specific forensic investigation such as the 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). Slay and Simon (2008) raised this concern. 
They propose the development of a software tool that could assist forensic 
investigations by extracting packets that can reconstruct a VoIP conversation.  
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Criminals could potentially misuse a tool similar to the proposed one, retrieve 
conversations and threaten someone’s privacy, or even take advantage of VoIP 
wiretapped conversations. In both cases the law enforcement should discover a 
way of recovering such conversations. Even though the product of Simon and 
Slay’s (2008) research is a software tool and not an analytical framework, it adds 
to the argument that due to the increase in computer crimes, there is a need to 
investigate each computer crime independently.  
Ferraro and Casey (2005) have published a book aiming to assist the investigation 
of child exploitation and pornography. Even though the book focuses on the legal 
aspect, there are specific guidelines that refer to the forensic investigation of the 
specific type of crime that are enhanced with examples. It seems that the existing 
published work of Casey (2004) is used throughout the book and applied to child 
exploitation. The forensic examination of the criminal’s computer system is 
presented in only one chapter. However, the contact with a physical crime scene is 
extensively discussed and how an internet investigation can prove the illegal 
activity and track the criminal. Also, advice on how to secure the evidence and 
handle it is provided. It provides guidance up to the stage of the trial.  
The interesting approach is that it aims to cover the internet investigation, the 
actual computer and other digital devices investigation, as well as the handling of 
servers and networks. There has been already one attempt to provide specific 
guidelines for computer forensic investigations, based on the type of crime. The 
investigation of child exploitation and pornography is based on different aspects 
than ID theft due to the different legal and ethical issues involved. This guideline 
is mostly focused on the legal side, probably because of Ferraro’s law 
background. It could have been used as a model for the ID theft framework if it 
was more concentrated on the digital side and if there was more detailed 
breakdown on the digital investigation. However, the type of crime the book 
examines is different than ID theft and is dependent on one of the two authors’ 
existing work. Casey’s (2004) existing Digital Evidence and Computer Crime is 
already considered to contribute to the design of the ID theft investigation 
framework. 
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2.5.7.2 Limitations and properties of the ID theft 
investigation framework 
The planning of a framework that concentrates on the forensic investigation of a 
single computer crime is not unproblematic. It was seriously considered at the 
initialisation of this research that this framework should be one step further than 
the existing ones. The areas that the research had to concentrate on were two; 
computer forensics and ID theft.  
The growth of online ID theft was discussed in a previous section (see section 
1.3). The suggestion that this type of crime is expanding, forms the base for the 
argument for further research. It is an area that demands an approach to assist the 
handling of the related digital evidence. Under the same philosophy each 
computer crime should be treated under specific guidelines, simply because each 
computer crime contains different attributes. The way an investigator should 
handle for example a child pornography incident is rather different than ID theft 
(see section 2.5.7.1) due to the content of the digital evidence and the places that 
this evidence can be discovered in the digital media. 
There were a number of problems indicated when trying to build a crime specific 
investigation framework. There was an argument raised in the beginning of the 
research that there may be no need for specific guidelines on ID theft, as long as 
the existing frameworks can also be applied for ID theft investigations. Section 
3.1 aims to give the answer to this argument. In brief, the work of the forensic 
investigator can become a faster and more accurate procedure, when he knows 
exactly where to search for evidence.   
Another issue that appeared was that the product of the research cannot be a high 
level framework similar to existing ones. No matter how researchers in computer 
forensics have currently approached the investigation, the proposed work should 
include specific areas. These are those related with online ID theft and should 
reach a very low investigation level. In order to achieve it the different types of  
ID theft can be accomplished needed to be studied and comprehended. The 
problem with this is that fraudsters tend to develop new ways of acting and the 
framework should be built in a flexible way that would allow possible near future 
techniques to be included.  
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When a very low level framework is being designed though, another concern is 
raised. The method should include guidelines about the different digital evidence 
that could be discovered when examining a victim’s and a fraudster’s system. In 
order to cover this and avoid confusion the framework should be split at some 
point and guide the investigator towards evidential points that involve the 
associated part (see section 3.1).    
Currently evidence uncovered during an investigation is not classified into 
particular categories using existing frameworks. This is due to their high-level 
approach. However, a low level framework has the ability to define special 
activities that could classify the evidential data based on its quality and relevance 
to the incident that is being investigated. Such an approach would support the 
construction of a scenario that could describe what has happened to the penetrated 
or the rogue system. Then, the investigator would be able to create a focused 
picture of the incident. 
Another issue that was highlighted when reviewing the existing frameworks was 
that an examination methodically collects information that could profile the 
perpetrator. The information that is gathered could assist in providing such data. 
The existing frameworks though do not seem to process it in order to create the 
fraudster’s profile. If such information was maintained under some constant 
values for avoiding confusion the investigator could prove that there may be 
unvarying procedures from the fraudsters that commit a specific type of e-crime.   
Ferraro and Casey (2005) claim that the only way not to miss any evidence is to 
perform a full-blown examination. A type of examination that includes and 
examines every instance of the digital media. This may be a case for computer 
forensic investigations and had to be taken seriously under consideration as the ID 
theft framework had to be persistent; it should ensure that everything is included. 
The existence of specialised investigation frameworks in the field though, 
strengthened the premise that it can be achieved.  
Another identified difficulty is the low level of the investigation that the 
framework needs to achieve. Digital media tend to use different operating systems 
that are developed in different modes. An analytical framework though needs to 
facilitate all of them. In order to overcome this problem the framework needs to 
State of the Art 
 
 
65 
maintain a conceptual approach that can encompass a range of systems. At the 
same time a popular Operating System should be selected and examples should be 
provided, where possible. 
Based on the above issues the framework’s design needs to consider the 
following: 
· An in depth understanding and knowledge of ID theft in order to avoid 
overlooking evidential data.  
· To be easily comprehended and applied by the practitioner. 
· To include all different systems and technologies, in order to be flexible.  
The review of the existing computer forensics frameworks and the above 
considerations assist in developing the properties that the ID theft framework 
needs to conform to and are stated below: 
· It should divide the investigation concerning the victim or the fraudster. 
· It should provide classified evidence. 
· It should provide profiling of the fraudster. 
The ID theft framework aims to approach the investigation from a different aspect 
than the existing ones based on the issues discussed on this section. The properties 
the framework needs to include were generated after the review of the existing 
literature. Their combination with the aims and objectives of the research (see 
section 1.4.1) were the principles of the design of the framework that is 
introduced on the next chapter. 
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Summary  
This chapter aimed to present the relevant state of the art in relation to ID theft 
investigation techniques. It defined important terms for the understanding of this 
work and then reviewed ID theft in its online dimensions and techniques. A brief 
report on traditional ID theft techniques was given and then a more detailed 
analysis on the innovative ID theft techniques.  
Then, issues on the forensic investigation of online ID theft were raised and 
discussed. The last part of this chapter reviewed existing computer forensic 
frameworks, methodologies and guidelines in order to identify the properties that 
the proposed framework needs to include. 
The review taken on existing works proves that the forensic investigator may 
benefit from additional guidance on deciphering ID theft incidents. Therefore, 
there is a lack of: 
1. Structured evidence specifically based on the type of e-crime;  
2. Structured profiles of the fraudsters; 
3. Prevention and detection techniques for eliminating the problem. 
If such work existed, then less effort would be required from the digital forensic 
investigators for resolving a case.  
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In this chapter the reader can 
► identify the need to construct an ID theft investigation framework; 
► understand the planning and design of the presented framework; 
► be introduced to the framework’s functionality. 
Overview 
The previous chapter highlighted the increasing use of online identities and the 
corresponding increasing risk of identity theft. Internet users are requested to 
provide personal identity information to perform a number of transactions; online 
shopping, memberships, social networking, and many others. The increased 
number of online activities has lead to an increased number of recorded ID theft 
victims.  
The ID theft crimes that occur in digital environments and later require computer 
forensics investigation suggest that it would be useful to develop a systematic 
approach for the analysis of ID theft incidents. 
This chapter addresses the issues relating to investigating ID theft in a digital 
environment. Examinations of this type of crime are discussed and the plan of an 
ID theft computer forensics investigation framework is presented. 
 
We hang the petty thieves and appoint the great ones to public office. 
Aesop, Greek slave & fable author 3 3 ID Theft Investigation Framework Outline 
ID Theft Investigation Framework Outline 
 
68 
3.1 The significance of ID Theft standalone 
investigation 
As determined in the preceding chapters, ID theft is considered a significant threat 
for individuals and corporations and consists of multiple types of crime. It 
involves numerous ways of achieving it, both with and without a digital 
environment. The growth of technology has transformed it to an e-crime and this 
is where this research focuses. The intention at this point is to demonstrate the 
reasons that online ID theft should be examined under an individual, crime-
focused investigation framework. 
The nature of the crime is one of its major differences from other types of 
computer crimes and consequently the way the digital evidence should be treated. 
ID theft is a result of a combination of crimes, as these were described on chapter 
two (see section 2.2). For example, a bank robbery can be achieved purely by 
force or purely via a computer (hacking) or by some form of combination of the 
two, e.g. forced extraction of password. However, the victims of the bank robbery 
will immediately or soon after realise the robbery against them. An ID theft 
incident, is achieved either by traditional techniques, e.g. shoulder surfing, or 
innovative, e.g. phishing, or a combination of both such as social engineering. 
However, there may be a period of time before the victims realise the crime has 
occurred.  
For the purpose of this thesis, all computer based evidential elements will be 
represented with the term online, whereas all other, secondary elements will be 
called offline. Consequently, the investigator needs to take into consideration the 
volume of the offline sources that influence the outcome of the investigation, as a 
number of offline methods could have been used to assist in committing the 
crime. The amount of offline evidence that could be added to an ID theft 
investigation, such as card cloning machines and stolen mail differentiate this type 
of crime from other computer related and raises the need of treating this type of 
computer crime in an individual manner.    
A characteristic example of this could be the comparison between a hacking 
offence and an online ID theft incident. In most cases, the source of evidence 
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available from a hacker is his system and usually intermediate systems that have 
been used and revealed the method of attack. The investigator will have to trace 
all evidential data from there. In an ID theft incident the digital evidence also 
depends on the fraudster’s computer and intermediate systems. However, there are 
also other factors, such as a card cloning machine that could enhance the 
evidence. Any supplementary sources that could be found on the crime scene 
support the investigation and can therefore contribute as evidence for ID theft. 
According to FTC, ID Theft Data Clearinghouse (2007) the total number of 
complaints in 2006 was 246,035, establishing ID theft the top complaint category 
in consumer fraud with 36 percent. In order to support the need of investigating an 
ID theft related computer crime as an independent entity an example of an ID 
theft case for financial purposes can be considered. Based on Cook (2008), the 
investigator can first focus on credit history, transactions made in the victim’s 
name, applications for bank accounts, loans and credit cards. The evidence would 
consist of data, logs etc. formats through various systems within one or even 
multiple financial organisations. As a result, the investigation is complicated and 
time-consuming. With identity-related ID theft cases, the investigator will need to 
consider not only the financial evidence but the personal information gained and 
subsequent actions triggered by a hijacked identity. 
The current computer forensic investigation frameworks are generic and they aim 
to deal with a number of different computer related crimes from hacking to 
copyright violation. In respect to the existing computer forensic frameworks (see 
chapter 2, section 2.5) and based on the continuing rise of ID theft (Grant, 2009), 
the need to assist the computer forensic investigation of ID theft related crime is 
imperative.  
The growth of e-crime leads to the point that the investigation procedure needs to 
be focused on different perspectives each time. Different sort of evidence is 
required, according to the type of crime in order to be concentrated on the unique 
aspects that characterise it. Simply because the use of the Internet and the public 
dependency will only grow, there is the argument that methods should be 
developed to efficiently cope efficient with this rapidly spreading threat 
(Marwaha et al., 2005). Computer forensic investigators need to be able to use 
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constructed methods that facilitate and support their actual aim; to provide 
evidence after the investigation of an incident. 
Kay (2006) divides computer crimes in two categories, where the computer is 
used to commit a crime and where the computer is the target of the crime.  A 
victim’s machine should provide conformational information, so that the theft of 
data or the fraud against the user will be proved. On the fraudster’s machine the 
evidential data should be treated in such a way that will reveal the intention of 
theft. Due to the fact that so many different crimes are involved and alternative 
techniques can be followed by the fraudsters, ID theft investigations are more 
complex than other types of crime (Roberson, 2008). Therefore, online ID theft 
investigations are also considered as more complex for the same purpose.  
The proposed ID theft framework is a consecutive procedure that aims to provide 
a detailed approach for the investigator and specify how evidential data should be 
treated under this type of e-crime. It also adds knowledge to the examiner as it is 
not only based on the analysis of the digital media, but also on gathering 
information about the target of the crime and the fraudster. The framework 
consists of two levels; a high level, where the basic functionality is presented and 
then it expands on a low level framework in order to collect the ID theft related 
specific data. 
A prerequisite for the application of the ID theft framework is that the type of the 
crime is known before the examination. A further requirement once the crime has 
been identified, is the system being examined. The examiner needs to be aware if 
they are analysing the victim’s or the fraudster’s system as outlined in the next 
section. 
Victim and Fraudster 
An ID theft, like almost all different types of crime, involves two parts, victim and 
criminal or fraudster. The Oxford Dictionary of English defines victim as a 
person who is tricked or duped and the fraudster as a person intending to deceive. 
The victim is the dupe, the prey, the target. The specific word has been selected in 
order to describe the person that has been affected emotionally or financially by 
ID theft.   
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The word fraudster has been chosen for this work among its synonyms (criminal, 
deceiver, perpetrator), as is approaches more accurately the intention of the person 
to commit fraud by acting deceitfully.     
There is an approach of distinguishing and discriminating the investigation 
process between the victim and the fraudster in this research work. It differentiates 
it among different investigation frameworks as such an approach has not been 
identified in the literature. The ID theft framework reaches on a very low level of 
the investigation. The collected data is organised and classified while 
investigating the crime. This property of the framework adds the need to 
understand the system on which the data originates.  
Different pieces of evidence can be discovered on each side (victim-fraudster) 
concerning the technique that has used to perpetrate the crime. While the online 
ID theft techniques can leave evidence on both the victim’s and the fraudster’s 
system (see chapter 2), it tends to contain different elements on each side (see 
chapter 4). For example, a phishing e-mail could leave evidence on the victim’s 
internet logs, while on the fraudster’s system, information about the building of 
the scam could be found. A malware might leave unknown running processes on 
the victim’s machine and a source code library on the fraudster’s machine.    
This is going to assist the investigator as it aims to focus the examination of the 
digital media on the side of interest. Therefore, the investigator will work on a 
structured ground under a procedure that includes only these elements that he 
needs to search for. A structured approach can reduce the duration that is required 
for the examination and reduce the chance of evidential material being 
overlooked.  
Classification of evidence 
In addition to the above, the proposed framework not only assists the 
investigation, but also classifies the gathered evidence and attempts to profile the 
fraudster. The information that is being collected comes from a different aspect 
depending on whether the media under investigation belongs to the victim or the 
fraudster. The classification of evidence aims to recognize and categorize 
evidential data based on the discovered findings.  
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As digital evidence is fragile (Kornblum, 2002), the investigator needs to 
precisely preserve and classify the ID theft related. For this reason the 
preservation of evidence can be maintained when it is structured and classified. 
The nature and purpose of the evidence appears beneficial for the quality of the 
findings, when constructing the case report on a later stage. The ID theft 
framework follows the classification of evidence as derived from and structured 
upon the admissibility of evidence that appears extensively in computer forensics 
literature (for example Casey, 2004; Schweitzer, 2003; Palmer, 2002).  
The collection of classified evidence among a number of different investigations 
could also result in assisting future ID theft incident analysis.  It is important to 
capture features of past ID crimes to aid the investigation of future crimes. 
Fraudster Profiling 
Marcella and Greenfield (2002), discuss the concept of profiling the fraudster. 
The application on the ID theft investigation framework depends on the fact that 
the victim and the fraudster are going to provide profiling elements from different 
perspectives. The profiling of the fraudster is drawn from a different aspect when 
it comes from the victim’s hard disk and different from the fraudster’s hard disk. 
Rogers (2003) argues that computer based investigation procedures need to 
develop in a similar way to procedures in the classic forensic science and include 
the profiling of the criminal (fraudster). Numerous studies refer to the importance 
of profiling the fraudster (for example, O’ Block et. al., 1991; Turvey, 2002; 
Kocsis, 2006). However, it is mainly based on the sex, race, age etc.  
This framework aims to identify and analyse the activities taken by the fraudster, 
in order to understand his methods and techniques. Information will be gathered 
based on the complexity of the attack that could reveal for example whether there 
is an intention of financial or identity ID theft (see chapter 2, section 2.2.3). The 
collection of evidence is able to provide such identification and offer additional 
valuable indications about the objective of the attack and the skills of the 
fraudster.  
The following sections of this chapter will expand the above arguments, 
describing the theoretical procedure of designing and implementing the ID theft 
investigation framework.  
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3.2 Design Principles 
The following paragraphs are going to explain the rationale of this work and set 
its principles. The framework design was presented at the 5th Australian Digital 
Forensics Conference (Angelopoulou, 2007). 
Fundamentally, a framework is considered as a tool to aid in planning, monitoring 
and evaluation of research projects (Carrier, 2006). A framework is required in 
order to achieve a comprehensive and repeatable procedure. In the case of ID 
theft, it should answer to what information might be stolen and how this 
information could be stolen. However, on a flexible way that will comply with 
current and future technologies. The way of achieving this is presented in chapter 
four, where the framework is thoroughly described. 
The major aim of the framework is to collect, construct and represent the 
evidential data that reveal an ID theft incident. The overall procedure needs to 
give answers to questions similar to  
 
In case a specific file exists, for example one with malicious content, then the 
analysis should confirm whether that file has been executed and as a result 
influences the investigation. The outcome of the analysis should provide accurate 
results after the analysis of the medium, based on what exists and what has 
occurred. The investigator should be able to examine every file and any event that 
influences the behaviour of the system. 
As highlighted in chapter two (section 2.5), a review of existing frameworks 
failed to identify an existing framework targeted at investigating ID theft. 
Therefore, the proposed work cannot expand or improve an existing ID theft 
framework; instead the principles of some of the forensics frameworks examined 
in chapter 2 form the basis for the new framework. The aimed approach to ID 
theft investigations differs from existing research works. However, the different 
perspective that Carrier and Spafford (2006) adds to computer forensic 
investigations was chosen as a basic model for the structure of the proposed 
framework. However, all of the frameworks that were analysed (see section 2.5) 
contributed in the design to a degree as outlined in the following sections. 
1. Does file X exist? 
2. Did event Y occur?  (Carrier and Spafford, 2006) 
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Beebe and Clark (2005) were based on the Carrier and Spafford (2003) model and 
extended it on a low level that appeared beneficial for the design of the ID theft 
framework. The ACPO guidelines have been of significant importance while 
planning this framework. However, these are generic and address the investigation 
of computer crimes in general. In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice (2001) 
guidelines have been taken under consideration for the design of the framework. 
This approach appears as more detailed than the ACPO, as described in the 
previous chapter and the knowledge gained from its study partially assisted on the 
design of the proposed framework.  
Casey (2004) has also added to computer crime investigations with his 
methodology. The model is general, in order to include all types of digital 
investigations. However, some core features were valuable for the design of this 
framework as well. Reith et al. (2002) focused their model on the law 
enforcement by creating an extended model. It also assisted in the development of 
the ID theft framework.  
The following section describes how the existing investigation frameworks have 
contributed to the implementation of the proposed ID theft investigation 
framework. 
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3.3 ID Theft Investigation Framework Design 
The background research of the existing computer forensic frameworks suggests 
that the most suitable approach for the ID theft investigation framework would be 
first to identify and define the key phases. It is based on the Carrier and Spafford 
(2006) high level model as that distinguishes each phase in such a discrete manner 
that fits this research.  
The processes required for the lifecycle of each phase are based upon ACPO 
(2007), U.S. Department of Justice (2008), Casey (2004), Reith et al. (2002) 
Beebe and Clark (2005) and obviously Carrier and Spafford (2006). The 
framework is classified into two levels. The high level gives the opportunity to the 
investigator to understand the basic structure of the investigation approach.  
Then, the low level of the framework, is a more advanced and detailed stage, 
where the examination steps become ID theft specific. The procedure unfolds at 
this level, as it aims to provide all the detailed steps required during the 
investigation and is adjusted to the needs of an ID theft incident.  
3.3.1 High Level structure of the ID Theft Investigation 
Framework 
The investigation is divided into phases, where every phase represents a major 
procedure during the ID theft investigation lifecycle. The purpose of the phase is 
to collect and include procedures that are related with each other. When these 
procedures are completed the outcome of the phase will be created. Then, the 
examination can continue to the next phase and search for further information in 
another group of investigation procedures.  
After the literature research and consideration of the existing computer forensics 
frameworks (see section 2.5), it was decided that four phases are sufficient to 
constitute the ID theft framework, as in Carrier and Spafford (2006), Casey (2004) 
and ACPO (2007). There is no need to expand its structure with more phases as in 
other models. The four phases support and maintain its consistency and 
functionality. The naming of each phase is adjusted to the needs of the ID theft 
framework. The terminology chosen for defining each phase is considered to be 
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representative for the needs of the proposed framework and could be comparable 
to the Carrier and Spafford (2006) model.  
The purpose of presenting the framework at the highest level first is to introduce a 
simple, conceptual outline to the reader (Beebe and Clark, 2005). This states the 
highest level of the framework’s formulation that is presented in figure two.  
The graphical method used is based on the UML activity diagram, as a flexible 
and commonly understood method. It is preferred among other methods because it 
is a simple demonstration of what occurs during an operation (Schmuller, 2004). 
It represents not only sequential, but also parallel operations, required for the 
design of the framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The four key phases at the high level of the model are: Media Analysis, Evidence 
Analysis, Scenario Construction and Evaluation. The Media Analysis phase is 
concerned with identifying information of evidential value collected from the 
media. This forms the foundation for the Evidence Analysis phase, where the 
digital media is examined for evidential data. Information of evidential value 
derived from the Evidence Analysis phase should be included in the Scenario 
Construction phase. This is closely linked with the Evaluation phase, where 
particular attention should be paid for assessing the produced scenario. The 
scenario that is produced in the Scenario Construction phase collects the 
evidential items that resulted from the previous phase and aims to construct a 
possible scenario concerning the history of the incident. This scenario will be 
assessed in the Evaluation phase.  
Figure 2: ID Theft Investigation Framework Phases 
Investigation 
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Pma 
Pea 
Psc 
Pe 
I 
The forensic analyst needs to have a start and an end point during the analysis of 
the digital media. At some stage in the examination though, he may need to 
circulate among the intermediate phases when additional information is required. 
The structure is inherited from the software engineering’s iterative waterfall 
model that supports the same principle (Mall, 2004).   
The information flow in figure 2 highlights the fact that the analyst should always 
be able to return from the Evidence Analysis to the Media Analysis. The analyst 
may need to search for any further data that might appear of value during the 
examination of the media. In the same way the analyst may need to revisit the 
Evidence Analysis at any stage in the Scenario Construction for any information 
that could emerge and indicate further investigation. Then, the Scenario 
Construction will need to be validated. However, the Evaluation phase involves 
the possibility to recall any of the previous phases of the investigation process in 
order to prove the objectivity of the research outcome. Figure 3 sets the variable 
names of the phases in order to be used during the discussion of the framework 
and demonstrates the lifecycle of the ID theft investigation framework with the 
variables. 
3.3.1.1 Inputs and Outputs 
The inputs and the outputs define the processing requirements of each phase and 
are integrated in the high level of the framework. Their existence is imperative as 
they constitute the purpose of the phase and define the object and the subject of 
the examination.  
Every phase receives an input; it is the object that needs to be entered into the 
phase, examined for a particular set of features and the results forming the output. 
This output is the subject of the phase that should be also examined in order to 
Level 0 Phases’ Variable Names 
Description Variable 
Incident Investigation I 
Media Analysis Pma 
Evidence Analysis Pea 
Scenario Construction Psc 
Evaluation  Pe 
Figure 3: Investigation Framework Variables’ and representation 
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provide its own results. The importance of the output will be verified in the 
following phase, where it will be used as an input. Consequently, the initial input 
of the framework should always be the digital media under investigation and the 
final output should always be the case that has resulted after the examination.  
The practice of using the output of the preceding phase as an input to the 
subsequent supports the coherence of the research outcome and functionality (see 
Beebe and Clark (2005), Ó Ciardhuáin (2004)). The I/O practice is presented in 
figure four. It highlights the necessity of the procedures presented at this level of 
the framework. The I/Os support the procedure in the terms of continuity during 
the investigation’s lifecycle. They are individually presented in chapter four, on 
the analysis of the framework. 
3.3.2 Low Level structure of the ID Theft Investigation 
Framework 
3.3.2.1 Practitioners’ requirements gathering 
The detectives of Gwent police were requested for a meeting when a draft version 
of the framework was designed. The aim was to contribute with their practical 
knowledge in the low level of the framework and verify that each necessary task 
was covered from the design. Eventually, there were meetings in the form of 
informal interviews that assisted the requirements gathering for the framework.  
The practitioners initially described how an investigation is performed in a real 
environment. They mentioned the procedures they follow and the way they 
normally treat ID theft. The idea of a crime specific framework was appealing to 
them. Then, there was a discussion on the draft version of the framework. Due to 
the fact that framework reaches the investigation on a low level, it needs to 
incorporate all possible areas that the examination could retrieve evidence from. 
Figure 4: The input / output practice 
Output 
Phase 
Input 
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The components were designed and specific questions were addressed to the 
detectives concerning the applicability of these components.  
Their point of view was particularly useful for the construction of the final 
structure of the framework. The practitioners’ requirements gathering assisted the 
development of the framework and its aim to become a tool for the investigators.  
3.3.2.2 The structure of the framework 
The following paragraphs provide a detailed review of the structure of the 
framework to demonstrate its usability; outlining the key phases, processes, 
activities, and instructions. Table 7 (section 2.5.7) compares the proposed 
framework with the existing. The comparison was enlightening in the terms of 
realising the actual breakdown the ID theft framework needs to consist of. It 
assisted on setting the design requirements and the properties of the framework 
(see section 2.5.7.2). There is no other ID theft specific framework in the literature 
in order to compare the breakdown of each phase. Therefore, the terminology was 
chosen based on the background research of the generic models as the most 
representative and descriptive for each element.  
The phases are individual procedural components inside the framework. The 
names that were selected to represent them describe their purpose in the terms of 
the ID theft investigation. The input and the output of the phase form the criteria 
that should be satisfied for the phase to operate, and the resulting output. They 
both consist of a number of processes that are a centralised, structured approach 
for the satisfaction of the I/O. However, on a low level the processes need the 
activities as a customised, focused ID theft guideline that clarifies the required 
actions set by the processes. All processes produce activities, but some activities 
need to focus on a further detailed level, the instructions.  
The instructions act as directions for the activities and offer additional 
characteristics to the examiner. Some instructions throughout the framework 
require declarations about their application and these are called objectives as they 
intent to clarify the purpose of the instruction. Figure 5 represents the breakdown 
of the elements that constitute the framework. 
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In detail, the investigative framework consists of four phases as shown in figure 5. 
In order to assist the ID theft investigation, the research outcome of this work 
should provide an in-depth procedure integrated among these four phases. 
As each phase includes an input and an output, the output that is produced in 
every phase is used as an input to the following phase (see Beebe and Clark 
(2005), Ó Ciardhuáin (2004)). A phase also consists of processes that appear for 
the first time on the low level. 
There are twenty-two processes in the framework and the actual analysis of the 
digital media in the terms of ID theft occurs from process four to fourteen among 
three phases. 
The processes satisfy the needs that their preceding input or output processes 
require. The processes relate to evidence produced either from the victim’s or the 
fraudster’s side where necessary. This division depends on what the process 
attempts to identify. Internally each of the processes contains one or more 
activities. They provide the fragmentation of the procedure for the practical 
achievement of the process’s function. In other words, the detailed route the 
investigator needs to follow in order to fulfil the requirements set by the process. 
Activities are used either as an input or as an output to the process, based on their 
nature. Therefore, they hold the characteristic I/O in front of their classification in 
order to be identified throughout the framework (see section 3.3.1.1).   
Figure 5: Representation of the framework's elements (lowest level) 
 
Process 
Activity 
I/O 
 Instruction 
Objective 
Output Input 
P H AS E  
Process 
Activity 
I/O 
 Instruction 
Objective 
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Some activities need to provide comprehensive direction that can be found in the 
instructions. They are expected to determine the purpose of the activity and 
provide the effective application of the process. The instructions answer the 
question of ‘where’ the supportive data can be discovered. In fact they reach into 
detail, concerning the expected findings for the investigator, and at the same time, 
they are as generic as possible to be flexible.  
The instructions are followed by the objectives that answer the question of ‘what’ 
the investigator is expected to discover during the execution of the activity. The 
instruction is the last action of the activity. It mainly adds a value to the required 
activity. The instructions and the objectives are considered as embedded detailed 
add-ons to the activities as they provide additional information for assisting the 
investigator. 
In summary: Every phase requires some form of Input; this is then modified or 
examined by the Processes present within that particular phase.  In turn the phases 
are built up from a number of Activities. These activities may then contain 
Instructions and Objectives although this is not always the case.  Not all activities 
include instructions and not all instructions an objective. Once a phase has 
completed all of the required activities, instructions and objectives, the output 
from that phase becomes the input for the next.   
The investigation framework complexity and the relationships among the phases 
can be found in Appendix F (II-III). Because of their size only an in text preview 
of the graphs can be found in figures 6 and 7 aiming to provide an overview to the 
reader. Each stage of the framework is represented in a different colour and shape, 
in order to create clear illustration of the graphical demonstration for the 
practitioner. Vivid colours have been chosen for assisting a symbolic recall of the 
framework’s breakdown to the reader, as recommended by the work of Stone 
(2002, 2006).  
In figure 6 the centre clear circle of the diagram represents the framework and the 
four phases can be found inside it in indigo circles. The framework expands its 
tasks with the I/Os, fuchsia for the input, teal for the output. The victim is purple 
and the fraudster violet diamond. All the events of the framework are symbolized in 
assorted different colours. The processes are represented in pink squares, the input 
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activities in orange oval and the output activities in sky blue. The instructions, 
where applicable, are yellow round corner rectangle and the objectives are green 
yellow hexagons. 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the four phases on the corners in indigo circles of a four-sided 
figure and the rotation among them is represented with single or double ended 
arrows according to the framework’s need. The input of each phase is a circle 
coloured in lime and the output in turquoise. The processes are in lavender colour 
embedded in each I/O that they fit in. The orange circle represents the input of the 
process and the pink the output of the process. The round corner rectangle in green 
colour in the corresponding process stands for the distinction between the victim 
and the fraudster. The dotted lines signify the relationships among the phases.   
Figure 6: ID Theft Framework Complexity (see App.-II) 
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These diagrams do not follow a standard diagram symbolisation as they need to 
be comprehensible to the investigators that may not be experienced in reading 
formal modelling techniques. The selected diagram symbolisation uses a 
combination of mind map (Buzan, 2003) and organisation chart (Koontz and 
Weihrich, 2008). They were chosen among other methods as they expand and 
satisfy the purpose of creating commonly understandable, uncomplicated 
diagrams.   
The relationships that occur in each phase independently can be found in 
Appendix F (IV). The relationships aim to preserve the chain of custody (Mohay 
et al., 2003; Stephenson, 1999; Mandia et al., 2003), vital for forensically sound 
evidential data. The instructions and the objectives are not included in diagrams 
III and IV, as their functionality is embedded in the corresponding activity.  
Figure 7: ID Theft Framework Relationships (see App.-III) 
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Summary 
ID theft is a type of old fashioned crime that transformed into a cybercrime 
because of the intense ‘investment’ in online sources. To investigate this and other 
computer related crime there have been a number of developments in the area of 
computer forensics. As a result, a number of procedures have been developed to 
guide the forensic process. Due to the nature of ID theft it has been suggested that 
a specific e-crime driven investigation framework is required. 
This chapter has presented the design principles of the proposed ID theft 
investigation framework which distinguishes the examination in the victim’s and 
the fraudster’s side. It classifies the evidence and profiles the fraudster. This type 
of investigation method aims to provide results on a more crime-focused basis 
regarding an ID theft incident.  
In the following chapter, the framework is analysed. It provides a detailed 
approach for the investigator to follow in case of an ID theft incident.   
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This chapter analyses 
► the structure of the investigation framework; 
► the purpose of every Phase; 
► the functionality of every Phase; and 
► can be used as a reference to the investigative procedure. 
Overview 
The ID theft investigation framework is an analytical tool to aid the computer 
forensics investigator in analysing ID theft incidents. The structure and 
functionality of this framework builds upon comparable existing investigative 
forensic frameworks, as discussed on chapters two and three. Unlike current 
generic frameworks, it focuses on the examination of a specific computer crime 
and presents detailed low-level procedures to be undertaken. Furthermore, the 
investigation process divides the examination on the fraudster and the victim’s 
part. The aim is to guide the investigator towards specific examination processes 
throughout the analysis. 
The following sections describe the flow of the ID theft investigation framework 
to the lowest level. The methodology is supported, where appropriate, by an 
example of evidence based on the current technology, operating systems and 
applications. The examples are mostly based on the Windows XP operating 
system, as it is considered the most popular desktop operating system over the last 
years and from the initiation of this research project. (Johnston et al., 2003)  
The following sections provide a detailed guide outlining the full functionality of 
the framework and justifying its design. The chapter is literally divided in two 
parts. First the inputs and outputs of the high level phases are presented and then 
the low level of the framework is explained. The flow of the ID theft investigation 
framework is presented altogether in an index list form on the low level in 
Experience is one thing you can't get for nothing. Oscar Wilde, 1854 - 1900 
4 4 The ID Theft investigation framework  
The ID Theft Investigation Framework 
 
86 
Appendix E. This document only arranges the list of all tasks serving the purpose of 
an overview for the framework.  
An abstracted procedure for the investigator can then be found in Appendix H. 
This document is intended to become a field manual for the investigator. It gives 
guidelines and summarises the purpose of every phase and provides basic 
information for every stage of the framework, so that the investigator could return 
to it anytime during the examination and get some further information.  
Appendix I provides a documenting procedure for assisting the investigator on 
recording the whole investigation and analysis. It is a table based document that 
can be used for the recording of the findings related with the case. It is suggested 
as a primary documentation tool for the ID theft investigation framework as it 
provides all the elements of the framework that are required for the investigation. 
4.1 High Level Inputs and Outputs 
The previous chapter explained the need of the framework to expect receiving an 
input and producing an output in each phase as well as the interaction among the 
phases. At this section, the I/Os of the framework will be presented and described. 
Their functionality needs to be clarified at the high level and provide the required 
justification for continuing to the low level of the framework.  
Media Analysis Phase 
The media analysis phase (Pma) does not differ in nature from the existing 
frameworks discussed in chapter two. The procedure that the investigator is 
required to undertake at this phase is established from previous works (see chapter 
2) as it involves the contact with the crime scene and the media acquisition. Phase 
1 cannot be excluded from the framework as it maintains its continuation and 
cohesion.  
It requires as an input any type of digital storage media that could give as an 
output possible ID theft data to further the investigation. At this point the term 
‘digital media’ is going to represent any type of computer storage device.    
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Possible digital storage media incorporated into the media analysis include 
computer/ laptop/ server hard disks, external hard disks, RAID hard disks, PDAs, 
memory cards, PCMCIA cards, mobile phones/ SIM cards, USB memory sticks, 
tape back-ups, floppy disks, CDs and DVDs. These are only indicative as they are 
based on the current technology. The handling of each storage media is in 
accordance to the ACPO preservation guidelines (ACPO, 2007).   
An ID theft investigation does not differ from other computer crimes in requiring 
specialized processing of the media that constituted the crime. Even though the 
most common media for analysis is the hard disk drive (Beebe and Clark, 2005), 
occasionally the processing may need to begin from that media that is suspected 
to contain the most valuable evidential data. 
Evidence Analysis Phase 
The Evidence Analysis phase (Pea) takes as input the possible ID theft data 
provided by the Pma and analyses it. At any time during an investigation 
additional data relevant to the investigation may become available, in which case 
the analyst may need to return to the previous phase relating to the analysis of the 
Digital Media.  
The aim of the investigator is to discover evidence at this stage that can be 
connected with ID theft. This is the required output. At the end of this phase the 
examiner should hold unprocessed evidential data that he should deal with in the 
third phase.     
 
 
 
Figure 8: Phase 1 - Media Analysis 
Figure 9: Phase 2 - Evidence Analysis 
Evidence Pea 
ID Theft Data 
Analysis 
ID Theft Data Pma Digital Media 
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Scenario Construction Phase 
The input of the Psc should be the Evidence (the output) from the Pea. The aim is 
to process and classify the evidence to produce a Scenario as an output. The way 
will be explained in the following sections, at the low level of the framework.  
The scenario is the chain of events constructed by the investigator based on the 
findings of the media examination. Only when sufficient information is gathered, 
the analyst is able to provide the possibilities to explain how the evidence was 
created. At this stage it may be necessary for the analyst to search for further 
details on any of the two previous phases (Pma and Pea). The importance of 
evidence reconstruction is mentioned by Carrier and Spafford (2004) and Beebe 
and Clark (2004).  
 
 
 
Evaluation Phase 
The evaluation phase (Pe) takes the output from the scenario construction in order 
to present the final output for the whole investigation.  Its purpose is to examine 
the produced from the previous phase output and in order to evaluate and verify 
the outcome of the investigation. The evaluation is an important procedure of the 
investigation. Every framework that exists in the literature and considered for the 
design of the ID theft framework attempts to verify and present the outcome of the 
investigation (E.g. Carrier and Spafford, 2003; Casey, 2004; ACPO, 2007)  
The output of this case is a constructed case that includes all the evidential 
material that was discovered. In case there is a need, the analyst should be able 
again to revisit all previous phases for the validation of the analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Phase 3 - Scenario Construction 
Figure 11: Phase 4 - Evaluation 
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The two levels of the framework (high and low) can be found on Appendix F (I) 
represented on organisational charts. In addition, Appendix G corresponds to a 
flowchart diagram of the high level of the ID theft investigation framework.  
4.2 Overview of the Low level ID Theft 
Investigation Framework  
Each phase contains one or more processes that define the procedure that needs to 
be followed in order to satisfy the input and the output of each phase. They define 
activities that assist in the fulfilment of each process. These will be further 
explained in the following sections, where each phase is individually analysed. 
The framework’s evidence source distinction between the victim’s or the 
fraudster’s system area also appears in this section. Where the framework is split a 
letter V stands for the victim and an F for the fraudster corresponding to the 
separation.  
The phases contain specific inputs and outputs which must be satisfied, in order to 
continue to the next phase. The processes are incrementally numbered within the 
phases to demonstrate the logical continuity of the framework. 
An initial informal meeting with members of the Gwent police assisted on the 
design of the low level. The police investigators added their practical knowledge 
to some of the key aspects included in this work. They recommended key areas 
that the investigation should focus and how the evidence should be treated.  
In this section each phase is presented and accompanied from a figure that 
represents it. A brief description of each phase follows. 
Figure 12: Phase 1, Media Analysis Representation (Low Level) 
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ID Theft Data 
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Phase 1, is structured according to the ACPO (2007) guidelines and the U.S. 
Department of Justice (2008). The processes required to support the Digital Media 
input, identify the available evidential sources on the crime scene -1-, collect them 
from the crime scene -2- (Casey, 2004) and image the digital media -3- under 
investigation at the computer forensics laboratory. These processes are a standard 
crime scene work, as described on the existing frameworks as well.  
The investigator is then requested to identify evidential data -4- concerning either 
a victim (V), or a fraudster (F). Whichever is identified, the discrimination of the 
framework should be followed until the end of the investigation. General 
information that identifies the target -5- and the threat agent -6- should be 
revealed. The output of these set of processes is ID Theft Data.   
Phase 2 takes as an input the ID Theft Data identified in the previous phase. This 
is achieved by identifying the available for analysis data -7-, analyse the target -8- 
, by differentiating the procedure for the victim (V) or the fraudster (F). Also, the 
analysis of the threat agent -9- based on the findings is provided by the process.  
The evidence is collected in process -10- and classified in -11-. The output is 
Evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Phase 2, Evidence Analysis Representation (Low Level) 
Phase 2. Evidence Analysis 
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Phase 3 takes the Evidence Classification as an input and structures the evidential 
data -12- and the threat agent’s profile -13-. Different information is classified by 
the victim’s (V) and the fraudster’s (F) medium. Then, the analysed digital 
evidence is prepared -14- for the output of the phase that it will be converted into 
a scenario of what has occurred. The scenario outline -15-, aims to represent the 
incident, based on the discovered evidence and prepares draft documentation with 
the investigator’s prediction -16-. The output is the Evidence. 
Figure 14: Phase 3, Scenario Construction Representation (Low Level) 
Figure 15: Phase 4, Evaluation Representation (Low Level) 
Phase 4. Evaluation 
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Phase 4 evaluates the 3 previous phases. The input is the scenario examination as 
resulted from the previous phase. It needs to be tested -17- and clarified -18- in 
order to ensure the validity of the procedure. 
The output of the framework is going to be a Case. The case needs first to be 
constructed -19- including all the evidential files, then clarified -20- in relation to 
the requirements of the case and evaluated -21- to ensure confirm that all included 
evidence is valid. The last process is the representation of the case -22-, where the 
case report is constructed. 
4.2.1 Summary of High Level stages and Example 
Scenario 
The following scenario demonstrates a hypothetical application of the framework. 
It is an initial attempt to apply it, aiming to create an overview of what has been 
discussed up to this point. It involves an incident with little information and an 
indication that ID theft has been committed. 
South Wales’ police visit a suspect for credit card fraud. On site they discover 
blank credit cards and a computer that could be used as a tool. They collect the 
potential evidence and transfer it to the lab for investigation. The ID theft 
investigation framework will be applied for the examination.  
Media Analysis phase 
The analysis begins with process 1. The investigator is supplied with the digital 
media for this investigation; the system’s hard disk for this case. The detectives 
have already collected, and identified it (Process 2). The analyst is imaging 
(Process 3) the hard disk. The purpose is to identify data that might indicate ID 
theft. Process 4 informs the next stage of the process confirming whether the 
evidence has been collected from a victim or a fraudster. However, for this case 
the evidence is derived from the fraudster. From this point and on, the 
investigation would follow the framework devised for examining the case based 
on the fraudster perspective.  
Process 5 identifies the target, that could be a vulnerable system, or information 
published on the public domain, where the fraudster could focus for potential 
victims. Process 6 aims to identify the threat agent and his purposes. Any 
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information gathered so far that could reveal his intention. At the end of this 
phase, ID theft data should be present, concerning the prospects of the fraudster. 
This will be analysed on the next phase. 
Evidence Analysis phase 
It aims to analyse the evidence from the original media, the investigator analyses 
the ID theft data under three processes: 7, 8, 9; data, target and threat agent 
respectively. The target analysis is divided to victim and fraudster, as each 
category guides the investigation towards a different perspective. For this 
scenario, the fraudster perspective must be followed.  
The output of the phase should be evidence derived from the analysis of the 
digital media.  Process 10 collects the evidential data that occurred from the three 
previous processes and then this data will need to be classified, on process 11 
based on their content.     
Scenario Construction 
At this point, the evidence extracted from the investigation needs to be classified. 
Process 12 structures the evidential data, while 13 structures the threat agent’s 
profile that is divided into the victim’s and the fraudster’s side, as there is going to 
be different sort of data gathered to give the investigator the information required 
to construct the attacker’s profile. Process 14 structures the analysed digital 
evidence that refers to the incident.  
The output is Evidence and the processes that follow are 15, the scenario outline 
and 16, the documentation preparation. At this point the investigator has a clear 
overview concerning the investigation. He could tell with structured evidence 
whether the suspected individual has committed ID theft. 
Evaluation 
The input is the scenario examination, Process 17 evaluates the scenario 
assumption and 18 clarifies the scenario. The output gives the investigator a case 
he needs to construct (Process 19), clarify (Process 20) and evaluate (Process 21). 
Finally, process 22 is the evidential case representation, the computer forensic 
report. All evidential data discovered will be described in a manner that could also 
be admissible in a court of law, charging the fraudster of the case. 
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The above scenario is a brief representation of how the high level of the 
framework could be applied in practise. The investigator benefits from a 
customised, structured ID theft procedure that guides him throughout the 
investigation of a suspected ID theft. The framework covers the investigation 
from the first contact with the crime scene to the analysis of the evidence and the 
construction of the case report for a court prosecution.  
The following sections continue with the analysis of the low level of the 
framework, where detailed guidelines for its functionality are provided. 
4.3 Structure of the Low Level Analysis  
The phases of the investigation framework are analysed based on the structure 
below and each one is accompanied by a representative graph that includes the 
stakeholders of the phase. The specific breakdown of presenting the framework 
has been selected, as it guides the reader each time one step forward in the phase 
while studying and describing it. It follows the structural flow of the framework 
and explains each task successively as it moves from the high to the low level.   
Phase Overview: a brief description of the phase at the low level. A figure 
accompanies the description of every phase. The purpose is to familiarise the 
reader with the objective of the phase.     
Input/ Output Overview: a description and the purpose of the input of the phase 
are provided in more detail than section 4.1. Then the description and the purpose 
of the output are produced. It presents what the investigator is searching for 
(input) and what he expects to generate (output). 
Processes’ Specification: the description and the purpose of each process (see 
section 4.2) that is necessary to generate their required I/Os.  The following 
sections explain the processes in more detail. 
Process Table: this is a flowchart type table where the breakdown of every 
process in a phase is presented. The grey areas of a table indicate that no data is 
present.    
The numbering of the tasks that constitute the framework has been mentioned in 
previous paragraphs. However, it would be beneficial to explain it further here to 
detail the breakdown of the framework.  
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The four phases are numbered sequentially from one to four. Then, follow the 
input and the output of the phase that are referred in the framework by their names 
(e.g. Digital Media). The processes are numbered from one to twenty two and 
continue successively among the phases. The word Process is found in front of 
their number to emphasise them.  
The activities follow the processes. The letter I stands for the input process and 
the letter O for the output process. Next to the letter the activity receives the 
number of the process it belongs to and a succeeding number that differentiates it 
among the others. For example I.1.2 is the second input activity of process one or 
O.2.1 is the first output activity of process two. At this stage the framework is 
divided between activities that deal with the victim examination and activities that 
deal with the fraudster. Where an instruction is required it is denoted by the word 
Instruction and the corresponding number. The instructions are not successively 
numbered, but renumbered among the phases, as they refer to the activities they 
belong. Therefore, the objectives, where applicable, follow the same tactic as they 
refer to their instructions. They are represented by the word Objective, the number 
of the instruction and a successive number. For example, Objective 1.3 is the third 
objective of the first instruction.  
This structure was selected as the most logical and easiest to represent the 
framework. Because of the extent of the framework, a characteristic symbolisation 
of each task should be chosen. This symbolisation should be straightforward for 
the investigator to distinguish it among the tasks of the framework.   
The framework aims to guide the practitioner through the investigation of ID 
theft. In some areas it becomes detailed on how an activity needs to be carried out. 
However, intentionally in most areas it directs the procedure without detailing a 
method. The investigator may choose a convenient approach for him, based on his 
experience and availability of tools. As a result, the flexibility of the framework is 
preserved.     
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4.4 Phase 1, Media Analysis 
4.4.1 Phase 1 Overview 
The Media Analysis (Pma) aims to identify, secure and examine the source of 
digital media. It includes the first contact with the crime scene. It recognises and 
handles the media; therefore receives the name Media Analysis.   
Therefore, during the Media Analysis phase, the investigator should identify, 
collect and secure the media that may provide digital evidence and begin the 
process to discover possible ID theft data. Pma requires the following input and 
produces the following output: 
Input: Digital Media, the identification and forensically sound preservation of 
digital media.  Although this is part of standard forensic practice it is included 
here for the completeness of the framework. 
Output: ID Theft Data, the identification of evidential data relating to ID theft 
and the initial distinction between the victim’s and the fraudster’s evidential data. 
In addition, the target identification provides the intention of the fraudster, as well 
as the threat agent’s identification and intention. For example, a victim’s 
vulnerable system could show an initial attempt of an external, individual attempt 
to steal personal data. Figure 16 introduces the processes, followed by their 
activities.  
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4.4.2 Digital Media 
The purpose of these processes is to give the investigator an insight into 
conducting the first on scene response related to an ID theft incident. However, 
the procedure that needs to be followed is based on the generic frameworks and 
guidelines (see section 2.5). 
It consists of the following three processes:  
1. Source identification  
2. Digital media collection  
3. Image Acquisition  
The following sections describe in detail their application along with the activities 
that are included in the process and any instructions and objectives that may 
appear. 
Figure 16: Phase 1 - Media Analysis Breakdown 
Phase 1 
Media 
Analysis 
Digital Media 
 Process 1. Source Identification 
I.1.1. Media Selection 
I.1.2. Live System 
O.1.1. Keep Record of the scene 
 Process 2. Digital Media Collection 
I.2.1. Identify different digital media 
I.2.2. Secure/ isolate digital media 
I.2.3. Collect/ package digital media 
O.2.1. Document 
 Process 3. Image Acquisition 
I.3.1. Select appropriate tool 
I.3.2. Protect media from possible 
alteration of data 
I.3.3. Image the original media  
I3.4. Store safely original media 
I.3.5. Back-up the image, work on 
that 
I.3.6. Create Cryptographic Value 
ID Theft Data 
 Process 4. Evidential Data Identification 
V. Victim 
I.4.1.V. Existence of malicious software 
I.4.2.V. Existence of unsecured 
transactions 
I.4.3.V. Vulnerable system 
O.4.1.V. Victim evidential data list 
 F. Fraudster 
I.4.1.F. Existence of malicious software 
code 
I.4.2.F. Forensic extraction software 
I.4.3.F. Hacking tools 
O.4.1.F. Fraudster evidential data list 
 Process 5. Target Identification 
I.5.1. vulnerable systems 
I.5.2. published information  
I.5.3. individual / corporate 
O.5.1.Target identification list 
Process 6. Threat Agent Identification/ 
Intention 
I.6.1. internal / external attack  
I.6.2. individual / corporate 
O.6.3. Threat agent identification list 
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4.4.2.1 Process 1, Source Identification  
One of the most important processes during the investigation, the source 
identification component of the model is in agreement with widely acceptable 
existing computer forensic guidelines (ACPO (2007), U.S. Department of Justice 
(2008)). This basic step cannot be avoided or altered, as the investigator or first-
on-scene officer must identify digital media that may contain relevant information 
to prepare for further analysis (Beebe and Clark, 2005). The process includes the 
following activities: 
Media selection (I.1.1.): The media selection activity refers to the search of 
defining the digital media, present at the crime scene that need to be collected and 
examined, and to create and maintain the required chain of custody. For its 
completeness, it requires two instructions to be followed as these are declared in 
section 3.1: 
Instruction 1. Online Data 
Instruction 2. Offline Data 
Live System (I.1.2.): This covers the possible need to treat a live system. It 
does not apply to all cases; however, when the system is still active the 
investigator should behave according to Grance et al. (2004) and follow the 
instruction: 
Instruction 1. Check the operating system 
Keep record of the scene (O.1.1.): It is the product of the input activities I.1.1 
and I.1.2. Lee (2001) mentions the recording of the scene can include 
documenting, photographing, and in some cases video recording. He noted an 
apparently insignificant, slight error in the collection of the evidence has the 
possibility to destroy an entire case. Furthermore, to keep record of every online 
and offline data found in the scene, e.g. the amount of memory installed on the 
system (Carrier and Spafford, 2003). The recording of the scene can be used as an 
evidential element in court.  
The instructions that were met above dictate: 
on Media Selection activity, 
Instruction 1. Online Data: is considered any data that is directly linked with the 
computer system. Instruction 1 requires the following two objectives: 
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Objective 1.1. Evidential computer storage components: At this point, the 
investigator needs to search for any computer storage components that can 
provide evidence and select them. E.g. unplugged USB flash memory, CDs. 
Objective 1.2. Computer storage media: it refers to all computer storage media 
that the investigator will be able to use for the analysis. E.g. Hard disk  
Instruction 2. Offline Data: In agreement to Shinder and Tittel (2002), it is the 
physical evidence, which can be seen or touched. There is, in most cases, a 
significant number of offline data that can influence the outcome of the 
investigation. It is always, considered as additional evidence, other than the 
computer system itself (Marcella and Greenfield, 2002). For instance, a 
fraudster’s case may identify ‘tools’ that have been used from the fraudster. The 
outcome of the investigation could be influenced, when these tools are proved to 
have an effect on the result. The most commonly known offline data are 
mentioned on objective 2.1.: 
Objective 2.1. Any offline data that can be used as additional evidence: based on 
the current knowledge possible offline data is described below, in order to stretch 
their importance and link with the purpose of the objective (Shinder and Tittel, 
2002 and Marcella and Greenfield, 2002):  
Computer peripherals: any type of computer peripheral that could reveal 
information of evidential value, e.g. a printer could retain a copy of data in 
memory or hardware keyloggers that could be found attached on a victim’s 
machine and register the key logs.  
Telephone devices: any type of telephone device can hold personal data. Mobile 
phones can store a decent amount of personal data that can be used as evidence, 
but also modern cordless phones for example, can save contact number or even 
send text messages.    
Personal belongings: anything personal that could be used as source of evidence. 
For example, books or magazines found near a fraudster’s working area and 
provide elements of his work. Printouts at the fraudster’s site, software purchase 
receipts and notes could be evidential as well.       
Litterbins: are always good sources of discovering people’s habits. For example, a 
victim’s litterbin can show that the victim throws away bank statements without 
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shredding them first. The victim could be simply questioned about such an 
occasion, but when dealing with the fraudster it could add information that he has 
recently discarded, such as notes.  
Card cloning devices: this type of device should immediately alert an investigator, 
as it is a popular tool among fraudsters for cloning for example, credit cards. 
Video screening equipment: may be used when having someone under 
surveillance in order to uncover his daily habits (Wright et al., 2008). E.g. hidden 
cameras installed in someone’s property. 
Digital camera: may keep a number of photographs in the memory that could be 
used for constructing a case. E.g. prove that a fraudster was stalking for possible 
victims.   
on Live System activity: 
Instruction 1. Check the operating system: Keep track and capture any volatile 
information that can be available from the system at that specific moment. The 
live system acquisition has been discussed by a number of experts, who examine 
live systems (Adelstein, 2006).The included objectives are: 
Objective 1.1. Shutdown: after capturing the information, the investigators should 
either shut down the system or immediately proceed with objective 1.2 and 
immediately disconnect it. The purpose of this dual option depends on the nature 
of the machine. As recommended by Gwent police (Appendix K), if the machine 
runs a server O.S. then it should be shut down to avoid data corruption. 
Objective 1.2. Disconnect: after having the system shut down first or by simply 
unplugging the system from the back of the computer to avoid activating a backup 
power supply. 
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The following table represents the Source Identification process with its activities 
and highlights the instructions and their objectives. 
Process 1. Source Identification 
I.1.1.. Media Selection I.1.2. Live system O.1.1. Keep Record of the 
scene 
1. online Data 
ú evidential computer storage 
components 
ú computer storage media 
1.check operating system 
ú shutdown 
ú disconnect 
 
2. offline Data  
ú any offline data that can be used as 
additional evidence  
  
Table 8: Process 1 - Source Identification 
4.4.2.2 Process 2, Digital Media Collection  
The actions taken during the Digital Media Collection provide the investigator 
with the sources of evidential material. During this process, the investigator will 
collect the digital media, based on the ACPO (2007), U.S. Department of Justice 
(2008), (Marcella and Greenfield, 2002).  
As the process’s name instructs, the following activities need to be performed, 
according to traditional computer forensic collection methods (Casey, 2004): 
Identify different digital media (I.2.1.): The examiner of the incident should 
identify the different digital media available for this activity, in order to be able to 
proceed to the next activity. I.2.1 involves one instruction: 
Instruction 1. Generic digital device storing personal data 
Secure / isolate digital media (I.2.2.): Securely extract digital media from 
the system in order to avoid alteration or damage (Marcella and Greenfield, 2002).  
Collect / package digital media (I.2.3.): The secure collection and packaging 
of the media according to the guidance of the U.S. Department of Justice (2008). 
This activity encloses the sealing of the collected media as part of Document 
(O.1.2) that maintains the chain of evidence. 
Document (O.1.2.): The investigator needs to document the process of 
acquiring the digital media collected for analysis. This is also performed in order 
to preserve the chain of custody (Marcella and Greenfield, 2002).  
Identify different digital media activity (I.2.1.) requires the following instruction: 
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Instruction 1. Generic digital device storing personal data: Any digital device 
that can save personal data can also be used to accomplish an ID theft. According 
to the current technology, the following devices can be used by a fraudster. 
However, future technology may present additional devices and for this reason, 
these devices are not specifically mentioned into the framework, but only as a 
current guide to the investigator (see section 4.1): Computer / Laptop / Server 
Hard Disk, External Hard Disk, Mobile Phone / SIM Card, Raid Hard Disks, Tape 
Back-ups, CD / DVD, PCMCIA cards, Memory Cards, USB Memory Stick, PDA, 
Floppy Disk. 
The table representation of the Digital Media Collection process: 
Process 2. Digital Media Collection 
I.2.1. Identify different 
digital media 
I.2.2. Secure/ isolate 
digital media 
I.2.3. Collect/ package 
digital media 
O.2.1. 
Document 
1. Generic digital device 
able to store personal data 
 
Table 9: Process 2 - Digital Media Collection 
4.4.2.3 Process 3, Image Acquisition  
The Image Acquisition process mandates the bit-stream back up of the digital 
media. Best practice requires a bit-stream copy of the media that includes all the 
areas of the disk to perform a thorough computer forensic investigation. The 
Common Digital Evidence Storage Format Working Group (DFRWS CDEFS) 
(2006) proposed the standardisation of the digital evidence storage for the 
advantage of the investigator. They suggest that the digital evidence should be 
stored and transmitted in a single format; however, this approach was abandoned 
less than a year later due to the lack of resources.  
This process consists of the following activities: 
Select appropriate tool (I.3.1.): This is based on the type of case, the 
investigator’s preference and training. It can be achieved in a number of ways. 
E.g. dd UNIX command.  
Protect media from possible alteration of data (I.3.2.): It is very important 
for the whole procedure to ensure the media is protected from any form of 
alteration, usually with a hardware write blocker. The investigator should preserve 
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the digital media from alteration caused by viruses, physical damage, data 
corruption and any other possible risks that could destroy the evidence. 
Image the original media (I.3.3.): After the selection of the tool and the 
protection of the media, the investigator needs to create the image according to the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (as cited in Schweitzer, 
2003).  
Store safely original media (I.3.4.): The original media should be stored at a 
safe place, e.g. an evidence locker. Limited access should be given to these 
lockers in order to minimise potential problems with the integrity of the chain of 
evidence. 
Back-up the image, work on that (I.3.5.): Because of the risk of damaging 
or losing the image of the media, it is recommended that the investigator should 
create a back-up copy of the image and work on this copy. The computer forensic 
analysis suites, such as Guidance EnCase back up the image automatically, so 
there is no need for an additional copy.  
Create Cryptographic Value (I.3.6.): The cryptographic algorithms 
appreciated by computer forensics people as they calculate a file’s checksum for 
verification, e.g. MD5 or SHA-1. They evaluate the association between the 
original media and its copy for the investigator’s gain and prove the integrity of 
the evidence for the representation in a court. (Carrier and Spafford, 2003). Both 
images should be checked. Best practice dictates that the cryptographic hash is 
taken straight after the image is made. 
The table below reflects the breakdown of the process: 
Process 3. Image Acquisition 
I.3.1. 
Select 
appropriate 
tool 
I.3.2. Protect 
media from 
possible alteration 
of data 
I.3.3. Image 
the original 
media 
 
I.3.4.Store 
safely 
original 
media 
I.3.5.Back-up 
the image, 
work on that 
I.3.6. 
Create 
Cryptographic 
Value 
Table 10: Process 3 - Image Acquisition 
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4.4.3 ID Theft Data 
Once digital media has been collected and preserved, evidence related to the ID 
theft incident should then be sought. ID Theft Data is the preparation of the 
detailed media analysis. The ID theft investigation framework is a detailed 
procedure that requires ID theft as the object of the crime. Therefore, in the case 
where no ID theft suspicious or related data is identified, then the application of 
the framework and perhaps the case would terminate at this point. A more generic 
computer investigation should be considered as more suitable or a specific 
framework more appropriate to the investigation. 
The application of the ID theft framework assumes prior knowledge of an ID theft 
for it to be applied. It would be either based on the report from a victim or on 
evidence from a fraudster.  
In addition, multiple ‘specialist frameworks’ could be placed after the Digital 
Media input of Phase 1 to deal with other specific types of computer crime. The 
ID theft framework is designed to accommodate this future work. 
At this point, the digital media will be transferred from the crime scene to the 
laboratory for further analysis. The investigator is required to perform a quick 
initial search of the image in order to maintain an overview of its contents before 
the detailed analysis on the next phase. 
ID Theft Data consists of three processes that are examined in detail in the 
following sections: 
4. Evidential data identification  
5. Target identification  
6. Threat Agent identification / intention  
4.4.3.1 Process 4, Evidential Data Identification  
The Evidential Data Identification process provides the first distinction of the ID 
theft investigation framework from the generic existing computer forensic 
frameworks, as it distinguishes the procedure between the victim (V) and the 
fraudster (F). It is the initial categorisation of the evidential data and after 
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ensuring all contingences of the process, the examination can be performed under 
the corresponding flow.  
In most cases, the examiner is aware whether the media belongs to the victim or 
the fraudster category, however this process aims to identify and verify it. The 
findings intend to strengthen the continuity of the evidence and its validation as 
the investigation will be focused on the side of interest only. The activities on 
both sides of this process assist this validation towards the investigator and verify 
the source of the crime (Victim-Fraudster). 
The activities that need to be undertaken on this process for a Victim’s (V) digital 
media are: 
Existence of malicious software (I.4.1.V): Most types of unusual system 
processes may hide a malicious code existence in the system, virus vaults and logs 
(Schweitzer, 2003) and it may be responsible for stealing personal data. The 
existence of malicious code can be identified in slightly different places, 
depending on the operating system. For example, for Windows operating systems 
the investigator should identify whether malicious code is running at the start-up 
folders, the scheduled tasks or the memory cache and verify the creation of new 
registry keys and files (Carvey, 2004). An antivirus scan will also assist in this 
function.  
Existence of unsecured transactions (I.4.2.V): It involves any type of 
transaction that could take place over an unsecure, unencrypted network. This can 
be identified for example, by the media’s history log, where the investigator can 
discover with a glance, the user’s web browsing habits. The purpose of this 
activity is to provide clues whether the victim could have exposed private 
information while carrying out unsecured transactions.  
Vulnerable system (I.4.3.V): Establishing a lack of security software can show 
that the system has been vulnerable to an attack. The user has not taken under 
consideration the protection of the system; for example, no firewall or no antivirus 
is installed (Shinder and Titel, 2002).     
Victim evidential data list (O.4.1.V): It is the product of the above activities, 
where the identified evidential elements are listed. 
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The activities for the Fraudster’s (F) side are: 
Existence of malicious software code (I.4.1.F): Not only is considered what 
is written in I.4.1.V activity, but also and with more emphasis the existence of 
malicious source code in the media. For example, the creation of programming 
code from the fraudster in order to achieve his purposes. The fraudster may be 
writing his own malicious scripts. 
Forensic extraction software (I.4.2.F): Forensic extraction software in a 
computer system that has been suspected for ID theft could mean that the user 
himself is trying to retrieve data for digital media, with malicious purposes, e.g. to 
discover personal data.  
Hacking tools (I.4.3.F): A collection of hacking applications in a digital media 
usually reveals the intention of the user to exploit them. The investigator can 
easily identify such type of applications by conducting a search throughout the 
media. They can be recognised by their name that usually reveals their use. At this 
stage, the identification involves only those applications that do not involve an 
altered file name.  
Fraudster evidential data list (O.4.1.F): As in O.4.1.V, the product of the 
above activities, where the identified elements are listed.  
The table represents the Evidential Data Identification process, the categorisation 
between victim and fraudster and the required activities: 
Process 4. Evidential data identification 
V. Victim F. Fraudster 
I.4.1.V 
existence of 
malicious 
software 
I.4.2.V  
existence of 
unsecured 
transactions 
I.4.3.V  
vulnerable 
system 
O.4.1.V 
Victim 
evidential 
data list 
I.4.1.F 
existence of 
malicious 
software 
code 
I.4.2. F 
forensic 
extraction 
software 
I.4.3.F 
Hacking 
tools 
O.4.1.F 
Fraudster 
evidential 
data list 
Table 11: Process 4 - Evidential data identification 
4.4.3.2 Process 5, Target Identification  
While proceeding with this process, the investigator is expected to identify the 
reason the machine became a target. It is beneficial for the outcome of an ID theft 
investigation to be able to determine the source of the problem by recognising 
significant causes. Such data can be collected from either the victim’s or the 
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fraudster’s side. It aims to add information concerning the investigation based on 
the initial findings as this was identified on the previous process. The framework 
aims not only to identify the clues of an ID theft incident, but also to add 
knowledge on what caused it by an initial attempt to identify and categorise the 
available information up to this point. This process will assist and will be used for 
the classification of the evidence on process eight, later in the framework and 
produces a listing of the identified information.   
The activities of the Target Identification are: 
Vulnerable systems (I.5.1.): It concerns unsafe systems that can easily 
become targets of unlawful use. The investigator needs to state at this point 
whether he considers the system under investigation as vulnerable, based on the 
collected information so far, for example no antivirus is installed. A vulnerable 
system is more likely to become a target of an attack than a protected system. The 
purpose is to determine if the system has been part of the crime, based on its 
unsecure exposure on the Internet. 
Published information (I.5.2.): According to the evidential findings revealed 
so far, the investigator is expected to be able to identify published personal 
information that could have been used for fraudulent purposes. E.g. Evidence of 
information being published on social networking web sites. This is an activity for 
adding some additional information for the profiling of the target identification. 
However, the user could have placed all sorts of personal information on a 
networking web site, but had his credit card skimmed in a restaurant. Any similar 
situation cannot be covered from the computer-based ID theft framework. It is 
related with traditional or offline ID theft. If such a case exists, it will be revealed 
during the detailed analysis of the media. The victim could volunteering provide 
such information to the investigator. 
Individual/ Corporate (I.5.3.): Determine whether the target has been an 
individual (personal computer connected on the internet) or corporate (business 
computer connected on the internet). However, this piece of information is most 
of the times available to the investigator before the initialisation of the 
examination. In case of a business medium, the examiner proceeds with the 
assistance of the corporate security policy as additional to the framework. Such a 
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policy is going to help him identify any inconsistencies between the processes that 
run to the system and the security principle of the organisation. However, this 
does not interfere with the flow of the framework’s processes. 
Target Identification list (O.5.1.): A list that includes the target identification 
data as provided from the previous activities. 
The Target Identification process table follows: 
Process 5. Target identification 
I.5.1.  
vulnerable systems 
I.5.2.  
published information 
I.5.3.  
individual / corporate 
O.5.1. 
Target Identification list 
Table 12: Process 5 - Target identification 
4.4.3.3 Process 6, Threat Agent Identification/ Intention  
According to Bidgoli (2004), a threat agent is: 
An individual or organisation that has the potential to realise a threat 
against a specific target 
Therefore, in the case of investigating an ID theft incident, the threat agent is 
interpreted as the fraudster. However, no matter whether the investigation 
concentrates on the victim’s or the fraudster’s perspective, it is of great 
importance for the analyst to identify the intention of the fraudster. It is going to 
add expertise and intelligence on the way future investigations will take place as 
the investigator will be considering the identification of the fraudster during the 
analysis and he will be keeping track of it. This can be achieved from the 
collection of information added at this stage and analysed on the following phase 
(Process 9).   
The activities of the Threat Agent Identification / Intention process are: 
Internal/ External attack (I.6.1.): Concerning the ID theft evidential data 
discovered, the incident should be considered either as a direct internal network 
attack or as an external source (Vidalis and Jones, 2005). It is based on the way 
the system has been accessed. This piece of information is going to give the first 
hints for profiling the threat agent in process nine.   
Individual/ Corporate (I.6.2.): This activity provides the threat agent’s 
intention, based on the information revealed so far from activity I.5.3. The 
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examiner should determine whether the fraudster retrieved private information 
from an individual or a corporate system (Vidalis and Jones, 2005). This can later 
reveal information about the intelligence and the intention of the fraudster.  
Threat agent identification list (O.6.1.): The output activity creates a list 
with the data identified so far from I.6.1 and I.6.2. 
The table showing the functions of the Threat Agent identification / intention: 
Process 6. Threat Agent identification / intention 
I.6.1. internal / external 
attack 
I.6.2. individual / corporate O.6.1. Threat agent identification 
list 
Table 13: Process 6 - Threat Agent identification / intention 
4.5 Phase 2, Evidence Analysis  
4.5.1 Phase 2 Overview 
After the detection of the ID Theft Data (Process 2), the investigator is requested 
to examine the digital media in detail and identify specific clues concerning the 
crime in phase two. He should create the evidence trail that will help him confirm 
an ID theft incident.  
As described in chapter three, the examiner may consider returning to phase 1 at 
any time for the accurate and precise outcome of the investigation. He may go 
back to the previous phase in order to re-examine a whole process or a single 
activity. Figure 17 is a fragment of the framework’s relationships as already 
presented in chapter three and found on a full page version on Appendix F (IV). 
The purpose is to show the interaction between phases one and two. 
Figure 17: Relationships between phases 1 and 2 
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Pea produces the input and output below: 
Input: ID Theft Data Analysis, examines in detail the ID theft data discovered in 
the overview of evidence that was completed in process two as part of the Media 
Analysis phase. However, the examiner will analyse in detail the data on the 
digital media. Furthermore, during this input he will analyse the target of the 
attack, based on the owner of the digital media (victim or fraudster) and analyse 
the fraudster, according to the findings.  
Output: Evidence, it presents the specific ID theft data that was discovered from 
the Digital Media which forms of the input of this phase. It is the attempt to 
collect and classify the evidence discovered after the analysis of the digital media, 
verifying the ID theft incident. 
The following sections look at each process of the phase independently and 
describe the use of every activity it consists of. Figure 18 represents the phase. 
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Figure 18: Phase 2 - Evidence Analysis Breakdown 
Phase 2 
Evidence 
Analysis 
ID Theft Data Analysis 
 Process 7. Data Analysis 
I.7.1. Identify all files of the system 
I.7.2. Recover deleted files 
I.7.3. Slack / Unallocated space 
I.7.4. Hidden partitions 
O.7.1. Define files that can be used as 
evidence 
 Process 8. Target Analysis 
V. Victim 
I.8.1.V. Malicious Software  
I.8.2.V. Local-based e-mail 
I.8.3.V. Web-based e-mail 
I.8.4.V. Embedded Object scripting 
access languages 
I.8.5.V. Recently accessed documents 
I.8.6.V. URL information  
I.8.7.V. Security permissions 
I.8.8.V. Application histories 
I.8.9.V. Instant message history log 
I.8.10.V. Databases 
I.8.11.V. Spreadsheets 
I.8.12.V. Number systems 
O.8.1.V. List evidential findings 
   F. Fraudster 
I.8.1.F. Internet bookmarks 
I.8.2.F. Steganographic search 
I.8.3.F. Embedded Object scripting 
access languages 
I.8.4.F. Installed Software 
I.8.5.F. Track illicit software use 
I.8.6.F. Recently Accessed Documents 
I.8.7.F. Filenames  
I.8.8.F. URL information 
I.8.9.F. Local based e-mail 
I.8.10.F. Web based e-mail 
I.8.11.F. Operating System registry 
entries 
I.8.12.F. Security permissions 
I.8.13.F. Instant message history log 
I.8.14.F. Malicious software 
I.8.15.F. Malicious source code 
existence 
I.8.16.F. Web server communication 
I.8.17.F. Databases 
I.8.18.F. Spreadsheets 
I.8.19.F. Images 
I.8.20.F. File Processes 
I.8.21.F. Number Systems 
O.8.1.F. List evidential findings 
Process 9. Threat Agent Analysis 
I.9.1. Intention 
I.9.2. Motivation 
I.9.3. Knowledge / Skills 
Evidence Collection 
 Process 10. Evidence Collection 
I.10.1. Use evidential finding  
list, O.8.1.V or  O.8.1.F 
O.10.1. Create list of evidence based  
on ID Theft types 
O.10.2. Target evidence list 
O.10.3. Threat agent evidence list 
(from Process 9) 
 Process 11. Evidence Categorisation 
I.11.1. Use evidential sorting list, 
O.8.1.V or  O.8.1.F 
O.11.1. Create evidence 
classification list  
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4.5.2 ID Theft Data Analysis 
The purpose of the ID theft Data Analysis is to perform a detailed examination for 
ID theft related evidence. The investigator has already identified ID theft 
information from Processes 4, 5 and 6 in phase 1. While the output of the previous 
phase (ID Theft Data) produces observation, detection and identification of 
fraudulent use of someone’s identity, in the ID Theft Data Analysis the 
investigator’s aim is to analyse this information. The analysis of this data is of 
significant importance, because the evidence related to the case will be examined.  
The ID Theft Data Analysis at its completion produces the ‘facts’ that the 
examiner needs.     
It consists of three processes that will be explained in this section: 
7. Data Analysis Process 
8. Target Analysis Process  
9. Threat Agent Analysis Process 
4.5.2.1 Process 7, Data Analysis  
The Data Analysis aims to identify evidential data pertinent to the case in every 
single part of the digital media. As the most common medium of computer 
forensic investigations is the hard disk, the examples provided mostly refer to a 
hard disk analysis. However, the framework is focused on the file system and it 
can be applied to any digital device. The following activities are part of the 
process: 
Identify all files of the system (I.7.1.): As in a traditional computer forensics 
investigation, evidential data can be discovered in all parts of the digital media. It 
is a prerequisite for the investigator to identify all the areas that files can be 
retrieved.   
The activity refers to the following instructions: 
Instruction 1. Existing files 
Instruction 2. Deleted, remaining 
Instruction 3. Hidden data 
Instruction 4. Encrypted / password protected 
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Instruction 5. Temporary files / folders 
Recover deleted files (I.7.2.): When the deleted files have been identified, 
they should be recovered in order to examine their content (Kizza, 2005). For 
example, a hex editor can be used to identify them.    
Slack / Unallocated space (I.7.3.): The use of special tools can help the 
investigator examine the slack and unallocated space of the medium, as 
information such as network logon names and passwords can be stored there. For 
example, analyse the Windows O.S. swap file as outlined in Wang et al. (2005). 
Hidden partitions (I.7.4.): They are created mainly to store files that the user 
does not desire to be visible in the operating system. Farmer and Venema (2005), 
provide information about revealing hidden partitions. An ID thief could hide 
sensitive data this way.  However, there are cases that a hidden partition could be 
installed by the manufacturer. Still in such a case it should be recovered and 
examined. Applications such as Norton Partition Magic can uncover a hidden 
partition. 
Define files that can be used as evidence (O.7.1.): This function aims to 
collect the files identified in the previous activities that could be used as possible 
evidence. The investigator can collect and archive the evidential data discovered, 
in order to create a concrete structure of the files. These files will be analysed in 
detail at the following activity.  
The instructions that were met above in Identify all files of the system (I.7.1.) 
disclose: 
Instruction 1. Existing files: search through all the existing files that appear in 
the medium during the search. 
Instruction 2. Deleted, remaining: check the deleted, but remaining files that 
exist in the medium. The investigator is able to retrieve deleted data that have 
remained and can probably provide additional proof. (Wang et al., 2005)  
Instruction 3. Hidden data: possible illicit data can be missed if the hidden files 
are not viewed (Gallegos, 2005). The investigator needs to check the system for 
hidden files. For example, a fraudster could hide a file that contains information 
about his victim or even employ rootkits to hide his action. 
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Instruction 4. Encrypted / password protected: Encrypted files are significant 
and with the aid of special tools the decryption and password recovery of files can 
be managed. Casey (2002) proposes practical approaches on overcoming 
encryption. The existence of encrypted files raises suspicion on its own. 
Instruction 5. Temporary files / folders: Wang (2003) recommends file 
shredders in order to wipe temporary files from a system. However, in case the 
user has not done so, files with extensions such as *.tmp and *.chk can provide 
information to the investigator about the user’s actions. The framework attempts 
to identify these cases with Instruction 5, even though they cannot be guaranteed. 
Any anti-forensic techniques that may have been used complicate the life of the 
investigator (Kessler, 2007b).   
The representation table of the Data Analysis process: 
Process 7. Data Analysis 
I.7.1. Identify all 
files of the system 
I.7.2.  Recover 
deleted files 
I.7.3. Slack / 
Unallocated 
space 
I7.4. Hidden 
partitions 
O.7.1.  Define files 
that can be used as 
evidence 
1. existing files 
2. deleted, 
remaining 
3. hidden 
4. encrypted / 
password 
protected 
5. temporary 
files/ folders 
    
Table 14: Process 7 - Data Analysis 
4.5.2.2 Process 8, Target Analysis  
The Target Analysis concentrates on the analysis of data that connect solely with 
the victim (V.) or the fraudster (F.). This process provides the investigator with 
detailed activities concerning the analysis of the digital media and the practice that 
will reveal the requested information for the ID theft case. It is important to 
mention at this point that the ID framework describes the procedure of identifying 
the ID theft evidence. An amount of the activities in this process can be 
interrogated using the search features of most forensics software to find the 
evidence. The purpose of this process though is to describe the procedure and 
demonstrate what evidential findings are connected with ID theft.      
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The initial identification of evidential data appeared in process four. At this stage, 
the investigator is required to use this information as an initial input and analyse 
in depth the elements of the system that provided ID theft data. 
In order to prove ID theft, the investigator is required to examine some further 
parts of the fraudster’s digital media in comparison with the victim’s. Therefore, 
the fraudster’s side includes more activities to be undertaken than the victim’s 
media. For example, there is no actual need to examine the pictures on the 
victim’s digital media. This would not add any value to the analysis, whereas it is 
important to examine the fraudster’s images, as they could indicate a filing of 
potential or past victims. 
In the following section, Target Analysis - V. Victim is first described and 
represented and then the Target Analysis - F. Fraudster. 
The activities for the Victim (V.) are: 
Malicious software (I.8.1.V): Perform a thorough anti-virus check with a 
collection of antivirus programs. An infected with malicious software system 
could mean that personal data may be stolen. The activity examines the identified 
malicious software from I.4.1.V.  
Skoudis and Zeltser (2003) provide a very detailed reference on the characteristics 
of malicious software and code and give guidelines to the investigator on how to 
analyse incidents that involve malware, based on the malware’s behaviour and 
timeline. In addition, Carvey (2004) provides an insight of the footprints left 
behind by malware, as well as the detection of rootkits that can be of great value 
for the investigation procedure. 
The activity requires the following instructions: 
Instruction 1. Monitors web-browser activity / network traffic 
Instruction 2. Accesses contact list records 
Instruction 3. Accesses clipboard contents 
Instruction 4. Trojans that collect personal info 
Instruction 5. Software Keylogger (hosted) 
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Local based e-mail (I.8.2.V): The e-mail correspondence of the user can reveal 
the relationship between the user and other contacts. The investigator proceeds 
with the rules and procedure he would follow for forensically analysing e-mail 
messages, although he concentrates on evidence that is related solely with the ID 
theft incident. 
According to the ACPO (2007) guidelines, the e-mail headers are available 
usually from the e-mail client program of the user. They can reveal information 
about the sender, the receiver, the date of the message and even the content. In 
such a case, valuable data concerning the e-mail exchange of the user can be 
revealed. It is specifically valuable for incidents where Phishing is involved. The 
storage archives can assist to the e-mail analysis, e.g. *.dbx, *.pst, *.mbx.  
Web-based e-mail (I.8.3.V): The web-based mail relates to the web browser 
and its analysis is based on a different perspective than the local based e-mail. 
Information about the existence of web-mail account logins can be found on 
cookies, history, typed URLs and cache of a system for windows systems. As 
Akin (2003) mentions, web-based mail has to deal with the amount of information 
that is stored locally by the web browsers. Any open relays that promote spam e-
mail should be examined by their originated IP address as well as the e-mail 
headers. 
A sophisticated attack will involve anonymous web servers, proxy servers and 
anonymous SSH tunnels. The investigator in order to trace evidence, he should 
examine the e-mail headers and discover the original IP address. The actual 
investigation is also based on classic techniques for analysing e-mail and is 
combined with information extracted from the URL, as described below. For 
example, the index.dat file can provide information for a Hotmail webmail 
account.  
Embedded Object scripting access languages (I.8.4.V): As long as web 
pages embed scripting languages such as JavaScript, hidden threats lie beneath. 
The victim’s storage media may reveal evidence of worms that send information 
back to the fraudster (Evers, (2006), Lemos, (2006)).  
Recently accessed documents (I.8.5.V): The recently accessed documents as 
identified on the hidden files on Windows O.S. ([...\Documents and 
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Settings\user\Recent]) can provide valuable information to the investigator 
concerning the files and folders the user has accessed relatively recently. 
However, the recent documents history can be disabled for the Windows, by 
altering the Registry key [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft 
\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\ Explorer] (PC Tools, 2002). On KDE Linux 
for instance, the recently accessed documents are stored in 
[../home/user/.kde/apps/share/RecentDocuments]. The user can avoid them being 
recorded only by changing the permission of the folder to read only (Greene, 
2002). In such a case, the investigator is unable to recover any information.  
URL information (I.8.6.V): Examine the information being kept on the system 
from the use of the Internet. The activity also inspects the identified unsecured 
transactions from I.4.2.V. For example, the index.dat file of the Internet Explorer 
can give valuable URL information about the user’s actions. Such information 
includes web browser history, cookies, and temporary internet files. The examiner 
can reconstruct the web activity of the user. (Jones, 2003) The default path for 
Windows O.S. is [...\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE7\ index.dat] 
There are two instructions here: 
Instruction 1. URL cache 
Instruction 2. URL activity record 
Security permissions (I.8.7.V): The security permissions that have been set to 
the operating system can recover potential insecurities. The security event log 
should be examined in order to check any alterations and login dates and time. 
The detailed examination identified the vulnerable system referring to I.4.3.V. 
Application histories (I.8.8.V): Similar to I.8.5.V, the history kept by several 
applications can reveal his footprints. The log files of suspicious installed 
applications should be examined. They can provide information, such as access 
times.  
Instant message history log (I.8.9.V): In case instant messengers are 
installed, the history log (when enabled), as well as the user’s contact list could 
provide valuable information to the investigator of the digital media. 
Databases (I.8.10.V): Possible evidence resides in databases nowadays, as they 
are widely used by computer users in order to assist their daily activities. The 
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investigator needs first to check the existence of databases. In case an ID thief 
gains access to such information on a victim’s medium, he could use it for his 
own purposes. A user could maintain databases that include assets and financial 
records for instance. 
Spreadsheets (I.8.11.V): A victim may use the spreadsheets under the same 
perspective with the databases (I.8.10.V.) and store financial information. 
Number systems (I.8.12.V): Number system searches can reveal information 
about stored phone numbers, addresses, security pins, postcodes, etc. and assist 
the investigator identify possible information leaks and uses. 
List evidential findings (O.8.13.V): This output activity produces a summary 
with the evidential findings resulted after the analysis of the victim’s medium. 
The instructions of Malicious software (I.8.1.V) request during the analysis that 
the examiner identifies the following at the behaviour of the malware: 
Instruction 1. Monitors web-browser activity / network traffic: whether the 
malware monitors the web-browser activity or monitors the network traffic of the 
machine. 
Instruction 2. Accesses contact list records: whether the malware accesses the 
victim’s contact list records. 
Instruction 3. Accesses clipboard contents: whether anything saved temporarily 
in the clipboard contains financial information, such as bots, aiming to financial 
information. 
Instruction 4. Trojans that collect personal info 
Instruction 5. Software Keylogger (hosted) 
The URL information (I.8.6.V.) activity holds the following instructions: 
Instruction 1. URL cache: Can be viewed with the help of special tools such as 
the Web Cache Illuminator (2008) and investigate all the cache memory of the 
system, including visited web pages and images.  
Instruction 2. URL activity record: Can reveal the typed URLs from the user, 
which is important information concerning the user’s activity and web site visiting 
habits.   
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The following table represents the Target Analysis process for the victim (V): 
 
The activities for the Fraudster (F.) are: 
Internet bookmarks (I.8.1.F.): A detailed exploration of the Internet 
bookmarks reveals information about that person’s habits. Even if the web page 
names have been saved with an alternative name in order to avoid tracing, the 
investigator needs to verify every page.     
Steganographic search (I.8.2.F.): Steganography is a technique used by 
fraudsters to ensure the masking of a file. As it is quite difficult to identify the 
existence of such a technique, Schweitzer (2003) recommends the use of 
Stegdetect (2004), a tool that discovers the existence of steganographic methods. 
The use of these methods refer to the fraudster’s side, as it is possible to attempt 
embedding evidence to ‘innocent’ files or images, in order to avoid those being 
uncovered. Kessler (2004) writes on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and provides useful guidelines concerning the forensic investigation of 
Steganographic techniques.  
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Table 15: Process 8 - Target Analysis (V. Victim) 
The ID Theft Investigation Framework 
 
120 
In addition, the existence of steganographic software should also be checked in 
the system. It would reveal the fraudster’s intention to use it. 
Embedded Object scripting access languages (I.8.3.F.): The same as V. 
Victim, activity I.8.4.V. 
Installed software (I.8.4.F.): The software installed on the user’s machine can 
indicate his intention and lead the investigator to important clues about his habits. 
Such as forensic extraction software that was identified in I.4.2.F. It is not about 
examining the legal software installations, but rather the purpose and intention of 
using the installed application. For example, the intruder may use tools like web 
design software aiming to conduct DNS Poisoning or Man-in-the-middle attacks 
for pharming or phishing respectively. 
The activity requires the following instructions: 
Instruction 1. Web design applications 
Instruction 2. Existence of Anti-Forensics applications 
Instruction 3. System process eraser 
Track illicit software use (I.8.5.F.): Illicit software can be identified by the 
.exe files on a hard disk search, the System Registry and the System Information. 
(Marcella and Greenfield, 2002) 
Recently Accessed Documents (I.8.6.F.): The same procedure that was 
followed in activity I.8.5.V. 
Filenames (I.8.7.F.): The computer criminals tend to hide sensitive content 
files; the investigator needs to examine the filenames of the system. Any 
suspicious or inconsistent filenames can provide potential information left 
available by the fraudster. 
URL information (I.8.8.F.): The same as I.8.6.V. In addition, any information 
that can be extracted from discussion forums and internet blogs would be of the 
interest of the investigator, as they would reveal the concerns and interests of the 
fraudster. 
The instructions that are needed for this activity are: 
Instruction 1. URL cache 
Instruction 2. URL activity record 
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Local based e-mail (I.8.9.F.): The same as activity I.8.2.V. 
Web-based e-mail (I.8.10.F.): The same as activity I.8.3.V. 
Operating System Registry entries (I.8.11.F.): The system registry files can 
provide a review of the system and valuable information for the fraudster’s latest 
actions. The latest typed URLs for example on Windows O.S. can be retrieved 
from My Computer\HKEY_CURRENT_USER 
\Software\Microsoft\InternetExplorer\TypedURLs 
Security permissions (I.8.12.F.): The same as activity I.8.7.V. 
Instant message history log (I.8.13.F.): The same as activity I.8.9.V. 
Malicious software (I.8.14.F.): The discovery of malicious software in the 
media could mean that the fraudster is maintaining a malicious software archive 
that has already used or intends to use. E.g. Trojan horses or botnets. The 
examiner can use MD5 or SHA1 hashes and NIST hash sets to check this 
software. Alternatively he could refer to the Common Malware Enumeration 
(2007) list for any additional information on the identified malware or to 
communities, such as Offensive Computing (2009). Additional information about 
the functionality of the malware is provided there and also the actual malware can 
be downloaded.  
Malicious source code existence (I.8.15.F.): It is not only the identification 
and examination of the malicious software that provide evidential data for the 
fraudster’s purposes, but also the existence of writing or altering malicious source 
code. This has obviously been already identified in I.4.1.F. The investigators need 
programming skills to reverse engineer and identify the content of the unknown 
malicious code and connect it with the ID theft incident. Otherwise, he needs to 
refer to a programmer.  
Web server communication (I.8.16.F.): In cases where the investigation 
reveals evidence linked with web server communication, instances of malicious 
actions, Denial-Of-Service attacks and DNS Poisoning should be examined 
according to the classic computer forensic investigation method. There are great 
possibilities that such communications are linked with the ID theft incident. These 
communications could involve intermediate machines. The analysis of network 
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traffic and additional tools, e.g. packet sniffers could probably reveal information 
about the web server communication (Kessler and Fasulo, 2007). 
Databases (I.8.17.F.): The same as V. Victim, function I.3.14. The fraudster 
could maintain data for exploiting new victims or even hold information about 
perpetrated attacks. However, it is quite unlike for a sophisticated fraudster to 
disregard the possibility of being discovered and such information being revealed. 
Spreadsheets (I.8.18.F.): The same as I.8.10.V. The spreadsheets can have the 
same value as the databases for the fraudster, as he could possibly keep track of 
his actions. 
Images (I.8.19.F.): The image files found on the fraudster’s disk can provide 
additional evidence, as the investigator may discover images from past victims, 
possible victims, or even contacts of the fraudster. For instance, the fraudster 
could collect pictures for forging passports.  
File Processes (I.8.20.F.): This function refers to any process of the files that 
appear as suspicious to the system during the investigation so far. For example, 
the investigator has identified duplicates of a file in several places then, he should 
compare the consistency of these files.  
Number systems (I.8.21.F.): The same as activity I.8.12.V. 
List evidential findings (O.8.1.F): The same as activity O.8.1.V. 
The purpose of the instructions on this activity for the Installed software (I.8.4.F.): 
Instruction 1. Web design applications: It can indicate the fraudster’s activity 
on phishing or malicious web site designing. 
Instruction 2. Existence of Anti-Forensics applications: It can indicate the 
fraudster’s intention to alter data with anti-forensic techniques. (Davies et al., 
2004) 
Instruction 3. System activity eraser: It involves the identification of any type 
of software that wipes data from the media. It indicates the fraudster’s intention to 
erase evidence, it can be also considered as an anti-forensic technique. However, 
it stands as an individual data file in order to stretch the importance of wiping 
data, rather than altering. E.g. Wipe Expert 1.6. (2006) 
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For the URL information (I.8.8.F.), 
Instruction 1. URL cache:  The same as activity I.8.6.V< Instruction 1.  
Instruction 2. URL activity record:  The same as I.8.6.V< Instruction 2. 
Table 16 summarizes Process 8. Target Analysis – F. Fraudster: 
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4.5.2.3 Process 9, Threat Agent Analysis  
This process analyses the threat agent, in other words, it is the contribution of 
findings of processes eight and nine. Without the knowledge gained from the Data 
Analysis and the Target Analysis, the examiner is not able to create an overall 
viewpoint about the Threat Agent.  
The collection of information and analysis of the data provided concerning the 
fraudster is independent from the owner of the media (victim or fraudster). It is 
going to supply invaluable elements for his profiling and knowledge to the 
investigator.    
Table 16: Process 8 - Target Analysis (F. Fraudster) 
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The process consists of three activities: 
Intention (I.9.1.): According to the information discovered the investigator 
should be able to put in the picture the intention of the fraudster. This is going to 
be based on the different forms of ID theft. For example, in the case where only 
identification data is stolen, then the intention of the threat agent appears to be 
identity ID theft. In some cases there may not be enough detail to prove this, but 
there should be indications in relation to the findings that support the fraudster’s 
intention. 
Therefore, the instructions for this activity are: 
Instruction 1. Financial  
Instruction 2. Identity 
Motivation (I.9.2.):  Vidalis and Jones (2004) present a threat agent list, where 
each different type of threat agent is motivated by his beliefs. In agreement with 
his motive, the threat agent penetrates the system. At this point, the function of the 
activity will give insight to the investigator. 
This activity requests one instruction: 
Instruction 1.Target 
Knowledge/ Skills (I.9.3.): The findings of the investigation so far provide 
information about the skills of the attacker. The investigator gets an insight about 
the background knowledge of the fraudster, the group that the threat agent belongs 
(Jones and Ashenden D., 2005), conspiracy intentions or an innovative attacker.  
The instructions of the Intention (I.9.1.) activity apply to the following, based on 
the different forms of ID theft (see section 2.2.3) 
Instruction 1. Financial: The purpose of the ID thief is to gain access to financial 
information for financial gain. 
Instruction 2. Identity: The purpose of the ID thief is to gain access to 
someone’s identification information or impersonate an individual for acquiring a 
new identity. 
The instruction of the Motivation (I.9.2.) activity requires:  
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Instruction 1. Target: The objective of the attack’s motive needs to be identified. 
For example, whether the attack was motivated over an organised group or 
whether the target was a vulnerable system. 
The following table reflects to the structure of the process: 
 
4.5.3 Evidence 
Evidence is the required outcome after the analysis. The investigator needs to 
begin structuring the collection of data that compose the evidence. Even though 
the analyst is not able to provide evidence, but indications of evidence, he should 
be able to determine it. Providing raw data does not justify the value of the 
findings. Therefore, the Evidence Analysis phase should present evidential data 
under such justification that can lead the investigator to the next phase (Scenario 
Construction). 
In order to achieve this, the examiner is required to gather the results from ID 
Theft Data Analysis, and use them in order to assemble the evidential data and 
classify it. The investigator will be able to collect the data under a concrete and 
structured basis that is explained below.   
For the manipulation of the output, two processes are constructed: 
10. Evidence Collection  
11. Evidence Classification  
  
Process 9. Threat Agent Analysis 
I.3.38. Intention I.3.39.  Motivation I.3.40. Knowledge / Skills 
1.Financial 1.Target  
2.Identity 
Table 17: Process 9 - Threat Agent Analysis 
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4.5.3.1 Process 10, Evidence Collection  
It is the first process the investigator should proceed after the analysis, as he needs 
to collect the evidential data from ID Theft Data Analysis. By simply identifying 
the evidential data during the analysis, the examiner has only raw data concerning 
the ID theft incident that needs to be gathered and sorted. The activities of this 
process use the information gathered from processes seven, eight and nine. The 
purpose is merely to facilitate the evidence collection under a single process. 
Evidence Collection consists of the following activities: 
Use evidential findings list O.8.1.V or O.8.1.F (I.10.1.): Use the lists of 
evidential data that resulted from the analysis of the target (Process 8), in order to 
continue to the next activity, where the evidence will be sorted based on the type 
of ID theft. 
List of evidence based on ID Theft types (O.10.1.): The investigator is 
requested to categorise the evidential data identified according to the different 
forms of ID theft (see section 2.2.3 and I.9.1). These are created in two 
instructions. The categorisation is similar to Process 9< I.9.1, although examined 
from a content perspective that is explained in the Instructions part of this section: 
Instruction 1. Financial  
Instruction 2. Identity 
Threat Agent Evidence list (O.10.2.): It uses information from the Threat 
Agent Analysis (Process 9). The investigator is requested to list the evidence that 
has been collected for the threat agent. The purpose is to gather information 
related with the threat agent.   
The instructions of the List of evidence based on ID theft types (O.10.1.) require 
the following instructions and some objectives are also required for each 
instruction. The objectives that appear here classify information that is directly 
linked with their name. Consequently, no further clarification is provided. The 
evidential data is classified; however, there can be information overlap, as 
evidential data discovered do not necessarily belong only in one form of ID theft. 
Instruction 1. Financial: This list is going to include all financial information 
gathered after the analysis of the digital media. The objectives that are included 
indicate the categories that financial data belong and are the following:  
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Objective 1.1. Credit histories  
Objective 1.2. Transactions  
Objective 1.3. Application names  
Objective 1.4. Phone records  
Objective 1.5. Tax records  
Objective 1.6. Bankruptcy records  
Objective 1.7. Documents on other people’s names 
Objective 1.8. Dates of birth  
Instruction 2. Identity: It concentrates on evidential data that deals with an 
individual’s identity and the following objectives categorise it: 
Objective 2.1. Financial Evidence  
Objective 2.2. National Insurance (N.I.) Numbers 
Objective 2.3. Driving licence  
Objective 2.4. Employment records  
Objective 2.5. Passport records 
Objective 2.6. Business records  
Objective 2.7. Property records  
Objective 2.8. Documents on other people’s names 
Objective 2.9. Dates of birth  
Objective 2.10. ID Card copies  
Objective 2.11. Criminal records 
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The representation table of the process follows: 
Process 10. Evidence Collection 
I.10.1. Use evidential findings 
list [O.8.1.V or O.8.1.F] 
O.10.1. List of evidence 
based on ID theft types 
O.10.2. Threat agent Evidence 
list 
 1. Financial 
ú Credit histories 
ú Transactions 
ú Application names 
ú Phone records 
ú Tax records 
ú Bankruptcy records  
ú Documents on other 
people’s names 
ú Dates of birth 
 
 2. Identity 
ú Financial Evidence 
ú N.I. Numbers 
ú Driving licence 
ú Employment records 
ú Passport records 
ú Business records 
ú Property records 
ú Documents on other 
people’s names 
ú Dates of birth 
ú ID Card copies 
ú Criminal records 
 
4.5.3.2 Process 11, Evidence Categorisation 
When the evidence has been identified, collected and sorted the framework 
suggests it should be categorised according to their quality and value. Casey 
(2004) supports the categorisation of evidence in comparison with traditional 
forensics. The categorisation can strengthen the association of the findings with 
the fraudster, where greater importance is given to the most relevant evidential 
findings. The detailed ID theft investigation that the framework provides, allows 
the investigator to attempt a categorisation of the findings. Computer forensic 
investigations in practice show that the evidence identified is not always of the 
same strength in order to prove the alleged ID theft incident, especially when this 
needs to be provable in a court of law. Because of the subjective treat of evidential 
data, the skilled computer forensics investigator should be able to determine the 
quality of the evidence discovered.  
Table 18: Process 10 - Evidence Collection 
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It dictates the creation of the following activities: 
Use evidential findings list, O.8.1.V or O.8.1.F respectively (I.11.1.): In 
order to satisfy the need of categorising the evidence, the analyst needs also to use 
the appropriate evidential findings list in this function. 
Create evidence classification list (O.11.1.): Concerning ID theft 
investigations it is advantageous for the investigator to classify the evidence 
during his examination. In fact, this activity will produce three lists under its three 
instructions. These three instructions were chosen for the sorting of evidence, 
because they categorise the findings in three groups: the most relevant and crucial, 
the relevant, but not crucial and the not directly referring to the case. It is exactly 
the number of instructions that was considered appropriate for the ID theft 
framework. The reason this activity has been included is to assist the admissibility 
of the evidence. Findings considered as irrelevant will not be excluded from the 
final report to avoid issues from the defence. The investigator will include all 
evidence, while giving more emphasis to the strongly relevant to the case.  For 
example, considering an examination where plenty of e-mail communication is 
involved; it may only be a small number of those found considered as directly 
linked with the case. Casey (2004) on the other hand, attempts a classification of 
the digital source.    
The evidence is sorted based on the following: 
Instruction 1. Strongly Evidential 
Instruction 2. Evidential  
Instruction 3. Irrelevant   
The above instructions require in detail: 
Instruction 1. Strongly Evidential: This list is only going to include the findings 
that exemplify the premise and can present its validity without any doubts. In case 
the investigator considers no evidence as strongly evidential, then this list will 
remain blank. The same applies for the following two as well.  
Instruction 2. Evidential: The evidential findings comprise this list. The piece of 
information revealed after the analysis of the media and is linked with the 
incident, but does not strongly support the ID theft incident. It is the pieces that 
The ID Theft Investigation Framework 
 
130 
complete the puzzle, although they need to be corroborated with other evidential 
findings. This piece of evidence belongs to this list. 
Instruction 3. Irrelevant: There could be some elements revealed at the 
completion of the ID Theft Data Analysis that seemed meaningful for the 
examination. However, after the completion of Evidence Collection (Process 10), 
this evidence is considered irrelevant with the investigation and is listed under this 
data file. Still, it should be mentioned in the documentation of the incident for 
later purposes. 
The table that represents the process is:    
Process 11. Evidence Categorisation 
I.11.1. Use evidential findings list [O.8.1.V or 
O.8.1.F] 
I.11.2. Create evidence classification list 
 1. Strongly Evidential 
 2. Evidential 
 3. Irrelevant 
Table 19: Process 11 - Evidence Categorisation 
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4.6 Phase 3, Scenario Construction 
4.6.1 Phase 3 Overview 
The third phase of the ID theft investigation framework aims to construct a 
scenario based on the evidential data that has been identified and collected so far. 
The investigator has completed the analysis of the media in Pea. However, the 
procedure of structuring the collected evidence in a scenario that attempts to 
describe the history of the incident, based on the findings is significant. At this 
stage, the investigator will be able to revisit the collected and categorised evidence 
from Phase 2 and classify the evidence and construct the scenario.  
During this phase the examiner may need to return to any of the two previous 
phases, in order to search for additional evidential data. He is required to group 
the evidential data and create a scenario for the incident. Figure 19 below signifies 
the relationships among phases one, two and three (see Appendix F (IV) for the 
relationships in full page representation): 
 
Figure 19: Relationships among phases 1, 2 and 3 
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The phase maintains the following input and required output: 
Input: Evidence Classification, the investigator is expected to use the information 
from Evidence (Phase 2< output) and structure the evidential data, the threat 
agent’s profile according to the information collected, occurring the victim or the 
fraudster, and consequently structure the analysed digital evidence.   
Output: Scenario, it is the reconstructed narrative, based on the evidence 
discovered. The investigator outlines the scenario and prepares the documentation 
that will be used on the last phase of the ID theft investigation framework. 
Figure 20 outlines the structure of Psc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 20: Phase 3 - Scenario Construction Breakdown 
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4.6.2 Evidence Classification 
The input of the phase accommodates the need of processing the evidential data 
gathered in phase two. Evidence will be used at this stage in order to assist the 
investigator identify the categories the evidential data belongs; group and appoint 
it accordingly. This procedure consists of three processes, where each one 
structures the evidence from different perspective and are analysed further in this 
section. The categorised evidential data of the Evidence classification will be then 
used in the construction of the Scenario, the output of the phase. 
The processes that constitute the Evidence Classification: 
12. Structure of Evidential Data  
13. Structure Threat Agent’s Profile  
14. Structure Analysed Digital Evidence 
4.6.2.1 Process 12, Structure of Evidential Data  
The purpose of the Structure of Evidential Data is to collect the evidence that has 
been discovered during the Media Analysis (Phase 2), structure and categorise it. 
The intention is to represent the evidential data in a manner that will correspond to 
the type of the content and the amount that it is linked with the case.  
The activities that construct the process are: 
Use evidence as of processes 10 and 11 (I.12.1.): The evidential data 
identified in Evidence (output, Phase 2), is studied and classified in Evidence 
Collection (Process 10) and Evidence Categorisation (Process 11). Therefore, 
I.12.1 aims to accumulate these findings in order to use them in the following 
activity.    
Categorisation of evidential data (O.12.1.): The purpose of this 
categorisation is to arrange the collected evidence that resulted from I.12.1 based 
on their content. The categories that evidence falls into are described in 
instructions of the activity. However, there is no prerequisite that the discovered 
evidence will necessarily belong to a defined instruction. They are mainly for 
guidance towards the investigator. The Target Evidence List (O.10.2.) and the 
Evidence Classification List (O.11.1.) have already provided the detection of data 
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that indicate an ID theft incident. For this categorisation, the investigator should 
only use Instruction 1 and/ or Instruction 2 of O.11.1. Instruction 3 holds only 
irrelevant data that do not need to be included in this categorisation. O.12.1 
activity is going to use these as collected in I.12.1 and group them to the 
following instructions: 
Instruction 1.E-mail 
Instruction 2.Internet Related 
Instruction 3.Malware 
Instruction 4.Hacked Databases 
Instruction 5.Malicious Tools 
Instruction 6.Documents 
Instruction 7.Application Logs 
Instruction 8.System Vulnerabilities  
Instruction 9.Other 
Their purpose is explained below. The related activities to the following 
instructions are borrowed from Target Analysis (Process 8) that shows their 
functionality and relationships in the framework. Activities O.10.2 and O.11.1 
also used process eight to proceed.   
Instruction 1. E-mail: All evidence concerning e-mails will be grouped under 
this instruction. It is the output of the evidence analysed in activities I.8.2.V, 
I.8.3.V or I.8.9.F, I.8.10.F.  
Instruction 2. Internet Related: All the information that is related with the 
Internet activity is going to be grouped under this instruction. The depending 
activities from the Target Analysis are I.8.4.V, I.8.6.V or I.8.1.F, I.8.3.F, I.8.4.F, 
I.8.16.F. 
Instruction 3. Malware: Any type of malicious activity that is identified in the 
system will re reported in this instruction, I.8.1.V or I.8.14.F, I.8.15.F. 
Instruction 4. Hacked Databases: In case there was some evidence discovered 
concerning hacked databases or spreadsheets (because of the similarity of their 
content) in the digital media under investigation it should be listed under this 
instruction. It involves I.8.10.V, I.8.11.V or I.8.17.F, I.8.18.F. 
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Instruction 5. Malicious Tools: Traces indicating the use of hacking tools or 
installed hacking applications should be collected here. The dependent activities 
are I.8.1.V or I.8.4.F., I.8.5.F. 
Instruction 6. Documents: All types of documents that can be used as supportive 
evidence belong to instruction 6, e.g. a document where the victim holds details 
about his financial status. The dependent activities are I.8.5.V or I.8.6.F, I.8.7.F, 
I.8.16.F.  
Instruction 7. Application Logs: The evidential log files that have been 
identified after the analysis will be used in this instruction after the I.8.8.V, 
I.8.9.V or I.8.13.F activities.  
Instruction 8. System Vulnerabilities: It aims to identify vulnerabilities 
identified to the system due to the security permissions set. The dependent 
instructions are I.8.7.V or I.8.8.F, I.8.9.F.  
Instruction 9. Other: Other residual information that has been collected and can 
be used as evidence is categorised under this instruction. The dependent activities 
are I.8.12.V or I.8.2.F, I.8.11.F, I.8.15.F, I.8.21.F. The following table represents 
the process: 
Process 12.  Structure of Evidential Data 
I.12.1. Use evidence from Processes 10 and 11 O.12.1. Categorisation of evidential data 
 1. E-mail 
 2. Internet Related 
 3. Malware 
 4. Hacked Databases 
 5. Malicious Tools 
 6. Documents 
 7. Application Logs 
 8. System Vulnerabilities  
 9. Other 
Table 20: Process 12 - Structure of evidential data 
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4.6.2.2 Process 13, Structure Threat Agent’s Profile 
The Threat Agent’s Profile aims to collect the evidence identified during the 
Threat Agent Analysis (Process 9) and listed in O.10.3. (Threat Agent Evidence 
list). As in Structure of Evidential Data (Process 12), the investigator is expected 
to structure the data that concern the threat agent and maintains in an unprocessed 
form after the Pea (Phase 2). Marcella and Greenfield (2002), highlight the 
importance of profiling the fraudster.  
The key issue for this process is to determine the findings based on the victim’s 
and the fraudster’s side. The profiling that will be drawn is going to be under a 
different perspective depending on the vector. The activities of the process are the 
following in respect to Vidalis and Jones (2005) as their work fits the needs of the 
framework.  
Use threat agent evidence list O.10.3. (I.13.1.): Use the list that was 
created in O.10.3 (Process 10) in order to aid the profiling of the threat agent. 
The output activities for the Victim (V) are: 
Reveal technical skills (O.13.1.V): The information discovered after the 
analysis of the victim’s side is obviously going to reveal clues concerning the 
technical skills of the fraudster. Brute force attacks and IP Spoofing are good 
examples for low and high technical level accordingly for the threat agent’s skills. 
In addition, the security measures considered by the owner of the system can 
reveal the required by the threat agent technical skills to manage the attack. 
Reveal programming skills (O.13.2.V): It is the abilities of the threat agent 
based on the method of the attack. The evidential data identified can show 
whether the intruder has programming skills, e.g. use of personal written scripts or 
an opportunist by using already written code.  
Ability to convince someone (O.13.3.V): The fraudster’s social engineering 
skills that are possibly identified after the media analysis. A phishing attack for 
example, could show that the threat agent has programming skills to develop the 
phishing and social engineering skills to conceal the fraud and convince the 
victim.   
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Ability to keep stealth action (O.13.4.V): The complexity of the attack is 
going to show the ability of the attacker to keep activities stealthy. The 
vulnerabilities of the system and the technical skills of the fraudster combined 
could possibly leave minimum traces for the investigator to identify further 
information about his actions. 
The activities for the Fraudster (F.) are: 
Sophistication of tools (O.13.1.F): The collection of tools – programming, 
hacking, and security - identified in the fraudster’s side can provide insight about 
his actions. Such tools can show the complexity of his capabilities.  
Level of expertise (O.13.2.F): It is depended to the previous activity, as the 
sophistication of the tools that are installed and probably also used by the attacker 
are able to define his level of expertise. The more advanced and complex the 
tools, the more experienced and advanced the threat agent. 
Use of defensive techniques (O.13.3.F): There is no sophisticated intruder 
acting without considering the use of defensive techniques. These techniques 
would let him act unattended. For example, someone may accomplish a man-in-
the-middle attack and introduce a third party involvement to the investigation.    
Identify purpose of attacking (O.13.4.F): It is whether the method of the 
attack reveals that the fraudster acts based on his ego or his curiosity. The 
investigator should be able to draw a picture regarding the purpose of the attack.  
Identify motivation (O.13.5.F): Jones (2002) refers to the components of the 
threat agent’s motivation. According to this categorization, an ID thief has 
personal gain as a motive. However, the evidential data can disclose more than 
just this. Information that concerns a limited number of attacked systems for 
example indicates that the threat agent works in a focused target group.  
Identify opportunities (O.13.6.F): This activity is a combination of O.13.1.V 
and O.13.4.V, in interdependence with his level of expertise O.13.2.F and 
motivation O.13.5.F. The opportunities of attacking a system differ according to 
the motive, the flexibility and the background of the fraudster, as well as with his 
capabilities. However, an attack to an unsecure system provides different aspect to 
his profiling than an attack to a protected, secure, or even business system.      
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The table below corresponds to the Structure Threat Agent’s Profile process: 
Process 13. Structure Threat Agent’s Profile 
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Table 21: Process 13 - Structure Threat Agent’s profile 
4.6.2.3 Process 14, Structure Analysed Digital Evidence 
This process aspires to collect the evidential data that have been categorised in the 
previous two processes (12 and 13). The investigator needs then to create a 
structured set of findings that will include the key aspects of the overall analysis.  
The purpose is to identify the amount of information that can be retrieved from 
evidence that involves a specific individual.   
The activities that constitute this process are: 
Structure all sort of valuable information (I.14.1.): This activity includes 
valuable evidential data for the outcome of the investigation, independent from its 
source. In other words, the investigator collects the outputs of the previous 
activities and works with these in order to continue to the next activity. The 
purpose is to list the piece of information that kept the attention of the examiner 
during the analysis of the digital media. E.g., picture files from scanned or forged 
passports that have been used for impersonation are imported from O.12.1. 
(Categorisation of evidential data). 
Identify evidential aspects (I.14.2.): At this function, the investigator needs 
to identify the evidential aspects of the structured information from the previous 
activity in order to give emphasis. For instance, if the examiner has identified in 
I.14.1 image files as evidential to the case, then he needs to declare the element 
that makes these images valuable for the outcome of the investigation. There 
could be more information discovered concerning the life of the person, whose 
passport has been scanned and saved as an electronic file. Therefore, the 
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investigator should conclude to a list, where all these similar evidential aspects are 
added. For example, if a national insurance number, a driving license copy and 
financial records all found to concern the same person; they should be listed under 
this activity.  
Group the evidential aspects (O.14.1.): This is the activity that the evidential 
aspects identified above will be categorised in a way that the investigator can 
create a structured approach of the evidential aspects. Following the example of 
I.14.1 and I.14.2, the investigator needs to group all four evidential files that refer 
to an individual.   
E.g. Victim = passport image, national insurance number, driving license copy, 
financial records   
The following table represents the Structure Analysed Digital Evidence process:  
Table 22: Process 14 - Structure analysed digital evidence 
4.6.3 Scenario 
As mentioned on chapter three, the purpose of reconstructing a story is valuable 
for the investigator as he can present a coherent and efficient chronicle of the 
evidence he identified so far. The scenario is the ‘prediction’ (Carrier, 2006), 
based on which the findings will be evaluated on the next phase. The examiner 
has the choice to return to any process in the previous phases during this output. 
Scenario structures the evidential data from the whole procedure so far.   
This output will be used as an input to the next and final phase of the ID theft 
investigation framework, where the validation of the procedure is targeted. 
There are two processes for the Scenario: 
15. Scenario Outline Activity 
16. Scenario Preparation Documentation Activity 
Process 14.  Structure analysed digital evidence 
I.14.1.  Structure all sort of 
valuable information 
I.14.2.   Identify evidential 
aspects 
O.14.1.  Group the evidential 
aspects 
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4.6.3.1 Process 15, Scenario Outline 
The Scenario Outline aims to create the scenario plan. This process uses 
information from the Evidence Classification (Phase 3< input). Furthermore, it 
uses sources from a number of processes met so far, such as the offline data from 
activity I.1.1< Instruction 2.  
The activities of the process are: 
Use evidence as of I.1.1.< Instruction 2, Phase 1 Output, Phase 2 
Output, and Phase 3 Input (I.15.1.): The investigator needs to use all offline 
evidential data discovered in Phase 1, activity I.1.1., offline data (Instruction 2). 
The results from the ID Theft Data Identification (Phase 1, output), Evidence 
(Phase 2, output) and Evidence Classification (Phase 3, input) are going to be of 
equal importance for this process. The purpose of the investigator is to collect the 
outcomes and use them on the next activity.  
List valuable data gathered (O.15.1.): This activity lists the valuable data 
that was gathered during I.15.1. The outcome of this list will produce an outline of 
groups, according to the type of the evidence. For example, all offline data 
identified in Phase 1 will be filed together; all evidential data concerning a certain 
person will be also filed together.    
The representation table of the process follows: 
 
4.6.3.2 Process 16, Scenario Preparation Documentation 
The Scenario Preparation Documentation aims to employ the findings of the 
analysis of the digital media and prepare the scenario that will attempt to 
reconstruct the history of the incident. There is no actual written documentation of 
this scenario as there is no need for the investigator to pursue such practise; it is 
only the merging of the evidential data. The case documentation will be 
constructed in the Phase 4. 
Process 15. Scenario Outline 
I.15.1.   Use evidence as of I.1.1.< Instruction 
2, Phase 1 Output, Phase 2 Output, and Phase 3 
Input  
O.15.1. List valuable data gathered 
Table 23: Process 15. - Scenario Outline 
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The data collected in process 15 will be now used and gathered before the 
evaluation of the case. The scenario will be evaluated in the next phase, where 
similar results to process 16 should occur. The process consists of the following 
two activities: 
Use Scenario outline list from O.15.1. (I.16.1.): The list created in O.15.1. 
(List Valuable Data Gathered), is going to be used at this stage in order to help the 
investigator continue to the following activity. 
Merge evidential data gathered (O.16.1.): The overall collection and 
merging of the evidential data aims to create the actual documentation and case 
preparation. The examiner brings in the front the evidential elements gathered and 
ensued by the classification. Therefore, he is prepared to continue with the 
evaluation of the findings.  
The following table represents process 16: 
Process 16. Scenario Preparation Documentation 
I.16.1. Use Scenario outline list from O.15.1. O.16.1. Merge evidential data gathered 
Table 24: Process 16 - Scenario Preparation Documentation 
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4.7 Phase 4, Evaluation 
4.7.1 Phase 4 Overview 
The only premise for the last Phase of the investigation framework is that the 
examiner has already completed the previous three phases. The phases are 
interconnected and allow revisiting the previous phases for further examination. 
The Evaluation phase endorses this re-examination of any of the previous three 
phases for evaluating purposes. The method supports the functionality and 
flexibility of the phase. The cohesion of the discovered evidential data will be 
verified during the evaluation. Same as in previous phases the following diagram 
is an overview of the relationships among the phases and can be found in a 
readable version on Appendix F (IV). 
 
Figure 21: Relationships among phases 1, 2, 3, 4 
The investigator is required to evaluate the whole examination and present the 
case by testing the Scenario. Phase 3 produced a Scenario in an attempt to 
construct the history of the incident, based on the digital evidence. The forensic 
examiner ought to appraise these results in Phase 4 and convert them to an 
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admissible report. The Evaluation phase requires the following input and output 
respectively: 
Input: Scenario Examination, the investigator needs to test the scenario that has 
been drawn after the Scenario Construction (Phase 3) and clarify it, according to 
the evidential data discovered. 
Output: Case, the examiner makes use of the Scenario Examination in order to 
construct a case. This case needs then to be clarified, evaluated and documented 
for the representation purposes. 
The following figure represents the phase: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7.2 Scenario Examination 
The investigator is required to use as an input the Scenario output of phase three. 
The purpose is to validate the outcome of the evidential data that resulted in the 
previous phases. On phase one the media that can provide indicative evidence is 
analysed, on phase two the resulting evidence, while on phase three the evidence 
is collected and the creation of a scenario is attempted. For the sequence and 
coherence of the procedure, the investigator uses the above in order to ensure the 
validity of the scenario.  
  
Figure 22: Phase 4 – Evaluation 
Scenario Examination 
Process 17. Scenario Testing/ Evaluation  
I.17.1. Use the outputs of Phases 1, 2 and 3 
I.17.2. Check validation/ entirety of  
the outputs 
O.17.1. Create evaluation list 
Process 18. Scenario Clarification 
I.18.1. Use evaluation list from O.17.1.  
I.18.2. Clarify the impact of evidential data 
O.18.1. Create scenario clarification list 
 
 
 
Phase 4 
Evaluation 
Case 
Process 19. Case Construction 
I.19.1. Use data from the scenario 
clarification list O.18.1. 
 O.19.1 Construct the case 
Process 20. Case Clarification 
I.20.1. Clarify the constructed case from 
O.18.1. 
Process 21. Case Evaluation 
I.21.1. Use the scenario evaluation list 
O.17.1. 
I.21.2. Check validation 
O.21.1. Confirm case evaluation 
Process 22. Evidential Case 
Representation 
I.22.1. Create the testimonial report 
O.22.1. ID Theft case investigation 
report 
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This will be accomplished in the following two processes: 
17. Scenario Testing / Evaluation  
18. Scenario Clarification  
4.7.2.1 Process 17, Scenario Testing/ Evaluation 
The importance of this process lies beneath the need for appraisal. Martinez 
(2005) emphasizes the needs for evaluation. A rephrase of his statement in terms 
of the specific procedure stresses that it is essential for  
effectively carrying out planned activities, and the extent to which it is 
achieving its stated objectives and anticipated results. 
Therefore, the undertaken method needs to be effectively verified according to the 
results that have been developed. In such an approach, the investigator is going to 
be able to ensure the validity of the examination. The activities that compose the 
process are: 
Use the outputs of Phases 1, 2 and 3 (I.17.1.): The investigator needs to 
make use of the outputs of the previous phases in order to revise his outcomes as 
gathered in the Scenario Preparation Documentation (Process 16). The 
investigator may decide the use of a virtual machine (Carrier, 2006) for rebuilding 
the events that appraise the initial premise of the ID theft incident. 
Check validation / entirety of the outputs (I.17.2.): The revision of the 
outcomes send the investigator to this activity, where he is required to check the 
validation and the entirety of the outputs. It is important to certify that the 
procedure has been accomplished under a concrete, structured basis.  
Create evaluation list (O.17.1.): The evaluation list aims to include the crucial 
data that have been identified after the evaluation. In case any amendments to the 
previous processes took place, these have to be listed in this function.     
The representation table of the process is: 
Table 25: Process 17 - Scenario Testing / Evaluation 
Process 17. Scenario Testing / Evaluation 
I.17.1.  Use the outputs of 
Phases 1, 2 and 3 
I.17.2.  Check validation / 
entirety of the outputs 
O.17.1. Create evaluation list 
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4.7.2.2 Process 18, Scenario Clarification 
The purpose of this process is to allow the confirmation of the scenario. To ensure 
that it is directly supported by the results of the Scenario Testing/ Evaluation 
(Process 17). The activities that constitute the process are: 
Use evaluation list from O.17.1. (I.18.1.): For this activity the examiner 
needs to use as an input the output of the previous process (O.17.1.). An 
evaluation list has been created and it now needs to be used in order to proceed to 
the clarification of the evidence. 
Clarify the impact of evidential data (I.18.2.): The investigator needs to 
explain the effect of the evidential data in relation to the incident. As long as the 
investigation has been completed and the evidential data has been assessed, their 
implication needs to be stated. 
Create scenario clarification list (O.18.1.): Create a list that includes the 
impact of clarified data as identified on I.18.2. This list will be used on the last 
process. 
The representation table of the process is the following: 
 
Table 26: Process 18 - Scenario Clarification 
Process 18. Scenario Clarification 
I.18.1. Use evaluation list 
from O.17.1. 
I.18.2.   Clarify the impact of 
evidential data 
O.18.1. Create scenario 
clarification list 
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4.7.3 Case 
The Scenario evaluated the findings of the analysis and defined a situation based 
on which the actual case is going to be constructed. The purpose of this process is 
to verify the vulnerable digital evidence has been treated sensibly and interpreted 
in a case report that reflects the ID theft incident and the findings. The handling of 
accurate, constructed evidence results to a precise representation of the case in the 
court. Therefore, the case will need to fulfil the following processes after the 
evaluation of the Scenario (Phase 4, input): 
19. Case Construction  
20. Case Clarification  
21. Case Evaluation  
22. Evidential Case Representation 
4.7.3.1 Process 19, Case Construction 
The Case Construction aims to build the foundation of the case representation, as 
this is essential for the admissible digital evidence handling. The examiner needs 
to use the output of Process 18, in order to define the necessary evidential data for 
the constructed case and convert the scenario to a filed case.    
Consecutively, two activities are required: 
Use data from scenario clarification list O.18.1. (I.19.1.): The examiner is 
requested to use activity O.18.1 (Process 18) as the input of this activity. Then, he 
can continue to the next activity. 
Construct the case (O.19.1.): It aims to the actual construction of the case. In 
other words, it is the initial attempt of the actual documentation of the case, after 
the testing of the scenario (Process17).  
The following table reflects the process: 
Process 19. Case Construction 
I.19.1. Use data from the scenario 
clarification list O.18.1. 
O.19.1. Construct the case 
Table 27: Process 19 - Case Construction 
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4.7.3.2 Process 20, Case Clarification  
Even though the case has been constructed, the examiner needs to link the 
representation of the evidence with the impact of the case in order to confirm the 
evidential findings. For those cases that an expert witness is required to testify in 
court, the legal aspects of the evidence should be included as well. These will be 
used in the next process that the case will be evaluated. The purpose of process 20 
is accomplished in a single activity. 
Clarify the constructed case from O.18.1. (I.20.1.): The clarification of the 
constructed case aims to the justification of the evidential data related with the 
initial premise. The investigator ought to clarify the reasons that the related digital 
evidence is considered as connected to the specific examination and attach them 
to the case. In addition, the source of the evidence, as well as its handling must be 
clarified. (Casey, 2007)   
The representation table of the process: 
Table 28: Process 20 - Case Clarification 
4.7.3.3 Process 21, Case Evaluation  
The Case Evaluation aims to test the outcome of the constructed case. Before the 
examiner proceeds to the final construction of the case report, he needs to ensure 
the validity of the constructed case, based on the fourth phase (Report or 
statement) of the ACPO (2007) guidelines’ Recovery Process.  
This process is considered as a final review of the supported digital evidence. 
Three activities are going to carry this out:  
Use the scenario evaluation list from O.17.1. (I.21.1.): Return to the 
Scenario Evaluation List (O.7.1.) in order to ensure that all evidential aspects are 
included in the case. 
Check validation (I.21.2.): As in I.17.2. (Check Validation/ Entirety of the 
outputs) the investigator needs to ensure the structured layout of the case, 
according to the scenario evaluation list that was used on I.21.1.  
Process 20. Case Clarification 
I.20.1.  Clarify the constructed case 
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Confirm case evaluation (O.21.1.): When the validity of the case has been 
certified, the investigator needs to confirm the official outcome of the case.  
The table that pictures the activity: 
4.7.3.4 Process 22, Evidential Case Representation  
The evidential case representation depicts the case in the terms of creating a 
testimonial report that can be presented in a court of law. The examiner is going to 
create a formal document that includes the outcome of his work. The process 
consists of the following two activities.   
Create the testimonial report (I.22.1.): The purpose is to represent the 
evidence in a structured way that could be comprehended from non-computer 
specialists. Kennedy (2006) mentions that the examiner needs to take under 
consideration the defence of the case and create his plan for defeating it. The 
structured form of the ID theft framework assists in this by the collection and 
categorisation of the evidence that has been already produced on phase 2 
(Processes 10 and 11) and classification of the evidence on phase 3 (Processes 13, 
14 and 15). 
 
 
 
The investigator needs to present all the findings of the examination in a manner 
that indicates the evidence from the technical, scientific point of view. In addition, 
it should be interpreted in a way to be read and comprehended by a jury. When 
the case needs to be presented in a court of law, then the findings should be 
interpreted in an appropriate way that support the offence, based on the ACPO 
(2007) principles. Solon and Harper (2004) provide comprehensive guidelines of 
Process 21. Case Evaluation 
I.21.1. Use the scenario 
evaluation list from O.17.1. 
I.21.2.  Check validation  O.21.1. Confirm case 
evaluation 
Table 29: Process 21 - Case Evaluation 
Figure 23: Processes that contribute on defeating the defence 
Processes 
Psc –Scenario Construction 
Ë 
Processes 
è 
Pea - Evidence 
10 11 13 14 15 
Defeat 
Defence 
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how the evidence should be presented in the court and strengthen the importance 
of a structured, well-written report.         
The activity needs the following instructions in order to achieve the above: 
Instruction 1. Include all case evidence 
Instruction 2. Describe all case evidence 
ID Theft case investigation report (O.22.1.): All evidence that has been 
identified and evaluated so far contribute to the final product of the investigation, 
the ID theft case investigation report.  
The instructions that appear on activity I.22.1 have the following purpose: 
Instruction 1. Include all case evidence: The investigator includes all evidence 
that has been already included and evaluated in Case Evaluation (Process 21) and 
by using this continues to the next instruction. 
Instruction 2. Describe all case evidence: The examiner is requested to describe 
all the evidential data in a report that describes the procedure he has followed, the 
findings and his conclusions. 
The table below represents the process:  
 
 
 
Process 22. Evidential Case Representation 
I.22.1.  Create the testimonial report O.22.1. ID Theft case investigation report 
1.Include all case evidence 
2.Describe all case evidence 
 
Table 30: Process 22 - Evidential Case Representation 
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Summary 
A detailed approach to the findings of the investigation process based on the 
evidence left behind on a victim’s and fraudster’s digital storage media 
respectively was presented in this chapter. The importance of this reflects to the 
fact that the forensic investigator needs to be provided with a thorough and 
comprehensive approach that explicates this research work. The analysis of the ID 
theft investigation framework presented all the aspects and the instances that 
construct it. The framework consists of four phases; every phase consists of a 
varying number of processes, necessary to satisfy the input and the output that 
define the phase. Every process holds a number of activities, while some activities 
require some instructions and objectives in order to specify their purpose.   
The low level analysis of the framework was presented with the following 
structure: 
- Overview of every phase; 
- Representation figure of the phase; 
- Description and purpose of the inputs and outputs; 
- Effect and operational aspect of every process; 
- Purpose and functionality of every activity; 
- Details on the application of instructions and objectives; 
- Representation table of every process. 
The actual aim throughout the development of the ID theft framework has been 
the satisfaction of the hypothesis statement of this research, to facilitate the 
investigation of computer-based ID theft and the handling of the related evidence. 
The investigator is required to identify and analyse the digital media that 
constituted to the crime. The analysis of the evidence aims to assist him identify 
the evidential data able to construct a scenario concerning the story behind the 
incident. The evaluation of the scenario is going to clarify the case and represent 
it. Throughout this procedure, information that concerns the target of the crime 
(victim) and the threat agent (fraudster) is gathered. The purpose is not only to 
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profile them both and collect material that enlightens the incident’s conditions, but 
also to defeat the defence. 
The following two chapters of this thesis will plan and execute respectively the 
application of the investigation framework in practice in order to prove its validity 
and reveal the achievement of the hypothesis.   
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In this chapter the reader can  
► find the need for evaluation; 
► find the evaluating techniques that pursue this research; 
► find the definition of the laboratory experiment. 
Overview 
There are a number of approaches in literature for evaluating research work, 
suggested methods are: content analysis, accountability, decision oriented, 
objectives based, testing programs, experimental research, and adversary. The 
evaluation approach answers to what works, for whom, in what circumstances, 
and why (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). In dealing with the challenge of an 
appropriate assessment for this project, two avenues of evaluation have been 
selected; they were considered to satisfy the needs of this work based on the 
background reading of evaluation methods. 
1. Based on the research methodology followed throughout this research, a case 
study in terms of a lab experiment has been selected. It appeared as the most 
appropriate method for evaluating the theory and defending the research outcome 
of this research. The purpose is to manage the validation of the research outcome 
via a laboratory experiment, in an attempt to prove or disprove the hypothesis.  
2. The support of members of the Hi-tech Crime Unit, Gwent Police 
Headquarters, enabled an external assessment. A qualitative study interview was 
conducted (Appendix J) after the end of the framework’s implementation, 
applying the investigators’ experience on ID theft incidents to the investigation 
framework. The police detectives also agreed to apply the ID theft framework 
stages to an existing investigation to provide a valuable practical assessment.  
A theory is something nobody believes, except the person who made it. An 
experiment is something everybody believes, except the person who made it. 
Albert Einstein, 1879 - 1955 
5 5 Framework Verification and Assessment  
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Therefore, this thesis makes use of the following evaluation methods and based 
on: 
a. The laboratory experiment 
b. The assessment and the interview of Gwent Police 
5  
5.1 Evaluation Objectives 
There are a number of different approaches to evaluation, based on the nature of 
the research. The objective is to prove that a piece of work and the assumptions 
are valid and applicable to the real world.  
Because literature provides endless theoretical material serving the purpose of 
evaluation some definitions have been selected to stress and clarify the 
importance of evaluation.   
An elastic word that stretches to cover judgements of many kinds 
(Weiss, 1972) 
An evaluation examines a programme from a number of different 
perspectives and looks for causal linkages between programme 
activities and outcomes. Programme evaluation is a theory-focused 
activity that also considers the relevance of the various components of 
a programme and makes predictions about future developments. 
(Clarke, 1999) 
The systematic collection of information about the activities, 
characteristics and outcomes of programmes to make judgements 
about the programme, improve programme effectiveness and/or 
inform decisions about future programming (Patton, 1997) 
In general terms, the evaluation procedure proves or disproves the initial project 
hypothesis. Therefore any weaknesses of the project results can be identified. In 
such a case this can provide assistance for any future modifications and 
improvements on the plan. Furthermore, confirm the fulfilled project objectives. 
(Hutton, 2001) 
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5.1.1 Chosen evaluation methods 
5.1.1.1 Evaluation Experiment 
This research was focussed on examining the hypothesis: to create an analytical 
framework to facilitate the investigation of computer-based ID Theft and the 
handling of the related digital evidence. The aim of the experiment is to test this 
hypothesis (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005). There should be no alternative hypothesis 
to the research derived from the experiment outcome (Barnes et al., 2005).  
The case study approach appears to be the most appropriate for this research, as 
already described on chapter one (also see Leedy and Ormrod, 2005). The case 
study scenario will be based on data extracted from forensic case work and will 
therefore be built upon real life examples. Then, the laboratory experiment will be 
based on the scenario and the ID theft investigation framework will be applied for 
the analysis. Meister and Rabideu (1965), include laboratory experiments in 
‘observational methods of data collection.  
5.1.1.2 Police Review 
The evaluation of the Hi-tech Crime Unit investigators will also be used to 
determine the framework applicability in an investigative environment. A number 
of interviews with members of the Gwent police took place during the design and 
implementation of the framework (see section 4.2). In these meetings the 
investigators assisted by adding knowledge and expertise from their practical 
experience. Once the framework was constructed the investigators contributed to 
the assessment by applying it on a suitable case. The intention was to determine if 
the framework contributed to the investigation. The feedback at this stage was in 
the form of a questionnaire. 
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5.2 Evaluation Experiment 
5.2.1 Aim of the evaluation 
The laboratory experiment for assessing the framework was based on the review 
of a number of existing ID theft cases. These cases suggested that a common 
method of personal identity data being harvested from a PC was by the use of 
malicious software1. In these cases the victim’s computer system is infected with 
malicious code, which records personal identity data and makes it available to the 
fraudster. To test the presented framework two systems were required which 
contained evidence that leads to ID theft. One system will represent the victim and 
the other the fraudster. The following test protocol was used: 
1. A closed network with two computers was created  
2. Computer A is the ‘fraudster’, Computer B is the ‘victim’. 
3. Both computers were populated with background data.2 
4. A fellow researcher acts as the fraudster to the ‘victim’ machine.3 
5. He attacks the machine and plants the malware. 
6. This malware tracks personal details.4 
7. The system is infected. 5 
8. Both computers are examined by using the framework.  
9. The examination starts from the ‘victim’ machine6 
                                               
1 See chapter 2: Malicious software and keyloggers 
2 The data that populate the disks are suitable to the purpose of each computer machine. 
3 The initial plan was that the researcher would act as the fraudster; however the idea of using an 
independent third party for the execution of the malicious code approaches the realistic side of the 
event. 
4 The researcher is not aware of the type malware planted by his ‘assistant-attacker’ to the victim’s 
machine. 
5 The type and extent of the infection is unknown. 
6  As this is considered to be discovered first, according to the scenario that follows in this chapter.  
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The computer systems that were used for the experiment have the following 
description: 
 Fraudster Victim 
CPU Pentium III 800Mhz Pentium III 800Mhz 
Memory 256 MB 256 MB 
Hard disk Fujitsu 20GB Fujitsu 20GB 
Optical devices Samsung CD-ROM Samsung CD-ROM 
Operating system Windows XP S.P. 2 Windows XP S.P. 2 
Table 31: Systems’ Specifications 
5.2.2 Sources of data for the scenario 
The scenario written for the experiment is supported and based on real incidents; 
despite the fact that there is limited detailed information available concerning the 
exact methods used to perpetrate an ID theft. However, news articles and journals 
provide an invaluable assistance. Amongst the inexhaustible sources of real life 
ID theft incidents, the following are a minor overview of these sources: 
· ‘ID theft is inescapable’ (Greene, 2005), 
· ‘ID theft ring escapes shutdown’ (Anon, 2005a),  
· ‘I was a victim of ID theft’ (Anon, 2005b), 
· ‘UK police arrest copycat phisher’ (Leyden, 2004),  
· ‘Arrest’ (Wolfe, 2007),  
· ‘How cyber-crime became a multi-billion-pound industry’ (Lush, 2007) 
· ‘Identity impairment: The problems facing victims of identity fraud’ 
(Furnell, 2007) 
· ‘Identity theft: No help for consumers’ (Matejkovic and Lahey, 2001) 
· ‘Cybercrimes Of The 21st Century’ (Riem, 2001) 
The news stories may contain a degree of journalistic licence (Greene (2005), 
Anon (2005a), Anon (2005b), Leyden (2004), Wolfe (2007), Lush (2007)). 
However, there is a large collection of victims’ stories and cases found on the 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse web site (2007), the Better Business Bureau (BBB 
online, 2003) and the Get Safe Online web site (2009). The fictional scenario has 
been constructed using commonly occurring elements found in the above cases. 
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A common scenario is the ID theft victim reports a suspected crime. The data loss 
is the result of a malware infection on a vulnerable computer system. The ID theft 
framework has been applied to this case in the following way:  
a. Examine the victim’s machine in a forensic manner to determine a malware 
infection. 
b. Identify and examine the timeline and behaviour (data possibly extracted) 
of the malware. 
The results of the investigation should lead the examiner to:   
a. the collection of evidential data concerning the fraudster.   
b. identify the way the fraudster attacked the victim’s machine.  
There are three stages that need to be fulfilled during the experiment:  
1. the network attack from the ‘fraudster’ to the ‘victim’ machine;  
2. the forensic analysis based on the investigation framework from the 
‘victim’s’ side;  
3. the analysis of the ‘fraudster’s’ machine that the researcher will be 
expectantly led to this by the evidence discovered to the victim’s disk.   
However, it should be acknowledged that the victim’s machine may frequently 
guide the investigator to a compromised third party connection. The term third 
party in this context refers to the use of an intermediate computer by the fraudster.  
In a case where the forensic analysis drives the researcher in such a perspective, 
then the intermediate machine should be examined under the same terms with a 
fraudster’s machine. This is because that machine was used to perpetrate and 
affect with fraudulent activity. However, such an approach could be mostly 
applied in theory. Access on a third party system usually cannot be granted, and in 
a number of occasions multiple intermediate systems could interfere. The use of 
zombie machines involved in attacks has influenced and raised questions on how 
they should be treated legislatively (Rasdale, 2006).  In a case where third party 
machines were involved to the attack, these would probably be identified during 
the analysis of the digital media.  
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Nevertheless, the specified experiment involves a one-to-one attack due to the 
limitations of the laboratory experiment. It is considered as a reasonable 
representation of a real life targeted attack. They may involve personal 
information extracted by social engineering or even from social networking web 
sites (see section 2.2.2.1). Dunne (2008) gives a detailed example of how he 
managed to gather personal information for a targeted attack against an individual. 
Figure 24 represents the layout of the introduced experiment: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.2.1 Evaluation Scenario  
This part of the evaluation procedure is based on a single case study and will be 
verified under its experimental form called as single subject design, borrowing the 
term from quasi-experimental research design (Dereshiwsky, 1998). The idea is 
based on real incidents and cases that have been found published during this 
research (see section 5.2.2). Among these contributed the experiences of Nasir 
Ahmed in Anon (2005b), the Nevada, Texas and Penssylvania consumers from 
BBB Online (2003), James from Furnell (2007), Lamar Christian from 
Matejkovic and Lahey (2001). Also, added the story ‘It was full of spyware’ on 
Get Safe Online (2009) and the story of Levine on Riem (2001).   However, there 
is the need to underline that the following story is not a representation of a real 
incident. 
Figure 24: Graphical Representation of the research experiment and its parts 
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The Background 
The potential victim uses the internet from his home computer extensively. He 
uses the following services: web banking services, online shopping and 
communicates via instant messaging and e-mails.  
Stages 
Day 1 
The victim routinely checks his online banking site and notes a potentially large 
charge on his credit card. The victim contacts his credit card company who agrees 
to investigate his case.  
Day 2 
A number of weeks later the victim receives a letter from a financial organisation 
stating an outstanding balance of a number of thousand pounds on a recently 
acquired loan. The victim corresponds with the loan company and determines the 
fraudulent activity. The application had been made online and in his name.  
The man asked for further details concerning the payment method and the bank 
account that the loan was issued on. He tended to use one particular bank account 
for all his payments.   
Day 3 
A few days later there was another incident. He received a new letter from another 
loan company acknowledging his successful application. The man was now fully 
convinced that this series of events was more than just a coincidence.  
He decided to contact the police as the situation seemed fraudulent. The man had 
never considered ID theft as a threat before. He was motivated to collect all his 
evidence and visit the nearest police department. Furthermore, he thought he 
should request more details about the transaction from the loan and the credit card 
companies.  
  
Framework Verification and Assessment 
 
160 
Day 4 
On his visit to the police station an officer kept record of his story, asked him a 
number of questions about his life, personal and social, and how concerned he 
was about computer security. The man didn’t even use antivirus software. ID theft 
is an assumption and his residence is not a crime scene. The police officers 
suggested they should investigate his personal computer as that is the machine he 
uses extensively for personal use and stores his personal records. Therefore, the 
man returned home, shut down his computer and carried it to the forensics 
department at the police station. 
Day 5 
At this stage it is not essential to retrieve any other background information about 
the negotiation between the man, the police officers and their questions. The fact 
of interest is the forensic investigation of his computer system. This computer 
forensics investigation should now take us to the stage that the ID theft incident 
will be proved or disproved. The purpose is to ensure appropriate application and 
functionality of the framework. Therefore, the above scenario should validate the 
previously described investigation framework and meet the requirements for its 
purpose.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Scenario Representation 
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- Interview with police officer 
- Delivers his computer to police station 
Day 5: 
- Computer arrives at the UoG computer forensics lab 
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5.2.3 Evaluation Experiment Decisions    
The major concern of the actual experiment is to approach the above scenario to 
the most possible realistic perspective. The experimental assessment of the 
framework requires an actual computer infrastructure. This required some 
decisions to be taken as to the systems specification in terms of both hardware and 
software. The following issues were addressed: 
1. Hard drive capacity: This had little impact on the scenario as a whole, 
however for a speedy imaging and analysis a limited capacity drive was selected. 
2. Bandwidth and processing power: These do not influence the experiment. 
3. Pre-existing data on the drive: The decision was not to remove pre-existing 
data on the drive as this would, for the investigative stage, simulate what an 
investigator would expect to find on a hard drive. Providing a degree of 
background information from which the evidence would need to be extracted. 
The following paragraphs aim to resolve all different decisions that were taken 
concerning issues about the laboratory experiment.  The decisions are the result of 
the background study (see chapter 2).  
One of the issues that needed to be resolved was which operating system would be 
ideal to install on the victim’s, fraudster’s and investigators hard drive. There are 
a number of operating systems available (Linux, Mac OS X, Microsoft Windows, 
Solaris); based on Johnston et al. (2003) it was decided that Windows XP was the 
operating system most commonly in use in the home environment. It may be 
argued that Windows Vista or 7 are replacing this to a degree but at the point of 
inception XP was the most popular O.S. and so remains the platform of choice for 
this project.   
Then, there should be decided which applications should be installed on the 
system. It is essential, based on the scenario, to show the Internet interactivity 
from the victim’s side. The selected applications were chosen according to their 
popularity and the researcher’s personal experience of exploiting them. The user 
should have installed the following applications (see table 32) in order to justify 
the use of the computer system as an entertainment system: 
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User’s applications e-mail accounts Social networking profiles 
a. Microsoft Office XP g. www.hotmail.com i. www.facebook.com 
b. MSN Live v.8 h. www.yahoo.co.uk j. www.hi5.com 
c. Yahoo! Messenger  k. Windows Live Spaces 
d. Adobe Acrobat Reader 8.0   
e. Adobe Flash Player 9   
f. Mozilla Firefox 2.0   
Table 32: Victim's applications and utilities installed 
Concerning the fraudster’s hard disk, the following applications will be installed 
for the same reasons as described above: 
Fraudster’s applications e-mail accounts Password cracking and 
hacking tools 
a. Microsoft Office XP g. www.gmail.com h. Brutus A2 
b. MSN Live v.8  i. Cain and Abel 
c. uTorrent  j. John the Ripper 
d. Adobe Acrobat Reader 8.0  k. Back Orifice 
e. Adobe Flash Player 9   
f. Mozilla Firefox 2.0   
Table 33: Fraudster’s applications and utilities installed 
The above applications were practically used during the experiment in order to 
populate the hard disk’s contents. Any additional software or tools installed on the 
fraudster’s machine are not of the preference of the author, but a fellow researcher 
specializing in network security who volunteered to assist the attack. This way, 
the author was not aware of the actual object of the investigation (the Trojan), 
which approaches a real life investigation.  
Another issue was whether to install any security products (antivirus, antispyware, 
or firewall) on the machine. It has been suggested in earlier chapters that one 
avenue exploited by ID theft fraudsters is the lack of appropriate security at the 
end user’s computer. This vulnerability enables the system to be infected with 
malware capable of capturing personal information. For the purpose of the 
experiment and based on the review in chapter 2 no antivirus was installed on the 
system.  
A major concern was the network and Internet connectivity of the computers. 
During the lifetime of the research and the data population the two computer 
machines were connected on a local network through a network switch in order to 
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achieve the closed network access control scheme.  The attack takes place over 
the closed, secure network as presented in Figure 24 above.  
The Internet connection seems to be the strongest constraint for fulfilling the 
experiment. It is unlikely to have Internet access on a controlled environment, 
execute malicious software considering all the threats involved and have conflicts 
with the university’s security policy as a result. 
However, it is impossible to reach to accurate results after the hard disk analysis 
in a case where the malicious code is not executed. The purpose of this work is to 
investigate online ID theft incidents. Therefore, the execution of the malware over 
the Internet appears of vital importance for the successful completion of the 
experiment.  
The question now is how the university policy that reasonably condemns the use 
of malware even for research purposes will be bypassed. The solution to this 
matter is to plant the malware on a standalone computer machine that is connected 
to the Internet but not connected to a computer network. This had to be achieved 
outside the university settings. The malware should be executed offline. Still the 
purpose of the experiment is to demonstrate the functionality of the ID theft 
framework, even if some restrictions apply due to the sensitivity of the private 
information.   
Figure 26 represents the stages of the experiment execution as explained in a 
previous section of this chapter. 
 
   
There are a number of forensic tools available, but the ideal for the purpose of the 
experiment should be chosen. On the market there are currently two leading 
forensics tools used by investigators; Encase from Guidance Software (2010) and 
FTK from AccessData (2010). Both these tools were available to use. Open 
source tools were not considered as both of the commercial tools are feature rich. 
Encase was selected as the author has extensive experience of using it. Other 
Figure 26: Stages of the experiment execution 
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forensic tools required included a hardware write blocker device for the 
experiment disks in order to prevent any alteration on the evidence hard disks. 
Also, a disk editor, in order to view any raw data on the disk and an MD5 utility is 
also required, because this way the integrity of the image and the original source. 
These are covered by the EnCase. Due to the complexity of steganography (see 
section 4.5.2.2) and the time restrictions of the experiment it was decided that 
steganalysis would not be included in the evaluation. 
Another important issue to be resolved was the most appropriate ID theft method 
for the experiment. The Information Security Forum (2005) warned about 
‘sophisticated and well-organised Trojan attacks’ a few years ago. These types of 
attacks are directly linked with online fraud and ID theft. Nowadays, a number of 
sources refer to plenty of incidents discussing about these new generation Trojan 
attacks (see Lowe (2009), Rodriguez (2009), Jaques (2008), MCRC (2008), 
Washkuch (2008), Thompson (2007)).  
Therefore, because of the common use of Trojan horse attacks and their injected 
sophistication, the ideal method of attack for the experiment is considered to be a 
form of Trojan horse that steals personal data. It was chosen to use a malware 
from the Banker family. It satisfies the needs of the experiment and is popularly 
used by the attackers to date. Ståhlberg (2007) gives a detailed view of the Trojan 
that belongs to this family and their extent. Their purpose is to steal financial 
information from the machines they are installed on. Trojan.Banker was 
downloaded from Offensive Computing (2009).  
However, while this experiment was planned, there were some thoughts of using a 
remote administration Trojan-tool, such as Back Orifice, for penetrating the 
victim’s system. These tools can remotely access a system’s files, log keystrokes 
and get passwords; they can also steal private data from the victim’s machine. 
Attention to the threat that arises from Back Orifice related to ID theft was also 
mentioned by Tarsavage (2007).  
Such types of attacks though are application based. The way they work could be 
an issue for someone who attempts an attack, as well and an immediate alert on a 
security application. A Trojan could also be an alert, but customised malicious 
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software may act unattended on a system until reported. For this reason, the use of 
a Trojan appears more appropriate than the remote administration tool.    
1. Is there any benefit for the outcome of the investigation if the researcher is not 
aware of the type of malware installed? 
Another concern was whether there would be any benefit for the outcome of the 
investigation if the researcher is not aware of the type of malware installed and the 
nature of the attack. This is advantageous as in such a case the researcher does not 
work on a concrete and predefined process to discover something predefined. She 
is trying to identify the penetration of the system with the aid of the ID theft 
investigation framework, rather than trying to determine the incident based on the 
type and nature of the malware used. For this reason the researcher is unaware of 
the malware’s name and attributes at this stage. 
Additional to this, it should be determined how the attack should be manipulated 
among the different ways that it could be managed. However, for this experiment 
it is part of the initial premise that the researcher is not aware of the attacker’s 
selected attack method. The attacker will choose the most appropriate line of 
attack for spreading the selected malware.   
5.3 Police Review 
5.3.1 Aim of the interview  
Based on Patton (1987), the qualitative interviewing in the terms of evaluation, 
aims to identify the point of view of the people that a piece of work is addressed.  
Also, identify their terms, opinions and thinking of personal perception and 
knowledge.  There is an extensive background concerning the design of an 
interview and is useful to mention the three different types of interviews: the 
informal conversational interview, the interview guide approach and standardised 
open-ended interview (Patton, 2002). Clarke (1999), states that there is nothing 
more than ‘general advice’ on how to conduct an interview and no right way of 
doing it. The advantage of interviews is their data collection method (Leedy and 
Ormrod, 2005). The researcher is able to gather data for the core of the research 
and interpret it accordingly. 
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The meeting with the Hi-tech Crime Unit was conducted in the manner of an 
informal interview. The framework was presented and discussed with the 
members of the crime unit concerning its probable impact on real life incidents 
and obtain their feedback concerning the research work. However, the whole 
conversation was based on the already constructed questions from the researcher 
and consists of two parts: 
a. general questions concerning ID theft investigations by the Gwent Police 
and 
b. questions  based on the presented ID theft investigation framework 
5.3.2 General questions on ID Theft investigations 
1. How do you value the idea of discriminating the investigation of computer 
crimes based on their method?  
This question aims to record the investigator’s point of view for discriminating the 
examination based on the type of the crime. 
2. Considering this method of investigation do you believe it can correspond to a 
valuable tool for the investigator? 
The investigator needs to give his point of view for the presented framework in 
respect to the existing used methodologies. 
3. Do you believe that the procedure has the ability to speed up the 
investigation? 
The question aims to identify the investigator’s opinion, concerning the duration 
of the examination process, by the application of the presented framework. 
4. Do you believe that the framework identifies all evidential aspects related to 
Identity Theft incidents? 
The practical experience of the investigator may identify some evidential aspects 
that are not stated in the framework. 
5. Do you normally use evidence classification methods? If yes, how do you 
normally classify the evidence? 
It is a general question that aims to identify whether the police investigators use 
methods to categorise the evidence and in which way.  
Framework Verification and Assessment 
 
167 
6. Does the framework facilitate the investigation of Internet Identity Theft cases 
and the processing of the related digital evidence?  
This question was composed in order to identify the actual value of the framework 
towards digital evidence. 
5.3.3 Specific questions on the methodology 
7. Are the data flows and graphical representation of the framework supportive 
for the investigator? 
A number of different data flows and graphs have been produced to support the 
framework and the purpose of the question is to understand whether these were 
found useful. 
8. Are the inputs and the outputs of the procedure properly defined? 
The question involves the inputs and the outputs of each activity and whether 
these were structured in accordance to the needs of the examination. 
9. Are the inputs and the outputs those that you expected to identify?  
By following the previous question, the purpose is to discover whether the 
investigator expected the framework to produce different inputs and outputs.  
10. Do the aspects of the methodology assess the capabilities required from the 
perpetrator? 
The purpose of this question is to make sure whether the framework exposes the 
capabilities the fraudster owns. 
11. Does the methodology effectively assess the ongoing threat? 
The question concerns the degree that the framework effectively covers the issues 
that involve ID theft. 
12. Is the procedure generic enough in order to be applicable to all different 
systems?  
The question aims to identify whether the investigator believes that the framework 
is flexible enough to be applied on different operating systems. 
13. Do you believe that the evidence classification presented by the ID theft 
investigation framework is of your benefit? 
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The investigator is requested to give his point of view for the classification of the 
evidence described in the framework and whether he finds it beneficial in this 
type of case. 
14. Did you identify any additional evidential data by the use of the presented 
framework? (comparing to the methodology you normally apply)  
The purpose of this question is to ensure that the framework includes all types of 
evidence that can be found during the analysis.   
15. Did you find the ‘Abstracted procedure for the investigator’ helpful during the 
analysis? 
The ‘Abstracted procedure for the investigator’ can be found on Appendix H. It is 
an instruction booklet, created to guide the investigator during the analysis. The 
question aims to confirm the value of the booklet. 
16. Did you find the ‘ID theft investigation framework’ form helpful during the 
analysis? 
The document is found on Appendix I and it is used as the documentation of the 
investigation. The investigator is requested to give an answer on how useful this 
document was for him. 
The results of these questions are discussed in the following chapter. 
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Summary 
A research project needs to be reviewed and evaluated and verify its validity to 
the research world. The described verification procedure of this chapter aims to 
examine the validity of the ID theft framework.  
The responsibility of the researcher is to identify the appropriate evaluation 
method/-s that needs to be followed, in order to conclude in an accurate final 
result. The theoretical clarification and description concerning the methods that 
have been selected for the evaluation of the ID theft investigation framework have 
been presented. This chapter also described how theory will be applied in practice. 
For the needs of this project and in order to strengthen the evaluation process, two 
different ways of evaluation are combined: 
1. Case study: 
- Applied on a laboratory experiment 
2. Police Interview 
- Gwent Police’s application of the framework on a suitable case 
- Feedback in the form of an open-ended interview 
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This chapter presents 
► the results of the laboratory experiment; and 
► comments the feedback submitted by Gwent  HTCU. 
Overview 
This chapter represents the application of the evaluation methods that were 
presented and discussed in the Framework Verification and Assessment (see 
chapter 5) in order to validate the research outcome.  
After executing the closed network attack, the ID theft investigation framework 
was applied to the evidence left on the experimental system. The results are 
presented in the following sections. Screenshots and accompanied proof 
concerning the execution of the experiment can be found on Appendices L and M.  
Each phase of the ID theft framework corresponds to the following structure, 
based on the analysis that was presented in chapter four: 
Description: A brief summary of the phase activities including a summary of the 
appropriate inputs and outputs followed by its input and output regarding the 
experiment. 
Process: A summary of the processes and their activities and their practical 
application. 
Comments: Any important comments that arose during the application of the 
framework. 
Table: An abstract table of the Documenting Procedure for the Investigator at the 
end of each process, as found on Appendix I.   
We have to learn again that science without contact with 
experiments is an enterprise which is likely to go completely astray 
into imaginary conjecture. Hannes Olof Gösta Alfvén, 1908-1995 6 6 Evaluation of  experiments  
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The practical application of the Documenting Procedure for the Investigator is 
also demonstrated in this chapter, as it is used as the model for describing the 
experiment.  
Later on this chapter, the reader will find a discussion that concerns the feedback 
received from Gwent Police, Hi-tech Crime Unit, after the application of the 
framework on an existing ID theft case. A questionnaire was supplied to the 
police detectives for assessing the proposed framework. The answers and 
comments of the questionnaire are discussed, while the original papers can be 
found on Appendix J. Furthermore, all communication e-mails exchanged with 
the police detectives can be found on Appendix K. Detective Tim Williams 
applied the framework on an existing case. Some of the original comments the 
investigator raised are quoted in this section in order to emphasise his 
observations during the analysis.  
6.1 Application of Laboratory Experiment  
The purpose of the laboratory experiment is to apply the ID theft investigation 
framework to the scenario case study described in the chapter 5. The practical 
application is intended to satisfy the objectives of the research and demonstrate 
the work flow of the framework.   
Initially, the ID theft investigation framework was applied to the victim’s 
perspective. Then, the activities that concern the fraudster’s side were employed. 
This is due to the large number of the activities that constitute the framework, 
only the specified fraudster activities are extensively described on the second 
section. These are the parts of the framework that differentiate the fraudster from 
the victim. They concentrate on these specific processes of the framework rather 
than the whole investigation that is already demonstrated on the analysis of the 
victim. However, the framework was also fully applied during the experiment for 
the fraudster’s side. 
The report produced by EnCase can be found on Appendix LI. 
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6.2 V. Victim 
6.2.1 Phase 1: Media Analysis 
6.2.1.1 Summary of Pma  
The first phase involves the analysis of the digital media found on the crime scene 
and the identification of the significant evidential ID theft data. It consists of the 
following input and output: 
Input: Digital Media, describes the procedure that should be undertaken when the 
investigator comes into the first contact with the crime scene and comprises of 
three processes. Because of the nature of the experiment, this input cannot be 
applied practically in the testing. However, it is considered to be functional as it is 
based on existing frameworks (see chapter 4).  
Output: ID Theft Data Identification, the investigator is expected to browse the 
digital media in order to detect the aspects that confirm ID theft related evidence. 
It consists of three activities that involve this identification.  
6.2.1.2 Digital Media 
Process 1. Source Identification 
This process applies to the first contact with the crime scene. The investigator 
needs to identify the computer related elements on the crime scene. As such 
application cannot be applied to a fictional scenario; the relevance to the 
framework will be as follows.   
Input Activities  
I.1.1. Media Selection  Instruction 1. Online data  
   Objective 1.1. Evidential computer storage       
components 
   Objective 1.2. Computer storage media 
 Instruction 2. Offline data 
   Objective 2.1. Any offline data that can be 
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used as   additional evidence 
 
I.1.2.Live system Instruction 1. Check operating system 
   Objective 1.1. Shutdown 
   Objective 1.2.  Disconnect 
 
Comments 
The law enforcement team is considered to search the crime scene. According to 
the scenario the victim delivers his computer system to the police department, as it 
is a common recommendation in incidents similar to the scenario. The process is 
accomplished by searching for online data in computer related mediums. In such 
an application the victim’s computer is identified. No additional storage media is 
found that could be used for further analysis related with the ID theft incident. For 
the collection of the online mediums the system was shut down by the victim. 
Therefore, there is no live system involvement. 
Expected Output Activity 
O.1.1. Keep record of the scene  
The crime scene is supposed to be found with the minimum alterations after the 
incident was reported to the law enforcement officers. The room contained a study 
desk, where a shut down desktop computer system was fitted at the time of the 
visit. Photographs of the room could have been taken in order to validate and 
ensure the visit in a proper application of the activity.  
Process 2. Digital Media Collection 
Input Activities  
I.2.1. Identify different digital media  Instruction 1. Generic device storing 
personal data 
I.2.2. Secure/ isolate digital media 
I.2.3. Collect/ package digital media 
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Expected Output Activity 
O.2.1. Document 
The computer has a 20GB Fujitsu hard disk installed. No other digital media is 
identified on the system. The computer system is considered isolated and 
packaged, then collected and transported to the computer laboratory.  The 
collected computer system had the following configuration: Pentium III 800 MHz, 
256 MB RAM, hard disk 20GB, Samsung CD-ROM and installed operating 
system is Windows XP S.P. 2. No additional digital storage device was identified 
or collected.  
Process 3. Image Acquisition 
Input Activities  
I.3.1. Select appropriate tool 
I.3.2. Protect media from possible alteration of data  
I.3.3. Image the original media 
I.3.4. Store safely original media 
I.3.5. Back-up the image, work on that 
I.3.6. Create Cryptographic Value 
Comments 
The selected tool for the acquisition is the EnCase Enterprise 4.20. The hard disk 
was connected to the dedicated imaging machine in order to be acquired. EnCase 
FastBloc1 was used in order to protect the media from alteration of data. The 
image file was created on another dedicated computer machine on the network 
and saved under a filename that specified date of the acquisition and the owner of 
the disk. The imaging process took approximately two hours to proceed. When it 
was completed, the original hard disk was disconnected from the FastBloc and 
safely stored into a cabinet. A customised tag indicating details about the origin of 
the disk was installed before being stored. EnCase automatically creates a back-up 
                                               
1 The write-protect device supplied to accompany the EnCase software 
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of the case, therefore a back-up of the image is unnecessary. The hash value of the 
image was created with the use of the EnCase. That was: 
4878389711654C7BB666E5EA1C61B02D (Appendix L II). 
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 1. Source Identification  
I.1.1. Media Selection P 
Instruction 1. Online data  P 
Objective 1.1. Evidential computer storage components P 
Objective 1.2. Computer storage media Hard Disk 
Instruction 2. Offline data  
Objective 2.1. Any offline data that can be used as additional 
evidence 
 
I.1.2.Live system  
Instruction 1. Check operating system  
Objective 1.2. Shutdown  
Objective 1.2. Disconnect  
O.1.1.keep record of the scene P 
Process 2. Digital Media collection  
I.2.1. Identify different digital media  P computer 
system 
Instruction 1. Generic device storing personal data  
I.2.2. Secure/ isolate digital media P 
I.2.3. Collect/ package digital media P 
Process 3. Image Acquisition  
I.3.1. Select appropriate tool EnCase 
I. 3.2. Image the original media P 
I. 3.3. Protect media from possible alteration of data  P Write blocker 
I. 3.4. Store safely original media P 
I.3.5. Back-up the image, work on that P 
I.3.6. Create Cryptographic Value P 
Table 34: Pma - Digital Media Documenting procedure 
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6.2.1.3 ID Theft Data Identification 
Process 4. Evidential data identification 
Input Activities  
I.4.1.V. Existence of malicious software 
I.4.2.V. Existence of unsecured transactions 
I.4.3.V. Vulnerable system 
Comments 
Existence of malicious software was identified at this stage. The system was 
checked with two different antivirus programs, Zonealarm and PC Tools. The 
reason for using these particular antivirus programs is that they are both popular, 
award winning commercial software. The author held a license for Zonealarm 
Antivirus (Zonealarm, 2010) at the period of the experiment, so it was considered 
as a respectable and well functioning antivirus. The PC Tools Antivirus (PC 
Tools, 2010) was available for free download. The purpose for using two similar 
antivirus programs is to ensure the consistency of the antivirus search in the 
digital media. Both programs identified that the system hosts two different types 
of malware that steal bank details. The alert on Zonealarm was 
Trojan.Win32.Agent.dtx and Trojan_Spy.Win32.banker.cpv, while PC Tools 
found Trojan.Agent.CWQA and TrojanSpy.Banker.LZY. A number of unknown 
.dll files exist in the system folder. These will be further analysed on the following 
phase, in order to identify whether the malware has been executed on the system 
and important files have been infected.  
No antivirus or firewall was installed to the system, which makes it more 
vulnerable to the identified malware. In addition, a number of bank transactions 
were identified in the registry entries, leading to possible unsecured transactions.  
Expected Output Activity 
O.4.1.V. Victim evidential data list 
The victim’s evidential data list is the following:  
- Existence of malware identified  
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- unrecognised *.dll files 
- unsecure transactions 
- vulnerable system 
Process 5. Target identification 
Input Activities  
I.5.1. vulnerable systems 
I.5.2. published information 
I.5.3. individual/ corporate 
Comments 
The system is exposed to different vulnerabilities as identified on the previous 
process. Therefore, the target was a vulnerable system. The owner of the media 
has published personal information on social networking web sites (Facebook, 
Hi5). The target is an individual system as it is already known from its owner 
(case study).  
Expected Output Activity 
O.5.1. Target identification list 
The target identification list as is was identified: 
- vulnerable system  
- no security software installed  
- accounts on social networking web sites identified  
- individual system 
Process 6. Threat agent identification/ intention 
Input Activities  
I.6.1. internal/ external attack 
I.6.2. individual/ corporate  
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Comments 
An external attack, as the system is not connected to a local network. The threat 
agent characteristic towards its target is an individual system. 
Expected Output Activity 
O.6.1. Threat agent identification list  
The threat agent identification list at this stage is: 
- external attack 
- individual system 
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 4. Evidential data identification  
  V. Victim  
I.4.1.V. Existence of malicious software P 
I.4.2.V. Existence of unsecured transactions P 
I.4.3.V. Vulnerable system P 
O.4.1.V. Victim evidential data list P 
Process 5. Target identification  
I.5.1. vulnerable systems P 
I.5.2. published information P Networking 
web sites 
I.5.3. individual/ corporate Individual 
Process 6. Threat agent identification / intention  
I.6.1. internal/ external attack External 
I.6.2. individual/ corporate  Individual 
O.6.1. Threat agent identification list P 
Table 35: Pma - ID Theft Data Identification Documenting procedure 
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6.2.2 Phase 2: Evidence Analysis 
6.2.2.1 Summary of Pea 
The second phase of the framework involves the examination of the evidence. It 
receives as input, the output of phase one and is therefore constructed. 
Input:  ID Theft Data Analysis, the investigator is required to examine the 
identified ID theft data (output of phase one). It includes three processes for the 
analysis.  
Output: Evidence, the evidential data that arose during the analysis is collected 
and categorised. This involves two processes. 
6.2.2.2 ID Theft Data Analysis 
Process 7. Data Analysis 
Input Activities  
I.7.1.Identify all files of the system  Instruction 1. Existing files 
 Instruction 2. Deleted, remaining 
 Instruction 3. Hidden data 
 Instruction 4. Encrypted/ password protected 
 Instruction 5. Temp files/ folders 
I.7.2. Recover deleted files 
I.7.3. Slack / Unallocated space 
I.7.4. Hidden partitions 
Comments 
All files that can be analysed for evidence have been identified. The deleted files 
were retrieved from the disk image; the unallocated space can be examined. No 
hidden partitions were discovered. Two zip files were present in C:\Documents 
and Settings\user\My Documents  
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Expected Output Activity 
O.7.1. Define files that can be used as evidence 
Files that can be used as evidence at this stage are: 
- Existing files 
- Deleted, remaining 
- Temp files/folders 
- Recovered deleted files 
- Slack / unallocated space 
Process 8. Target Analysis 
Input Activities  
I.8.1.V. Malicious software/ code Instruction   1. Monitors web-browser Process/ 
network traffic 
 Instruction 2. Accesses contact list records 
 Instruction 3. Accesses clipboard contents 
 Instruction 4. Trojans that collect personal 
information 
 Instruction 5. Software Keylogger (hosted) 
I.8.2.V. Local-based e-mail  
I.8.3.V. Web-based e-mail   
I.8.4.V. Embedded Object scripting access languages 
I.8.5.V. Recently accessed documents 
I.8.6.V. URL information  Instruction 1. URL cache 
 Instruction 2. URL Process record 
I.8.7.V. Security permissions 
I.8.8.V. Application histories 
I.8.9.V. Instant message history log 
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I.8.10.V. Databases 
I.8.11.V. Spreadsheets 
I.8.12.V. Number systems 
Comments 
The identified malwares installed in the system are both Trojans that collect 
financial information and record keystrokes (keylogger). It immediately highlights 
the fact that the system would be vulnerable and the data may have been extracted 
this way. Based on antivirus internet reports (Sophos (2009), F-Secure (2009), 
Threat Expert (2009)) concerning the files that are created by the malicious 
software, a number of .dll files were identified 
(C:\Windows\System32\mscorews.dll, C:\Windows\System\shdocvs.dll etc.). It is 
important to identify the behaviour of the malware and files that can be created or 
altered by it, in order to verify that it has run on the system. Because of the 
existence of malware the registry keys were examined, created files and 
directories, running processes and open ports.  The behaviour of the Trojan-
Spy:W32/Banker.CPV shows that it acts as a Browser Helper Object (BHO) on 
Internet Explorer, the web browser internet history appears. The following entries 
on the registry linked with the malware were discovered:  
- HKLM\Software\Helper 
- HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer 
\Browser Helper Objects\{327C3AF0-4EF6-4f8a-9A8D-685A4815D9F8} 
- HKLM\Software\Classes\CLSID\{327C3AF0-4EF6-4f8a-9A8D- 
85A4815D9F8} 
- HKLM\Software\Classes\CLSID\{327C3AF0-4EF6-4f8a-9A8D- 
685A4815D9F8}\InprocServer32 
- HKLM\Software\Classes\CLSID\{327C3AF0-4EF6-4f8a-9A8D-
685A4815D9F8}\ProgID 
- HKLM\Software\Classes\CLSID\{327C3AF0-4EF6-4f8a-9A8D-
685A4815D9F8}\TypeLib 
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Local based e-mail was not identified on the system. However, information 
concerning web-based e-mail was retrieved. The user appears to have web-based 
e-mail accounts on Hotmail and Yahoo. The names of the accounts that were 
identified for the user are: jacobss05@yahoo.co.uk and jacobs.st@hotmail.com. A 
large number of e-mail contacts were identified in the search. Some personal e-
mails were retrieved of no particular value. An e-mail contact 
scissors@email.com appears to have sent the compressed files game.zip and 
funny.zip to jacobss05@yahoo.co.uk that were saved on C:\Documents and 
Settings\user\My Documents folder and identified in I.7.1 as attachments1. The 
date the e-mail was sent is the 20th of May 2008. The files were exported and 
unzipped. The analysis system alerted the files as virus infected.   
Some work information was also retrieved from the retrieved e-mails on the user’s 
system and also published information on the Facebook and the Hi-5 platform.  
The system is JavaScript enabled. The recently accessed documents didn’t 
illustrate anything suspicious concerning the victim’s story. The URL information 
was retrieved. The temporary internet files were checked and multiple browsing 
histories were identified. The user was using web banking internet sites 
(www.natwest.co.uk, www.hsbc.co.uk), where information login was retrieved. 
The alerts were Trojan.Win32.Agent.dtx and Trojan_Spy.Win32.banker.cpv, 
identical with those identified from Zonealarm on the image virus scan.  
The security permissions of the Windows system were not altered and nothing 
valuable was retrieved from application histories. It appears that the system had 
Windows Live Messenger installed since 2006 and Yahoo Messenger on 2008. 
The history logs that were retrieved didn’t provide any evidence other than 
personal conversations. There was no database software installed on the system. 
                                               
1 The e-mail was managed to be downloaded without activating the web server’s antivirus system, 
because it was planted to the system and not sent at the execution of the experiment. This 
information was revealed by the ‘attacker-fellow researcher’ that executed the case study scenario. 
The systems were connected to the internet when a dummy e-mail was sent to the victim by the 
fraudster’s machine representing the attack without alerting. Then, the malware was saved to the 
system and executed in order to install the Trojans.    
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There was a spreadsheet Microsoft Excel file, where the user kept track of his 
bank accounts balance (Bank Accounts 060408.xlsx). The file was un-erased.  
Extensive number system searches that took place with EnCase included bank 
account number, post code, date of birth and telephone numbers. 
Expected Output Activity 
O.8.1.V. List evidential findings  
The evidential findings list is: 
- Malware evidence included:  
C:\Windows\System32\mscorews.dll  
C:\Windows\System\shdocvs.dll 
C:\Windows\System\edlin.dll 
C:\Windows\System\perfnw.cpl 
Registry entries 
- User’s e-mail accounts 
 jacobss05@yahoo.co.uk 
 jacobs.st.hotmail.com 
 and other e-mail accounts with recent contact: 
 j.g.evans@gmx.xo.uk 
 emma01@mail.org 
 cocopika@hotmail.com 
 scissors@email.com 
- MSN contacts 
- Yahoo! Messenger contacts 
- Web-banking activities  
Logins on: www.natwest.com and www.hsbc.co.uk 
- JavaScript 
- User’s bank account numbers 
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- Virus infected e-mail attachments received:  
game.zip and funny.zip 
- MS Excel file holding bank account numbers  
C:\Documents and Settings\user\My Documents\Bank Accounts 
060408.xlsx 
- Work information:  
Book publisher 
- Post code: 
NP20 5EH 
- Telephone numbers 
- Date of birth:  
05/04/1969 
Process 9. Threat Agent Analysis 
Input Activities  
I.9.1. Intention Instruction 1. Financial 
 Instruction 2. Identity 
 
I.9.2. Motivation Instruction 1. Target 
I.9.3. Knowledge / Skills 
Expected Output Activity 
None 
Comments 
The existence of a Trojan that captures and steals financial information shows 
financial intention from the fraudster. The target that worked as motivation seems 
to be an independent unsecure internet connected system. The fraudster 
discovered an easy target that used minimum security measures and exploited it. 
Evaluation of experiments 
 
185 
The skills of the fraudster so far declare him as a conspiracy, opportunist, 
innovative attacker, may belong to organised crime. 
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 7. Data Analysis  
I.7.1.Identify all files of the system   
Instruction 1. Existing files P 
Instruction 2. Deleted, remaining  
Instruction 3. Hidden data  
Instruction 4. Encrypted / password protected  
Instruction 5. Temp files / folders P 
I.7.2. Recover deleted files P 
I.7.3. Slack / Unallocated space P 
I.7.4. Hidden partitions P 
O.7.1.Define files that can be used as evidence P 
Process 8. Target Analysis   
   V. Victim  
I.8.1.V. Malicious software / code P 
Instruction 1. Monitors web-browser activity / network traffic  
Instruction 2. Accesses contact list records  
Instruction 3. Accesses clipboard contents  
Instruction 4. Trojans that collect personal info P 
Instruction 5. Software Keylogger (hosted) P 
I.8.2.V. Local-based e-mail   
I.8.2.V. Web-based e-mail   P 
I.8.3.V. Embedded Object scripting access languages P 
I.8.4.V. Recently accessed documents P 
I.8.5.V. URL information   
Instruction 1. URL cache P 
Instruction 2. URL activity record P 
I.8.6.V. Security permissions P 
I.8.7.V. Application histories P 
I.8.8.V. Instant message history log P 
I.8.9.V. Databases  
I.8.10.V. Spreadsheets  
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I.8.11.V. Number systems P 
O.8.1.V List evidential findings  P 
Process 9. Threat Agent Analysis  
I.9.1. Intention  
Instruction 1. Financial P 
Instruction 2. Identity P 
I.9.2. Motivation  
Instruction 1. Target P  
unsecure 
system 
I.9.3. Knowledge / Skills P  
conspiracy, 
opportunist 
Table 36: Pea - ID Theft Data Analysis Documenting procedure 
6.2.2.3 Evidence   
Process 10. Evidence Collection  
Input Activity  
I.10.1. Use evidential findings list, O.8.1.V or O.8.1.F. 
Expected Output Activities 
O.10.1.Create list of evidence based 
on ID Theft types  
Instruction 1. Financial 
 Instruction 2. Identity 
O.10.2. Threat agent Evidence list (Process 9 is used as input) 
Comments 
The evidential findings list O.8.1.V is used as an input and the created outputs are: 
O.10.1. 
Financial 
- Identified Malware evidence 
- Web-banking activities 
- User’s bank account numbers 
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- Virus infected e-mail attachments received and saved on  (game.zip and 
funny.zip) 
- MS Excel file holding bank account numbers (C:\Documents and 
Settings\user\My Documents\Bank Accounts 060408.xlsx) 
- Date of birth 
Identity 
- User’s e-mail accounts 
- MSN contacts 
- Yahoo! Messenger contacts 
- Post Code 
- Telephone Numbers 
- Date of birth 
- Business record 
O.10.2. 
- Financial intention because of the behaviour of the malware 
- Independent unsecure internet connected system 
- Innovative attacker may belong to organised crime  
At this stage the actual categorisation of the findings has begun. Process 10 uses 
the evidence that was discovered during the ID Theft Data Analysis (Processes 7, 
8 and 9). It satisfies its purpose that is to collect all these findings and sort it 
according to the ID theft type (O.10.1) and the threat agent related findings.  
Process 11. Evidence Categorisation 
Input Activity  
I.11.1. Use evidential findings list, O.8.1.V or O.8.1.F respectively  
Expected Output Activity 
O.11.1. Create evidence classification list  Instruction 1. Strongly Evidential 
 Instruction 2. Evidential 
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 Instruction 3. Irrelevant 
 
Comments 
- Strongly Evidential: Malware evidence, Virus infected e-mail attachments.  
- Evidential: Web-banking activities, User’s bank account numbers, MS 
Excel file holding bank account numbers, Work information, Post code, 
Telephone numbers, Date of Birth. 
- Irrelevant: MSN contacts, Yahoo! Messenger contacts, personal instant 
messenger log files, personal e-mail communication. 
The above classification list refers to and sorts the findings that are directly linked 
with ID theft. The data included in the Strongly Evidential are inarguable findings 
related with ID theft. In this case, malware that records financial information and 
virus infected e-mail attachments are strongly evidential findings that reveal the 
involvement of an ID thief.     
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 10. Evidence Collection   
I.10.1. Use evidential findings list, O.8.1.V or O.8.1.F. P 
O.10.1.Create list of evidence based on ID Theft types    
Instruction 1. Financial  
Objective 1.1. Credit histories P 
Objective 1.2. Transactions P 
Objective 1.3. Application names  
Objective 1.4. Phone records  
Objective 1.5. Tax records  
Objective 1.6. Bankruptcy records   
Objective 1.7. Documents on other people’s names  
Objective 1.8. Dates of birth P 
Instruction 2. Identity  
Objective 2.1. Financial Evidence P 
Objective 2.2. N.I. Numbers  
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6.2.3 Phase 3: Scenario Construction 
6.2.3.1 Summary of Psc 
The third phase of the framework interprets the evidence identified on Pea in 
order to reach effective conclusions. It receives as input the output of the previous 
phase. It is constructed as following: 
Input: Evidence Classification, the identified categorised evidence will be 
classified. 
Output: Scenario, creates an outline of the scenario that involves the evidential 
findings. 
6.2.3.2 Evidence Classification   
Process 12. Structure of evidential data 
Input Activity  
I.12.1. Use evidence as of Processes 10 and 11 
 
Objective 2.3. Driving licence  
Objective 2.4. Employment records  
Objective 2.5. Passport records  
Objective 2.6. Business records P 
Objective 2.7. Property records  
Objective 2.8. Documents on other people’s names  
Objective 2.9. Dates of birth P 
Objective 2.10. ID Card copies  
Objective 2.11. Criminal records  
O.10.2. Threat agent Evidence list  P 
Process 11. Evidence Categorisation  
I.11.1. Use evidential findings list, O.8.1.V or O.8.1.F.  
O.11.1. Create evidence classification list   
Instruction 1. Strongly Evidential P 
Instruction 2. Evidential P 
Instruction 3. Irrelevant P 
Table 37: Pea - Evidence Documenting procedure 
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Expected Output Activity 
O.12.1.Categorisation of evidential data Instruction 1. E-mail 
 Instruction 2. Internet Related 
 Instruction 3. Malware 
 Instruction 4. Hacked Databases 
 Instruction 5. Malicious Tools 
 Instruction 6. Documents 
 Instruction 7. Application logs 
 Instruction 8. System Vulnerabilities 
 Instruction 9. Other 
Comments 
1. e-mail accounts and communication identified:  
user and contacts e-mail accounts 
2. Internet related: 
JavaScript installed, web banking logins and activity, social networking 
account logins, instant messengers and contacts  
3. Malware: 
 Malware evidence .dll files and registry entries 
4. Hacked databases: 
None 
5. Malicious Tools: 
 Virus infected e-mail attachments received 
6. Documents: 
 MS Excel file holding bank account numbers 
7. Application logs 
 Instant message history log files 
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8. System Vulnerabilities 
 No security permissions altered 
9. Other 
 Work information, Post code, Telephone numbers, Date of birth 
Process 13. Structure threat agent’s profile 
Input Activity  
I. 13.1. Use Threat agent Evidence list O.10.2 
Expected Output Activities 
O.13.1.V Reveal technical skills 
O.13.2.V Reveal programming skills 
O.13.3.V Ability to convince someone 
O.13.4.V Ability to keep stealth action 
Comments 
The threat agent’s profile has been structured according to O.10.2. 
O.13.1.V. Technical skills by the fraudster in order to effectively use the malware 
O.13.2.V. Programming skills to create and distribute the malware 
O.13.3.V. Persuasion skills to convince someone run the malware 
O.13.4.V. The malware would have been identified if the system had antivirus 
installed.  
Process 14. Structure analysed digital evidence 
Input Activities  
I.14.1. Structure all sort of valuable information 
I.14.2. Identify evidential aspects 
Comments 
The most relevant evidential data identified during the examination linked with 
the incident is the following (I.14.1.): Malware evidence, Virus infected e-mail 
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attachments saved in C:\Documents and Settings\user\My Documents\funny.zip 
and C:\Documents and Settings\user\My Documents\games.zip, Web-banking 
activities, User’s bank account numbers, MS Excel file holding bank account 
numbers, Work information, Post code, Telephone numbers, Date of Birth. 
The evidential aspects that belong together in a group are identified (I.14.2.) and 
prepared to be presented at the output of the process.  
Expected Output 
O.14.1. Group the evidential aspects  
All evidence involved with the malware is grouped as it states the most critical 
information identified: antivirus results, malware behaviour, .dll entries, registry 
entries, and virus infected e-mail attachments. This output is the result of I.14.1 
and I.14.2.  
The Evidence Classification aims to organise the findings before preparing the 
Scenario of the case. Some of the activities may seem repeatable to the reader. 
However, they adhere to the logical continuation of the process and they are fully 
represented in this section in order to demonstrate their functionality.  
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 12. Structure of evidential data  
I.12.1. Use evidence as of Processes 10 & 11 P 
O.12.1.Categorisation of evidential data  
Instruction 1. E-mail P 
Instruction 2. Internet Related P 
Instruction 3. Malware P 
Instruction 4. Hacked Databases  
Instruction 5. Malicious Tools  
Instruction 6. Documents P 
Instruction 7. Application logs  
Instruction 8. System Vulnerabilities P 
Instruction 9. Other  
Process 13. Structure threat agent’s profile  
I. 13.1. Use Threat agent Evidence list O.10.2  
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V. Victim  
O.13.1.V. Reveal technical skills P 
O.13.2.V. Reveal programming skills P 
O.13.3.V. Ability to convince someone P 
O.13.4.V. Ability to keep stealth action  
Process 14. Structure analysed digital evidence  
I.14.1. Structure all sort of valuable information P 
I.14.2. Identify evidential aspects P 
O.14.1. Group the evidential aspects  P 
Table 38: Pea - Evidence Classification Documenting Procedure 
6.2.3.3 Scenario  
Process 15. Scenario Outline 
Input Activity  
I.15.1. Use evidence as of I.1.1.< Instruction 2, Phase 1< ID Theft Data 
Identification, Phase 2< Evidence, and Phase 3< Evidence Classification 
Expected Output Activity 
O.15.1. List valuable data gathered 
Comments 
I.15.1. is used and creates the following valuable data gathered (O.15.1.). The list 
is not presented here for avoiding repetition, as it uses the outputs of phases one, 
two and three and these are already indicated on the previous sections. I.1.1< 
Instruction 2 contains no relative data with this examination. The scenario outline 
list is used as an input on the next process.  
Process 16. Scenario Preparation Documentation 
Input Activity  
I.16.1. Use Scenario outline list O.15.1. 
Expected Output Activity 
O.16.1. Merge evidential data gathered 
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Comments 
All evidential data from process fifteen (O.15.1.) is gathered in order to continue 
to phase four. The purpose of process 16 is to document everything that will be 
included in the case in the last phase.  
The evidential data gathered include:  
Victim evidential data list (O.4.1.V.): Existence of malware identified, 
unrecognised *.dll files, unsecure transactions, vulnerable system 
Target identification list (O.5.1.): vulnerable system, no security software 
installed, accounts on social networking web sites identified, individual system 
Threat agent identification list (O.6.1.): external attack, individual system 
Financial information (O.10.1.): Identified Malware evidence, Web-banking 
activities, User’s bank account numbers, Virus infected e-mail attachments 
received and saved on  (game.zip and funny.zip), MS Excel file holding bank 
account numbers (C:\Documents and Settings\user\My Documents\Bank 
Accounts 060408.xlsx), Date of birth 
Identity information (O.10.1.): User’s e-mail accounts, MSN contacts, Yahoo! 
Messenger contacts, Post Code, Telephone Numbers, Date of birth, Business 
record 
Threat agent evidence list (O.10.2.): Financial intention because of the behaviour 
of the malware, Independent unsecure internet connected system, Innovative 
attacker may belong to organised crime  
Evidence classification list  (O.11.1.): Strongly Evidential data identified: Malware 
evidence, Virus infected e-mail attachments, Evidential: Web-banking activities, 
User’s bank account numbers, MS Excel file holding bank account numbers, 
Work information, Post code, Telephone numbers, Date of Birth, Irrelevant: MSN 
contacts, Yahoo! Messenger contacts, personal instant messenger log files, 
personal e-mail communication. 
Categorisation of evidential data (O.12.1.): e-mail accounts and communication 
identified: user and contacts e-mail accounts; Internet related: JavaScript installed, 
web banking logins and activity, social networking account logins, instant 
messengers and contacts; Malware: Malware evidence .dll files and registry 
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entries; Hacked databases: None; Malicious Tools: Virus infected e-mail 
attachments received; Documents: MS Excel file holding bank account numbers; 
Application logs: Instant message history log files; System Vulnerabilities: No 
security permissions altered; Other: Work information, Post code, Telephone 
numbers, Date of birth 
The threat agent’s profile (O.13.1- 4.V): Technical skills by the fraudster in order 
to effectively use the malware, Programming skills to create and distribute the 
malware, Persuasion skills to convince someone run the malware. The malware 
would have been identified if the system had antivirus installed.  
Group the evidential aspects (O.14.1.): All evidence involved with the malware; 
antivirus results, malware behaviour, .dll entries, registry entries, virus infected e-mail 
attachments. 
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 15. Scenario Outline  
I.15.1. Use evidence as of I.1.1.< Instruction 2, Phase 1< ID Theft 
Data Identification, Phase 2< Evidence, and Phase 3< Evidence 
Classification  
P 
O.15.1. List valuable data gathered P 
Process 16. Scenario Preparation Documentation  
I.16.1. Use Scenario outline list from O.15.1. P 
O.16.1. Merge evidential data gathered P 
Table 39: Psc - Scenario Documenting Procedure 
6.2.4 Phase 4: Evaluation 
6.2.4.1 Summary of Pe 
The Pe evaluates the scenario and produces the case report. The following input 
and output are required: 
Input: Scenario examination, where the output of phase three is tested and 
clarified. 
Output: Case, the actual case documentation is created based on the evaluated 
evidential findings. 
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6.2.4.2 Scenario Examination 
Process 17. Scenario Testing/ Evaluation  
Input Activities  
I.17.1. Use Phase 1< ID Theft Data Identification, Phase 2< Evidence, and Phase 
3< Scenario 
I.17.2. Check validation/ entirety of the outputs 
Comments 
The outputs from the previous phases are used and their validity is checked 
among the phases. No mistakes were identified.  
Expected Output Activity 
O.17.1. Create evaluation list 
The evaluation list includes the most crucial data of the examination as this was 
stated in O.11.1. Malware evidence, Virus infected e-mail attachments. No 
amendments were made, and the validity of the evidential files was confirmed. 
Process 18. Scenario Clarification 
Input Activities  
I.18.1. Use evaluation list as of O.17.1. 
I.18.2. Clarify the impact of evidential data 
Comments 
The evaluation list is used (O.17.1.); the impact of evidential data is clarified 
according to the evidence. 
Expected Output Activity 
O.18.1. Create scenario clarification list   
The scenario clarification list for this activity is identical with O.17.1, as no 
amendments were made. Therefore, it is constructed as following: 
Malware evidence, Virus infected e-mail attachments and also the output of 
O.16.1 that states all evidential data gathered. 
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 Table 40: Pe - Scenario Examination Documenting procedure 
6.2.4.1 Case 
Process 19. Case Construction 
Input Activity  
I.19.1. Use data from the scenario clarification list O.18.1 
Comments 
The scenario clarification list is used as it emerged from O.16.1 and O.17.1 in 
order to create the output of the activity. 
Expected Output Activity 
O.19.1. Construct the case 
The outline of the case is created at this activity as it is given from the input 
I.19.1. The representation of the evidence should be linked with the impact of the 
case. It is not entirely stated at this section as the evidential data has been 
indicated on the previous sections. 
The investigator could also follow this activity as a draft of the case 
documentation that he is required to compose in a later process. 
  
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 17. Scenario Testing / Evaluation  
I.17.1. Use Phase 1< ID Theft Data Identification, Phase 2< 
Evidence, and Phase 3< Scenario 
P 
I.17.2. Check validation / entirety of the outputs P 
O.17.1. Create evaluation list P 
Process 18. Scenario Clarification  
I.18.1. Use evaluation list from O.7.1. P 
I.18.2. Clarify the impact of evidential data P 
O.18.1. Create scenario clarification list   P 
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Process 20. Case Clarification 
Input Activity  
I.20.1. Clarify the constructed case from O.18.1. 
Comments 
The relation of the evidential data is justified in accordance to the initial premise 
that is the ID theft incident that the user of the computer system appears to have 
fallen as a victim.  
To summarise, the victim appears to have received an e-mail attachment with the 
files funny.zip and games.zip from scissors@email.com. The user saved into the 
C:\Windows\user\My Documents folder these files, unzipped them and installed 
the two Trojans, TrojanSpy.Banker.LZY and Trojan.Agent.CWQA. The 
behaviour of the Trojans in relation to the created files identified during the 
forensic analysis justifies the ID theft incident.  
Expected Output Activity 
None 
Process 21. Case Evaluation 
Input Activities 
I.21.1. Use the scenario evaluation list from O.17.1. 
I.21.2. Check validation 
Comments 
Again the output of process 17 is used in order to evaluate the constructed case as 
this was outlined in process nineteen.  
Expected Output Activities 
O.21.1.Confirm case evaluation 
The official outcome of the case is confirmed at this activity based on the 
evidential findings that constructed it.  
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Process 22. Evidential Case Representation 
Input Activity  
I.22.1. Create the testimonial report Instruction 1. Include all case evidence 
 Instruction 2. Describe all case evidence 
Comments 
All case evidence as it was identified in phases one, two and three and included at 
this process and described.  
Expected Output Activity 
O.22.1. ID Theft Case Investigation Report  
The case report includes everything as mentioned on I.22.1. The report is not 
extensively written at this activity. It includes all case evidence that was described 
on the previous cases in a manner that could support a juridical judgement.  
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 19. Case Construction  
I.19.1. Use data from the scenario clarification list O.18.1 P 
O.19.1. Construct the case P 
Process 20. Case Clarification  
I.20.1. Clarify the constructed case from O.18.1. P 
Process 21. Case Evaluation  
I.21.1. Use the scenario evaluation list from O.17.1. P 
I.21.2. Check validation P 
O.21.1.Confirm case evaluation P 
Process 22. Evidential Case Representation  
I.22.1. Create the testimonial report P 
Instruction 1. Include all case evidence P 
Instruction 2. Describe all case evidence P 
O.22.1. ID Theft Case Investigation Report  P 
Table 41: Pe - Case Documenting Procedure 
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The application of the ID theft investigation framework on the victim’s side 
demonstrated the functionality of the framework. In addition, it verified that the 
processes that constitute it support the initial premise that aims to facilitate the 
investigation of computer based ID theft as well as the handling of the related 
digital evidence.  
6.3 F. Fraudster 
The parts of the framework that involve the analysis from the fraudster’s side will 
be presented at this section. The victim’s analysis presented results that profiled 
the fraudster’s intention and motives. However, the design of the experiment as 
this was described on chapter 5 included the attacker’s computer system in the 
specifications. This allows the analysis of the fraudster’s hard disk. The 
framework has been applied on the digital media; however it is partially presented 
in order to demonstrate its functionality on fraudster (F).  
Therefore, processes four, eight, nine, ten and thirteen will be presented. These 
processes include the fraudster’s division and some of the analysis that involves 
him, in order to compare the results with the evidential findings from victim (V). 
The reports produced by the EnCase and accompany the investigation can be 
found on Appendix M. It is important to mention that the hard disk was checked 
for viruses prior to the examination with Zonealarm and PC Tools and no viruses 
were identified.     
Process 4. Evidential data identification 
Input Activities  
I.4.1.F. existence of malicious software code 
I.4.2.F. forensic extraction software 
I.4.3.F. hacking tools 
Comments 
Expected Output Activity 
O.4.1.F. Fraudster evidential data list 
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On the fraudster evidential data list, the following elements were identified: 
- no existence of malicious software code (written scripts), programming 
code existed in the system, but not written by the user (implementation of 
the MD5 message-digest algorithm (C language source code)).  
- Encase, AccessData, WinHex, MD5 Digest were installed in the system 
- Cain and Abel (Brute force), RAR Password Cracker, Password Tools 
folder 
Process 8. Target Analysis 
Input Activities  
I.8.1.F. Internet bookmarks 
I.8.2.F. Steganographic search 
I.8.3.F. Embedded Object scripting access languages 
I.8.4.F. Installed software Instruction 1. Web design applications 
 Instruction 2. Existence of Anti-Forensics 
applications  
 Instruction 3. System Process eraser 
 
I.8.5.F. Track illicit software use 
I.8.6.F. Recently Accessed Documents 
I.8.7.F. Filenames 
I.8.8.F.URL information Instruction 1. URL cache 
 Instruction 2. URL Process record 
I.8.9.F.Local based e-mail  
I.8.10.F.Web based e-mail 
I.8.11.F. Operating System Registry entries  
I.8.12.F. Security permissions 
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I.8.13.F. Instant message history log 
I.8.14.F. Malicious software (Trojan code / bot) 
I.8.15.F. Malicious source code existence 
I.8.16.F. Web server communication 
I.8.17.F. Databases 
I.8.18.F.Spreadsheets 
I.8.19.F. Images 
I.8.20.F. File Processes 
I.8.21.F. Number systems 
Comments 
The Internet bookmarks that were identified provided the support of malicious 
interests that were bookmarked (http://sectools.org/crackers.html, 
http://www.password-crackers.com/en/articles/12/, http://www.nirsoft.net/, 
http://www.nmrc.org/pub/faq/hackfaq/hackfaq-05.html, http://kerpass.wordpress. 
com/2007/01/25/phishing-dns-poisoning-man-in-the-middle/). As well as interest 
on forensic examinations and hacking courses (http://www2.cit.cornell.edu/ 
services/training/courses/chfi.html, http://www. fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/ 
july2004/research/2004_03_research01.htm). A print screen image can be found 
on Appendix M II. The installed software did not include web design, anti-
forensic or system process eraser applications. However, as mentioned on O.4.1.F 
forensic extraction software and hacking tools were identified. The recently 
accessed documents provided a large amount of information concerning the user. 
It effectively showed a link to C:\Documents and Settings\user\Desktop\brutus-
aet2, a brute forcing application that wasn’t identified on process four. In addition 
a file concerning malware presentation was identified (C:\Documents and 
Settings\user\Local Settings\Temp\ Rar$DI00.547\malware.ppt). These also 
identify some suspicious for the filenames activity. In addition a search for 
filenames in malware returned the following that belongs to an external plugged 
in device, probably a USB memory stick: 
LEGO·P:\Research\Malware\malware2.zip, C:\Documents and 
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Settings\user\Desktop\Malware\malware.zip from the recent files. A snapshot can 
be found on Appendix M II. However, the archived file was never saved on the 
hard disk on a further archived files search (covers activities I.8.15.F. and I.8.16.F 
as well). 
The URL information was retrieved for the bookmarks identified so far and 
revealed the user’s online visits. The user was mostly using Mozilla Firefox as it 
provided more activity than Internet Explorer. The cookies.txt and the 
downloads.rdf files were observed, but they didn’t appear to have any malicious 
code downloads. The user was active on .avi downloads instead. Searches on the 
Windows Temporary Internet Files appear to include malware searches. Facebook 
activities but not logins to an account were found. The existence of the account 
could be linked with searches for potential targeted identities. Furthermore, 
activity on the malware forum, www.offensivecomputing.net was discovered. 
There was no local based e-mail browser used. However, there was web based e-
mail activity and contacts. E-mail accounts were retrieved from Google mail and 
mail.com through online access. The e-mail logins that were used were 
l.h.scissors@googlemail.com and scissors@email.com. The activity of the e-mail 
account was extensive by sending and receiving e-mails with individuals as well 
as subscriptions. Among these, the e-mail message that was sent to 
jacobss05@yahoo.co.uk with the file attachments funny.zip and games.zip was 
identified.        
The operating system entries and the security permissions didn’t show any 
alterations. Instant Messenger log files show the victim’s e-mail 
Jacobs.st@hotmail.com added as a contact among others (e.g. fsr0000F.log, 
fsr00010.log). Appendix M II provides this information. Web server 
communication was not identified in the system. No spreadsheet or database files 
were also created or saved in the disk. A number of the victim’s pictures were 
identified on the fraudster’s hard disk.  
Expected Output Activity 
O.8.1.F. List evidential findings  
- Malicious and forensic interests on Internet bookmarks 
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- Forensic extraction software and hacking tools 
 Cain and Abel, RAR Password Cracker, Password Tools, Brutus, EnCase 
- Recently accessed documents 
- Filenames 
 LEGO·P:\Research\Malware\malware2.zip 
- URL information 
Malware searches 
Facebook activity 
www.offensivecomputing.net 
- Active e-mail accounts 
l.h.scissors@googlemail.com 
scissors@email.com 
- Instant Messenger contacts 
Jacobs.st@hotmail.com 
Process 9. Threat Agent Analysis 
Input Activities  
I.9.1. Intention Instruction 1. Financial 
 Instruction 2. Identity 
 
I.9.2. Motivation Instruction 1. Target 
I.9.3. Knowledge / Skills 
Comments 
Based on the findings the intention of the threat agent could match both financial 
or identity as the fraudster’s hard disk appear to have a number of different 
research activities on malware, forensic extraction software and hacking tools. 
The target is any vulnerable, unsecure system that could accept the malware 
attachment and execute it. The knowledge/ skills of the threat agent match I.9.3 on 
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Victim (V), as the findings declare him as a conspiracy, opportunist attacker. 
However, he cannot belong to organised crime, as he is mostly described as a 
novice researching the malware capabilities. 
Process 10. Evidence Collection  
Expected Output Activity 
O.10.2. Threat agent Evidence list (Process 9 is used as input) 
- Financial and/ or Identity 
- Vulnerable, unsecure to malware system 
- Conspiracy, opportunist, novice attacker 
Process 13. Structure threat agent’s profile 
Input Activity  
I. 13.1. Use Threat agent Evidence list O.10.2 
Expected Output Activities 
O.13.1.F Sophistication of tools 
O.13.2.F Level of expertise 
O.13.3.F Use of defensive techniques 
O.13.4.F Identify purpose of attacking 
O.13.5.F Identify motivation 
O.13.6.F Identify opportunities 
Comments 
The output of O.10.2 is used in order to structure the threat agent’s profile.  
O.13.1.F. The sophistication of tools identified state him as an opportunist. The 
evidential findings didn’t provide any information about the fraudster compiling 
complex methods (e.g. customised malicious scripts). Therefore, the fraudster 
took advantage of an occasional victim.  
O.13.2.F. The attacker is not advanced based on the findings in his digital media.   
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O.13.3.F. Anonymous mail servers or man-in-the-middle attacks were not 
identified as defensive techniques during the analysis. However, the 
straightforward method of contacting the victim could reveal some social 
engineering techniques. 
O.13.4.F. The purpose of attacking appears to be either curiosity or ego; to prove 
that he was able to achieve ID theft. 
O.13.5.F. The motivation appears to be personal financial gain. 
O.13.6.F. The above outcomes are used in order to assume and outline the profile 
of the fraudster. 
This part aimed to apply the required for the fraudster processes of the framework. 
Even though there were limitations concerning the laboratory experiment, the 
processes were applied successfully and provided valuable results that could also 
represent evidential ID theft data of a real incident.  
6.4 Discussion of the results 
The ID theft framework needs to be a tool that combines theory and practice in 
order to assist the investigator. This was a major concern at the beginning of the 
design and the implementation, as the academic background needed to incorporate 
practical issues. However, the framework had to be low level and specific, and at 
the same time generic in order to be able to adopt different circumstances. The 
validity of this effort wouldn’t be supported without an experimental evaluation.  
The laboratory experiment had some limitations (see chapter 5, section 5.2.3) due 
to the sensitivity of ID theft. For this reason, the experiment was not executed 
under completely realistic circumstances. A real fraudster would attack the system 
remotely by sending a sophisticated malware, aiming to breach the system’s 
firewall and antivirus. On the closed network attack the malware should not be 
able to send data over the Internet, because of the risk of having a leak of private 
information. Therefore, the only solution that would approach reality was to plant 
the malware. The fellow researcher that assisted the experiment acted as the 
fraudster planted the malware and executed it offline on the system; rather than try 
to open the e-mail attachment. Nevertheless, the purpose of the experiment is to 
demonstrate the functionality of the framework and not to penetrate the victim’s 
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system. The web based e-mail providers have embedded malware detection 
systems and would not allow opening the attachment.  
However, the execution of the malware offline has probably resulted in missing 
the creation of some files and registry entries that are considered to be created by 
the specific malware. The entries that were not identified in the victim’s system 
were subject to the Viruses and Spyware analysis of Sophos (2009) that provided 
information about the action of the malware. This was not considered as a 
disadvantage for the application of the framework. The purpose of the experiment 
was to verify whether it can be successfully applied on an ID theft investigation 
without omitting any evidential aspects. It appears that both the victim and the 
fraudster part did not miss anything of vital importance that could provide 
misleading results.  
An initial consideration was that ideally the evidence that results from the victim’s 
investigation would provide enough information to lead to the fraudster. The 
profiling of the fraudster does give some indications about his behaviour, but 
there is not enough guidance to lead on discovering the perpetrator. However, 
there is intelligence gathering on profiling each fraudster with the evidence that is 
left behind on a victim’s machine.  
The framework may be very precise in phases three and four where the discovered 
evidence needs to be sorted and evaluated. It could be an issue that an investigator 
would prefer to spend less time treating the evidence than required. The structure 
of the ID theft framework guides the investigator during the examination, so that 
he knows every step he needs to follow. The scenario construction and the 
evaluation phases are designed based on science and theory, and need to have a 
complete structure. Therefore, they are detailed and approach the handling of 
evidence in a way that may be questioning for the investigator. The last two 
phases could be condensed and satisfy the same purposes in less processes. 
As mentioned already, the framework did not fail to identify evidential data after 
the experiment. While chapter two presented all the different techniques that 
online ID theft can be achieved and the framework was created around these 
techniques, the experiment only examined the malware occasion. It is considered 
that the rest of the techniques can also be successfully applied in the framework, 
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but they are untested. The reason that the framework was not applied in all 
techniques was mainly practical. Setting up experiments to cover all techniques 
would require time and resources. The demonstration of the framework’s 
functionality on a popular ID theft technique (malware) should be representative 
for all techniques.  
The detailed description of the experiment in the previous sections aims to 
provide the most possible information concerning its execution. Both parts of the 
framework, concerning the victim and the fraudster, provided the desired results 
and indicated that the framework could be applied in any ID theft technique.  
In order to avoid the evaluation of the experiment to appear one sided; the 
contribution of the expert review resolves this issue. The following sections intend 
to provide from an expert’s side of view that the evaluation of the ID theft 
framework could not only be successfully applied to a controlled environment, but 
also on the real world.     
6.5 Presentation of expert review 
This section details the second part of the evaluation undertaken on the ID theft 
framework. It presents the expert evaluation that was received from Gwent Police, 
Hi-tech Crime Unit. The feedback provided some suggestions concerning the 
framework, but it was overall positive and encouraging. The comments and 
discussion on the questionnaire received by the experts appears in the following 
section.  
An evaluation based on the opinion of an expert on the field is invaluable. 
Therefore, the expert advice of the Gwent police officers was requested in order to 
establish and validate the objective of the research. During winter 2007, an initial 
approach was made to the police officers. The purpose was to explain the 
intention of the research and how their practical experience and guidance would 
be important for this piece of work. Their practical experience enlightened 
sections on the development of the framework, especially the evidence analysis 
(Phase 2-Pea). 
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6.5.1 Expert Review 
The police officers agreed to assist and provide an insight concerning the evidence 
that is left behind after an ID theft incident. Their instructive comments informed 
the design stage and were used during the implementation period. Furthermore, 
the officers gave permission for their names and emails to be incorporated into 
this thesis. 
In May 2008 a draft of the framework (comprising chapters 3 and 4) was sent to 
Detective Jon Evans. The email also briefly outlined the aim of the research. In 
addition to the outline of the framework, all the produced graphs that illustrate the 
framework and its phases were sent, accompanied by the ‘Abstracted Procedure 
for the Investigator’ document (Appendix H). The purpose is to assist the experts 
in how to use and apply the ID theft framework for the investigation of a real 
incident and differentiate the examination from their usual procedure.  
Detective Jon Evans forwarded the attached material to Detective Tim Williams; 
the expert officer, who deals with the computer forensic examination of relevant 
incidents. He replied with an insightful and detailed e-mail (see Appendix K) 
mentioning some areas in the framework that he believed would be valuable for 
the practical approach of each activity. His comments were taken under 
consideration. However, some of them were considered as too broad for the 
purpose of the current framework, some others were included but probably not 
recognized before the application of the framework and some others valuable (see 
section 6.5.2.1).  Therefore, some amendments were made to suit the latest 
comments.  
The purpose of this framework is to formalise the procedure on a theoretical and 
practical basis, in order to be applicable on numerous ID theft cases regardless the 
technology that is involved. Effectively in the same e-mail DC Williams 
mentioned:  
… I have not been able to apply the framework to a live job, as I do not 
have a job that fits the criteria at the moment. However it does seem to 
be a complete and comprehensive coverage of handling an ID theft. I 
do like the idea of a framework as it prevents overlooking some crucial 
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part of an investigation and frameworks are present in so many other 
areas of policing. 
On a later e-mail he noted: 
…the outline framework doesn’t seem to be missing anything major in 
an investigation of this type. You have obviously put a lot of effort into it. 
A few days later DC Williams replied with the filled in questionnaire that was 
applied on an already investigated case. That case was examined with the 
traditional method that Gwent police is using and the findings were already 
known. Consequently, it was much more efficient for the detective to apply the ID 
theft framework and try to identify the crucial evidence he was supposed to 
conclude and evaluate the results. This method was additionally beneficial for the 
framework as it was immediately compared with a verified by the police 
procedure.  
The detective answered the questionnaire and the results are discussed below (see 
section 5.3). The completed questionnaire can be found on Appendix J. 
On the first question the investigator was asked to value the idea of discriminating 
the investigation of computer crimes based on their method, where he answered 
that he totally agrees and commented that  
If the method of committing the crime is known and is reliable, then it is 
more efficient to concentrate your investigation efforts to areas known to 
be affected, rather than following the same routine for all offences. 
On the second question that was asking whether an ID theft framework can be a 
valuable tool for the investigator. The detective also answered that he totally 
agrees. 
The third question concerned the data flows and graphical representation of the 
framework and whether they were supportive for the investigator and the he 
agreed, however he noted that 
Some of the graphical representations may need explaining to 
investigators before they are used. Although I can see that the graphical 
files are not meant to be used as a standalone description. 
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The fourth question was about the effectiveness of the framework and whether it 
would speed up the investigation and the detective partially disagreed, while he 
commented the following: 
My disagreement isn’t a negative thing. The framework is 
comprehensive and would give an investigator more things to look at, 
which may have been overlooked or forgotten, therefore extending the 
initial examination, but this may lead to a time saving later on if there is 
no need to return to a case. 
The fifth question aims to discover whether the framework identifies all evidential 
aspects related to Identity Theft incidents. The interviewee totally agrees with this 
and points out the following comment: 
When applying the framework I did not discover anything missing that 
would have a detrimental effect on the investigation; neither could I 
think of anything else to add. However a framework, like software, will 
probably have a few minor bugs, and they will be discovered the more 
they are used. This framework appears to have the ability to be 
“tweaked” should the need arise. 
The sixth question involved the produced inputs and the outputs of the framework 
and whether the investigator believed that these were defined properly. In this 
question the expert answered that he totally agreed, without giving any comments.  
The seventh question was of a similar manner and enquired the investigator to 
answer if the inputs and the outputs were those that he expected to identify. He 
answered that he totally agreed, revealing that he was asked to examine areas of 
the media that he had already identified and detected as an expert.  
On the eighth question he was required to answer whether such a type of 
framework assesses the capabilities of the fraudster. The interviewee agreed with 
the probability that the findings can sketch the profile of the fraudster. The ninth 
question aims to verify whether the framework effectively assesses the ongoing 
threat of ID theft and the investigator answered that he agrees. However, he raised 
the following comment: 
Short term: yes. The method of ID theft is fluid and the criminals are 
constantly re-inventing themselves. Whilst we may have an idea of what 
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is happening now and the methods being employed, this will change in 
the future as criminals get to know investigators capabilities. However 
the framework is future-proof and new areas of examination can be 
added as would any such procedure. 
The tenth question enquires whether the framework is generic enough to be 
applicable in different systems, meaning the different operating systems and the 
interviewee answered in such a manner and agreed totally, while he commented: 
If by systems you mean Computer Operating systems, then yes. I don’t 
think it would make any difference what computer was being used. It 
does not limit the investigator. 
The eleventh question examines the general reflection of the framework towards 
an investigation by asking if the framework facilitates the investigation of Internet 
ID theft cases and the processing of the related digital evidence. DC Williams 
totally agreed with that, while he mentioned: 
I didn’t have the opportunity to apply the framework to an active search 
warrant, but the framework brings structure to gathering digital 
evidence pre-delivery to the forensic lab, so I don’t see any particular 
problem with this. The framework certainly brings structure to an 
investigation. I have had moments in the past where I stare blankly into 
space wondering what I am doing and where I am going. The framework 
brought a structure I could follow and tick-off as I progressed the case. 
The twelfth question was asking whether the interviewee normally uses evidence 
classification methods and if yes how the evidence is usually classified. The 
purpose was to identify the existing procedure of the police department, without a 
structured approach that the presented framework provides. The investigator 
replied the following: 
Normally our evidence is either classed as admissible or not (but still 
disclosable) there are varying strengths to admissible evidence, but this 
is not normally broken down. With changes in law, what has been 
inadmissible can now be used as evidence of bad character or 
knowledge and expertise of computer systems. In criminal cases the 
evidence overall has to be of such strength as to be beyond all 
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reasonable doubt. Civil cases are on a balance of probabilities. 
Therefore, the strength of the evidence will vary depending on the court 
hearing the case. 
There is also a classification of evidence that undermines the 
prosecution and assists the defence, which has to be disclosed at some 
point during the prosecution. 
His response reveals that the classification of the evidence according to the 
procedure the police follows is based on the prosecution and the defence, rather 
that the quality of the collected information that can be used as evidence. 
The thirteenth question adds to the previous by asking whether the evidence 
classification presented by the framework is of the investigator’s benefit. He 
answered that he agrees with this, while he commented: 
From a Police/CPS perspective I think it will highlight where the 
strengths and weaknesses of a case are. I am not sure if classifying the 
evidence would require some additional work on the case or if this 
would aid the enquiry. My case did not require classification so I cannot 
comment further. It would need to be put into practice and commented 
on after a few applications. 
It proves that he comprehends the purposes of classifying the evidence that is to 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of the incident. However, this could be an 
additional workload for the investigator. The fact that the detective did not 
actually classify the evidence on his case cannot defend a negative aspect on the 
classification.    
The fourteenth question asked whether the investigator identified any additional 
evidential data with the application of the framework, comparing to the procedure 
he normally uses. His answer was negative and he mentioned the following:   
I didn’t, but that is simply because the evidence wasn’t there. I did have 
extra logs and files to check thanks to the framework, which perhaps I 
would have missed or would have had to come back to at a later date. 
The last two questions involved the additional material that was provided to the 
detective in order to assist the investigation. The fifteenth question aims to value 
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the importance of the ‘Abstracted procedure for the investigator’ (Appendix H) 
document that was provided for fulfilling the analysis. The interviewee totally 
agrees with the existence of this document and commented that 
There is enough of a description so that the investigator knows what is 
required. 
The sixteenth question involved the ‘ID theft documenting procedure for the 
investigator’ form and whether that was found useful during the analysis 
(Appendix I). The interviewee agreed with the idea of this document, however he 
commented the following  
I didn’t use it. This is new to me so I needed the ‘Abstracted procedure 
for the investigator’ document as it was a bit more descriptive. However, 
most of the headings are obvious as to what is required and with a few 
applications it would take over as the main document to follow. 
At the end of the questionnaire on question seventeen, the interviewee was 
prompted to provide comments and recommendations concerning the framework. 
The purpose of this section was to let the interviewee express his general opinion 
about the framework. The correspondence was satisfying and supported the 
positive feedback that was outlined by the rest of the questionnaire. The exact 
words of the expert are quoted below and those phrases that are considered as 
most important are highlighted. 
There is always some reluctance to change the way an offence is 
investigated, but e-crime is becoming a very complex area of 
investigation with some serious offences being committed. It is becoming 
apparent that an investigator needs to complete a structured 
investigation that can be followed by others and reach the same 
conclusion and or results. The phrase “We need to be singing from the 
same song book” comes to mind. 
I am not a fan of catch all check lists as you may have to spend time 
explaining to a court or defence barrister why you didn’t look at a 
particular area that is on the list (a check list is a disclosable document 
if used). The idea of a framework that is offence specific is more 
appealing. 
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Using a framework that caters to a particular offence ensures that you 
do exactly what is required, keeps an investigator on-track, reduces the 
chance of overlooking an area where evidence could reside and affords 
some flexibility for the individual. 
It is clear that a lot of work has gone into this framework and it fitted 
well into my case. It was a little difficult at first, but with repeated use 
this will get easier the more it is used as with any other new policy or 
procedure. I would certainly consider using it again when it is finally 
published. I also think it would make a good foundation for any 
offence specific investigations. 
On the first paragraph the interviewee stresses the need of a structured approach 
towards e-crime as this becomes even more popular. This need is supported by the 
development of the ID theft investigation framework, concerning the ID theft 
related incidents. As he mentions on the second paragraph the idea of an offence 
specific framework can also confront the defence that would try to debate other 
methods of investigation. The benefit the investigator extracts from this method of 
investigation is that he keeps the analysis focused on its purpose as mentioned 
above. However, the most important matter DC Williams raises is that he would 
certainly consider using this work when published. His last words show that the 
presented work can satisfy not only scientific needs, but also assist investigations 
in real life. 
6.5.2 Discussion on the expert review 
The previous section is a demonstration of the views that were provided from the 
field expert. It was chosen to quote some of the comments received from Gwent 
Police in order to stress their value. 
The best of effort was given to create the questionnaire in a way to provide a 
general evaluation of the framework. DC Williams was positive with the idea of a 
crime specific framework and his responses showed that he appreciated its 
purpose with the first application. It was not the intention of the above section to 
provide a one sided review that shows no flaws to the ID theft framework, but to 
reassure the demonstration of its positive aspects.  
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However, the fact that the feedback was overall positive shows that the initial 
research hypothesis was validated: 
It is proposed to create an analytical framework to facilitate the 
investigation of Internet Identity Theft cases and the processing of the 
related digital evidence.  
The framework facilitated the investigation of computer based ID theft and 
handled the related digital evidence. This was confirmed while the investigator 
stated that he could have overlooked some evidential data he would probably need 
to return on a later stage of the investigation to find them. The application of a 
structured flow that assists the ID theft investigation guided him not to miss any 
evidence.  
The investigator believes that the framework does not accelerate the investigation 
required time.  However, a repetition of the framework could possibly familiarise 
the investigator with the process and eventually require less time for its 
application. 
The supporting material that accompanies the framework aims to cover any 
queries that an investigator could generate. The Abstracted procedure for the 
investigator (Appendix H), the document that explains the functionality of the 
framework was beneficial for the expert. Therefore, this paper appointed its 
purpose to act as a field manual to what the framework requires. The detective 
commented that he did not use the form ID theft investigative methodology, which 
after the evaluation of the work was renamed to ID theft investigation framework, 
Documenting Procedure for the investigator. This naming was considered as 
more suitable for its purpose.  
The detective commented that the graphical representations may need some 
explanation. Still the reason that the graphs were chosen to be represented in a 
simple form was to be easily comprehended by anyone. Definitely some 
explanation about the philosophy of the framework’s design would make them 
easier to understand. The purpose of the graphs though is to accompany the 
framework and not to stand alone.  
The detective agrees with the fact that the framework assesses the capabilities 
required from the fraudster and the ongoing threat of ID theft. However, he 
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effectively mentions that future methods could be developed by the fraudsters. 
The positive argument he raises on that is that he considers the framework as a 
future-proof design that could adopt upcoming procedures. 
The field expert believes the ID theft framework is a structured approach towards 
the processing of the digital evidence. It is an acknowledgement that the work has 
achieved one of its main targets. The flexibility of the framework was also 
mentioned as the expert believes that it is not limited and could be applied to 
different operating systems. Even though, the feedback involved only the view of 
a single expert, his comments are indicative that the ID theft framework could be 
applied in the real world and return accurate results of the investigation.   
6.5.2.1 Evaluation issues on the field expert review 
The meetings and the evaluation of the field experts provided a number of 
alternative perspectives for the framework.  These requested some clarifications of 
some areas of the framework that were taken under consideration during and after 
the evaluation. They need to be mentioned at this stage to support the evaluation 
and provide an overall assessment of this research. Some points could be 
considered as weaknesses and others as optional considerations. 
The framework could have included internet specific guidelines that would refer 
to remote data storage. The field expert mentioned that there are warrant issues 
due to territory problems in order to manage the access on remote systems and 
cloud environments. Such an approach is particularly interesting, but it seems a 
research area on its own. There are also other issues on that, as a fraudster could 
delete remote data at any time, which would complicate the investigation. Also, 
there should be implications concerning privacy rights in order to achieve access 
on the remote server. There should be given particular effort on this type of 
investigation and the ID theft framework would lose its focus if these areas were 
included. However, they are considerable for future development or amendments. 
A limitation of the framework is that it is basically built upon standalone systems. 
It could be applied to networks as well, but there are not special activities 
referring to networked systems. The handling of offline data on activity I.1.1 
should have included routers as well as the field expert has effectively indicated. 
The routers are commonly used and security logs, DHCP lists, access through a 
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firewall and port forwarding could provide evidential data. Because the network 
forensics is a special category and might include more additional aspects, they 
weren’t considered at the design of the framework.      
Activity I.1.2 considers the handling of a live system. There are two objectives 
provided, shutdown and disconnect. Effectively the detective has commented that 
they are taught to pull the plug from the computer, which is in accordance with 
the ACPO (2007) guidelines or shutdown the system. So, in this case, the 
disconnect objective could have been clearer in order to avoid unplugging the wall 
socket.  
The field experts have also pointed out some more effective comments on the 
communication and meetings we had. These add to the framework the expertise of 
the practitioner. The comments concerned how to examine the virus program logs, 
treat steganography, if suspected, and compressed files. These indications can be 
found on Appendix K. However, it is considered that they mainly refer to the way 
an investigator practically analyses the evidence. Some of them are mentioned in 
chapter four; some others are left with the side of the investigator and his 
experience. After all, the purpose of the framework is to facilitate the 
investigation, to show the way the examination should be treated, rather than 
describe of the examination process.     
6.6 The properties of the framework 
The properties that the ID theft investigation framework needs to include were 
presented at chapter 2 (see section 2.5.7.2). Table 43 demonstrates that the 
evaluation of this research work supported that these properties were successfully 
met.  It is a combination of the laboratory experiment and the expert review.     
The properties of the ID theft investigation framework 
It should divide the investigation concerning the victim or the 
fraudster. 
P 
Processes 4, 8 and 13 of 
the framework 
It should provide classified evidence. 
P 
Processes 5, 11 and 12 
of the framework 
It should provide profiling of the fraudster. 
P 
Processes 6, 9 and 13 of 
the framework 
Table 42: The accomplishment of the framework's properties 
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The application of the framework in the case study showed that the required 
results were discovered for both, the victim and the fraudster. The investigation 
can follow a different direction based on the subject of the examination. The first 
property concerning the separation between the victim and the fraudster is met on 
processes 4, 8 and 13 of the framework and according to the laboratory 
experiment (see sections 6.2.1.3, 6.2.2.2, 6.2.3.2 and 6.3) it was satisfied. 
Even though the best of effort was made on the design of the questionnaire, there 
appears to have an omission that was only noticed when the results were studied. 
There is no question assigning the separation of the investigation on the victim 
and the fraudster side. However, the Gwent police was aware of that since our 
early meetings discussing the design of the framework. Then, they supported this 
separation. According to the feedback they provided no negative comments were 
raised that could influence this feature of the ID theft framework. 
Another property that was set for the framework was to classify the evidence. The 
classification of the evidence is designed in order to organize the evidential 
findings and as it was experienced from the laboratory experiment it didn’t require 
much time. The findings were already there. The advantage is that the findings 
will be processed for the case construction, when the evidential data is already 
classified (see sections 6.2.1.3, 6.2.2.3, 6.2.3.2 and 6.3). 
The investigator provided a different aspect on classification, based on the 
procedure that the police follow. They classify the case as admissible or not, 
challenge the prosecution and assist the defence. In one of our e-mail 
communications he reckons that there may be an issue in court if some evidence 
has not been disclosed by the police. The classification does not intend to leave 
any evidential findings outside the final report of the case. Perhaps some initial 
findings could be considered as irrelevant, but they should still be considered.   
The positive comment of the expert is that the classification of the evidence could 
draw attention to the strengths and weaknesses of the case. He worries though, 
whether this would require extra time during the investigation (see section 6.5.1).  
The experiment collected appropriate material that could give an outline of the 
fraudster’s intentions (see sections 6.2.1.3, 6.2.2.2, 6.2.3.2 and 6.3). The purpose 
of the profiling is more to gather intelligence that would assist future 
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investigations. Due to the results of the experiment it was demonstrated that 
evidential data discovered can assist on drawing the profile of the fraudster that 
has committed ID theft. It derives only from the available evidential data of a 
specific case though, which could make the profiling subjective. 
Apparently, the questionnaire omitted a question concerning the profiling of the 
fraudster. The investigator did not comment about it at any point in order to 
discuss his opinion at this stage. However, the profiling of the fraudster is based 
on the evidential findings and the construction of the scenario, where the detective 
provided positive feedback.  
Even though the questionnaire for the expert review had omitted some of the 
properties the framework needed to include, the combination of the police 
feedback and the experiment showed that these properties were met for this 
application. 
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to evaluate the ID theft investigation framework 
and support its validity. This was achieved by employing two evaluation methods 
as introduced in chapter 5.  
The application of the framework on a laboratory based experiment involved a 
victim and a fraudster. The case study scenario that was composed concerned the 
implication of a computer user who noticed that he had a number of daily 
incidents connecting him with ID theft. The examination of the hard disk that was 
identified on his system showed that malware that steals financial information was 
installed. The application of the ID theft framework was successful. Then, the 
hard disk that was used for the fraudster’s purposes was analysed in order to apply 
the framework on the fraudster’s side processes and evaluate their practice. The 
application of these processes provided accurate results. 
The second part of this chapter demonstrated the feedback that was received from 
a field expert from Gwent police. The answers from the questionnaire that was 
provided to the detective were discussed. It worth repeating an important 
comment among his positive feedback: it does seem to be a complete and 
comprehensive coverage of handling an ID theft. The expert also mentions that he 
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considers using the framework in real incidents as he is tempted by the idea of an 
offence specific investigation structure.  
In chapter 2 some issues were raised concerning the design of the framework. 
Based on them (see section 2.5.7.2) the following premises needed to be 
considered before its implementation. The evaluation chapter supports table 42 
showing where these concerns were eliminated.    
Design issues 
A deep understanding and knowledge of ID theft in order to avoid 
overlooking evidential data.  
P 
Sections 6.4 and 
6.5.2 
To be easily comprehended and applied by the practitioner. P 
Sections 6.5.1 and 
6.5.2 
To be comprised of all different systems and technologies, in 
order to be flexible.  
P 
Sections 6.4, 6.5.1 
and 6.5.2 
Table 43: Design issues met 
The results of the laboratory experiment and the field expert review confirmed that 
the framework has the ability to recover evidential data that is there, without 
overlooking any evidence. The practitioner comprehended and applied the framework 
on the second part of the evaluation, while he also provided positive feedback. The 
experiment was executed in a controlled environment in order to evaluate its 
functionality. The field expert applied the framework in an already investigated case, 
where the evidential findings were established.  Both instances showed that it is a 
flexible tool that can be adopted in different environments.   
However, the framework could have been applied in all different types of ID theft and 
could have received feedback from more field experts. Then, the precision and 
verification of the framework would have been preserved and would have established 
the ID theft framework. Even though there were multiple restrictions that did not 
permit such an evaluation approach, the laboratory experiment and the expert review 
contributed in providing indicative and supportive results of the validity of this work.   
The evaluation showed that even though there might have been some weaknesses that 
appear to exist in the framework it is a complete ID theft investigation approach. It 
could be applied in real life investigations and provide accurate results concerning 
this type of e-crime.  
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In this chapter the reader can  
► find a summary of the thesis; 
► find the conclusions of the research; 
► discover recommendations for further research on the subject. 
Summary 
This chapter aims to provide a brief summary to the reader of what has been 
achieved in this thesis, discuss the various problems that appeared during the 
lifetime of the research and finish with suggestions for future work and research 
on the subject. 
Technological innovations contributed in the increase of ID theft in the digital 
environment. Computer forensics has provided a number of different investigation 
frameworks and guidelines in order to assist the investigators. However, these are 
generalised in order to be flexible and appropriate for all types of computer crime. 
The extensive increase of ID theft incidents, and the complexities of ID theft in a 
digital environment, both suggest a need for a specific methodical framework for 
investigating digital ID theft. This approach can support the investigator, focus the 
procedure on the type of the crime and produce reliable, repeatable results. 
To develop the framework a review of ID theft was undertaken, and the different 
types identified. A framework that is especially designed for examining ID theft 
related cases was developed. The evaluation and assessment of the framework 
was supported by officers from the Gwent Hi-tech Crime Unit. The sensitivity of 
personal data and legal and ethical implications caused some limitations for the 
execution of the laboratory experiment. Nevertheless, the results were a 
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought 
without accepting it. Aristotle, 384 BC - 322 BC 
7 7 Conclusion and further research  
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suggestive demonstration that the investigation framework can be applied on ID 
theft cases.  
7.1 Contribution to science 
The execution of the experiment as well the feedback obtained after the 
application of the framework from the Hi-tech Crime Unit indicated the 
practicability of the framework and that the outcome of this work could be applied 
to actual cases. Computer forensics investigations require a structured and formal 
approach. Standards and formal procedures concerning digital investigations are 
still progressing and developing and this work contributes to the effort to improve 
the digital investigative process. 
The presented work has successfully introduced, constructed and assessed a 
formalised and structured approach that assists the computer forensics investigator 
in handling digital evidence of computer-based ID theft. The rapid growth of ID 
theft incidents demanded a guided, analytical framework that is especially 
designed for investigating these incidents.    
This research work examined ID theft, its different techniques and characteristics, 
in order to recognise the uniqueness of this type of crime. It maintained the idea 
that different types of computer crime should be treated separate, in relation to 
their nature. The product of the research was the development of the investigative 
framework that differentiated the procedure between the victim’s and the 
fraudster’s side. This approach directs the investigator in the examination of the 
digital media. 
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7.1.1 The research objectives 
The research objectives are set in the formulation of a research project. It is of 
great importance then for the researcher to be able to identify whether the research 
objectives have been met. Then, the outcome of the work is validated Table 44 
represents the appointed objectives. 
1. 
Analyse the state of the art in order to identify and investigate 
the different types of Identity Theft 
P 
Chapter 2 
2. 
Develop a conceptual framework for analysing the process of 
Identity Theft investigation and assess the digital evidence. 
P 
Chapters 3 and 4 
3. 
Evaluate the framework based on case studies and expert 
opinion in order to assess the proposed framework’s impact on 
processing online Identity Theft cases.  
P 
Chapters 5 and 6 
Table 44: Research Objectives 
The first objective was met with the completion of Chapter 2, where the state of 
the art was studied and analysed. The different types of ID Theft were examined 
and the need for research on the subject was established. The examination of the 
existing literature set the requirements for this work. 
The second objective refers to the implementation part of this research. Chapters 3 
and 4 handle the design, the development and the analysis of the framework. The 
reader can find in detail how this objective was met by referring to these chapters. 
The third objective concerns the evaluation of this work. The application of the 
research outcome in the real world was introduced on Chapter 5, where the two 
main evaluation methods to be applied were presented. This chapter demonstrates 
in the previous sections the results of the laboratory experiment and the evaluation 
feedback from the Gwent Police, Hi-tech Crime Unit. The positive experiment 
outcome and the evaluation feedback satisfied the third objective. 
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7.1.2 Project Review 
Some issues that concern the planning, analysis and design of a research work 
need to be determined at its conclusion. This procedure is called decision making 
(Buchanan and O’Conell (2006), Leedy and Ormord (2005)) evaluation approach, 
where the answer should be usually a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and the questions 
formed have been based on the overall content and behaviour of the research 
taken place and its outcome.  
There is a large theory behind the term decision making. The Harvard Business 
Review on Decision Making (2006) appeared of great value background reading. 
Harris (1998) defines decision making as the process of sufficiently reducing 
uncertainty and doubt about alternatives to allow a reasonable choice to be made 
from among them. In simple words, decision making helps the researcher to 
identify the positive or negative status of his research. By following the ‘whether’ 
kind of decisions the researcher is requested to answer with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’.  
The decision making evaluating approach provides an inner assessment for the 
assessment of the work. Leedy and Ormord (2005) suggest decision making in the 
form of a checklist for evaluating qualitative research projects. For this research, 
the decision making questions are based on the methods and findings of the 
research. In order for the researcher to be able to give accurate answers to the 
questions, the following procedure should be followed as presented from Harris 
(1998): 
The following questions have been constructed as a result of the effort taken so 
far. They are inner enquiries that regard the value and the quality of this research 
work. Some research issues during the research were resolved with these 
questions in mind intending to affirmative answers. The questions and their 
answers are presented in table 45 below.   
  
Figure 27: Decision making procedure 
decision whether à select criteria à  identify alternatives à  make choice 
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Decision making Question Answer 
1.  Can the benefits of the 
project be assessed?   
Yes, the ID theft framework is the research 
outcome and its benefits were evaluated with the 
execution of the experiment. 
2.  Is the final outcome of the 
project useful and original? 
Yes, the final outcome is useful to the real world, 
according to the feedback of Gwent police and the 
evaluation of the framework. The originality of the 
work relies to the fact that a similar research work 
does not exist in the literature.  
3.  Is there enough justification 
with background reading and 
citation of sources? 
Yes, it appears that the number of different sources 
used and cited prove that the author performed 
adequate research on the existing literature. 
4.  Can the project be 
realistically applied on such 
type of investigations and 
does it follow a concrete 
methodology / technology? 
Yes, the combination of a laboratory experiment 
and the application of the framework on a law 
enforcement case suggest that the research outcome 
can be applied on the real world under a concrete 
method.  
5.  Does the project fulfil the 
aims and objectives of the 
design? Does it apply to the 
hypothesis for the 
contribution of science? 
Yes, as presented on the previous section the 
objectives set in the beginning of the research were 
met. An attachment between the author and the 
hypothesis for the contribution to science existed 
throughout the research years in order to ensue and 
support the initial statement. The result indicates 
that it was successful. 
6.  Are the techniques that have 
been used for the analysis of 
the project thoroughly 
described? 
Yes, even though a number of amendments had to 
be conducted in order to ensure this. To the best of 
the author’s knowledge, even a non-expert reader 
should understand the content.   
7.  Are tables, figures and 
graphs understandable and 
clarifying for the reader? 
Yes, the best effort has been done so that the 
captions of the tables, figures and graphs that have 
been used are indicative of their content and can 
stand on their own.    
Table 45: Decision making questions and answers 
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7.2 Further Research 
The evaluation of this work demonstrated that individual examination 
methodologies concerning the different types of computer crimes can contribute 
to the investigative process.   
In applying the ID theft investigation framework the investigator needs to be 
aware of the procedure he needs to follow. A future development would be the 
creation of an application that would guide the investigator during the process and 
assist in recording his findings. This way, the output functions that result after the 
examination can be structured automatically without any interference from the 
investigator. The results will be gathered faster at the end of the investigation, 
while the examiner will be occupied only with the input functions of the 
framework. 
Such an approach could be achieved with the implementation of an application 
that keeps all data in a database, and provides the investigator with a step-by-step 
procedure that involves further required actions. Such an application could be 
either stand alone or online by linking the findings of different laboratories 
examining similar cases.  
There may also be a need for the development of other specific methodologies 
according to the type of computer crime that has been perpetrated. However, it is 
recognised that there may be a situation where a complex crime has occurred. In 
such a case, this approach would fail to apply.  
In order to overcome this issue, the categorisation of the digital media 
examination based on the computer crime, should be combined under one 
automated tool. Even if the investigator is unaware of the type of crime at the 
beginning of the investigation, he will be able to follow a structured procedure 
that identifies certain clues. These clues will provide initial results that adhere to 
certain types of crime. This ‘sorting’ the evidence will eventually result to 
profiling the type of crime according to the findings. 
A creation of an online database that includes all different computer crimes could 
be the answer. The investigator interacts and simultaneously examines the media 
with the selected analysis tool. The database processes all the functions 
automatically and produces the listings that are the required outputs. It could even 
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create the documentation of the investigation. An improved version of such a 
database could also combine different types of crimes, in order to include more 
complex or mixed cases.   
Another alternative for the computer forensics world could be the implementation 
of the following idea. An online database can keep records of all different 
evidential findings for all computer crimes. The automated system can produce 
statistical results that concern specific types of crime on a regional basis. It could 
be also applied on a national or international base, for example an online tool that 
holds data concerning all computer forensic investigations in the European Union. 
There are two actual benefits out of such an application: 
1. The online automated tool is an intelligent instrument that manages to gather 
evidence about different types of computer crimes. This information can be 
shared among the investigators for a collective structured and in depth 
collection of data. Therefore, the examiners could benefit in working time and 
effort from references to previous investigations and existing results.  
2. The result of this information gathering from different sources could lead to a 
deep understanding of the nature of the incidents. For example, the profiling of 
the ID thief aids to a deeper understanding of the purposes and the actions of 
the fraudster. Furthermore, collections of the attacks that concern all different 
types of computer crimes lead to the understanding of each different type of 
crime respectively. The effect in the long run is the understanding of the areas 
in which enhanced computer security is required.  
Although, it may be considered impractical or of little use for its cost, knowledge 
exchange would occur if such a tool could efficiently work. As a result, 
practitioners, law enforcement agencies, and researchers would benefit from such 
an approach and proactively deal with computer crimes.  
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7.3  Conclusion 
The rational of this research work is the implementation of a conceptual analytical 
ID theft investigation framework. Based on the existing literature there are a 
number of different computer forensics methodologies that examine digital 
evidence. The initial purpose was to ‘facilitate the investigation of computer-
based ID theft and the handling of the related digital evidence’, as stated on the 
hypothesis. The need was born due to the continuous growth of ID theft figures 
based on the incidents reported.  
Some key issues had to be considered. ID theft is an old type of crime that has 
taken advantage of the growth of new technology. The ID thief can perform his 
actions with a combination of techniques, computer-based or not. Therefore, the 
outcome of an ID theft investigation is influenced by not only the evidential 
information identified during the computer investigation, but also by the findings 
that concern the crime scene. As in most crimes, ID theft requires two parts, a 
victim and a fraudster (or criminal).  In order to establish a tool for the 
investigator, the methodology had to differentiate the examination for both parts. 
The initial assumption was that the investigation of the victim’s digital media 
would lead the investigator to identify the fraudster. However, this cannot be 
achieved in all cases, as the intruders attempt to conceal their activity. Though the 
attempt to profile the fraudster and categorise the gathered digital evidence 
appears of value for the digital investigation.   
A major limitation in the development of the analysis was the limited volume of 
existing literature in the area. In order to provide a broad scope for research an 
extensive review of related material on methodologies was required. Related 
sources needed to be researched and examined for ensuring that they are used and 
referred appropriately in this work. The availability of background material on 
actual ID theft examples also caused some difficulty when considering the 
assessment of the investigation framework. It seems that the authorities 
intentionally do not publish in detail the methods ID thieves follow for achieving 
fraud, in order to avoid providing facts that could be followed by potential 
fraudsters.  
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Despite good computer security practices taken in relation to private information, 
there is a possibility of ID theft while the computer that contains the data is 
connected to the Internet. Crime follows the money and ID theft is for the most 
part about money. It is therefore likely that number of incidents containing the 
misuse of identity data will continue. As Schneier (2004), effectively mentions  
It’s clear that computer security is not a problem that technology can 
solve. Security solutions have a technological component, but security 
is fundamentally a people problem.  
Computer forensics is employed in cases when computer security fails. As long as 
computer security retains a human component, then there will be a need for 
computer forensics and further research will be required in the field. 
The development of an ID theft framework is only a small component in this 
research area, where there is scope for work to develop a number of processes. 
The Internet is a valuable tool but with a significant degree of risk that cannot 
easily be eliminated. Even though there have been efforts to identify the threats, 
eliminate the risks, inform and educate the users, attacks against someone’s good 
name cannot be totally omitted. There lies the need for computer forensics. It can 
effectively recover a computer machine’s history, after people have failed on 
computer security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is no happiness where there is no wisdom; 
No wisdom but in submission to the gods. 
Big words are always punished, 
And proud men in old age learn to be wise. 
Sophocles, Antigone, Greek tragic dramatist 
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Abstract 
ID theft, especially in its on-line form, is currently one of the most prevalent types of computer crime. The limited end-
user awareness as well as the retention and business processing of large amounts of personal data in a manner that 
does not meet security and regulatory requirements provide plenty of opportunities to fraudsters. A number of 
organisations have produced guidelines of good practice targeted to individuals and organisations, however the 
matter is still on the rise. In this paper we review computer-based techniques employed by fraudsters in order to steal 
IDs and refer to published guidelines and the documented good practice against those. We discuss the issues 
related to the investigation of such incidents and provide the grounds for the development of a framework to assist in 
their forensic examination. 
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9 Introduction 
According to a study of the Identity Theft Resource Center (2003), ID theft is distinguished in 
three forms: financial, criminal and identity cloning. The study takes as examples real victims, 
and drawing upon these cases those three forms are defined. Ultimate purposes for ID theft 
could be either financial and other resource and privilege gains or protection of one’s real 
identity and masquerading behind another, mostly legitimate entity. ID thefts can also take 
advantage of an organisation’s good name in order to attract individuals and hence then there 
is a case of a double ID theft, the corporation’s and the consumer’s (Dwan, 2004). 
Identity theft can occur in many forms, for example, by lost or stolen wallets, discarded 
documents containing personal details, phishing e-mails etc. According to The Identity Theft 
Resource Center (2003), students, old people and the military appear to be more vulnerable 
to ID theft than any other group of people. By the time the end user has found out that they 
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have been a victim of identity theft, is already too late and their personal details have been 
used for fraudulent purposes (Dwan, 2004). It also seems that most perpetrators of this kind 
of crime are not alone, but rather organised and well equipped. Indeed, ID Theft is nowadays 
directly linked to drug trafficking, money laundering and terrorism (Collins, 2003).  
Based on the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s report for National and State Trends in Fraud 
and Identity Theft 2004 of the 635,173 complaints received, 246,570 were ID theft reports. 
The most common form of reported identity theft was Credit Card fraud, followed by phone or 
utilities fraud, bank fraud, and employment fraud. It is very important to note that only 30% of 
victims notified a police department. It can therefore be assumed that the majority of people 
are not aware that they could have contacted law enforcement agencies and prefer not to 
make their ID theft incident known. 
In 1999 20,000 cases of ID Theft were reported in the UK, in 2001 there were 53,000 and in 
2003 the number had almost doubled. It can take a victim up to 300 hours of work when 
dealing with the consequences of their ID theft with banks and credit card companies (Porter, 
2004). This emerging and developing trend in crime triggers complex investigations that 
require extensive use of information technology, both as a medium for analysis and as 
evidence at the same time. Fraudsters are obtaining more sophisticated technological ways 
and manage to conceal their crimes. 
For example, in ID theft cases for financial purposes, the investigator can first focus on credit 
history, transactions made on the victim’s name, applications for bank accounts, loans and 
credit cards. This evidence trail is to be recovered in the form of data, logs etc. formats 
through various systems within one or even multiple financial organisations. As a result, the 
investigation is complicated and time-consuming. With identity-related ID theft cases, the 
investigator will need to consider not only the financial evidence but the personal information 
gained, subsequent actions triggered by a hijacked identity etc. 
In this paper we discuss how ID theft can occur in the interconnected world and what 
evidence may be left behind for the computer forensic investigator. We intend to provide an 
initial insight into this computer-fuelled crime in order to facilitate the analyst in identifying and 
analysing the related digital evidence. 
10 ID Theft Techniques and Digital Evidence 
Techniques and tools of identity thieves 
Information can be obtained from stolen wallets or handbags which usually contain 
identification papers, driving licences, credit and bank cards, etc. Alternatively, someone’s 
personal mail might be stolen to gain bank and credit card statements, pre-approved credit 
offers and tax information. The techniques used to collect this information include searching 
through household litter bags, burglary, social engineering or even identification of a 
deceased person. 
The identity theft criminals may contact a person who has lost his credit card claiming that 
they found it, ask for personal details and then use it in a fraudulent manner (Dwan, 2004). 
They may apply for a new credit card using someone else’s personal details, buy items they 
never pay for and the offence will be against the legitimate owner. They might even bankrupt 
on someone’s account or give stolen personal details in case of an arrest (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2003). 
High-tech techniques for ID theft require the use of a computer, and usually the Internet, in 
order to gain the required information. The techniques that are used require at least 
intermediate information technology knowledge and skills and the most common techniques 
are detailed below. 
Phishing 
Phishing is used to gain personal information by sending e-mail messages that appear to 
come from trusted organisations. A Phishing attack takes the form of a mass distribution of 
'spoofed' e-mail messages in which the reply addresses, links, and branding appear to come 
from banks, insurance agencies, retailers or credit card companies. The messages look 
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authentic by using corporate logos and formats similar to those that are used by the official 
companies. The threat is perceivably dangerous when personal information is requested for 
auditing or verification purposes, for example, personal account numbers, passwords and 
other private information. In April 2004, an unemployed 21 year old British man was arrested 
by the UK National Hi-tech Crime Unit, allegedly for a phishing attack against The Co-
operative bank and targeting the Smile Internet Bank. However this man was just an amateur 
and according to the police he is not related with the organised crime (news article ‘Police 
Catch UK Phisher’, 2004). 
Web-spoofing 
Web Spoofing is the method by which the users believe that they have been directed to the 
official website of a company. Instead, they have actually been directed to a ‘spoofed’ website 
where any personal information that is entered, will be stored and used for malicious 
purposes. The web pages will have been designed by skilled web designers and are often an 
exact copy of the original company’s website. The important difference is that there are minor 
changes that allow for user information to be stored on the fraudster’s servers. 
Malicious software: Spyware, Viruses and Trojans 
Spyware is designed for exploiting infected computers usually for marketing purposes. The 
activity of the web browser is monitored, resulting to routing of HTTP requests to the web 
sites that are advertised through the spyware. Also, pop-up advertisements are can be 
delivered or theft of personal information can be achieved, including users’ financial 
information. Recently, spyware was used by an identity theft ring to retrieve and store 
remotely, user information. This was identified by research conducted by an anti-spyware 
firm, Sunbelt (Vijayan, 2005). 
Some Trojan Horses are security-breakers that have the ability to steal passwords and 
personal details and forward them through a number of ways to the fraudsters. Smart Trojan 
software can keep a log from keystrokes (key-loggers) or takes a screenshot when a 
customer is visiting a financial web-site and the information is then forwarded to the fraudster 
(news item ‘Exit old fashion phishing […]’, 2005). 
Biometrics circumvention 
Biometrics was supposed to be a countermeasure for Identity Theft. Even though it is a 
relatively new method for identity verification and the aim is to replace the vulnerable 
passwords, there are already numerous ways of the fraudsters to dump a biometric system. It 
can be easy to deceive biometric technology by tampering machines that read biometric data 
or altering the records that are contained within them. Finger prints that are left behind on 
scanners can be re-used by breathing on the glass, cooling down the sensors to give false 
information, using graphite powder to dust the fingerprint and then copy it to a “jelly finger” 
etc. Facial recognition can also be duped in some cases by playing someone’s video at the 
reader and gaining access to a system (Hamadi, 2004). 
Other Techniques 
Other techniques, not discussed in further detail here as we focus on on-line ID theft, may 
include card cloning (Gerard et al., 2004), attacks on off-line kept data (e.g. back-up copies 
and disaster recovery facilities) or data media in general (McKinley, 2004) and use of CCTV 
footage etc. 
Forensic Investigation of On-line ID Theft 
Identity Theft in its on-line form is considered as a relatively new method of fraud and there is 
not enough guidance for forensic investigators. The investigator will have to unfold the digital 
trail of evidence and try to present potential explanations of how such a crime occurred. This 
digital trail involves examining how a crime was committed using computers and the Internet. 
The investigation should identify how the leak of personal information occurred that made it 
possible to conduct a misuse of resources such as a credit card number. It should also 
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include details of the misuse such as dates, goods purchased and amounts spent. If it is 
possible the perpetrator should also be identified. The latter is perhaps one of the most 
challenging tasks as, unlike DNA evidence, computer records can identify user accounts that 
are logically, not physically, linked to individuals (Tryfonas et al., 2006). 
Forensic extraction and analysis of data from a computer hard disk will detail much of this 
information. However, the conversion of data to evidence is a lengthy and costly process that, 
at the end of the process, has also to be made understandable to a jury. Therefore, there 
would be value in creating an analytical framework to facilitate the investigation of Internet 
Identity Theft cases and the handling of the related digital evidence. The construction of a 
formalised and structured approach that would assist the computer forensic investigative 
practice in terms of identification of evidence, presentation in a court of Law etc. presents an 
opportunity for further research. 
Towards such a direction, in Table 11 we have combined the types of threats against on-line 
identities and the means to achieve illegitimate gains (or simple masquerade through ID theft) 
in a systematic analytical framework. We try to identify and record the digital evidence that 
may be found per category. Other factors of concern for an investigation are also recorded, 
such as required skills and capability profile of the perpetrator etc. Forensics professionals 
can then refer to this when they have to examine a case concerning internet identity theft. The 
main idea is that the professional is able to identify and understand the crime scene through 
such a framework.  
ID Theft Response - Detection and Prevention 
According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC, 2005) the majority of people discovered they were 
victims by monitoring their accounts. However, it is only fifty per cent of the victims that finally find 
out how thieves retrieved their personal data (DeMarrais, 2003). The majority of ID theft incidents in 
the UK can be traced back to a suspicious phone call (Edwards, 2005). This fact alone raises concerns 
about communication of individuals’ personal information and the precautions that are required when 
such an exchange is needed. Further to precautions on releasing personal information to not trusted 
sources, both individuals and organisation have to be suspicious of the ways personal data can be stolen 
and used for malicious reasons. According to the FTC, individuals should order a copy of their credit 
report from credit card bureaus in order to check whether the information held there is accurate. 
Personal information at home should be held in a secure place and individuals should be informed 
about who has access to their personal information in the workplace.    
From an organisational point of view, the security community has now accepted that in organisations a 
major security threat against information comes from inside. Research has proved that 70% of the total 
identity thefts start from employees who steal personal data from the company they work for (Hinde, 
2004). The majority of companies cannot cope with well organised attacks coming from internal 
sources, or even instances of an employee giving out information unintentionally (Porter, 2004). 
Hence, in the light of the rising figures of on-line ID theft, the protection of personal information of 
clients and other affiliates held by organisations is much more than a compliance issue. Indeed, the 
same FTC survey shows that $48 billion loss was of businesses and financial institutions comparing to 
$5 billion loss of the consumers (DeMarrais, 2003). Therefore, organisations need to become more 
active on how they detect and prevent ID theft. Regulatory compliance with the Data Protection Act is 
then a very important issue in a company’s security architecture agenda and its information security 
and privacy policy. 
The detection controls comprise authorisation, internal auditing and whistleblower hotlines that alert 
the employees of the company about a committed or potential fraud underway. From a technological 
perspective automated detection systems that process large volumes of transaction data and look to 
highlight any suspicious actions based on specific patterns should be used (Porter, 2004). In addition to 
monitoring business information for external instances of ID theft, there is also the need to protect 
corporate information with references to identification and related information from the threat from 
                                               
1 For Table 1, see Appendix C 
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within. In order to prevent such internal instances of identity theft, personal information held inside the 
company should be treated with the appropriate confidentiality. Information assets that contain such 
personal and sensitive information should be protected in terms of allowed access (Solomon et al., 
2003) and destruction/disposal of those electronic or paper-based records (Gerard et al., 2004). 
The most common measure for protecting unauthorised access to a computer network is to use 
passwords. However, problems arise when users choose easily guessed words for a password. In 
addition, they should change their secret password regularly in order to avoid any problems (Gerard et 
al., 2004). File encryption is commonly used as most database software packages provide built-in 
encryption and decryption of data. In addition, hardware or software firewalls have a wide use and are 
necessary in any company to limit the risk of intrusion to its network. Access logs should be kept for 
those files that contain personal and private data. Internal auditors of the company should have the 
authorisation to analyse and evaluate these audit records (Gerard et al., 2004). 
11 Conclusions and Further Research 
Hardly is ID theft or a simple masquerade a new crime; however it is now fuelled by information 
technology resulting in high numbers of such crimes committed annually, corporate liabilities and 
financial loss – and of course personal inconvenience. As ID fraudsters have discovered new tools, so 
must forensic investigators and Law practitioners in order to be able to cope with this trend and tackle 
it effectively. A responsive plan should include components of prevention and detection, reaction and 
investigation of incidents. 
 
However, whilst prevention and reaction can be largely covered within the organisation’s security 
architecture plans, given an emphasis in meaningful compliance with regulations such as the Data 
Protection Act, detection and investigation require new tools and methods. Through such a perspective, 
we try to initiate a framework for the investigation of this crime, by recording artefacts of evidential 
value and creating suspect profiles against potential instances of hi-tech ID theft. Such a systematic 
approach to explaining ID theft will hopefully facilitate the understanding of the crime scene by the 
forensic investigator. 
Table 1 is an initial attempt to address this issue and it demonstrates how a categorisation of ID theft 
incidents against the method used, the required skills behind the attack, the technologies exploited and 
the potential digital evidence left behind can provide an investigative insight. Potential future work 
would include a detailed categorisation of the majority of known ID theft attacks (or a meaningful, 
representative grouping of those), a detailed recording of potential evidence in the corresponding crime 
scenes, guidance on how to locate and extract these artefacts in an evidentially sound manner etc. A 
review of secondary empirical data from published cases and public court proceedings may also 
complement or cross-validate this approach. 
12 References and Relevant Sources 
Casey, E., April 2003, Determining Intent — Opportunistic vs Targeted Attacks, Computer Fraud & Security, Volume 
2003, Issue 4, pp. 8-11  
Collins, J., 2003, Business identity theft: The latest twist, Journal of Forensics Accounting, 4, p. 303-306  
DeMarrais, K., September 2003, Identity Theft on the rise, FTC warns, Knight Rider Business News, p.1-4  
Dwan B., 2004, Identity Theft, Computer Fraud and Security, Volume 2004, Issue 4, Page 14-17 
Edwards, S., 2005, Hi-tech Crime And International Business – What Are The Latest Risks And How Can You Avoid 
Them?, SC Conference: Hi-Tech Security in a hi-tech crime world, November 2005, London. 
‘Exit old fashioned phishing – enter hardcore Trojans and moles’, October 2005, Computer Fraud & Security, 
Vol.2005, Issue10, P. 2, ISSN 1361-3723 
Federal Trade Commission, November 2003, ID Theft, When Bad Things happen to your good name. pdf, 
downloaded from http://www.ftc.gov [Last Accessed: 18/10/2005] 
Federal Trade Commission, February 2005, National and State Trends in Fraud & Identity Theft, January – 
December 2004. pdf, downloaded from http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/02/top102005.htm [Last Accessed: 20/10/2005] 
Gerard G.J., Hillison W., Pacini C., January 2004, Identify Theft: An Organization's Responsibilities. pdf, downloaded 
from http://ruby.fgcu.edu/courses/cpacini/ courses/  [Last Accessed: 20/10/2005] 
Gerard G.J., Hillison W., Pacini C., May/June 2004, What your firm should know about Identity Theft, Journal of 
Corporate Accounting and Finance, Vol. 15 Issue 4, pp. 3-11  
Appendices 
 
B6 
Greene T.C., 23/03/2005, ID theft is inescapable, http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2005/03 
/23/id_theft_cannot_be_escaped, [Last Accessed: 27/11/2005] 
Groves S., May/June 2003, The Unlikely Heroes of Cyber Security, Information Management Journal, pp.34 – 40 
Hamadi R., 2004, Identity Theft – What It Is, How To Prevent It, And What To Do If It Happens To You, ISBN: 
1904132499. Vision Paperbacks: London 
Hinde, S., Identity theft: the fight, 1 September 2004, Computer Fraud & Security, Volume 2004, Issue 9, Pages 6-7 
Identity Theft Resource Center, 2003, Identity Theft: The Aftermath 2003. pdf, downloaded from: 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/index.shtml [Last Accessed: 19/11/2005] 
Lininger, R et al., 2005, Phishing: Cutting the Identity Theft Line. , ISBN: 0-7645-8498-7. Wiley Publishing, Inc: 
Indiana. 
Mckinley B., 10/11/04, Network World, http://www.networkworld.com/careers/2004/ 101104man.html [Last Accessed: 
27/11/2005] 
Michaud D. J., 2001, Adventures in Computer Forensics .pdf, downloaded from: 
http://www.sans.org/rr/whitepapers/incident/638.php, [Last Accessed: 20/10/2005] 
Pierce M., November 2003, Detailed Forensic Procedure for Laptop computers. pdf, downloaded from: 
http://www.sans.org/rr/whitepapers/casestudies/1141.php [Last Accessed: 20/10/2005] 
‘Police catch UK phisher’, 2004, Computer Fraud and Security, Volume 2004, Issue 5, Page 1, ISSN 1361-3723 
Porter D., 2004, Identity fraud: The stealth threat to UK plc, Computer Fraud and Security, Volume 2004, Issue 7, 
Pages 4-6 
Scalet S., May 2005, The Five Most Shocking Things About the ChoicePoint Debacle,  
http://www.csoonline.com/read/050105/choicepoint.html [Last Accessed: 27/11/2005]  
Solomon T., Gordon P., & New L., December 2003, Incidence of workplace identity theft signals need for proactive 
measures, New York Law Journal, pp. 5 - 8   
Stephenson, P., October 2002, The Forensic Investigation Steps, Computer Fraud & Security, Volume 2002, Issue 
10, Pages 17-19  
Stephenson, P., November 2002, Collecting Evidence of a Computer Crime, Computer Fraud & Security, Volume 
2002, Issue 11, Pages 17-19 
Symantec Corp., 05/09/2005, http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/ pwsteal.bancos.html [Last 
Accessed: 27/11/2005]  
Tryfonas T., Thomas, P. and Owen, P., 2006, ID Theft: Fraudsters’ Techniques for Personal Data Collection, the 
Related Digital Evidence and Investigation Issues, JOnline (Information Systems Control Journal on-line counterpart), 
Volume 1, 2006. 
Vijayan J., 05/08/2005, Antispyware firm warns of massive ID theft ring, 
http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,103737,00.html  [Last Accessed: 27/11/2005] 
Ward M., 17/11/2003, Pickpockets turn to technology, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/ 3276315.stm [Last 
Accessed: 27/11/2005] 
Wells S.J., December 2002, Stolen Identity, HR Magazine, Vol. 47, No. 12  
Appendices 
 
B7 
 
Conference Research Papers 
O. Angelopoulou, 2007, ID Theft: An Investigation's Framework, Proceedings 
of the 5th Australian Digital Forensics Conference, Edith Cowan University, 
Australia 
 
G.Fragkos, K.Xynos, O.Angelopoulou and V.Mee, 2006, “An empirical 
methodology for the analysis of information remaining on second-hand hard 
disks”, WDFIA 2006: 1st Annual Workshop on Digital Forensics and Incident 
Analysis, University of Glamorgan 2006 
 
Angelopoulou O., Thomas P., Xynos K. and Tryfonas T., 2006, “On-line ID 
theft techniques, investigation and response”, Proceedings of the 2nd 
International Conference on Global E-Security, University of East London, UK. 
  
Appendices 
 
B8 
ID Theft: A Computer Forensics’ Investigation 
Framework  
Olga Angelopoulou 
University of Glamorgan 
oangelop@glam.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
The exposure of online identities grows rapidly nowadays and so does the threat of having even more 
impersonated identities. Internet users provide their private information on multiple web-based agents 
for a number of reasons, online shopping, memberships, social networking, and many others. However, 
the number of ID Theft victims grows as well, resulting to the growth of the number of incidents that 
require computer forensics investigation in order to resolve this type of crime. For this reason, it 
appears of value to provide a systematic approach for the computer forensics investigators aiming to 
resolve such type of computer based ID Theft incidents. The issues that demand individual 
examinations of this type of crime are discussed and the plan of an ID Theft computer forensics 
investigation framework is presented.  
Keywords 
ID theft, incident investigation, digital evidence, computer forensics, computer crime, computer 
forensic investigator 
INTRODUCTION 
According to the Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System (CIFAS) (2007), the UK’s Fraud Prevention 
Service, in 2006 alone 80000 cases of ID Theft were recorded, comparing to 9000 cases in 1999. It 
appears as the wide use and the anonymity occurring on the Internet has influenced a number of people 
proceeding to Internet related, non-legitimate actions.     
This is a global problem. ID Theft is considered as a standalone crime since 1998 in the United States 
as defined in the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (1998) and belongs to federal crimes, 
where the establishment of the Offence is made as follows:  
“knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of 
another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that 
constitutes a violation of federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable 
state or local law.”  
In the H. R. 2622, Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, the American Identity Theft 
legislation provides the state approach of combating ID Theft and protecting the consumers. Based on 
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) report for National and State Trends in Fraud and Identity 
Theft 2004, of the 635,173 complaints received, 246,570 were ID Theft reports. The most common 
form of reported ID Theft was Credit Card fraud, followed by phone or utilities fraud, bank and 
employment fraud. It is very important to note that only 30% of victims notified a police department. It 
can therefore be assumed that the majority of people are either not aware that they could have 
contacted law enforcement agencies or prefer not to make their ID theft incident known. 
In plain words, the intention and plan of the person who decides to steal someone’s identity, the ID 
Thief, is to collect the more personal details the possible for the person he’s interested in, attempt to 
use this information for the largest personal gain of his and finally continue his life under someone 
else’s name. It seems that the popular saying ‘there is no perfect crime’ is not taken seriously from 
some individuals. However, the world’s history has proved that no matter the precautions and strategies 
followed to combat a crime regardless its nature, the fraudsters will discover a way to conduct it. Under 
no circumstances should people give up the effort of eliminating a type of crime, nevertheless there 
should be also invented radical and innovative ways of discovering and uncovering evidence of those 
already taken place.   
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Based on the above unfolds the rationale of this paper presenting a piece of under development work. 
The first aim is to provide some insight of the basic terms, ID Theft and Digital Evidence and their 
sequence in order to lead to the successful computer forensics investigation. The issues concerning the 
importance of such an individual approach of ID Theft incidents towards Computer Crime are 
discussed; the design of the proposed ID Theft Investigation Framework is presented and defended by 
an example.    
ID THEFT AND THE DIGITAL EVIDENCE 
The fraudulent use of another’s personal details has become an increasingly significant concern. One 
out of ten people in Britain was a victim of online fraud during 2006 revealed a survey, corresponding 
to 3.5 million British internet users (unknown, 2007). Attacks on financial institutions have risen from 
39% in 2003 to 83% for 2004 (McKenna, 2004).  
The Home Office (2006) defines Identity Theft as:  
“Criminals can find out your personal details and use them to open bank accounts and 
get credit cards, loans, state benefits and documents such as passports and driving 
licenses in your name.” 
Identity theft (ID Theft) can be perpetrated in a number of ways. Discarded documents containing 
personal details can provide a rich source of personal information.  Simple forms of deception can also 
be used to extract the information from the victim an example would be an attacker poses as a 
legitimate government official or business person collecting personal data door to door. Other methods 
include the so called ‘brute force’ techniques such as the stealing of wallets and purses containing 
identification and credit and bank cards or the removal of personal documents during a burglary. In 
particular stolen mail, where the perpetrator may have access to bank and credit card statements, pre-
approved credit offers, checks and tax information, can be used to gather information for an ID Theft. 
This may be followed up by social engineering.  The perpetrator contacts the person who has lost his 
card claiming that they found it, asks for personal details and then uses this information fraudulently 
(Dwan, 2004).  
However, personal identity is increasingly being stored and used in a range of digital forms. This can 
leave individuals exposed to possible threats as a result. Examples include; Phishing e-mails, web 
spoofing and numerous other techniques. This emerging and developing trend in crime can result in 
complex investigations that involve information technology, both as a medium for analysis and as 
evidence at the same time. Fraudsters are obtaining more sophisticated technological ways and manage 
to conceal their crimes. 
The following table summarises all different methods by which ID Theft is performed, separated in 
offline and online: 
 
Table 146: Summary of offline and online ID Theft Techniques 
Digital evidence is any kind of digitally processed information that is stored in any sort of digital 
media. The data strengthens or neglects the assumption of an electronic crime in the terms of the 
Offline Techniques Online Techniques 
Stolen wallets or bags  Phishing 
Stolen mail  Pharming 
Deceased people Web-Spoofing 
Dumpster diving Social Engineering 
Burglars Card Cloning 
Shoulder surfing  Storage Devices and Media 
Social Engineering Biometrics 
 Malicious Software 
 Key-loggers 
 CCTV Cameras 
 Data Retrieval 
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investigation process. It can be therefore presented as supportive proof in a court of law. (Carrier B., 
2006)   
In the late 20th century Dr.Edmund Locard, director of Lyons Institute of Forensic Medicine, defined 
an important theorem for the foundation of the forensic science that is widely known as the Locard 
Exchange Principle: 
“Any action of an individual, and obviously, the violent action constituting a crime, 
cannot occur without leaving a mark. What is admirable is the variety of these marks. 
Sometimes they will be prints, sometimes simple traces, and sometimes stains” (Chisum 
W., J.,and Turvey B.E. (2006) from Locard, 1934).  
The theorem has been transformed and misinterpreted during the years aiming to cover the science 
needs (Chisum, Tervey, 2006). The simplest form that can be found in literature is “with contact 
between two items, there will be an exchange” (Thornton, 1997). Casey (2003) has noted that this fact 
holds true in the digital world as a digital exchange between two devices results in an exchange of 
information. For example a request to view a web page from a client may be logged on the server and 
the web page, if downloaded, may then reside temporarily on the client. 
As stated from Marcella and Greenfield (2002), computer forensics demands accurate evidence and 
results of the investigation. For this reason, the use of state of the art equipment and methods should be 
used in order to reassure it. The world of Computer Forensics is dealing with a number of situations 
from industrial espionage to damage assessment and holds back to the beginning of the 1980s. 
Nevertheless, the last few years have made it widely known to the public and demand even more 
expertise. It is by nature a science that requires detail by all means and there is where the handling of 
the digital evidence should be based. 
THE “SOLITARY” OF ID THEFT TOWARDS COMPUTER CRIME 
INCIDENTS 
Initially, it is worth mentioning some issues concerning computer crime in general. Those types of 
crime where a computer or any other electronic device is involved in order to perform the crime or as 
the target of it are considered as computer crimes (Postnote Computer Crime, 2006). The criminals 
become more and more sophisticated nowadays and attempt to use technology by any means in order 
to avoid detection and perform the crime in greater detail and excess deception. A simple glance on 
news articles enhances the anxiety to information security people and the need to eliminate the 
problem. However, this could only happen on a virtual world as the use of computers and online 
transactions becomes only wider, giving the fraudsters’ the chance to increase their ways of attacking 
systems. 
Computer crime involves different types of offences as hacking, copyright, child pornography, fraud, 
viruses, and harassment. They can be categorised in different ways, according to the methods used in 
order to prevent them. Icove et al. (1995) in Computer Crime classify them with this approach, 
grouping them in: 
· Physical security breaches 
· Personnel security breaches 
· Communications and data security breaches 
· Operations security breaches 
Each security breach involves several fraudster actions that lead to computer crime. Hence, computer 
crime as a general matter can be treated based on the facts and the incidents that surround it. This 
basically requires treating computer crimes independently, in order to achieve a more analytical and in 
depth examination of a case. The investigation process time will be accelerated as the investigator will 
be able to follow specific steps once the type of the crime is revealed and he will be able to track on a 
certain process. 
Concerning the current research, the digital investigation of computer based ID Theft is a computer 
crime that requires the expertise of a computer forensic investigator in order to be resolved. The digital 
evidence that comes into sight after the analysis of a related to crime computer misuse is of critical 
value as it should be efficient to accuse someone with a crime or not. Therefore, the manipulation of 
the evidential data should be treated sensibly and with sensitivity. 
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As described in a number of existing published sources, ID Theft is besides considered as a major 
threat for individuals and corporations and consists of multiple types of crime. It involves multiple 
ways of achieving it, either by the aid of technology or not. This is the major difference from other 
types of computer crime and the way the digital evidence should be treated.  
In view of this influence, for the function of science, it could be considered that all technology aided 
evidential elements will be represented with the term ‘online’, whereas all non-technology aided will 
be called ‘offline’. Consequently, the investigator has to take into consideration the volume of the 
offline sources that influence the outcome of the investigation, as a number of offline techniques could 
have been used to commit the crime. A characteristic example of this issue could be the offence of 
hacking. In such a case, the actual evidence will be hidden inside the suspect’s computer, as the 
hacker’s only weapon is that; and the assigned to the incident investigator will have to trace all 
evidential data from there. At the same time, in a computer-based ID Theft incident the investigator’s 
findings depend on the fraudster’s computer, in addition other sources, such as a card cloning machine 
and forged documents could enhance the evidence. However, this is not the purpose of the computer 
forensics investigator, but still differentiates this type of crime from any other computer related and 
raises the need of treating this type of computer crime in an individual manner.    
Based on FTC’s Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse (2007), ID Theft was established as the top 
complaint category in consumer fraud with 36 percent. Therefore, in order to support the need of 
treating a computer crime as an independent entity, an example of an ID Theft case for financial 
purposes can be considered, where the investigator can first focus on credit history, transactions made 
on the victim’s name, applications for bank accounts, loans and credit cards. This evidence trail is to be 
recovered in the form of data, logs etc. formats through various systems within one or even multiple 
financial organisations. As a result, the investigation is complicated and time-consuming. With 
identity-related ID Theft cases, the investigator will need to consider not only the financial evidence 
but the personal information gained, subsequent actions triggered by a hijacked identity etc. 
The difficulty the investigators need to face when dealing with an ID Theft incident and what really 
makes this type of crime individually-treated is that they actually have to face two investigative 
categories; victim or perpetrator. This is where all starts, as the need to distinguish and separate the 
investigation process is going to differentiate such a detailed process from others. A victim’s machine 
should provide such evidential data that will be able to prove the fraud against the computer user, while 
on the perpetrator’s machine the evidential data should be treated in such a way that will reveal the 
deception’s proof. One might argue that the existing computer forensic investigation frameworks can 
cover this argument. However, a generic guideline cannot reach to a far detailed phase of the 
investigative process as it aims to cover all different types of computer related crimes. In respect to the 
existing computer forensic frameworks and based on the substantial increment of ID Theft the need to 
aid the computer forensic investigation of this type of crime leads to the point that the investigation 
process needs to be focused on a different perspective each time as different sort of evidence is 
required.   
  
Figure 1: The different aspects of evidence concerning ID Theft incidents 
 
 
 
Victim’s side 
Perpetrator’s side 
Evidence 
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People who work at this field need to be able to use constructive methods in order to facilitate their 
actual aim that is to provide evidential data after a computer forensic investigation. The threat of 
becoming an ID Theft victim becomes even greater day by day for everyone, especially those who use 
the Internet by any mean, make transactions, socialize, interact, anything that someone could take part 
on through it. Simply because the use of Internet and the public dependency will only grow, there 
should be invented and developed efficient ways that could cope with this rapidly spreading threat. 
The following sections are going to support the above arguments on a practical approach, describing 
the theoretical procedure of designing and implementing such a computer forensics investigation 
framework.  
DESIGN DESCRIPTION 
There is the need at this stage to describe ‘why’ and ‘how’ the foundation of this work is set. For this 
reason, the following paragraphs are going to set the principles of this work. 
The fact is that in order to accomplish a comprehensive and structured investigation about a computer 
forensic case, the steps followed should be of extreme diligence. The procedure that is followed should 
give an answer to the question of what information might be stolen and how this information could be 
stolen. The major aim is to collect the data that give evidence and can prove a possible attack. Only 
after a detailed and constructed approach the data analysis can return and verify the only premise that 
might appear in the beginning of the research; that the investigator has to deal with an ID Theft case.         
Fundamentally, a framework is considered as tool to aid in planning, monitoring and evaluation of 
research projects (Carrier, 2006). The general investigation scientific method presented by Carrier 
and Spafford at the DFRWS 2006 though, structures a checklist of high-level phases on a theoretical 
foundation in order to propose and describe a procedure in a digital investigation research field. The 
phases have been applied on existing frameworks and demonstrate an accurate approach to the specific 
area of research. These include: 
· Observation, where the researcher needs to observe the field in order to create a clear picture 
about the processes and the activities that take place on the investigation.  
· Hypothesis Formulation, where the researcher focuses on the results of the observation phase 
and is able to categorise the techniques that will aid the analysis of the findings.  
· Prediction, this phase will support the Hypothesis Formulation as the results of this part will 
prove whether or not the Hypothesis is formed on a constructed basis and will lead the 
researcher to the last phase.  
· Testing and Searching, where the tests and experiments that take place on a generally 
approved manner will probably result to new predictions and evaluate the Hypothesis the 
researcher has set.   
The procedure described should give answers to questions for the existence of an x file to a y event and 
should be responded accurately only after a successful analysis of the data. The investigator should be 
able to have access and examine each one of them, every file and any event that influences the file’s 
behaviour. 
 ID THEFT INVESTIGATION FRAMEWORK DESIGN 
For the ID Theft Investigation Framework the research of the existing literature has revealed that the 
most suitable approach would be first to identify and define the phases that will lead the researcher to 
the appropriate procedures, based on the model described above and consequently the implementation 
of a conceptual framework that will aid the forensic investigator. The idea is based on the concept of 
handing over the procedure on a fundamental basis. This way the process will correspond to any 
possible procedure during the investigation. The presented process is adjusted to the needs that an ID 
Theft incident investigation requires as it is going to be analysed on the following chapter. The phases 
at the first level of the process follow a generic pattern. However, in the advance of the process the 
model will reveal the second level phases that contain the processes of the framework and the third 
level phases, including the activities that tae place. Every Phase is influenced by the inputs and the 
outputs (I/Os) that resign it.     
Therefore, the study should be distinguished in four phases, where every phase represents a major 
procedure throughout the ID Theft investigation lifecycle. The impact on every phase is featured from 
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all influential actions taken place on each phase. This states the first level of the framework’s 
formulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the procedure that is proposed to guide the researcher in order to formulate the 
investigation process, the above graph outlines the first level of it. There is always one start and one 
end point concerning the investigation. The forensic analyst needs to begin under a concrete method 
and finish so. Hence, the Media Analysis (Observation) is the phase that appears of extreme importance 
in order to provide the data that will prolong to the Evidence Analysis (Hypothesis Formulation). The 
findings of the disk analysis will move forwards to the analysis and the decision whether this evidence 
can stand as accurate to the Scenario Construction (Prediction), where it is going to validate or not the 
Evidence Analysis. However, the analyst should always be able to return from the Evidence Analysis 
to the Media Analysis for any further data that might appear of value during the examination of the 
media, as well as he should always be able to revisit the Evidence Analysis at any stage in the Scenario 
Construction for any information that could emerge and indicate further investigation. Then, the 
Scenario Construction will need to be evaluated in order to prove its validation that is going to direct to 
the end of the process. However, the Evaluation phase requires the possibility to recall any of the 
previous phases of the investigation process in order to prove the objectivity of the research outcome. 
The following table sets the Variable Names at this Phase of the process in order to be used during this 
level of the procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: First Level Investigation Process Variable Names 
First Level Investigation Process Variable Names 
Description Variable 
Incident Investigation I 
Media Analysis Pma 
Evidence Analysis Pea 
Scenario Construction Psc 
Evaluation  Pe 
Media  
Analysis 
Evaluation Scenario 
Construction 
Evidence 
Analysis 
Graph 1: First Level Investigation Process Phases 
Appendices 
 
B14 
A graphical representation demonstrates the process that is proposed to be followed from the ID Theft 
Investigation Framework concerning an Incident. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Every phase at this level of the investigation process needs to respond to an input and an output (I/O) 
practice. This provides the necessity of defining the processes and the activities that will be set for the 
further analysis of this research. The I/Os support the general process in the terms of continuity during 
the investigation’s lifecycle. Below, there is a graphical representation of every phase in 
correspondence with the First Level I/Os that manipulate it. Every phase of the process requires as an 
input the output of the preceding phase for supporting the coherence of the research outcome.     
Media Analysis 
The Pma requires as an input any type of Digital storage Media that could give as an output possible ID 
Theft data in order for the further investigation to take place. At this point the term Digital Media is 
going to represent any type of computer storage device.    
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Possible Digital storage media 
Computer / Laptop / Server Hard Disk PCMCIA cards 
External Hard Disk Memory Cards 
Mobile Phone / SIM Card USB Memory Stick 
Raid Hard Disks PDA 
Tape Back-ups Floppy Disk 
CD / DVD  
Table 3: Possible Digital storage Media 
  
Media  
Analysis 
Graph 3: Phase 1. Media Analysis I/Os 
Input:  Digital Media 
 
Graph 2: Incident Investigation Process Lifecycle 
 
Pma 
Pea 
Psc 
Pe 
I 
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Evidence Analysis 
The Pea takes as input the possible ID Theft data provided by the Pma and will try to convert it to 
Evidence. At any time during an investigation further data may significantly come into view and the 
analyst will return to the previous phase for the analysis of the Digital Media.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario Construction 
The input of the Psc should be anything else but the Evidence from the Pea aiming to produce a 
Scenario as an output. The scenario is the ‘story’ that is created by the investigator based on the 
findings of the media examination. Only when the required information is gathered, the analyst is able 
to present a coherent and efficient chronicle of the evidence. The reconstructed story of what has taken 
place to the original media. At this Phase it may be required for the analyst to search for further details 
on the two previous phases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Graph 4: Phase 2.  Evidence Analysis I/Os 
Evidence  
Analysis 
Input:  ID Theft Data 
 
Scenario 
Construction 
Graph 5: Phase 3.  Scenario Construction I/O 
Input:  Evidence 
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Evaluation 
The Pe uses the Scenario from the Psc as an input in order to present the Case that is also the required 
output of the whole investigation. At this stage the Media Analysis will be either proved or disproved. 
However, the analyst needs to be able to revisit all previous Phases for the validation of the research 
outcome.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On a theoretical basis the Investigation Process obtains the following instruction format that is going to 
be analysed in detail on the analysis chapter. Each phase, the processes (I/Os) and the activities of the 
first level of the investigation framework are list numbered is order to create a logical continuation. By 
progressing the activities at this level of the procedure appear, where the separation of the framework 
in two parts comes into sight, the victim’s and the perpetrator’s that are going to lead to the second 
level of the Investigation Process.  
First Level Investigative Process 
Phase 1. Media Analysis 
Process 1.1. Digital Media 
Activity 1.1.1. Source Identification 
Activity 1.1.2. Digital Media collection 
Activity 1.1.3. Copy/ image the source 
Process 1.2. ID Theft Data 
Activity 1.2.1. Evidential data identification 
a Victim 
b Fraudster 
Activity 1.2.2. Target identification 
Activity 1.2.3. Threat agent identification / intention 
Phase 2. Evidence Analysis 
Process 2.1. ID Theft Data 
Activity 2.1.1. Data Analysis 
Activity 2.1.2. Target Analysis  
a Victim 
b Fraudster 
Activity 2.1.3. Threat Agent Analysis 
Process 2.2. Evidence 
Activity 2.2.1. Evidence Collection 
Activity 2.2.2. Evidence Classification 
Phase 3. Scenario Construction 
Process 3.1. Evidence 
Activity 3.1.1. Structure of evidential data 
Activity 3.1.2. Structure threat agent’s profile 
a Victim 
b Fraudster 
Activity 3.1.3. Structure analysed digital evidence 
Process 3.2. Scenario 
Activity 3.2.1. Scenario Outline 
Activity 3.2.2. Scenario Preparation Documentation 
Evaluation 
Graph 6: Phase 4. Evaluation I/O 
Input:  Scenario 
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Phase 4. Evaluation 
Process 4.1. Scenario 
Activity 4.1.1. Scenario Testing / Evaluation 
Activity 4.1.2. Scenario Clarification 
Process 4.2. Case 
Activity 4.2.1. Case Construction 
Activity 4.2.2. Case Clarification 
Activity 4.2.3. Case Evaluation 
Activity 4.2.4. Evidential Case Representation 
 
EXAMPLE FICTIONAL SCENARIO 
Assuming there is a computer hard disk delivered to a computer forensics lab from a major company 
suspecting an employee for computer misuse, but without any further details. Consequently, this is 
going to be the first attempt to apply the above described first level framework, in an incident that the 
analyst is not provided with any further information. 
In such a case, and for Phase 1 of the investigation process, the investigator receives the input of the 
Process 1.1 that needs to collect (Activity 1.1.1), identify (Activity 1.1.2) and image (Activity 1.1.3)  
the hard disk. The output process of this Phase is the 1.2, where for the needs of this example is ID 
Theft Data or even data that could stand as ID Theft evidence and this is what the investigator is 
challenged to discover. The Activity 1.2.1 reveals the first element, whether the evidence belongs to a 
victim or a fraudster. From this point the investigation process on a lower level framework should 
progress under a bipolar perspective according to the data provided from 1.2.1. However, for this 
example it can easily give the first glance charging the employee as a fraudster committing ID Theft 
from his work computer, including every instance of it, inside the company or towards outside targets. 
His machine could also state him as a victim of ID Theft, meaning that the company has probably got 
information leak to the outside. There is when Activity 1.2.2 identifies the target, that could be a 
vulnerable system, or information published on the public domain, as well as the Activity 1.2.3 where 
the threat agent and his intentions can be identified.  
Phase 2, aims to analyse the evidence from the original media on Process 2.1, the investigator analyses 
the ID Theft data under three Activities 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, data, target and threat agent accordingly. 
The target analysis activity is divided to victim and fraudster, as the inputs for each category are 
different and guide the investigation towards different perspective. In case the employee has been a 
victim, the investigator will be able to analyse the target from this side, if the employee was the 
fraudster perhaps the investigator will be able to collect more details about the target. Therefore, the 
Process 2.2 provides the evidence with the Activities 2.2.1 that collects the evidence and 2.2.2, where 
the evidence is classified.     
Phase 3 constructs the scenario of the incident. At this point, Process 3.1 is the evidence extracted from 
the investigation, where Activity 3.1.1 structures the evidential data, while 3.1.2 structure the threat 
agent’s profile that is divided to the victim’s and the fraudster’s side, as there is going to be different 
sort of data gathered to give the investigator the information required to construct the attacker’s profile. 
Activity 3.1.3 structures the analysed digital evidence that refers to the incident as a whole. In such a 
manner, on Process 3.2 the activities that follow are 3.2.1, the scenario outline and 3.2.2, the 
documentation preparation. At this point the investigator has a clear aspect about his suspect. He could 
tell with structured evidence whether the suspected employee has committed ID Theft or has only been 
another victim. 
However, he owes to continue with Phase 4, the evaluation of the scenario. So, on Process 4.1 that is 
the scenario, Activity 4.1.1 is followed, evaluates or not the scenario assumption and 4.2.2 clarifies the 
scenario. Process 4.2 leaves the investigator with a case where he needs to construct it (Activity 4.2.1), 
clarify it (Activity 4.2.2) and evaluate it (Activity 4.2.3). The last Activity 4.2.4 for the investigator is 
the evidential case representation, the computer forensic report, where all evidence will be described 
and could also stand in a court of law, charging the fraudster of the case that could be either the victim 
or not.    
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CONCLUSION: 
When someone who can describe his relation with computers and the Internet as professional or even 
as advanced user, reaches to the point that feels insecure and suspicious with the interaction with them, 
then it obviously appears that the situation requires some attention. The statistics prove that the ID 
Theft is a type of old fashioned crime that transformed into a Cybercrime because of the intense 
‘investment’ of online sources. There may be more ‘bad’ people in the world than good ones and the 
spur of committing the perfect crime that will never be revealed still runs in some people’s minds.  
This situation leads to the improvement of tools and popularity of studying and research in computer 
forensics the last few years. It is the type of science that corresponds to the needs of digital 
investigations. Therefore for the conditions where ID Theft is combined with computer usage, 
computer forensics is the type of science that will be requested to provide the evidence. In such a 
perspective, there should be an effort to provide the computer forensic analysts with more detailed and 
concrete procedures that will help them accomplish their target.     
For this reason, with respect and based on the computer forensics frameworks aiming to aid digital 
investigations, there is an approach of investigating ID Theft incidents with an independent 
investigation methodology. The ID Theft investigation framework distinguishes the examination in the 
victim’s and the fraudster’s side and the first level of this investigation process analysis was hence 
presented. This type of investigation method aims to provide results on a more focused basis regarding 
an ID Theft incident. Future work includes a more detailed approach to the findings of the investigation 
process based on the evidence left behind on a fraudster’s digital storage media and the victim’s 
accordingly. An experimental assessment on fictional cases by analysing reliable, residual data from 
hard disk drives will validate the research; and that will be accomplished in two parts, where the 
researcher behaves as the perpetrator in a closed network attack in the laboratory, and where the 
researcher uses the evidence that is left behind (from the first experiment) and acts as a forensic 
examiner, analysing the hypothetical victims’ hard disk drives. 
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An empirical methodology derived from the analysis 
of information remaining on second hand hard disks.  
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Abstract. In this paper we present the findings of an analysis of approximately 260 
second hand disks that was conducted in 2006. A third party organisation bought the 
disks from the second hand market providing a degree of anonymity. This paper will 
demonstrate the quantitative outcomes of the analysis and the overall experiences. It will 
look at how analysts can expand their tools and techniques in order to achieve faster 
results, how one can organise the analysis based on the way information is found and 
finally a holistic picture of the case should be generated following the proposed 
methodology.  
Keywords: disk analysis, second hand disks, corporate data, computer forensic analysis, 
Forensic Race  
1 Introduction  
During 2006 we organised a research initiative on the analysis of residual data on second hand hard 
disks. In this respect a number of hard disks where studied in order to identify and understand the data 
that can be revealed from randomly purchased hard disks from a number of different countries. The 
sample countries/regions included the U.K., Germany and North America.  
It is vital to be aware of the importance and utilisation of a disk study for the computer forensics 
science [1]. The researcher gains awareness concerning end-user and corporate knowledge regarding 
data exposure. Unaware users can become victims of espionage and blackmail. By analysing disks that 
contain any personal data for research reasons the possibility of espionage is prevented, while on the 
other hand people that hear about this study get informed about the way their data can be retrieved and 
used for malicious reasons. Therefore, from the researcher’s point of view, potential criminal activity 
can be identified where sensitive data is available and can be used for such purposes.  
The overall number of disks analysed lead to results that should be considered further, such as 
statistical reports concerning the users’ familiarity with techniques like wiping data from their hard 
disks and thus securing their privacy when disposing of disks. In any case that data is left behind in 
hard disks there is a fraud risk for the user. Consequently, the capacity of personal information revealed 
can even lead to Identity Theft by thoroughly profiling the victim, as there were multiple cases where 
personal identification details could be retrieved.  
This disk study signifies issues not only for the research community, but for the general user awareness 
as well. Further to discussing those issues based on our experience of taking part in this disk study, in 
this paper we propose a methodology that could be implemented in order to simplify and manage a disk 
study research procedure.  
2 Forensic Race  
As a result of the disk study, a new terminology, “Forensic Race” was brought about. The word race 
differentiates the species from one kind to the other. Consequently, the term “Forensic Race” 
determines the race of a computer’s hard disk or any type of digital data repository. The “Forensic 
Race” of a hard disk is based on a hard disk’s capacity, operating system and in combination with the 
nature of the data contained within the disk drive.  
In the disk study, it was found that the majority of the disks were between 500 Mega Bytes and 10 Giga 
Bytes with an overwhelming 69 per cent (see Fig 1). From the disk’s capacity it is possible to assume 
approximately the year from which it was manufactured. This, most likely can then lead the analyst to a 
simple deduction that the Operating System would be from around that period. This was validated 
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since the majority of the systems contained old Operating Systems (e.g., MS Dos, MS. Windows 98, 
NT, 2000 and ME).  
As a result of the ‘Forensic Race’ term, an investigator could predict the approximate time period 
required. During an analysis, the size of the disks and the amount of information stored on them 
contributes to this variable. The majority of the disks had low capacity therefore the time period took 
for each one to be investigated was substantial. This is not always holds true since the demand to store 
more and larger files requires larger hard disks. Consequently, future disk studies will consist of disks 
that will have massive capacity. Therefore, the investigation will demand a time management schedule 
in order to contact the analysis in a reasonable period of time.  
 
Fig. 1. Disk Capacity Percentages 
With the time factor in mind, it is very helpful, from an investigators point of view, to have an idea of 
the race of the disks you are dealing with in advance. Thus, it is makes sense to know is you are dealing 
with a Dwarf or a Gnome or if you are dealing with a Cyclops or a Giant (see Table 1). What one 
wouldn’t want to deal with is a Black Giant.  
Table 1. Classification sample of a disk’s Forensic Race 
Giant  Large Capacity – Vast amount of data present  
Cyclops  Large Capacity – Very few data present  
Dwarf  Low Capacity – Vast amount of data present  
Gnome  Low Capacity – Very few data present  
Blue  Corporate data present  
Green  Individual data present  
Black  Illicit Material  
 
A hard disk can be classed as a Cyclops, as a Dwarf, as Gnome etc.  
• The Cyclops is a hard disk that has a large capacity that even a one eye person could easily see 
that it contains almost no data and definitely no illicit material.  
• On the contrary, a Dwarf is a small capacity hard disk that contains a vast amount of data that 
would take days to investigate. The disks classify themselves according the data they do 
contain.  
• A Gnome is a small capacity hard disk that contains a small amount of legitimate data.  
 
It is possible to expand the list of the Forensic Race categories depending on how detailed the 
investigator would like to categorise findings of an investigation. 
 
3 A proposal for an empirical approach  
The methodology of computer forensics investigation calls out for a more empirical approach. Instead 
of just following an out of the book procedure, while investigating a case, the consideration of past 
experience along with an empirical approach could lead to a far more efficient analysis. The required 
experience and knowledge to deal efficiently with the vast amount of information contained within the 
disks, has been developed through the investigation of a series of data repositories in the past. 
However, the time allocated for the analysis was 3 months for approximately 260 disks. Within that 
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time the disks had to be imaged, recovered, data carved, cross referenced with existing data or data 
already recovered from other disks, characterise and categorise the nature of the data recovered. 
After completing the disk study [2] [1] the need for a more flexible methodology was raised. The 
investigators felt that they shouldn’t arrange the disks to be analysed based on their criteria but let the 
disks decide which one it is going to be investigated in what order.  
The Table 2 represents the total number of disks provided and how this number went down by 
excluding disks that matched certain criteria.  
 
Table 2. Disks obtained / analysed 
 
Disk Category  Excluding List  
Total Number of Disks  259  -124  Faulty / Unreadable  
Readable Disks  135  -70  Wiped  
Disks Containing Data  65  -4  Handed to the police  
Final Disk Investigated 61    
Comparing the total numbers of disk provided (259) with the number of the disks that has been actual 
investigated (61) it is clearly that the only the 1/4 (23.5%) of the disks were processed (see Table 2).  
The proposed methodology tries to generate an informative table that will provide with some internal 
information of how a disk study should start and in which order to be conducted.  
1. Start by excluding the faulty disks, this is the easiest part. Indisputably, these are the one that 
cannot be imaged due to physical damage and need special equipment or resources in order to 
be investigated.  
2. An automated procedure that checks for wiped drives that contain no data is the second step of 
the methodology.  
3. The third step is more complex and advanced than the previous steps. It involves four different 
applications which will sift through the date on the disk images.  
· The first application will try to locate (within the present data) and/or recover (deleted) 
any pictures (photographs, image files) of any type. By examining the different headers 
and footers of various image files, the application can extract full or partial known image 
file types. Researchers form the Information Research Group (ISRG) within the 
University of Glamorgan conceived the idea and developed a program which proves that 
this is possible.  
· The second application will extract all the thumb.db files by locating them or recovering 
them from the slack space. Then a smart application goes through the thumb.db files and 
extracts all the pictures stored in them. The special case with the thumb.db file is that it 
stores forever (until wiped) a backup preview version of the user’s pictures even if they 
have been deleted or even wiped. Furthermore, a small preview of a picture is more likely 
to be found when stored with others in one single file, than trying to recover the large 
version of a picture spread across the hard disk and most possibly been overwritten in 
various parts. Researchers from the Information Security Research Group (ISRG) within 
the University of Glamorgan have also conceived this idea and have developed a program 
[3] which proves that this is possible. Recently, a tool called Vinetto [7] was released that 
extracts pictures and generates reports too.  
· The third application extracts the directory names form the index.dat file(s) (see Fig. 2) 
and tries to locate/recover the contents. This is where the Operating System (OS) is 
caching the user’s activity. The conceived idea that extracts the thumb.db files was 
slightly modified to extract the contents (directory names and URLs) of the index.dat 
files.  
· Last but not least, the fourth application that tries to extract the registry file of the user. 
Further investigation in the registry can reveal a vast amount of information if needed that 
could totally end up profiling the user. Information such as software installed, hardware 
installed, user’s Internet activity and habits can all be retrieved from the Registry alone 
[4].  
 
Once these four steps have been completed, the informative table of internal information gives the 
investigator a brief overview of what the investigation is going to entail, and which disks have priority 
over others for further analysis.  
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3.1 Further details about the methodology  
By having a collection of the pictures contained into the disk it is fairly easy to identify potential illicit 
material within the hard disk. Thus, in a very small period of time the pictures will do their best to help 
the investigators identify disks that has to be reported to the police immediately.  
Especially with the MS Windows® OS, a list of the original files that are shipped with the Operating 
System can be produced. For every MS Windows® distribution a list of MD5 hashes of each file can 
be generated. Thus, during the investigating process, a number of approximately 50,000 files (depends 
the distribution) can be excluded from the processing cycles of the investigation’s procedure. 
Additionally, this will also minimise the successful hits returned when searching keywords by focusing 
at the unknown for the system files which however are the user’s data.  
The registry file contains many secrets that are waiting to be revealed. A quick search through specific 
locations in the registry, if this is possible of course, could reveal the origins of the disk. The company 
name used to register software, the computer name, the type of installed programs, quick list of URLs 
visited; network shares and previously connected devices provide a good chance to the investigator to 
identify if the data present belong to some kind of company, to some individual as home user or both 
(see Table 3).  
Table 3. Origin of disks investigated  
Disks Investigated  Commercial Data Present  Individual data present  
65 -4(illicit material)  37  28  
 
4 Advantages of the proposed methodology  
Taking under consideration all this information revealed by the automated process and by having in 
mind the idea of how to classify the “Forensic Race” of a disk. It is fairly possible to start organising 
the investigation according to the estimated time that has to be spent on each case. The approximate 
idea of which disk contains what kind data can easily lead us to start with the larger in capacity disks 
that seems to contain a lot of corporate data and continue with the smaller in capacity disks that also 
seems to contain data from companies. That way we can leave all the disks that seem to contain data 
about individuals for the end of the investigation. Additionally, large disk that have been identified to 
contain very few data can be also left for the end of the investigation. Finally, disks that seem to have 
been originated from the same source (i.e. same company) can be grouped together from the beginning 
of the investigation despite their capacity.  
By checking the time spend for each disk to be investigated in a random order to the overall time spend 
to complete the disk study one could see that the overall timeframe could be minimised. There have 
been disks that were only 6 GB in capacity and took ten times more time to investigate than disks that 
where double in size. Having an approximate idea of how long could take you to investigate a disk can 
be really helpful while organising such large scale projects.  
· Disks that were found to belong to a specific group (i.e. from the same individual or the 
same company) should be crossed referenced every time new data were identified. 
Another example would be disks that have foreign origin.  
· It is also very convenient to know from the beginning that you have to deal with a number 
of disks in different foreign languages. Consequently, these disks will be allocated to the 
proper people in order to perform the investigation in that foreign language. Otherwise in 
the middle of a study could end up trying to find a translator.  
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4.1 Providing some examples  
The process of extracting information from the thumb.db files and index.dat files is similar.  
 
Fig. 2. Overwiew of the Index.dat file 
Within the Fig. 2 it is clear how the information is stored in the index.dat file. A pattern is used that 
helps the investigator to extract information. After 80 bytes form the begging of the file the name of the 
directories starts. Every directory consists of 8 capital alphanumeric characters. Between the directory 
names the hex values FA 03 00 00 separates them with each other. CAD5RND0 and WTF1T4TM are 
the random generated directory names. Furthermore, going through the file searching for the URL 
string a web link will be found after 100 bytes (see Fig 3).  
Fig. 3. Pattern of extracting the web addresses  
There are numerous locations by which information can be extracted to give an analyst a further 
understanding of what data is present on the disk. As mentioned before it is possible to get usernames, 
company names and a user’s internet activity all just solely from the Registry. Mee et al [5] have given 
some examples of what and where this information can be extracted from the Registry. The following 
tables summarises these examples illustrating the keys which hold the information.  
 
Table 4. Registry Six main Root Keys with their associated data [7] 
Table 4. Registry Six main Root Keys 
with their associated data [7] Root Key  
Description  
HKEY_CURRENT_USER  Current logged-on user data  
HKEY_USERS  Data about all the user accounts on the 
machine  
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT  File association and Object Linking and 
Embedding (OLE) registration 
information  
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE  System related information  
HKEY_DYN_DATA  Performance data  
HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG  Information about the current hardware 
profile  
 
URL 100 
bytes 
[Address] 
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Table 5. System information which can be extracted 
 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Hardware\D
escription\System\CentralProcessor\0\Proc
essorNameString  
Name of the processor that the system in 
running  
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Hardware\D
escription\System\ system  
Bios that the machine is running the bios 
date of both the video bios and the system 
bios.  
 
Table 6. Illustrates sample locations in the registry whereby Software related information can be extracted 
 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Mi
crosoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion key  
operating system installed, its service 
pack, system default path, and the 
registered owner can also be found in this 
Registry root key  
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Mi
crosoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion key 
\CSDVersion  
service pack name that has been installed  
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Mi
crosoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion key 
\Winlogon  
can be set to allow a user to automatically 
log onto the system, whenever the system 
boots  
 
Table 7. Illustrates sample information related to specifically to users in which can be extracted from the Registry 
 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\M
icrosoft\Windows NT\Current 
Version\Profile List  
lists all current and deleted users that has 
accesses to the machine, identified by 
their SID.  
HKEY_USER\SID\Software\Microsoft\In
ternet Explorer\TypedURLs  
stores all the typed URLs that the user 
typed into Internet Explorer  
HKEY_USER\SID\Software\Microsoft\M
SNMessenger\PerPassportSettings\  
gives information about the location of 
the default path for received files for the 
user’s MSN Messenger software  
HKEY_USERS\sid\Software\Microsoft\
Messenger Service\ListCache\.Net 
Messenger Service  
holds the entire user’s MSN contact list  
HKEY_USER\SID\Software\Microsoft\S
earchAssistant\ACMru\5683  
user’s recent searches in Windows  
 
5 Conclusions  
The proposed methodology of this paper is based on experience. Simple forensic applications could 
easily help the investigators to organise their study in advance when dealing with unknown quantities 
of data to be analysed. We believe that in the near future a system could be build that will be able to 
perform all the steps presented here automatically. Consequently, computer forensics investigators will 
be able to deal with a large number of high capacity disks in an efficient way.  
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Abstract 
ID theft, especially in its on-line form, is currently one of the most prevalent types of computer crime. The limited end-user 
awareness as well as the retention and business processing of large amounts of personal data in a manner that does not meet 
security and regulatory requirements provide plenty of opportunities to fraudsters. A number of organisations have produced 
guidelines of good practice targeted to individuals and organisations, however the matter is still on the rise. In this paper we 
review computer-based techniques employed by fraudsters in order to steal IDs and refer to published guidelines and the 
documented good practice against those. We discuss the issues related to the investigation of such incidents and provide the 
grounds for the development of a framework to assist in their forensic examination. 
Keywords 
e-Crime, ID theft, incident investigation, digital evidence, computer forensics 
Introduction 
According to a study of the Identity Theft Resource Center (2003), ID theft is distinguished in three 
forms: financial, criminal and identity cloning. The study takes as examples real victims, and drawing 
upon these cases those three forms are defined. Ultimate purposes for ID theft could be either financial 
and other resource and privilege gains or protection of one’s real identity and masquerading behind 
another, mostly legitimate entity. ID thefts can also take advantage of an organisation’s good name in 
order to attract individuals and hence then there is a case of a double ID theft, the corporation’s and the 
consumer’s (Dwan, 2004). 
Identity theft can occur in many forms, for example, by lost or stolen wallets, discarded documents 
containing personal details, phishing e-mails etc. According to The Identity Theft Resource Center 
(2003), students, old people and the military appear to be more vulnerable to ID theft than any other 
group of people. By the time the end user has found out that they have been a victim of identity theft, is 
already too late and their personal details have been used for fraudulent purposes (Dwan, 2004). It also 
seems that most perpetrators of this kind of crime are not alone, but rather organised and well 
equipped. Indeed, ID Theft is nowadays directly linked to drug trafficking, money laundering and 
terrorism (Collins, 2003).  
Based on the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s report for National and State Trends in Fraud and 
Identity Theft 2004 of the 635,173 complaints received, 246,570 were ID theft reports. The most 
common form of reported identity theft was Credit Card fraud, followed by phone or utilities fraud, 
bank fraud, and employment fraud. It is very important to note that only 30% of victims notified a 
police department. It can therefore be assumed that the majority of people are not aware that they could 
have contacted law enforcement agencies and prefer not to make their ID theft incident known. 
In 1999 20,000 cases of ID Theft were reported in the UK, in 2001 there were 53,000 and in 2003 the 
number had almost doubled. It can take a victim up to 300 hours of work when dealing with the 
consequences of their ID theft with banks and credit card companies (Porter, 2004). This emerging and 
developing trend in crime triggers complex investigations that require extensive use of information 
technology, both as a medium for analysis and as evidence at the same time. Fraudsters are obtaining 
more sophisticated technological ways and manage to conceal their crimes. 
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For example, in ID theft cases for financial purposes, the investigator can first focus on credit history, 
transactions made on the victim’s name, applications for bank accounts, loans and credit cards. This 
evidence trail is to be recovered in the form of data, logs etc. formats through various systems within 
one or even multiple financial organisations. As a result, the investigation is complicated and time-
consuming. With identity-related ID theft cases, the investigator will need to consider not only the 
financial evidence but the personal information gained, subsequent actions triggered by a hijacked 
identity etc. 
In this paper we discuss how ID theft can occur in the interconnected world and what evidence may be 
left behind for the computer forensic investigator. We intend to provide an initial insight into this 
computer-fuelled crime in order to facilitate the analyst in identifying and analysing the related digital 
evidence. 
ID Theft Techniques and Digital Evidence 
Techniques and tools of identity thieves 
Information can be obtained from stolen wallets or handbags which usually contain identification 
papers, driving licences, credit and bank cards, etc. Alternatively, someone’s personal mail might be 
stolen to gain bank and credit card statements, pre-approved credit offers and tax information. The 
techniques used to collect this information include searching through household litter bags, burglary, 
social engineering or even identification of a deceased person. 
The identity theft criminals may contact a person who has lost his credit card claiming that they found 
it, ask for personal details and then use it in a fraudulent manner (Dwan, 2004). They may apply for a 
new credit card using someone else’s personal details, buy items they never pay for and the offence 
will be against the legitimate owner. They might even bankrupt on someone’s account or give stolen 
personal details in case of an arrest (Federal Trade Commission, 2003). 
High-tech techniques for ID theft require the use of a computer, and usually the Internet, in order to 
gain the required information. The techniques that are used require at least intermediate information 
technology knowledge and skills and the most common techniques are detailed below. 
Phishing 
Phishing is used to gain personal information by sending e-mail messages that appear to come from 
trusted organisations. A Phishing attack takes the form of a mass distribution of 'spoofed' e-mail 
messages in which the reply addresses, links, and branding appear to come from banks, insurance 
agencies, retailers or credit card companies. The messages look authentic by using corporate logos and 
formats similar to those that are used by the official companies. The threat is perceivably dangerous 
when personal information is requested for auditing or verification purposes, for example, personal 
account numbers, passwords and other private information. In April 2004, an unemployed 21 year old 
British man was arrested by the UK National Hi-tech Crime Unit, allegedly for a phishing attack 
against The Co-operative bank and targeting the Smile Internet Bank. However this man was just an 
amateur and according to the police he is not related with the organised crime (news article ‘Police 
Catch UK Phisher’, 2004). 
Web-spoofing 
Web Spoofing is the method by which the users believe that they have been directed to the official 
website of a company. Instead, they have actually been directed to a ‘spoofed’ website where any 
personal information that is entered, will be stored and used for malicious purposes. The web pages 
will have been designed by skilled web designers and are often an exact copy of the original company’s 
website. The important difference is that there are minor changes that allow for user information to be 
stored on the fraudster’s servers. 
Malicious software: Spyware, Viruses and Trojans 
Spyware is designed for exploiting infected computers usually for marketing purposes. The activity of 
the web browser is monitored, resulting to routing of HTTP requests to the web sites that are advertised 
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through the spyware. Also, pop-up advertisements are can be delivered or theft of personal information 
can be achieved, including users’ financial information. Recently, spyware was used by an identity 
theft ring to retrieve and store remotely, user information. This was identified by research conducted by 
an anti-spyware firm, Sunbelt (Vijayan, 2005). 
Some Trojan Horses are security-breakers that have the ability to steal passwords and personal details 
and forward them through a number of ways to the fraudsters. Smart Trojan software can keep a log 
from keystrokes (key-loggers) or takes a screenshot when a customer is visiting a financial web-site 
and the information is then forwarded to the fraudster (news item ‘Exit old fashion phishing […]’, 
2005). 
Biometrics circumvention 
Biometrics was supposed to be a countermeasure for Identity Theft. Even though it is a relatively new 
method for identity verification and the aim is to replace the vulnerable passwords, there are already 
numerous ways of the fraudsters to dump a biometric system. It can be easy to deceive biometric 
technology by tampering machines that read biometric data or altering the records that are contained 
within them. Finger prints that are left behind on scanners can be re-used by breathing on the glass, 
cooling down the sensors to give false information, using graphite powder to dust the fingerprint and 
then copy it to a “jelly finger” etc. Facial recognition can also be duped in some cases by playing 
someone’s video at the reader and gaining access to a system (Hamadi, 2004). 
Other Techniques 
Other techniques, not discussed in further detail here as we focus on on-line ID theft, may include card 
cloning (Gerard et al., 2004), attacks on off-line kept data (e.g. back-up copies and disaster recovery 
facilities) or data media in general (McKinley, 2004) and use of CCTV footage etc. 
Forensic Investigation of On-line ID Theft 
Identity Theft in its on-line form is considered as a relatively new method of fraud and there is not 
enough guidance for forensic investigators. The investigator will have to unfold the digital trail of 
evidence and try to present potential explanations of how such a crime occurred. This digital trail 
involves examining how a crime was committed using computers and the Internet. The investigation 
should identify how the leak of personal information occurred that made it possible to conduct a misuse 
of resources such as a credit card number. It should also include details of the misuse such as dates, 
goods purchased and amounts spent. If it is possible the perpetrator should also be identified. The latter 
is perhaps one of the most challenging tasks as, unlike DNA evidence, computer records can identify 
user accounts that are logically, not physically, linked to individuals (Tryfonas et al., 2006). 
Forensic extraction and analysis of data from a computer hard disk will detail much of this information. 
However, the conversion of data to evidence is a lengthy and costly process that, at the end of the 
process, has also to be made understandable to a jury. Therefore, there would be value in creating an 
analytical framework to facilitate the investigation of Internet Identity Theft cases and the handling of 
the related digital evidence. The construction of a formalised and structured approach that would assist 
the computer forensic investigative practice in terms of identification of evidence, presentation in a 
court of Law etc. presents an opportunity for further research. 
Towards such a direction, in Table 11 we have combined the types of threats against on-line identities 
and the means to achieve illegitimate gains (or simple masquerade through ID theft) in a systematic 
analytical framework. We try to identify and record the digital evidence that may be found per 
category. Other factors of concern for an investigation are also recorded, such as required skills and 
capability profile of the perpetrator etc. Forensics professionals can then refer to this when they have to 
examine a case concerning internet identity theft. The main idea is that the professional is able to 
identify and understand the crime scene through such a framework.  
                                               
1  For Table 1, see Appendix C 
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ID Theft Response - Detection and Prevention 
According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC, 2005) the majority of people discovered they were 
victims by monitoring their accounts. However, it is only fifty per cent of the victims that finally find 
out how thieves retrieved their personal data (DeMarrais, 2003). The majority of ID theft incidents in 
the UK can be traced back to a suspicious phone call (Edwards, 2005). This fact alone raises concerns 
about communication of individuals’ personal information and the precautions that are required when 
such an exchange is needed. Further to precautions on releasing personal information to not trusted 
sources, both individuals and organisation have to be suspicious of the ways personal data can be 
stolen and used for malicious reasons. According to the FTC, individuals should order a copy of their 
credit report from credit card bureaus in order to check whether the information held there is accurate. 
Personal information at home should be held in a secure place and individuals should be informed 
about who has access to their personal information in the workplace.    
From an organisational point of view, the security community has now accepted that in organisations a 
major security threat against information comes from inside. Research has proved that 70% of the total 
identity thefts start from employees who steal personal data from the company they work for (Hinde, 
2004). The majority of companies cannot cope with well organised attacks coming from internal 
sources, or even instances of an employee giving out information unintentionally (Porter, 2004). 
Hence, in the light of the rising figures of on-line ID theft, the protection of personal information of 
clients and other affiliates held by organisations is much more than a compliance issue. Indeed, the 
same FTC survey shows that $48 billion loss was of businesses and financial institutions comparing to 
$5 billion loss of the consumers (DeMarrais, 2003). Therefore, organisations need to become more 
active on how they detect and prevent ID theft. Regulatory compliance with the Data Protection Act is 
then a very important issue in a company’s security architecture agenda and its information security 
and privacy policy. 
The detection controls comprise authorisation, internal auditing and whistleblower hotlines that alert 
the employees of the company about a committed or potential fraud underway. From a technological 
perspective automated detection systems that process large volumes of transaction data and look to 
highlight any suspicious actions based on specific patterns should be used (Porter, 2004). In addition to 
monitoring business information for external instances of ID theft, there is also the need to protect 
corporate information with references to identification and related information from the threat from 
within. In order to prevent such internal instances of identity theft, personal information held inside the 
company should be treated with the appropriate confidentiality. Information assets that contain such 
personal and sensitive information should be protected in terms of allowed access (Solomon et al., 
2003) and destruction/disposal of those electronic or paper-based records (Gerard et al., 2004). 
The most common measure for protecting unauthorised access to a computer network is to use 
passwords. However, problems arise when users choose easily guessed words for a password. In 
addition, they should change their secret password regularly in order to avoid any problems (Gerard et 
al., 2004). File encryption is commonly used as most database software packages provide built-in 
encryption and decryption of data. In addition, hardware or software firewalls have a wide use and are 
necessary in any company to limit the risk of intrusion to its network. Access logs should be kept for 
those files that contain personal and private data. Internal auditors of the company should have the 
authorisation to analyse and evaluate these audit records (Gerard et al., 2004). 
Conclusions and Further Research 
Hardly is ID theft or a simple masquerade a new crime; however it is now fuelled by information 
technology resulting in high numbers of such crimes committed annually, corporate liabilities and 
financial loss – and of course personal inconvenience. As ID fraudsters have discovered new tools, so 
must forensic investigators and Law practitioners in order to be able to cope with this trend and tackle 
it effectively. A responsive plan should include components of prevention and detection, reaction and 
investigation of incidents. 
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However, whilst prevention and reaction can be largely covered within the organisation’s security 
architecture plans, given an emphasis in meaningful compliance with regulations such as the Data 
Protection Act, detection and investigation require new tools and methods. Through such a 
perspective, we try to initiate a framework for the investigation of this crime, by recording artefacts of 
evidential value and creating suspect profiles against potential instances of hi-tech ID theft. Such a 
systematic approach to explaining ID theft will hopefully facilitate the understanding of the crime 
scene by the forensic investigator. 
Table 1 is an initial attempt to address this issue and it demonstrates how a categorisation of ID theft 
incidents against the method used, the required skills behind the attack, the technologies exploited and 
the potential digital evidence left behind can provide an investigative insight. Potential future work 
would include a detailed categorisation of the majority of known ID theft attacks (or a meaningful, 
representative grouping of those), a detailed recording of potential evidence in the corresponding crime 
scenes, guidance on how to locate and extract these artefacts in an evidentially sound manner etc. A 
review of secondary empirical data from published cases and public court proceedings may also 
complement or cross-validate this approach. 
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Appendix C:  
A categorisation of computer-based ID theft techniques 
The associated attackers’ profiles and the potential digital evidence left on the crime scene 
ID Theft Technique 
Attacker’s Profile Evidence 
Popularity Motivation Skills Methods / Tools Technology Characteristics 
Phishing:  
May be also called carding or 
e-mail spoofing. It has the form 
of an official email claiming to 
come from an online bank or 
retailer, because in fact is a 
scam that steals personal 
information. 
To gain/get:  
· Bank Accounts 
· Cheque Books  
· Credit Cards  
· Loans 
· Financial account 
hijacking 
High 
Considered to belong on 
organised crime 
· Official e-mail or web site 
claim 
· Unsecured wireless 
mediums  
· Unregistered domains 
 
· Graphics  
· Pop-up windows  
· URL cloning 
· Trojans 
· Key-loggers 
· No use of port 80, mainly 
use of port 4903 
· e-mails - image map or with 
encoded URL in JavaScript 
· Respond to “SHS” web 
server 
· Run on “zombie”  machines 
· Trojan code hits exploitable 
machines 
Growing very 
fast, about 56% 
per month 
(R.Lininger et 
al, 2005) 
Web-spoofing:  
The method that the users 
believe they are on a website 
that actually they aren’t. 
· Store personal 
information 
· Use passwords and 
personal details for 
malicious reasons 
High 
Redirection to the 
fraudster’s web site 
· Web servers 
· Web page design software 
· Domain name registration 
· URL rewriting · Professionally designed web 
pages 
· Copied web pages linked to 
the original 
· Information is redirected and 
stored to the fraudster’s server 
· Respond to “SHS” web 
server 
Growing as 
most users can 
get convinced    
Spyware, Viruses and 
Trojans:  
Malicious software that can 
gain access on a system and 
infect it.  
· Infect a computer to gain 
access to personal 
information 
· To retrieve financial 
information 
High and Very 
Technical 
The fraudster needs to 
have high standard  
programming skills 
· Programming software · Malicious code 
· Pop-up windows  
· Infected web sites 
· HTTP requests routing 
· Monitored web browser 
activity, network traffic, e-
mail, clipboard contents, 
keystrokes 
Growing at an 
alarming rate 
and considered 
as an explosion 
in privacy 
issues. 
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Key Loggers:  
Tracking personal data a user 
may enter. Can be hardware or 
software. Software key loggers 
belong to spyware.  
· Track data entered on a 
computer 
· To have access on 
personal information 
· To retrieve financial 
information 
Medium to Technical   
Knowledge of the 
acquisition process & 
how they are used is 
required 
· Physical presence of the 
fraudster required in order 
to install the hardware key 
logger  
· Installation of the 
software, even remotely 
· Software can be installed 
as part of another software 
· Hardware key loggers are 
invisible 
· Key logger software code 
can be downloaded free 
· Keyboard events are 
captured and record data 
entered 
· Specific applications are 
targeted and others are 
ignored 
Growing at an 
alarming rate 
Biometrics circumvention:  
Biometric at the first stage was supposed 
to fight Identity Theft as a countermeasure 
for not duplicating a human identity, 
however there are already numerous 
ways of the fraudsters to dump a 
biometric system. 
· To gain/ get: 
· Access to authorised 
mediums 
· Personal information  
Innovative, High 
Knowledge of the 
acquisition process & 
how they are used is 
required. 
· Photograph 
· Silicone 
· Graphite Powder 
· Video screening 
equipment 
· Loggers store information 
to send to the 
authentication machine.  
· Replayed information can 
give access to an 
unauthorised person 
· Physical access to such 
devices 
· Physical access is 
transformed to digitized 
Static, however 
the ID Theft 
interest on this 
subject is 
expected to 
grow 
Data Retrieval: 
Gaining access on people’s 
shared information from 
Internet or hacking corporate 
databases. 
· Retrieve personal and 
private information 
· Retrieve financial 
information 
 
Low to Technical 
Depends on whether the 
fraudster retrieves 
published information 
or needs hacking skills 
to access a database 
· Internet 
· Databases 
· Knowledge on how to 
process data 
· Hacking skills for 
databases  
· Security breaches 
· Access to public shared 
information  
Growing as 
more and more 
personal 
information is 
published on 
Internet 
Storage Devices and Media: 
Hard Disks, USB Sticks, 
Floppy Disks and C.D.’s, as 
well as stolen computers are a 
source for stealing personal 
data. 
· Retrieve personal and 
private information Low to High Technical 
· Simple extraction of 
copying files 
· Forensic extraction 
software 
· Only basic knowledge of 
how to extract data  
· Computers stolen, discarded 
or sold information. 
· E-mail messages 
· Logs/Internet activity 
Growing as the 
demand for 
storage devices 
grows 
PDA’s, Mobile Phones and 
Bluetooth:  
The wide use of PDAs, Mobile 
Phones and Bluetooth is a 
matter of deception for 
retrieving personal data. 
 
· Acquire address book  
· Retrieve personal details 
stored (even photos)  
· Gain complete access on 
the device 
Technical, None when 
the device is stolen 
· PDAs and Mobile phones 
can be treated also as 
storage devices:  
· Simple extraction and  
copying of the files 
· Forensic extraction 
software 
· Knowledge on how to 
extract data 
· Bluesnarfing  
· Stolen PDAs and mobile 
phones  
· Bluetooth technology is still 
unsecure 
Growing as the 
popularity of 
such devices 
grows  
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Card Cloning:  
A very important part of 
Identity Thieves’ work. Card 
Cloning needs a person with 
basic technical skills in order to 
manipulate a card replication 
machine and reproduce credit 
cards. 
· To replicate bank account 
cards, credit cards Low to Basic Technical 
The fraudster should 
know how to process 
the card replicate 
machine 
· Skimming devices 
· Card replication machines 
· Appropriate computer 
software 
· Card reader 
· Compromised ATM 
· Tampered ATM machines 
· Fraudsters own card 
replication equipment 
Growing 
Social Engineering:  
The method used for retrieving 
personal information from 
someone by claiming to be 
another person. 
· To gain/get:  
· Bank Accounts details 
· Passwords 
· Personal information 
 
Conspiracy 
The fraudster only needs 
to convince the victim 
· Official e-mail claim 
· Official phone call claim 
· E-mail 
· Graphics 
· Influence the victim’s 
psychology 
· Co-operation with the victim 
· Legitimate-look e-mail 
messages 
Growing  
CCTV / Wireless Cameras:  
CCTV can be monitoring the 
behaviour of a person, even 
following his steps. Often the 
motive is a PIN Number 
collection and for this reason 
widely used on ATM machines 
from fraudsters. 
· How a person behaves 
· States how the thief 
should then behave 
Medium to Low 
The fraudster should 
know how to process 
· Camera operation 
· Knowledge of filming and 
processing video  
· Camera hardware 
· Video processing 
software 
· Video Tapes 
· Expensive camera 
equipment  
· Unofficially installed 
cameras 
Growing as the 
use of cameras 
extends 
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Appendix D: 
 
Additional Reading 
Appendices 
 
D2 
Review of preventing internal ID Theft 
All paper documents that contain sensitive information in a company should be 
protected by being accessed only by authorised employees in designated areas as well 
as computer printers and fax machines should also be accessed in controlled areas 
(Solomon et al., 2003). The records that are no longer necessary for a company to 
maintain should be very carefully treated when destructing them. The corporation 
should follow three principles in order to avoid any unauthorised access to its data. 
First, there should be a plan of how these documents are going to be destroyed and 
second, consistency of what is going to be destroyed. Specific schedule should be 
followed and data should be destructed on the same manner. Third, documentation 
should be kept and maintained for a period of time about data that have been 
obliterated. (Gerard G.J., et al., 2004) 
Any electronic data storage medium in an organisation should be controlled, and 
these devices should be tracked from the time they are part of the organisation’s 
property until the moment they are disposed. Anyone who is related with computer 
forensics understands the reason. There is a way to retrieve information from a hard 
disk to a memory stick. Therefore, company’s sensitive data should not be found 
unprotected. (Gerard G.J., et al., 2004) 
The most common measure for protecting unauthorised access to a computer network 
is to use passwords. However, problems arise when users choose easily guessed 
words for a password. In an ideal world a password should be combination of letters, 
numbers and special characters, with not exact words and the employees have to keep 
in mind that they should never let anyone know their password. In addition, they 
should change their secret password from time to time in order to avoid any leak. 
(Gerard G.J., et al., 2004) 
Databases with encrypted files can also store information that concerns data that 
should not be revealed and add security to the company’s data. File encryption is 
commonly used in many organisations as most of database software packages provide 
built-in encryption and decryption of data. In addition, firewalls either hardware or 
software have a wide use and are necessary in any company to limit the risk of 
intrusion to its network. However, they are not considered as “unbeatable” and 
hackers quite often manage to force an entry. Even though, a firewall can monitor a) 
network traffic in case an intruder tries to have access to the network, b) changes to 
files by hackers and c) access log files that can be evidence in case someone has 
forced into the network. Furthermore, access logs should be kept for those files that 
contain personal and private data. This way, the organisation can audit the files that 
have been accessed and preceded by an employee in order to avoid security threats. 
Internal auditors of the company will have the authorisation to analyse and evaluate 
these records. (Gerard G.J., et al., 2004) 
A very important issue in a company’s secure function is to compose an information 
security and privacy policy. The actual purpose of designing a policy for a computer 
system is to decrease the risks that can appear on it. During the performance of a risk 
analysis to a system it is easy for the administration to identify the vulnerabilities the 
system might be exposed. As long as computer networks may appear weaknesses due 
Appendices 
 
D3 
to illegal use, each individual should be responsible for his actions that concern his 
access to the system and should respect the terms of using it. In addition the company 
should “invest” on insurance concerning cyberspace. Many insurance companies 
provide it and a firm can be compensated in case of proved loss due to ID Theft. 
(Gerard G.J., et al., 2004) 
The Method of Phishing 
Phishing has the form of an official e-mail claiming to come from an online bank or 
retailer, because in fact is a scam that steals personal information. The danger that 
arises from these e-mails is that they actually look legitimate, sometimes even more 
professional than the organisation’s site. Phishers use graphics, pop-up windows or 
even URLs identical with the official organisations’. The present situation is exposed 
even to the involvement of Trojans and key loggers in these e-mail messages. In 
addition, experts believe that organised crime is behind Phishing attacks. (Malim, 
2004) The life of a Phishing web site on the Internet is average 4.0 days, according to 
an Anti-Phishing Working Group (2006) investigation. However, based on their latest 
report, the longest time online for a site is 30 days.    
On summer 2003 the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigators (FBI), announced about 
Phishing that is the: “hottest, and most troubling, new scam on the Internet.” Many 
financial organisations have been Phishing targets since then, for instance eBay, 
Natwest Bank, Paypal, Citibank and a number of others. The major problem caused 
by these Phishing attacks is the loss of reliance customers’ show towards the security 
a financial institution can provide them, which means more loss of money for the 
banks.  
NatWest Bank had to set up and maintain a telephone number for customer service in 
the period the web site was shut down; however many customers felt disappointed 
(Hinde, 2004). Citibank on the other hand, informs the customers about the situation 
and advises them how to protect themselves, mainly by sending them warning 
messages. However, banks support that even if they take protection measures, 
nothing is going to be achieved when the customers are not aware of the situation. In 
addition there is a group of banks that meet in order to find enhanced ways for 
addressing the problem. As safety measure, they scan the Internet for direct abuse of 
their brand, expecting better software protection from browsers as well. (McKenna, 
2004)  
Phishing and Countermeasures 
Based on Tuliani (2004), the threat of Phishing won’t be prevented easily. The 
industry will introduce stronger user authentication as a countermeasure to Phishing. 
A simple way for succeeding this would be the use of one-time passwords, provided 
either by a text message on a mobile phone or by USB tokens, valid only for one use 
and then expire. Such methods are not widely, because of a number of restrictions, 
including the user unawareness and the cost.     
In addition, a number of different Anti-Phishing tools have been implemented aiming 
to prevent the user entering a phishing web site and eventually eliminate the amount 
Appendices 
 
D4 
of incidents. However, it appears that the tools alone cannot the answer to the 
problem. (Zhang et al. (2007), Downs et al. (2006)) 
Anatomy of a Phishing e-mail 
In this section, an existing Phishing e-mail is going to be analysed, so that the actual 
techniques used by the fraudsters can be presented and identified. The e-mail 
examined, is a well designed PayPal Phishing scam that on a first glance looks 
legitimate and well constructed. Many users could become victims of this attempt, as 
there is nothing really suspicious, except the request of updating the personal 
information.   
Figure 28: Phishing e-mail example 
No recipient  
e-mail address 
The link redirects to 
another web address: 
https://www.ppp-info-
update.com/ssl/secure/1
28bit/manage/account/w
There is no personalised greeting 
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Even though, the above Phishing e-mail is sophisticated; there are also some points 
that should be taken under consideration when the e-mail recipient feels threatened by 
Phishing: 
· The link that appears in the Phishing e-mails is always different from the 
destination web address. This can be verified by checking the e-mail’s status bar.  
· Often account details and numbers are included that are incorrect, trying to create 
a more official looking request. 
· Poor use of the English language is also a common characteristic, extended even 
on spelling and grammar mistakes.  
The following picture illustrates the log-in page that follows when the e-mail receiver 
clicks on the link. The defrauded PayPal home page represents an almost identical 
copy of the legitimate one. As you can verify below the card’s PIN number is 
requested and should draw suspicions to the user. On the other hand the web page is 
similar to a legitimate, while any links transfer the user to the original PayPal site 
where the victim can be deceived quite effortless again.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 29: Defrauded PayPal web page I 
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Other oddly required information is the Social Security Number and the Driver’s 
License number as it can be noticed below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, if any information is filled in the user will be transferred to the following 
web page as confirmation of the user account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above example is no longer online as the fraud was exposed. As mentioned on 
the first picture, the login page transfers the victim to the Phishing web site: 
The SSL certificate used by the Phishing site, does not match its domain and the 
browser should notify the user about that. The certificate used is stolen so that they 
avoid entering valid information. This cert used is s.p8.hostingprod.com that is 
registered with Yahoo! that leads to the conclusion that the fraudsters might be using 
a hosting package. This Phishing domain is registered to:    
Figure 30: Defrauded PayPal web page II 
Figure 31: PayPal login confirmation 
https://www.ppp-info-update.com/ssl/secure/128bit/manage/account/webscr/ 
http://whois.domaintools.com/ppp-info-update.com 
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There are numerous Phishing examples on the web and as the situation gets worse 
nowadays, when the Phishing e-mails will be more sophisticated and deceptive. 
(Darugar, 2006) 
Spear Phishing 
Spear Phishing is a targeted and more personal Phishing attempt requesting for 
private information. It is a Phishing e-mail supposed to come from a well-known 
source of a company, such as administrators or human resource departments, 
massively sent to all staff. Even if only one person replies, the fraudsters can gain 
access to the company’s resources. (McDowell, 2006) It is more sophisticated than a 
classic Phishing attack; as the electronic message appears to be sent form the same 
domain with the target. Spear Phishing attacks emerge on a rise while the damage 
caused can be massive and the use of social engineering is more artistic and 
intelligent and can also serve spyware. Based on the IBM’s Global Security Index 
Report, in January 2005 there were 56 cases of Spear Phishing, whilst in June same 
year the incidents rose to 600.000. (Larkin, 2005)  
On the Credit Union Information Security Professionals Association (CUISPA) case, 
the Spear Phishing e-mail attempt not only contained grammatical and spelling errors, 
but also Internet Explorer’s security flaw, by which the attackers could achieve a 
DOS (Denial-of-Service) attack and also execute  or even use the legal user's log-in 
privileges in order to run malicious code remotely. While the employees of the 
company are unaware of the threat, the fraudsters can break the security in simple 
steps. The employee receives the Phishing e-mail that requests to log-in in an 
organisation's software application or a spoofed web page that appears as the 
company's legitimate one. While the employee logs-in the, most probable, attached 
key logger records the keystrokes and as a result the fraudster gets access to the 
company's private information.  Therefore, one more time the end-user's education 
appears vital. (Credit Union Journal, 2006)  
According to William Pelgrin, director of the New York State Office of Cyber 
Security and Critical Infrastructure Coordination (CSCIC) in Albany, there was a test 
Phishing scenario in the period between March and May 2005, when the New York 
CSCIC sent spear Phishing e-mails to almost 10,000 employees in order to discover 
whether they would reveal their personal information, in five state agencies. The 
results were remarkable: over 75% of the recipients opened the e-mail, 17% clicked 
on the link, and 15% tried to reveal their passwords. However, on a similar occasion a 
couple of months later, when the users were aware of the situation, a little 8% of the 
employees only opened the message. (Vijayan, 2005)  
People can get easily deceived from Spear Phishing as the e-mails’ text is familiar to 
them, comes from a trustworthy source and even anti-spam software may miss to 
recognise the threat. In addition in most of these messages there are hidden Trojan-
horse key loggers. (Security Director's Report, 2005) 
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Based on the Credit Union National Association, Inc. (2006) web site one of the latest 
trends on Phishing scams is the cash rewards' e-mails in exchange of answers 
concerning customer satisfaction. There is always a targeted organisation, on a 
spoofed website, that inquires feedback about its services. The bank account 
information is claimed to be requested for depositing the cash reward. 
Below there is a sample of such a Phishing e-mail: 
Dear Credit Union Customer,  
 
You have been chosen by our online department to take part in this 
quick and easy 5 question survey. In return we will credit $20 to 
your account - Just for your time! Helping us better understand how 
our customers feel benefits everyone.  
This survey serve as a useful tool in determining how we are doing 
and how we can improve. With the information collected we can decide 
to direct a number of change to improve and expand our online 
services.  
We kindly ask you to spare two minutes of your time in taking part 
with this unique offer! 
 
[Confirm Now] 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=U&start=4&q=http://poustevnici.mb-
net.cz/uvod/cuna/sign_up.html?secure/wbscr/complete.html?WT.svl=1  
your $20 Reward Survey with CUNA® Reward services.  
The information you provide us is all non-sensitive and anonymous. 
No part of it is handed down to any third party groups. It will be 
stored in our secure database for maximum of 3 days while we process 
the results of this nationwide survey. Please do not reply to this 
message. For any inquiries, contact Customer Service.  
(Source: http://www.cuispa.org/announcement.php?12, 2006) 
Common Characteristics on Phishing attacks 
Phishing is considered as a form of a Man-in-the-Middle attack (MITM), where the 
user can communicate with the attacker, but in the meanwhile the attacker 
communicates with the bank in real-time. In such a case neither the bank nor the user 
are aware of the attacker’s existence, claiming they have a secure connection. A Man-
in-the-Middle attack has total control of the system, meaning that the attacker can 
even disconnect the user and submit his instruction to the bank. In order to avoid this 
threat the user only needs to prevent it happening, something that is beyond the 
current technology. (Oppliger et al. (2006), Dhamija, and Tygar (2005))  
The APWG (2004) uncovered a common pattern used by fraudster when employing 
Phishing web sites. They determined that the web sites were hosted on machines 
appearing to be operated by the attacker. The hosts didn’t have registered domains. In 
addition none of the sites was running on port 80, most of them were on port 4903. 
All these analysed Phishing web sites were not intending to exploit financial 
organisations. The received Phishing e-mails were either an image map or with 
encoded URL in JavaScript. The JavaScript web sites were used with a popup page 
on top covering the original site. All the web sites on the research were responding as 
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SHS web server (small HTTP Server). This kind of attack may be running on zombie 
machines, while the attacker makes use of Trojan code hitting exploitable machines 
and installing the SHS, running for as many days as required for obtaining the 
information.  
The method of Web Spoofing 
Methods of achieving Web Spoofing 
Web spoofing is considered as a hard-to-detect method. However, there is an almost 
‘concrete’ method followed in order to publish a spoofed web site. The actual 
procedure is illustrated on the figure below:    
 
Every time a user requests a web page from a web browser, the web browser calls for 
that page over the network from the web server that hosts the page. However, when a 
fraudster discovers network security vulnerability, can pass over this procedure, 
attack the network and manage to use the web traffic arbitrary. 
a. Universal Resource Locator (URL) rewriting:  
It is the easy deception method used by the attacker. The aim is to lead the victim 
visit his spoofed web page. The URL is rewritten on a Web page providing the link 
for the requested web page, while indicating the attacker’s web server. The rewriting 
is usually difficult for the victim to point it out. Therefore, when the victim clicks on 
the link on his web browser, the attacker’s server is going to request the valid Web 
page.    
However, at the same time, the content of the original web page is rewritten for the 
attacker’s needs and presented to the victim’s browser. 
This way, the fraudster manages to copy the whole URL for his spoofed web page 
and the result is that anytime the victim uses a new link form this page, will always 
stay and use the attacker’s web page on his web server, without the user’s knowledge. 
Assuming that the original web site is [url] www.victim.com [/url], the attacker could 
Figure 32: Web transaction during a Web spoofing attack (Felten et. al, 1997) 
1 -> Request URL 
Fraudster 
Victim 
5 -> Spoofed Web 
page returns 
2 -> Request legitimate URL 
3 -> Return legitimate page contents 
4 -> content 
alteration 
Server 
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rename it as [url] http://www.victim.com [/url]. Therefore, each time the victim tries 
to visit the specific web page will be entrapped to the fraudster’s web server.  
b. Forms:  
As long as a URL can be spoofed, so can a web based form. A submitted form is 
URL encoded and the reply is plain HTML. Consequently, every time a form is 
completed on a spoofed web page, the procedure appears to continue as normal. 
However, the information is submitted to the fraudster’s web server, who has the 
opportunity to process the data according to his needs and will and then transfer them 
to the legitimate server, the same procedure is also followed for the reply forms. 
c. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL): 
SSL is a protocol created to encrypt data on web transactions in order to protect any 
sensitive information transferred on the web. Even though it is considered as the ‘top 
requirement’ for establishing a secure transaction, it appears as weak related to web 
browsers and fraudsters. While the victim connects to the fraudster’s web server, 
even the secure connection indicator will appear as normal, but the transaction will 
take place through the fraudster’s server instead. (Felten et al., 1997) In general terms 
though, the SSL protocol is considered as invulnerable for the man-in-the-middle 
attacks, the threat emerges by the exploits of the software applications on the users’ 
computers. (Emigh, 2006)   
There are three principles that make a web site unique: 
1. The domain name that is the unique name each web site owns as its identifier. 
They can be purchased online that protects the identity of the imposer who is 
going to choose a very similar name to the target’s original one. It is usually 
difficult for the user’s eye to spot on the difference at the first glance. 
2. The content, the most important issue concerning a web site, as it needs to be 
identical to the original. The majority of web sites include HTML code 
(HyperText Markup Language). 
3. The web hosting service that is going to make the web site available. The 
fraudster may even have the opportunity to defraud and create custom e-mail 
addresses on the legitimate company’s name.     
When the fraudster achieves to manipulate all of them, he has achieved the attack.     
The man-in-the-middle attack is also performed on the web spoofing attacks, the 
same way with phishing attacks. Once the attacker achieves this, it is easy then to 
perform the supervision of the web page and manage the attack. 
Common Characteristics on Web Spoofing attacks 
There are some common characteristics that reveal the redirection to a ‘spoofed’ web 
page. In cases where user authentication is required any incorrect login attempt is 
usually prompted as correct, as the entries cannot be handled. However, some of the 
latest web spoofed sites appear display messages for incorrect login.  
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Another common feature is the JavaScript handling that controls all links and content, 
in order to avoid showing the genuine web address. In case the user saves the HTML 
page, he won’t be able to retrieve it, as there is a .dll component that rules the code 
generation on the browser, as well as the JavaScript code that is inherited on the 
fraudster’s web server. Ye et al. (2000) argue that standard internet browsers, user 
interfaces, SSL sessions and their certificates can be forged, while the JavaScript 
session has the ability to replace the original web address on the address bar with a 
forged one at the top of the browser window. (Dinev, 2006) 
The method of Pharming 
Common Characteristics on Pharming attacks 
The target of a pharming attack for conducting ID theft is the computer, not the 
individual (Mahmood, 2006). Bocij (2006) supports that they are difficult to be 
suspected, detected and revealed, as they basically refer to web sites that the user 
reasonably visits, ‘pulled to the web site’, such as a web banking site. Pharming 
occurs due to the alteration of a single IP address, which means that the fraudster 
targets a specific group of people, e.g. customers of a specific bank. This gives them 
the ability to have a large profit, as they will act unattended and the risk of being 
exposed is low. 
DNS cache poisoning seems to be the most popular way of achieving pharming, 
while the pharm sites are hosted on botnets. The APWG (2005), refer to registration 
of similar domain names and attacks on search engines as future pharming methods.  
Social Engineering 
Types of Social Engineering 
Impersonation is the most relevant word to social engineering. The attacker pretends 
either in person or over the phone to be a trustworthy person, depending on the 
objective; a convincing situation to persuade an individual to reveal a piece of private 
information. This might be a user ID, password or any other type of information 
sensitive or not, that appears valuable for the fraudster.  
Reverse social engineering is considered as the most dangerous type. For this case, 
the social engineer behaves as an authorised person to help a company’s employees 
overcome a problem. Any trouble that has appeared is caused by the hacker usually 
by disrupting the network’s traffic, therefore the victim is going to contact the 
attacker persuaded that he can solve the problem. (Gartner, 2002) Then, the fraudster, 
either creates a trustworthy relationship with the victim, or achieves a direct attack. 
(Gragg, 2002)  
One suggested example for social engineering is that a company’s competitors or 
former employees might try to harm a business by accessing a company’s private 
information. They can use social engineering techniques in order to achieve their 
purpose (Hiemstra, 2004). According to Denning (1999) the information flow from 
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the employees could be limited if the users were trained in security awareness and 
were instructed on requesting further details before disclosing sensitive data.  
Stasiukonis (2006) conducted an experiment and placed twenty USB flash drives in 
areas frequently visited by a credit union’s employees. They contained a specially 
written Trojan program, planted in image files, which would email any logins, 
passwords and other sensitive information to him. Fifteen were collected by the 
employees and immediately plugged into their company’s computers.  
Anaphora on Nigerian 419 scam  
The Nigerian 419 scam first appeared in the early 1980s originally as a request 
usually from the central bank or other official government agency. This scam is 
considered as the third largest industry in Nigeria has cost more than five billion 
dollars all over the world the last fifteen years and at least 15 people have lost their 
lives until 1998. (Mintz, 2002)     
It belongs to the advance fee fraud and is also popular as the Nigerian letter or 419 
scam. According to the Internet Fraud Watch in the USA, it is a 2% of all scam 
complaints, however considered third in the top ten scam list.  The scam starts either 
with a bulk e-mail or bulk fax gathering similar letters to companies and individuals 
usually with a wealth background. It requests usually an investment of a large amount 
of money to be made through the recipient’s account due to the limits exist in Nigeria 
(the amount is usually in dollars).  
In case the recipient reply to such a letter then gets in contact with the defrauders 
asking him to pay advance fees, transfer taxes, performance bonds etc. and every time 
he pays he will be asked to pay something else in advance.   
Characteristics of the Nigerian Scam  
· The situation appears urgent by the deceivers 
· The victim is usually requested to travel to Nigeria  
· Sometimes actual Nigerian officials and government buildings are used  
· The victim’s account numbers are asked 
· Different kinds of processing fees are asked to be paid 
· They demand to keep the transaction confidential 
· They often use a Nigerian U.S. or U.K. resident for the transaction 
· Really often someone pretends to be a Nigerian loyalty person (Quatloos, 
2006) 
The Nigerian penal code prohibits the action and many web sites informing the 
people about the fraud, however the activity cannot be minimised. According to the 
fraud department of the Metropolitan Police (2008) losses of the scam have reached 
four to five million dollars.     
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Appendix E: 
 
ID Theft Investigation Framework Flow 
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Phase 1. Media Analysis 
Digital Media  
Process 1. Source Identification 
Activities 
I.1.1. Data browse Instruction 1. Online data  
   Objective 1.1. Evidential computer storage       
components 
   Objective 1.2. Computer storage media 
 Instruction 2. Offline data 
   Objective 2.1. Any offline data that can be used as   
additional evidence 
 
I.1.2.Live system Instruction 1. Check operating system 
   Objective 1.1. Shutdown 
   Objective 1.2.  Disconnect 
O.1.1.keep record of the scene 
Process 2. Digital Media collection 
Activities 
I.2.1. Identify different digital media  Instruction 1. Generic device storing personal data 
I.2.2. Secure/ isolate digital media 
I.2.3. Collect/ package digital media 
O.2.1. Document  
Process 3. Image Acquisition 
Activities 
I.3.1. Select appropriate tool 
I.3.2. Protect media from possible alteration of data  
I.3.3. Image the original media 
I.3.4. Store safely original media 
I.3.5. Back-up the image, work on that 
I.3.6. Create Cryptographic Value 
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ID Theft Data Identification 
Process 4. Evidential data identification 
Activities 
 V. Victim 
I.4.1.V. Existence of malicious software 
I.4.2.V. Existence of unsecured transactions 
I.4.3.V. Vulnerable system 
O.4.1.V. Victim evidential data list 
 F. Fraudster 
I.4.1.F. existence of malicious software code 
I.4.2.F. forensic extraction software 
I.4.3.F. hacking tools 
O.4.1.F. Fraudster evidential data list 
Process 5. Target identification 
Activities 
I.5.1. vulnerable systems 
I.5.2. published information 
I.5.3. individual/ corporate 
O.5.1. Target identification list 
Process 6. Threat agent identification / intention 
Activities 
I.6.1. internal/ external attack 
I.6.2. individual/ corporate  
O.6.1. Threat agent identification list 
 
Phase 2. Evidence Analysis 
ID Theft Data Analysis 
Process 7. Data Analysis 
Activities 
I.7.1.Identify all files of the system  Instruction 1. Existing files 
 Instruction 2. Deleted, remaining 
 Instruction 3. Hidden data 
 Instruction 4. Encrypted / password protected 
 Instruction 5. Temp files / folders 
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I.7.2. Recover deleted files 
I.7.3. Slack / Unallocated space 
I.7.4. Hidden partitions 
O.7.1.Define files that can be used as evidence 
Process 8. Target Analysis   
Activities 
V. Victim 
I.8.1.V. Malicious software / code Instruction   1. Monitors web-browser Process/ network traffic 
 Instruction 2. Accesses contact list records 
 Instruction 3. Accesses clipboard contents 
 Instruction 4. Trojans that collect personal info 
 Instruction 5. Software Keylogger (hosted) 
I.8.2.V. Local-based e-mail  
I.8.3.V. Web-based e-mail   
I.8.4.V. Embedded Object scripting access languages 
I.8.5.V. Recently accessed documents 
I.8.6.V. URL information  Instruction 1. URL cache 
 Instruction 2. URL Process record 
I.8.7.V. Security permissions 
I.8.8.V. Application histories 
I.8.9.V. Instant message history log 
I.8.10.V. Databases 
I.8.11.V. Spreadsheets 
I.8.12.V. Number systems 
O.8.1.V. List evidential findings  
Activities 
F. Fraudster  
I.8.1.F. Internet bookmarks 
I.8.2.F. Steganographic search 
I.8.3.F. Embedded Object scripting access languages 
I.8.4.F. Installed software Instruction 1. Web design applications 
 Instruction 2. Existence of Anti-Forensics applications  
 Instruction 3. System Process eraser 
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I.8.1.F. Track illicit software use 
I.8.2.F. Recent Documents 
I.8.3.F. Filenames 
I.8.4.F.URL information Instruction 1. URL cache 
 Instruction 2. URL Process record 
I.8.5.F.Local based e-mail  
I.8.6.F.Web based e-mail 
I.8.7.F. Operating System Registry entries  
I.8.8.F. Security permissions 
I.8.9.F. Instant message history log 
I.8.10.F. Malicious software (Trojan code / bot) 
I.8.11.F.Malicious source code existence 
I.8.12.F.Web server communication 
I.8.13.F. Databases 
I.8.14.F.Spreadsheets 
I.8.15.F. Images 
I.8.16.F. File Processes 
I.8.17.F. Number systems 
O.8.1.F. List evidential findings  
Process 9. Threat Agent Analysis 
Activities 
I.9.1. Intention Instruction 1. Financial 
 Instruction 2. Identity 
 
I.9.2. Motivation Instruction 1. Target 
I.9.3. Knowledge / Skills 
 
Evidence 
Process 10. Evidence Collection  
Activities 
I.10.1. Use evidential findings list, O.8.1.V. or O.8.1.F. 
O.10.1.Create list of evidence based 
on ID Theft types  
Instruction 1. Financial 
   Objective 1.1. Credit histories 
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   Objective 1.2. Transactions 
   Objective 1.3. Application names 
   Objective 1.4. Phone records 
   Objective 1.5. Tax records 
   Objective 1.6. Bankruptcy records  
   Objective 1.7. Documents on other people’s names 
   Objective 1.8. Dates of birth 
 Instruction 2. Identity 
   Objective 2.1. Financial Evidence 
   Objective 2.2. N.I. Numbers 
   Objective 2.3. Driving licence 
   Objective 2.4. Employment records 
   Objective 2.5. Passport records 
   Objective 2.6. Business records 
   Objective 2.7. Property records 
   Objective 2.8. Documents on other people’s names 
   Objective 2.9. Dates of birth 
   Objective 2.10. ID Card copies 
   Objective 2.11. Criminal records 
O.10.2. Threat agent Evidence list (Process 9 is used as input) 
Process 11. Evidence Classification 
Activities 
I.11.1. Use evidential findings list, O.8.1.V. or O.8.1.F. respectively 
O.11.1. Create evidence classification list  Instruction 1. Strongly Evidential 
 Instruction 2. Evidential 
 Instruction 3. Irrelevant 
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Phase 3. Scenario Construction 
Evidence Classification 
Process 12. Structure of evidential data 
Activities 
I.12.1. Use evidence as of Processes 10 and 11 
O.12.1.Categorisation of evidential data Instruction 1. E-mail 
 Instruction 2. Internet Related 
 Instruction 3. Malware 
 Instruction 4. Hacked Databases 
 Instruction 5. Malicious Tools 
 Instruction 6. Documents 
 Instruction 7. Application logs 
 Instruction 8. System Vulnerabilities 
 Instruction 9. Other 
Process 13. Structure threat agent’s profile 
Activities 
I. 13.1. Use Threat agent Evidence list O.10.2 
V. Victim 
O.13.1.V Reveal technical skills 
O.13.2.V Reveal programming skills 
O.13.3.V Ability to convince someone 
O.13.4.V Ability to keep stealth action 
F. Fraudster 
O.13.1.F Sophistication of tools 
O.13.2.F Level of expertise 
O.13.3.F Use of defensive techniques 
O.13.4.F Identify purpose of attacking 
O.13.5.F Identify motivation 
O.13.6.F Identify opportunities 
Process 14. Structure analysed digital evidence 
Activities 
I.14.1. Structure all sort of valuable information 
I.14.2. Identify evidential aspects 
O.14.1. Group the evidential aspects  
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Scenario  
Process 15. Scenario Outline 
Activities 
I.15.1. Use evidence as of I.1.1.< Instruction 2, Phase 1< ID Theft Data Identification, Phase 2< 
Evidence, and Phase 3< Evidence Classification 
O.15.1. List valuable data gathered 
Process 16. Scenario Preparation Documentation 
Activities 
I.16.1. Use Scenario outline list O.15.1. 
O.16.1. Merge evidential data gathered 
 
Phase 4. Evaluation 
Scenario Examination 
Process 17. Scenario Testing/ Evaluation  
Activities 
I.17.1. Use Phase 1< ID Theft Data Identification, Phase 2< Evidence, and Phase 3< Scenario 
I.17.2. Check validation / entirety of the outputs 
O.17.1. Create evaluation list 
Process 18. Scenario Clarification 
Activities 
I.18.1. Use evaluation list as of O.17.1. 
I.18.2. Clarify the impact of evidential data 
O.18.1. Create scenario clarification list   
Case 
Process 19. Case Construction 
Activities 
I.19.1. Use data from the scenario clarification list O.18.1 
O.19.1. Construct the case 
Process 20. Case Clarification 
Activities 
I.20.1. Clarify the constructed case from O.18.1. 
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Process 21. Case Evaluation 
Activities 
I.21.1. Use the scenario evaluation list from O.17.1. 
I.21.2. Check validation 
O.21.1.Confirm case evaluation 
Process 22. Evidential Case Representation 
Activities 
I.22.1. Create the testimonial report Instruction 1. Include all case evidence 
 Instruction 2. Describe all case evidence 
O.22.1. ID Theft Case Investigation Report  
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Appendix F: 
Data Dependencies  
Appendices 
 
F2 
I. Representation of Dependencies and Processes 
  
 
High Level Phases 
High Level Processes 
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II. Representation of the ID Theft Investigation  
Framework Complexity 
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III. Representation of the ID Theft Investigation 
Framework Relationships 
7.1.1.1  
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IV. The relationships of each Phase 
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Phase 1: Media Analysis 
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Phase 2: Evidence Analysis 
Phase 2: Evidence Analysis 
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Phase 3: Scenario Construction 
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Phase 4: Evaluation 
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Appendix G: 
High Level Flowchart 
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Appendix H: 
ID Theft Investigation Framework 
Abstracted procedure for the investigator 
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Initialization of the investigation 
P1. MEDIA ANALYSIS 
 
DIGITAL MEDIA: Identify, collect and image the available digital media 
Process 1.Source Identification,  
Identify the source of information, follow the Activities: 
I.1.1. Media Selection: observe and identify all the evidential aspects, based on the 
following instructions: 
Instruction 1.online  
Instruction 2.offline  
where for online the investigator is searching for  
Objective 1. evidential computer storage components 
Objective 2. computer storage media 
and for offline stands 
Objective 2.1. any offline data that can be used as additional evidence 
continue to 
I.1.2.  Live system: check the operating system in case the system is running, continue 
to 
O.1.1.  Keep Record of the scene: Record the current scene, close Source Identification 
(Process 1), and continue to Digital Media Collection (Process 2). 
Process 2.Digital Media Collection,  
Prepare for the digital media acquisition, follow the functions: 
I.2.1.  Identify different digital media: identify the different digital media available in 
the crime scene, where different digital media is 
Instruction 1.Generic digital device able to store personal data,  
continue to 
I.2.2.  Secure/ isolate digital media: Securely detach the digital media by avoiding any 
alteration or damage and continue to 
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I.2.3.  Collect/ package digital media: Securely collect and package the media for the 
transport to the lab, continue to 
O.2.1.  Document: Verify the process by documenting the procedure undertaken, close 
Activity, continue to Image Acquisition (Process 3). 
Process 3.Image Acquisition,  
The digital media is transferred to the lab, preparation for imaging initiates, the 
following activities occur: 
I.3.1.  Select appropriate tool: select the preferable the tool for imaging the media, 
continue to 
I.3.2.  Protect media from possible alteration of data: protect the media from any other 
possible risks that could alter the evidence, continue to 
I.3.3.  Image the original media: create the image of the medium, continue to  
I.3.4.  Store safely original media: store original media in limited access storage 
locker, continue to 
I.3.5.  Back-up the image, work on that: create a back-up copy of the image and work 
on this copy, continue to 
I.3.6.  Create Cryptographic Value: calculates the file’s checksum for the integrity of 
the evidence, ensure completion of the process, close Image Acquisition 
(Process 3), and continue to ID Theft Data Identification. 
 
ID THEFT DATA IDENTIFICATION: Initial identification, browsing for ID 
Theft Data, create viewpoint, preparation for the next Phase (Evidence Analysis) 
Process 4.Evidential data identification: Identify whether the medium belongs to a 
victim or a fraudster, follow the activities 
for Victim (V): 
I.4.1.V.  Existence of malicious software: Identify malicious software running on the 
system, continue to 
I.4.2.V. Existence of unsecured transactions: Identify unsecure, unencrypted network 
transactions, continue to 
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I.4.3.V. Vulnerable system: Identify the lack of computer security software, proves that 
the system has been vulnerable to an attack, continue to 
O.4.1.V.  Victim evidential data list: The products of the above activities, where the 
identified elements are listed, close Evidential data identification (Process 4), 
continue to Target identification (Process 5). 
for Fraudster(F): 
I.4.1.F.  Existence of malicious software code: Not only malicious software existence as 
in I.4.1.V., but also the existence of malicious source code, continues to 
I.4.2.F.  Forensic extraction software: Identify forensic extraction software existence, 
continue to 
I.4.3.F.  Hacking tools: Existence of hacking applications to the system, according to 
the findings, continue to 
O.4.1.F. Fraudster evidential data list: As in O.4.1.V., the products of the above 
activities, where the identified elements are listed, close Evidential data 
identification (Process 4), and continue to Target identification (Process 5). 
Process 5.Target identification: Identify the reason that led the machine to become a 
target, follow the activities 
I.5.1. Vulnerable systems: Identify an unsecure system that can easily become target 
of unlawful use, continue to 
I.5.2.  Published information: Identify published personal information on the internet 
that could have been used for fraudulent purposes, continue to 
I.5.3. Individual / corporate: Determine whether the target has been an individual or 
corporate system. If corporate, refer to the organisation’s security policy, 
continue to 
O.5.1. Target identification list: A list that includes the target identification data, as 
provided from the activities of this process, close Target Identification (Process 
5), and continue to Threat Agent identification/ intention (Process 6). 
Process 6.Threat Agent identification/ intention: Identify the intention of the fraudster, 
based on the existing observation, follow the activities 
I.6.1.  Internal/ external attack: Identify whether the incident is considered as a direct 
internal network attack or as an external source, continue to  
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I.6.2.  Individual/ corporate: State the threat agent’s intention. Determine whether the 
target appears as individual or corporate. 
O.6.1.  Threat Agent identification list: The output activity that creates a list with the 
data identified on I.6.1 and I.6.2. 
Keep track of the evidential data provided from this Phase and complete Media Analysis 
(P1). The purpose is to use the results (output) of the Phase as the significant link to the 
input of the next Phase. Continue to Evidence Analysis (P2).  
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Examination of the evidence 
P2. EVIDENCE ANALYSIS 
 
ID THEFT DATA ANALYSIS: Analyse the medium, aiming to identify and collect 
the evidential data. It requires the use of a selection of analysis tools. 
Process 7.Data Analysis: Identify evidential data in every single part of the digital media, 
based on the classic computer forensics investigation, follow the functions 
I.7.1. Identify all files of the system: Identify all the areas of the digital media that 
files can be retrieved, these are 
Instruction 1.Existing files: all the existing files that appear in the medium 
during   the search 
Instruction 2.Deleted, remaining: retrieve deleted data that have remained and 
can probably provide additional proof 
Instruction 3.Hidden data: check the system for hidden files 
Instruction 4.Encrypted/ password protected: identify encrypted and password 
protected files, attempt decryption 
Instruction 5.Temporary files/ folders: identify temporary files and folders on 
the system 
continue to  
I.7.2. Recover deleted files: Recovered the deleted files in order to examine their 
content, continue to 
I.7.3.  Slack / Unallocated space: Examine the slack and unallocated space of the 
medium, continue to 
I.7.4. Hidden partitions: Check the system for hidden partitions that could contain 
sensitive data, continue to 
O.7.1.  Define files that can be used as evidence: Collect the files identified in the 
previous functions and can be used as evidential aspects to the following 
activity, close Data Analysis (process 7), continue to Target Analysis (Process 
8). 
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Process 8.Target Analysis: Analyse the data that connect either with the victim (V.) or 
the fraudster (F.), according to the existing findings, follow the activities 
For Victim (V.) 
I.8.1.V. Malicious Software: Perform a thorough anti-virus check with a collection of 
Antivirus programs. Identify whether the system has been infected with 
malware, this should perform the following in order to be linked with ID Theft  
Instruction 1.Monitors web-browser activity/ network traffic 
Instruction 2.Accesses contact list records 
Instruction 3.Accesses clipboard contents 
Instruction 4.Trojans that collect personal info 
Instruction 5.Software Keylogger (hosted) 
continue to 
I.8.2.V. Local-based e-mail: Analyse the e-mail correspondence of the user. Identify 
information about the sender, the receiver, the date of the message and the 
content, continue to  
I.8.3.V. Web-based e-mail: Web-based mail has to deal with the amount of information 
that is stored locally by the web browsers, continue to 
I.8.4.V. Embedded Object scripting access languages: Analyse the purpose of existence 
of Embedded Object scripting access languages, continue to  
I.8.5.V. Recently accessed documents: Identify whether track of recent documents is 
kept from the system, examine their content, continue to  
I.8.6.V. URL information: Examine the information being kept to the system from the 
use of the Internet, in the terms of  
Instruction1.URL cache: investigate all the cache of the system, including 
visited web pages and images.  
Instruction 2.URL activity record: reveal the typed URLs  
continue to 
I.8.7.V. Security permissions: Examine the security event log, check for alterations, 
continue to 
I.8.8.V. Application histories: Examine the history kept by the installed applications, 
continue to  
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I.8.9.V. Instant message history log: Examine the history log (when enabled) and the 
contact list of the possibly installed instant messengers, continue to   
I.8.10.V. Databases: Examine the content of the databases, where applicable, for 
financial records saved, continue to   
I.8.11.V. Spreadsheets: Examine the content of the spreadsheets, where applicable, for 
financial records saved, continue to   
I.8.12.V. Number systems: Perform searches that can reveal information about stored 
phone numbers, addresses, security pins, postcodes, etc. 
O.8.1.V. List evidential findings: The output activity that creates a list with the 
evidential findings from Target Analysis, close Target Analysis (Process 8), 
and continue to Threat Agent Analysis (Process 9) 
For Fraudster (F.) 
I.8.1.F. Internet bookmarks: Visit and examine every page that appears in bookmarks 
for content verification, continue to 
I.8.2.F. Steganographic search: Examine the existence of steganographic methods 
undertaken, continue to 
I.8.3.F. Embedded Object scripting access languages: Analyse the purpose of 
Embedded Object scripting access languages existence, continue to  
I.8.4.F. Installed Software: Examine the system for existence of installed software that 
promotes ID Theft, these are 
Instruction 1.Web design applications: Can indicate the fraudster’s activity on   
Phishing or malicious web site designing 
Instruction 2.Existence of Anti-Forensics applications: Can indicate the 
fraudster’s tension to alter data with Anti-Forensic techniques  
Instruction 3.System activity eraser: Identification of software that wipes data 
and activities. 
continue to 
I.8.5.F. Track illicit software use: Examine the existence of hacking tools and shared 
files for Peer-to-Peer applications, continue to 
I.8.6.F. Recently Accessed Documents: See I.8.5.V., continue to  
I.8.7.F. Filenames: Examine the filenames of the system for suspicious content, 
continue to  
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I.8.9.F. URL information: See I.8.6.V. 
Instruction 1.URL cache: See I.8.6.V.< Instruction 1  
Instruction 2.URL activity record: See I.8.6.V.< Instruction 2.  
continue to 
I.8.10.F. Local based e-mail: See I.8.2.V., continue to  
I.8.11.F. Web based e-mail: See I.8.3.V., continue to 
I.8.12.F. Operating System registry entries: Examine the registry entries of the system as 
valuable information for the fraudster’s latest actions can be revealed, continue 
to 
I.8.13.F. Security permissions: See I.8.7.V., continue to 
I.8.14.F. Instant message history log: See I.8.9.V., continue to   
I.8.15.F. Malicious software: Examine the system for malicious software archive that the 
fraudster may have used or intends to use, examine the behaviour of the 
malware, and continue to 
I.8.16.F. Malicious source code existence: Examine the existence of writing or altering 
malicious source code and its behaviour, continue to  
I.8.17.F. Web server communication: Examine information linked with web server 
communication, it can reveal instances of malicious actions, Denial-Of-Service 
attacks and DNS Poisoning, continue to 
I.8.18.F. Databases: See I.8.10.V., continue to   
I.8.19.F. Spreadsheets: See I.8.11.V., continue to   
I.8.20.F. Images: Examine for identification of images from past victims, possible 
victims, or even contacts that the fraudster collects information, continue to 
I.8.21.F. File Processes: Examine processes of the files that appear suspicious to the 
system during the investigation so far, continue to 
I.8.22.F. Number Systems: See I.8.12.V. 
O.8.1.F. List evidential findings: The output activity that creates a list with the 
evidential findings from Target Analysis, close Target Analysis (Process 8), 
and continue to Threat Agent Analysis (Process 9) 
Process 9.Threat Agent Analysis: Analyse the purposes of the Threat Agent, based on 
the findings, follow the activities 
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I.9.1.  Intention: Identify the intention of the fraudster, based on the findings and the 
different ID Theft types: 
Instruction 1.Financial: The purpose of the ID thief is to gain access to 
financial information. 
Instruction 2.Identity: The purpose of the ID thief is to gain access to 
someone’s identification information or impersonate an individual. 
continue to 
I.9.2.  Motivation: Determine the motive of the threat agent, in the terms of 
Instruction 1.Target: Identify the objective of the attack 
continue to 
I.9.3. Knowledge / Skills: Determine the background knowledge of the fraudster, the 
group that the threat agent belongs, close Threat Agent Analysis (Process 9), 
and continue to Evidence. 
EVIDENCE: It involves the determination of the evidence, as raw data as evidence 
does not justify the value of the findings. The outcome (output) leads to the P3 Scenario 
Construction, where the evidence is defined. 
Process 10.Evidence Collection: Collect the evidential data that was gathered on the 
previous process and follow the activities 
I.10.1. Use evidential findings list, O.3.2.(A) or O.3.3.(B): In order to satisfy the need 
of classifying the evidence, the analyst needs to use the appropriate evidential 
findings list also in this function. 
O.10.1. Create list of evidence based on ID Theft types: Categorise the evidential data 
identified from the analysis according to the different forms of ID Theft:   
Instruction 1.Financial, all financial information gathered after the analysis of 
the digital media is included 
Objective 1.Credit histories 
Objective2.Transactions 
Objective 3.Application names 
Objective 4.Phone records 
Objective 5.Tax records 
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Objective 6.Bankruptcy records 
Objective 7.Documents on other people’s names 
Objective 8.Birth dates 
Instruction 2.Identity, evidential data that has to do with an individual’s 
identity,  
Objective 1.Financial Evidence 
Objective 2.National Insurance (N.I.) Numbers  
Objective 3.Driving licence 
Objective 4.Employment records 
Objective 5.Passport records 
Objective 6.Business records 
Objective 7.Property records 
Objective 8.Documents on other people’s names 
Objective 9.Dates of birth 
Objective 10.ID Card copies  
Objective 11.Criminal records 
continue to 
O.4.2. Threat agent Evidence list: List the evidence that has been collected after the 
Threat Agent Analysis (Process 9), close Evidence Collection (Process 10), and 
continue to Evidence Classification (Process 11). 
Process 11.Evidence categorisation: Categorise the findings of the analysis by 
determining their quality, follow the activities 
I.4.2. Use evidential findings list, O.8.1.V. or O.8.1.F.: use the appropriate evidential 
findings list also in this function as an input. 
O.4.4. Create evidence classification list: Provide three lists where evidence is 
classified based on its gravity, the categorisation is 
Instruction 1.Strongly Evidential: include the findings that exemplify the 
premise and promote its validity 
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Instruction 2.Evidential: include the findings that are linked with the incident, 
but is not outstanding  
Instruction 3. Irrelevant: include findings that seemed meaningful in the 
beginning of the examination and are considered irrelevant after 
the completion of Evidence Collection (Process 10). 
P2 Evidence Analysis is completed with the creation of the classification lists. The output 
Evidence is linked with the manipulation of data at the Evidence Classification input on 
the next Phase. Continue to P3 Scenario Construction. 
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Interpretation of the evidence 
P3. SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION 
 
EVIDENCE CLASSIFICATION: Use the outcomes of P2, identify the categories 
that the evidential data belong, group and appoint it accordingly. 
Process 12.Structure of evidential data: Collect the evidence that has been discovered 
during P2. Evidence Analysis, structure and categorise it in order to draw a 
constructed picture concerning the evidential data. Follow the activities 
I.12.1. Use evidence as of Processes 10 and 11: Collect this evidence listed and 
classified on O.10.1. and O.10.2., use it in the next activity, continue to 
O.12.1. Categorisation of evidential data: Categorise the evidential data from the 
previous activity, based on their content  
Instruction 1.E-mail: from I.8.2.V., I.8.3.V. or I.8.9.F, I.8.10.F. 
Instruction 2.Internet Related: from I.8.4.V., I.8.6.V. or I.8.1.F., I.8.3.F., 
I.8.4.F., I.8.16.F. 
Instruction 3.Malware: from I.8.1.V or I.8.14.F, I.8.15.F. 
Instruction 4.Hacked Databases: from I.8.10.V., I.8.11.V. or I.8.17.F., I.8.18.F. 
Instruction 5.Malicious Tools: from I.8.1.V or I.8.4.F., I.8.5.F. 
Instruction 6.Documents: from I.8.5.V. or I.8.6.F., I.8.7.F., I.8.16.F.  
Instruction 7.Application Logs: from I.8.8.V., I.8.9.V. or I.8.13.F.  
Instruction 8.System Vulnerabilities: from I.8.7.V. or I.8.8.F., I.8.9.F.  
Instruction 9.Other: from I.8.12.V. or I.8.2.F., I.8.11.F., I.8.15.F., I.8.21.F.   
close Structure of Evidential Data (Process 12), continue to Structure Threat Agent’s 
profile (Process 13). 
Process 13.Structure Threat Agent’s profile: Collect the evidence identified during the 
Threat Agent Analysis (Process 9). Determine the findings based on the 
victim’s and the fraudster’s side. 
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I.13.1. Use threat agent evidence list O.10.3.: Use the list that was created from 
Evidence Collection (Process 10)< Threat Agent Evidence list O.10.3., in order 
to aid the profiling of the threat agent, continue to 
For Victim (V.) 
O.13.1.V. Reveal technical skills: structure the technical abilities of the fraudster 
according to the techniques undertaken, as low and high technical level, 
continue to 
O.13.2.V. Reveal programming skills: based on the method of the attack and the quality 
of the programming scripts, continue to 
O.13.3.V. Ability to convince someone: social engineering skills that are possibly 
identified after the media analysis, continue to 
O.13.4.V. Ability to keep stealth action: the complexity of the attack, as combined from 
the vulnerabilities of the system and the technical skills of the fraudster, close 
Structure Threat Agent’s profile (Process 13), continue to Structure Analysed 
Digital Evidence (Process 14). 
For Fraudster (F.) 
O.13.1.F. Sophistication of tools: the identified collection of tools at the fraudster’s side 
that provide his capabilities complexity and background, continue to  
O.13.2.F. Level of expertise: the more advanced and complex the tools that have been 
used, the more experienced and advanced the threat agent, continue to 
O.13.3.F. Use of defensive techniques: identification of techniques that indicate stealth 
action, continue to 
O.13.4.F. Identify purpose of attacking: draw a picture regarding the purpose of the 
attack (ego or curiosity), continue to 
O.13.5.F. Identify motivation: identify data that indicate a more than personal gain 
motive, continue to 
O.13.6.F. Identify opportunities: combine the lists created from O.13.1.F to O.13.5.F. in 
order to identify the opportunities, close Structure Threat Agent’s Profile 
(Process 13), continue to Structure analysed digital evidence (Process 14). 
Process 14.Structure analysed digital evidence: Create a structured set of evidential 
data that includes the key aspects of the overall analysis, based on Structure of 
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Evidential Data (Process 12) and Structure Threat Agent’s Profile (Process 13), 
follow the activities    
I.14.1. Structure all sort of valuable information: list the piece of information that kept 
your attention examiner during the analysis of the digital media, continue to 
I.14.2. Identify evidential aspects: declare the data that link the piece of evidence 
together. The number of times an evidential file appears in the medium and 
concerns the same individual, continue to 
O.14.1. Group the evidential aspects: Collect the evidential aspects from Identify 
Evidential aspects I.14.2. and group them 
close Structure analysed digital evidence (Process 14), and continue to Scenario, the 
output of the Phase. 
 
SCENARIO: ‘Predict’ and present a coherent and efficient chronicle of the evidence 
identified and classified so far.  
Process 15.Scenario Outline: Use the evidential sources identified during the analysis 
and classification to create lists, follow the activities 
I.15.1. Use evidence as of I.1.1.< Instruction 2, Phase 1< ID Theft Data Identification, 
Phase 2< Evidence, and Phase 3< Evidence Classification: Collect the 
evidential outputs and use them on the next activity, continue to 
O.15.1. List valuable data gathered: List the valuable data that has been gathered during 
the previous activity I.15.1.; produce an outline of groups, according to the type 
of the evidence, close Scenario Outline (Process 15) , continue to Scenario 
Preparation Documentation (Process 16) 
Process 16.Scenario Preparation Documentation: Prepare the scenario, according to the 
listed valuable data of the Scenario Outline (Process 16), follow the activities 
I.16.1. Use Scenario outline list: Use the list created in the List valuable data gathered 
O.15.1., continue to  
O.16.1. Merge evidential data gathered: Collect and merge the overall evidential data in 
order to prepare the documentation 
P3 Scenario Construction is completed with the production of a draft scenario. Continue 
to P4 Evaluation. 
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Validation of the Evidence 
P4. EVALUATION 
SCENARIO EXAMINATION: Evaluate the examination that has taken place so far 
in order to present the case by testing the Scenario output from P3 Scenario Construction. 
Process 17.Scenario Testing/ Evaluation: Verify and clarify the scenario, according to 
the evidential data discovered, follow the functions  
I.17.1. Use the outputs of Phases 1, 2 and 3: Use of the outputs of the previous Phases 
in order to revise his outcomes as gathered in Scenario Preparation 
Documentation (Process 16), continue to  
I.17.2. Check validation / entirety of the outputs: Check the validation and the entirety 
of the outputs, continue to 
O.17.1. Create evaluation list: Include the crucial data that have been identified after 
the evaluation and create the evaluation list, mention amendments to previous 
activities. Close Scenario Testing/ Evaluation (Process 17), continue to 
Scenario Clarification (Process 18) 
Process 18.Scenario Clarification: Confirm the outcome of the scenario, its 
dependencies and agreement with the results of Scenario Testing/ Evaluation 
(Process 17), follow the activities 
I.18.1. Use evaluation list from O.17.1.: At this function the examiner needs to use as 
an input the output of the previous process, continue to  
I.18.2. Clarify the impact of evidential data: Explain the effect of the evidential data in 
relation to the incident, state the implication of the results. 
O.18.1. Create scenario clarification list: Create a list that includes the impact of 
clarified data as resulted from the previous activity. Close Scenario 
Clarification (Process 18), continue to Case, the output of P4 Evaluation. 
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CASE: Present in this process, present accurate, constructed evidence results for the 
submission and representation of the case 
Process 19.Case Construction: Build the foundation of the case representation, use the 
output of the previous process, and follow the activities 
I.19.1. Use data from the scenario clarification list O.18.1.: Use the output of the 
Process 18 and continue to  
O.19.1. Construct the case: Create a constructed outline of the case, close Case 
Construction (Process 19), and continue to Case Clarification (Process 20). 
Process 20.Case Clarification: Link the representation of the evidence with the impact of 
the case, follow the activity 
I.20.1. Clarify the constructed case: Justify the relation of the evidential data with the 
initial premise, clarify the sources. Close Case Clarification (Process 20), and 
continue to Case Evaluation (Process 21). 
Process 21.Case Evaluation: Ensure the validity of the constructed case, follow the 
activities 
I.21.1. Use the scenario evaluation list from O.17.1.: Refer to the Scenario Evaluation 
list activity O.17.1. in order to ensure that all evidential aspects are included, 
continue to 
I.21.2. Check validation: Ensure the structured layout of the case, according to Check 
validation/ entirety of the outputs I.17.2. activity, continue to 
O.21.1. Confirm case evaluation: Confirm the official outcome of the case, close Case 
Evaluation (Process 21), continue to Evidential Case Representation (Process 22). 
Process 22.Evidential Case Representation: Create a formal document that includes the 
outcome of his work, follow the activities 
I.22.1. Create the testimonial report: Represent all the findings of the examination on a 
manner that adheres to the evidence from the technical and scientific point of 
view and can be interpreted in a way to be read and comprehended by a jury. 
Therefore, follow 
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Instruction 1.Include all case evidence: includes all evidence that has been 
already included and evaluated in Case Evaluation (Process 21). 
Instruction 2.Describe all case evidence: use information from Instruction 1 and 
describe all the evidential data and the procedure undertaken. 
O.22.1. ID Theft case investigation report: This is the final output, as all evidence has 
been described in the report and the final product of the investigation is the ID 
Theft case report.  
P4 Evaluation closes with the representation of the case and terminates the ID Theft 
Investigation Framework. 
 
Appendices 
 
I1 
Appendix I: 
ID theft Investigation Framework 
Documenting procedure 
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ID Theft Investigation Framework 
Documenting Procedure for the investigator 
 
 
FORENSIC EXAMINER NAME: 
ID THEFT FORENSIC CASE NUMBER:  
 
Requester: 
Current date and time:  
Receive Date:  
Open Date: 
Complete Date:  
Working Hours:  
Significant problems: 
 
Keywords’ identifiable list: 
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Phase 1. Media Analysis 
Digital Media 
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 1. Source Identification  
I.1.1. Media Selection  
Instruction 1. Online data   
Objective 1.1. Evidential computer storage components  
Objective 1.2. Computer storage media  
Instruction 2. Offline data  
Objective 2.1. Any offline data that can be used as additional evidence  
I.1.2.Live system  
Instruction 1 Check operating system  
Objective 1.2. Shutdown  
Objective 1.2. Disconnect  
O.1.1.keep record of the scene  
Process 2. Digital Media collection  
I.2.1. Identify different digital media   
Instruction 1. Generic device storing personal data  
I.2.2. Secure/ isolate digital media  
I.2.3. Collect/ package digital media  
Process 3. Image Acquisition  
I.3.1. Select appropriate tool  
I. 3.2. Protect media from possible alteration of data   
I. 3.3. Image the original media  
I. 3.4. Store safely original media  
I.3.5. Back-up the image, work on that  
I.3.6. Create Cryptographic Value  
 
Comments on Digital Media 
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ID Theft Data Identification 
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 4. Evidential data identification  
V. Victim  
I.4.1.V. Existence of malicious software  
I.4.2.V. Existence of unsecured transactions  
I.4.3.V. Vulnerable system  
O.4.1.V. Victim evidential data list  
F. Fraudster  
I.4.1.F. existence of malicious software code  
I.4.2.F. forensic extraction software  
I.4.3.F. hacking tools  
O. 4.1.F. Fraudster evidential data list  
Process 2. Target identification  
I.5.1. vulnerable systems  
I.5.2. published information  
I.5.3. individual/ corporate  
Process 3. Threat agent identification / intention  
I.6.1. internal/ external attack  
I.6.2. individual/ corporate   
O.6.1. Threat agent identification list  
 
Comments on ID Theft Data Identification 
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Media Analysis Worksheet 
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Phase 2. Evidence Analysis 
ID Theft Data Analysis 
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 7. Data Analysis  
I.7.1.Identify all files of the system   
Instruction 1. Existing files  
Instruction 2. Deleted, remaining  
Instruction 3. Hidden data  
Instruction 4. Encrypted / password protected  
Instruction 5. Temp files / folders  
I.7.2. Recover deleted files  
I.7.3. Slack / Unallocated space  
I.7.4. Hidden partitions  
O.7.1.Define files that can be used as evidence  
Process 8. Target Analysis    
V. Victim  
I.8.1.V. Malicious software / code  
Instruction 1. Monitors web-browser activity / network traffic  
Instruction 2. Accesses contact list records  
Instruction 3. Accesses clipboard contents  
Instruction 4. Trojans that collect personal info  
Instruction 5. Software Keylogger (hosted)  
I.8.2.V. Local-based e-mail   
I.8.2.V. Web-based e-mail    
I.8.3.V. Embedded Object scripting access languages  
I.8.4.V. Recently accessed documents  
I.8.5.V. URL information   
Instruction 3. URL cache  
Instruction 4. URL activity record  
I.8.6.V. Security permissions  
I.8.7.V. Application histories  
I.8.8.V. Instant message history log  
I.8.9.V. Databases  
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I.8.10.V. Spreadsheets  
I.8.11.V. Number systems  
O.8.1.V List evidential findings   
F. Fraudster   
I.8.1.F. Internet bookmarks  
I.8.2.F. Steganographic search  
I.8.3.F. Embedded Object scripting access languages  
I.8.4.F. Installed software  
Instruction 1. Web design applications  
Instruction 2. Existence of Anti-Forensics applications   
Instruction 3. System activity eraser  
I.8.5.F. Track illicit software use  
I.8.6.F. Recently Accessed Documents  
I.8.7.F. Filenames  
I.8.8.F. URL information  
Instruction 1. URL cache  
Instruction 2. URL activity record  
I.8.9.F. Local based e-mail   
I.8.10.F. Web based e-mail  
I.8.11.F. Operating System Registry entries   
I.8.12.F. Security permissions  
I.8.13.F. Instant message history log  
I.8.14.F. Malicious software  
I.8.15.F. Malicious source code existence  
I.8.16.F. Web server communication  
I.8.17.F. Databases  
I.8.18.F. Spreadsheets  
I.8.19.F. Images  
I.8.20.F. File Processes  
I.8.21.F. Number systems  
O.8.1.F. List evidential findings   
Process 8. Threat Agent Analysis  
I.9.1. Intention  
Instruction 1. Financial  
Instruction 2. Identity  
I.9.2. Motivation  
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Instruction 1. Target  
I.9.3. Knowledge / Skills  
Comments on ID Theft Data Analysis 
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Evidence 
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 9. Evidence Collection   
I.10.1. Use evidential findings list, O.8.1.V. or O.8.1.F.  
O.10.1.Create list of evidence based on ID Theft types    
Instruction 1. Financial  
Objective 1.1. Credit histories  
Objective 1.2. Transactions  
Objective 1.3. Application names  
Objective 1.4. Phone records  
Objective 1.5. Tax records  
Objective 1.6. Bankruptcy records   
Objective 1.7. Documents on other people’s names  
Objective 1.8. Dates of birth  
Instruction 2. Identity  
Objective 2.1. Financial Evidence  
Objective 2.2. N.I. Numbers  
Objective 2.3. Driving licence  
Objective 2.4. Employment records  
Objective 2.5. Passport records  
Objective 2.6. Business records  
Objective 2.7. Property records  
Objective 2.8. Documents on other people’s names  
Objective 2.9. Dates of birth  
Objective 2.10. ID Card copies  
Objective 2.11. Criminal records  
O.10.2. Target Evidence list  
O.10.3. Threat agent Evidence list   
Process 10. Evidence Categorisation  
I.11.1. Use evidential findings list, O.8.1.V. or O.8.1.F.  
O.11.1. Create evidence classification list   
Instruction 1. Strongly Evidential  
Instruction 2. Evidential  
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Instruction 3. Irrelevant  
 
Comments on Evidence 
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Evidence Analysis Worksheet 
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Phase 3. Scenario Construction 
Evidence Classification 
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 12. Structure of evidential data  
I.12.1. Use evidence as of Processes 10 & 11  
O.12.1.Categorisation of evidential data  
Instruction 1. E-mail  
Instruction 2. Internet Related  
Instruction 3. Malware  
Instruction 4. Hacked Databases  
Instruction 5. Malicious Tools  
Instruction 6. Documents  
Instruction 7. Application logs  
Instruction 8. System Vulnerabilities  
Instruction 9. Other  
Process 13. Structure threat agent’s profile  
I. 13.1. Use Threat agent Evidence list O.10.2  
V. Victim  
O.13.1.V. Reveal technical skills  
O.13.2.V. Reveal programming skills  
O.13.3.V. Ability to convince someone  
O.13.4.V. Ability to keep stealth action  
F. Fraudster  
O.13.1.F. Sophistication of tools  
O.13.2.F. Level of expertise  
O.13.3.F. Use of defensive techniques  
O.13.4.F. Identify purpose of attacking  
O.13.5.F. Identify motivation  
O.13.6.F. Identify opportunities  
Process 13. Structure analysed digital evidence  
I.14.1. Structure all sort of valuable information  
I.14.2. Identify evidential aspects  
O.14.1. Group the evidential aspects   
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Comments on Evidence Classification 
 
 
Scenario 
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 14. Scenario Outline  
I.15.1. Use evidence as of I.1.1.< Instruction 2, Phase 1< ID Theft 
Data Identification, Phase 2< Evidence, and Phase 3< Evidence 
Classification  
 
O.15.1. List valuable data gathered  
Process 15. Scenario Preparation Documentation  
I.16.1. Use Scenario outline list from O.15.1.  
O.16.1. Merge evidential data gathered  
 
Comments on Scenario 
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Scenario Construction Worksheet 
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Phase 4. Evaluation 
Scenario Examination 
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 17. Scenario Testing / Evaluation  
I.17.1. Use Phase 1< ID Theft Data Identification, Phase 2< 
Evidence, and Phase 3< Scenario 
 
I.17.2. Check validation / entirety of the outputs  
O.17.1. Create evaluation list  
Process 18. Scenario Clarification  
I.18.1. Use evaluation list from O.7.1.  
I.18.2. Clarify the impact of evidential data  
O.18.1. Create scenario clarification list    
 
Comments on Scenario Examination 
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Case 
Processes, Activities, Instructions, Objectives 
þ   
Corresponding  
Findings 
Process 19. Case Construction  
I.19.1. Use data from the scenario clarification list O.18.1  
O.19.1. Construct the case  
Process 20. Case Clarification  
I.20.1. Clarify the constructed case from O.18.1.  
Process 21. Case Evaluation  
I.21.1. Use the scenario evaluation list from O.17.1.  
I.21.2. Check validation  
O.21.1.Confirm case evaluation  
Process 22. Evidential Case Representation  
I.22.1. Create the testimonial report  
Instruction 3. Include all case evidence  
Instruction 4. Describe all case evidence  
O.22.1. ID Theft Case Investigation Report   
 
Comments on Case 
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Evaluation Worksheet 
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Case Documentation 
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Appendix J: 
Gwent Police Review 
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Gwent Police HTCU 
ID Theft Investigation Framework  
Evaluation Questionnaire 
 
Officer’s Name:  DC Tim Williams, Computer Crime Investigator 
Date:   27/5/08 
Please answer the questions below after you have applied the ID Theft 
investigation framework on an existing case. Where applicable, you can rate your 
answer from 1 to 5 (Strongly disagree to strongly agree) by selecting the 
appropriate number. Some personal comments are desired as well. 
 
1. How do you value the idea of discriminating the investigation of computer 
crimes based on their method?  
 
Comments on rating:  If the method of committing the crime is known and is 
reliable, then it is more efficient to concentrate your investigation efforts to 
areas known to be affected, rather than following the same routine for all 
offences 
2. Considering this method of investigation do you believe it can correspond 
to a valuable tool for the investigator? 
 
Totally  Partially  Agree    Partially  Totally 
Agree   Agree    Disagree   Disagree 
Totally  Partially  Agree    Partially  Totally 
Agree   Agree    Disagree   Disagree 
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Comments on rating: 
3. Are the data flows and graphical representation of the framework 
supportive for the investigator? 
 
Comments on rating: Some of the graphical representations may need 
explaining to investigators before they are used. Although I can see that the 
graphical files are not meant to be used as a standalone description 
4. Do you believe that the procedure has the ability to speed up the 
investigation? 
 
Comments on rating: My disagreance isn’t a negative thing. The framework is 
comprehensive and would give an investigator more things to look at, which 
may have been overlooked or forgotten, therefore extending the initial 
examination, but this may lead to a time saving later on if there is no need to 
return to a case. 
5. Do you believe that the framework identifies all evidential aspects related 
to Identity Theft incidents? 
 
Comments on rating: When applying the framework I did not discover 
anything missing that would have a detrimental effect on the investigation; 
neither could I think of anything else to add. However a framework, like 
software, will probably have a few minor bugs, and they will be discovered 
Totally  Partially  Agree    Partially  Totally 
Agree   Agree    Disagree   Disagree 
Totally  Partially  Agree    Partially  Totally 
Agree   Agree    Disagree   Disagree 
                                                                            X 
Totally  Partially  Agree    Partially  Totally 
Agree   Agree    Disagree   Disagree 
         X 
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the more they are used. This framework appears to have the ability to be 
“tweaked” should the need arise.  
6. Are the inputs and the outputs of the procedure properly defined? 
 
Comments on rating: 
7. Are the inputs and the outputs those that you expected to identify?  
 
Comments on rating: 
8. Do the aspects of the methodology assess the capabilities required from 
the perpetrator? 
 
Comments on rating: 
9. Does the methodology effectively assess the on going threat? 
 
Comments on rating: Short term: yes. The method of ID theft is fluid and the 
criminals are constantly re-inventing themselves. Whilst we may have an idea 
of what is happening now and the methods being employed, this will change 
in the future as criminals get to know investigators capabilities. However the 
Totally  Partially  Agree    Partially  Totally 
Agree   Agree    Disagree   Disagree 
          
Totally  Partially  Agree    Partially  Totally 
Agree   Agree    Disagree   Disagree 
         X 
Totally  Partially  Agree    Partially  Totally 
Agree   Agree    Disagree   Disagree 
Totally  Partially  Agree    Partially  Totally 
Agree   Agree    Disagree   Disagree 
X 
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framework is future-proof and new areas of examination can be added as 
would any such procedure 
10. Is the procedure generic enough in order to be applicable to all different 
systems?  
 
Comments on rating: If by systems you mean Computer Operating systems, 
then yes. I don’t think it would make any difference what computer was being 
used. It does not limit the investigator 
11. Does the framework facilitate the investigation of Internet Identity Theft 
cases and the processing of the related digital evidence?  
 
Comments on rating:  I didn’t have the opportunity to apply the framework to 
an active search warrant, but the framework brings structure to gathering 
digital evidence pre-delivery to the forensic lab, so I don’t see any particular 
problem with this. The framework certainly brings structure to an 
investigation. I have had moments in the past where I stare blankly into space 
wondering what I am doing and where I am going. The framework brought a 
structure I could follow and tick-off as I progressed the case. 
12. Do you normally use evidence classification methods? If yes, how do you 
normally classify the evidence? 
Normally our evidence is either classed as admissible or not (but still 
disclosable) there are varying strengths to admissible evidence, but this is not 
normally broken down. With changes in law, what has been inadmissible can 
now be used as evidence of bad character or knowledge and expertise of 
Totally  Partially  Agree    Partially  Totally 
Agree   Agree    Disagree   Disagree 
          
Totally  Partially  Agree    Partially  Totally 
Agree   Agree    Disagree   Disagree 
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computer systems. In criminal cases the evidence overall has to be of such 
strength as to be beyond all reasonable doubt. Civil cases are on a balance of 
probabilities. Therefore, the strength of the evidence will vary depending on 
the court hearing the case. 
There is also a classification of evidence that undermines the prosecution and 
assists the defence, which has to be disclosed at some point during the 
prosecution. 
13. Do you believe that the evidence classification presented by the ID Theft 
investigation framework is of your benefit? 
 
Comments on rating: from a Police/CPS perspective I think it will highlight 
where the strengths and weaknesses of a case are. I am not sure if classifying 
the evidence would require some additional work on the case or if this would 
aid the enquiry. My case did not require classification so I cannot comment 
further. It would need to be put into practice and commented on after a few 
applications 
14. Did you identify any additional evidential data by the use of the presented 
framework? (comparing to the methodology you normally apply)  
I didn’t, but that is simply because the evidence wasn’t there. I did have extra 
logs and files to check thanks to the frame-work, which perhaps I would have 
missed or would have had to come back to at a later date.  
15. Did you find the ‘Abstracted procedure for the investigator’ helpful during 
the analysis? 
 
Totally  Partially  Agree    Partially  Totally 
Agree   Agree    Disagree   Disagree 
                                                    
Totally  Partially  Agree    Partially  Totally 
Agree   Agree    Disagree   Disagree 
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Comments on rating: There is enough of a description so that the investigator 
knows what is required 
16. Did you find the ‘ID theft investigative methodology’ form helpful during 
the analysis? 
 
 
Comments on rating: I didn’t use it. This is new to me so I needed the 
Abstracted procedure for the investigator document as it was a bit more 
descriptive. However, most of the headings are obvious as to what is required 
and with a few applications it would take over as the main document to follow 
17. Any additional comments and recommendations. 
There is always some reluctance to change the way an offence is investigated, 
but e-crime is becoming a very complex area of investigation with some 
serious offences being committed. It is becoming apparent that an investigator 
needs to complete a structured investigation that can be followed by others 
and reach the same conclusion and or results. The phrase “We need to be 
singing from the same song book” comes to mind. 
I am not a fan of catch all check lists as you may have to spend time 
explaining to a court or defence barrister why you didn’t look at a particular 
area that is on the list (a check list is a disclosable document if used). The idea 
of a framework that is offence specific is more appealing 
Using a framework that caters to a particular offence ensures that you do 
exactly what is required, keeps an investigator on-track, reduces the chance of 
overlooking an area where evidence could reside and affords some flexibility 
for the individual. 
Totally  Partially  Agree    Partially  Totally 
Agree   Agree    Disagree   Disagree 
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It is clear that a lot of work has gone into this framework and it fitted well into 
my case. It was a little difficult at first, but with repeated use this will get 
easier the more it is used as with any other new policy or procedure. I would 
certainly consider using it again when it is finally published. I also think it 
would make a good foundation for any offence specific investigations.  
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Appendix K 
Gwent Police e-mail communication 
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1st e-mail contact: DC Jon Evans, Monday 19/05/2008 
Hi Olga, 
Just a quick email to confirm I have received the ID frame work 
evaluation and will be giving it attention in due course. 
btw can I send this on to a contact I have within the NPIA (National 
Police Improvement Agency)? 
http://www.npia.police.uk/ 
 
Regards, 
Jon. 
 
Angelopoulou O (AT) wrote: 
> 
> Dear Jon, 
> 
> Following our last contact, I’m grateful that you have agreed to 
> evaluate my research project. I’m sending you the appropriate 
> documentation that will help you comprehend the presented methodology, 
> some flowcharts and graphs that support the design, a form that I 
> would like you to fill in and a questionnaire that I would like you to 
> answer. 
> 
> In order to make your life easier I need to summarise some key issues. 
> As we have already discussed, the specified research work implements a 
> conceptual ID Theft investigation framework. Initially the purpose is 
> to maintain the idea that there should be a different methodology 
> applied by the forensics investigator concerning the nature of 
> different e-crimes. In addition, the methodology differentiates from 
> others, by discriminating the analysis to the fraudster’s and the 
> victim’s side, as different findings are requested from each side. 
> 
> The application of a conceptual framework may differ with the actual 
> practical process and the procedure you already follow; however the 
> purpose is to create a structured, formal approach to the procedure 
> that needs to be undertaken. 
> 
> The framework consists of four phases and every phase is accomplished 
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> in two processes. Every process requires a number of activities to be 
> undertaken and produce appropriate outputs. As a result, the functions 
> serve this need, receive inputs and produce outputs. 
> 
> The documents that I’m sending you are the last draft chapters of my 
> PhD thesis; therefore, they are quite extended and detailed. For this 
> reason, in some cases you will find references to some other chapters. 
> Also the figures, graphs and references to appendices do not have 
> correct numbering. 
> 
> The ‘Design’ file explains the purpose and the structure of the 
> framework and you may find it useful for understanding how the 
> framework works. The ‘Functionality of the ID Theft investigation 
> framework’ is the chapter that analyses every process of the 
> methodology. I suppose that you will need to refer to this one as 
> well, for understanding the aim of every different function. The 
> ‘Abstracted procedure for the investigator’ acts as a handbook that 
> you may need to make use of. It includes the very basic purpose of 
> every phase and its components and my intention is to provide it as a 
> manual that the investigator can refer at any point during the 
> analysis. The attached graphs and flowcharts represent the framework. 
> Their filenames stand for the purpose of the graph or the flowchart. 
> 
> The ‘ID Theft investigative methodology’ file intends to aid the life 
> of the investigator during the analysis and maintain the chain of 
> custody. You are supposed to use the form when you apply the framework 
> on the case, and keep track of the progress of the procedure. This 
> form can also be used for producing the documentation of the case. 
> 
> The attached questionnaire should be answered after the application of 
> the methodology. I would really appreciate it if some of your 
> colleagues would like to fill in the questionnaire as well. In this 
> case I could reach to more convincing results for the evaluation purposes. 
> 
> I hope the whole procedure will not consume much of your time. 
> 
> I would like to include the completed questionnaires as appendices to 
> the thesis only with your permission. In case you don’t want your 
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> names to be published, then these will be kept separately. Whether you 
> prefer the replies to remain unpublished, then the access to the 
> questionnaires will be restricted between me and my supervisor, Dr. 
> Ian Sutherland. Additionally, if you would like me to send you a copy 
> of the work that includes your feedback; I would be more than happy to 
> do so. 
> 
> Your feedback is going to be of great value for the assessment of the 
> project and once again I would like to mention how much I appreciate 
> your help. Feel free to contact me anytime regarding any queries you 
> may have. In case you thought there is no deadline for your reply, I 
> would be just waiting for a prompt response. 
> 
> Yours sincerely, 
> 
> *Olga Angelopoulou* 
> Research Student 
> Faculty of Advanced Technology 
> University of Glamorgan 
> Pontypridd 
> CF37 1DL 
> United Kingdom 
> Tel: +44 (0)1443 483246 
> E-mail: oangelop@glam.ac.uk 
 
2nd and 3rd e-mail contact: DC Tim Williams, 21/05/2008 
Glad I could be of some help. Unfortunately I don’t have the time to go through all of the 
descriptive notes, but the outline frame work doesn’t seem to be missing anything major in an 
investigation of this type. You have obviously put a lot of effort into it and I wish you the best of 
luck with it. 
 I will always be willing to help out where I can 
 Tim 
  
From: Angelopoulou O (AT) [mailto:oangelop@glam.ac.uk]  
Sent: 21 May 2008 10:01 
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To: DC Tim Williams 
Subject: RE: ID theftInvestigation framework eval 
  
Hi Tim, 
 this is only a quick e-mail to say many many thanks for your reply.  
I really appreciate it that you dedicated some of your time to write these comments, they are so 
valuable for me. 
You have the practical experience, I don't; and it's so important to see your point of view.  
 I will consider your notes and send you back any necessary clarifications.  
 Thanks again, 
Olga 
 
Hi Olga, 
 
I was enquiring the other day on how you were getting on with the framework. 
You must have heard me, because you emailed Jon with your draft. 
 
I have had a look through the Framework, but not had a chance to go through all of the 
descriptive notes that go with each point. I have only really looked at the descriptive notes where 
I marked some points of interest. 
 
I have a few things that might be worth consideration. However, bear in mind I have not read all 
the notes so they may already be covered and/or are just not necessary for your framework 
 
Point 1.1 covers offline data. Routers are becoming the norm in most households and may be 
worth mentioning separately as an item to seize and interrogate. Most now have security logs 
and DHCP lists or show deliberate access through a firewall or port forwarding 
 
Point 1.1 also covers recording the scene (photo and video) Is it worth mentioning that these also 
become exhibits and need to be handled in the same fashion as any other 
 
Point 1.1.5 covers packaging exhibits, How about the "sealing" of evidence bags to show that 
they have not been tampered with during transit or storage. 
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Point 1.3 covers acquisition which is then broken down into sub-points. It might be worth re-
arranging them so that protection from alteration of media is higher on the list. Select 
appropriate tool left as first and then protect the media (hardware write blockers etc) then on to 
the imaging. 
 
Where you mention checksums to ensure integrity, I usually highlight that the created checksums 
were compared to the checksums of the original media for verification. 
 
Point 3.1.1 It is probably encompassed within Existing Files, but is it worth mentioning 
compressed files separately? Not all forensic programs mount zipped files and as you know text is 
not searchable in a compressed files. Furthermore most virus checkers will mount and scan a 
compressed file, but if another compressed file is within the archive it will not be scanned. I have 
seen a few Trojans being hidden in this fashion. 
 
Point 1.3.6 to 1.3.16 - Have you thought about checking virus vaults and virus program logs on 
the victim computer 
 
Point 1.3.18 I attended a lecture recently on steganography, It was mentioned that we should 
compare md5 hash values on identical images with the same byte size if we suspect 
stegonography is being used. Although not conclusive it could help especially if the victims 
computer is also available to run a search on the hash value 
 
Point 1.3.24 URL information. Although covered in point 1.3.27 I also like specifically to check 
typed URLs in the registry, this shows an intention to visit the site and it cannot be blamed on a 
"pop-up". 
 
Point 4.1.1.1 - 4.1.1.8 - I know this isn't a definitive list but Credit card numbers might be worth 
an entry on its own. Encase has a script to locate them and they can identify a victim(s) 
 
Point 4.2 - Mentions Evidence classifications. Have you thought about unused material whereby a 
file is known from the beginning that it has no evidential value. It often becomes an issue in court 
when it is overlooked and not disclosed. Although not strictly evidence, the defence will assume 
that it is the "best evidence" to clear their client when not disclosed properly and will accuse the 
police of deliberately hiding it. So it needs 
to be handled properly and made known. 
Have you also considered classifying data that actually undermines the prosecution or supports 
the defence? This evidence still needs to be disclosed 
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Point 8 presentation of the evidence. Most of the time I find that I need to really dumb down my 
reports, avoid wherever possible anything too technical and keep it simple. So it would be worth 
an investigator thinking about the audience that will be reading the report and cater to them 
accordingly  
 
Lastly have you considered securing remote data stored on a server eg googlemail with 6Gb 
storage for files and emails. This is not covered in a warrant, but might host a wealth of evidence. 
It is an absolute nightmare getting to this, due to territorial problems, but should be considered 
prior to executing a warrant as the fraudster could access it post-warrant and delete the lot. 
Although this might be in need of its own framework 
 
I hope this could be of some help to you. Don't worry about responding to the above points, I 
only throw them in for you to consider just in case you have overlooked something. I have not 
been able to apply the framework to a live job, as I do not have a job that fits the criteria at the 
moment. 
However it does seem to be a complete and comprehensive coverage of handling an ID theft. I do 
like the idea of a framework as it prevents overlooking some crucial part of an investigation and 
frameworks are present in so many other areas of policing. 
 
Best of luck with this and if there is anything I can do to help just drop 
me a line. 
 
Tim 
DC 459 Tim Williams 
Computer crime Investigator 
Gwent Police Hi-tech Crime Unit 
Police HQ 
Cwmbran 
Gwent 
Np44 2XJ 
Tel 01633 643032 
Fax 01633 877643 
 
4th and 5th e-mail contact: DC Tim Williams, 23/05/2008 
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I am sure I can find a few past cases that I can put this to or at least something close. Obviously I 
may have to miss out certain parts, but I am sure that your framework is modular so I don’t 
anticipate any problems. I will look at it next week and email the results back to you. If you prefer 
a paper copy for authenticity I can post them. 
Have a good weekend 
Tim 
  
From: Angelopoulou O (AT) [mailto:oangelop@glam.ac.uk]  
Sent: 23 May 2008 10:37 
To: DC Tim Williams 
Subject: RE: ID theftInvestigation framework eval 
  
  
Hello Tim, 
 thank you for the additional observations. Both comments were really useful.  
 I respect that your time is limited, and really appreciate it that you've sent me all these 
comments. I thought from the beginning that it would be quite probable for you not to have an 
ID theft incident for a long time after I sent you the framework. The framework is more 
a theoretical than a practical approach to the investigation, in order to be as general as possible. 
Even if you have an already solved case on your mind and you would like to apply it in theory in 
order to see whether you can reach the same results and answer the questionnaire, then it 
would be great for me. Just  to show concentrated results from your evaluation in the thesis. I 
know that you have already spent quite a few hours reading the framework and trying to 
understand how it works and I don't intend to be awkward. Even if you don't complete the 
questionnaire, I am still able to use your comments as a personal contact. 
  
Thanks again. 
  
Regards, 
Olga 
  
  
From: DC Tim Williams [mailto:timwilliams@gwentpolice.org] 
Sent: Fri 23/05/2008 09:12 
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To: Angelopoulou O (AT) 
Subject: RE: ID theftInvestigation framework eval 
 
Olga, 
 1 other point I forgot to mention, Within your notes for “The functionality of the ID Theft 
investigation framework.pdf” You mention shutdown the computer or simply unplug. 
Investigators are taught to pull the plug from the back of the computer not the wall socket, just 
in case there is a backup power supply. We are also taught that if the machine is a server running 
a server OS, then it should be shut down as you would normally (especially if the server is used 
for a business) This is to avoid  the risk of data corruption which could lead to problems for the 
business. 
 Jon is going to try and look over it this weekend, he has been busy on a warrant and not had the 
time yet. He did mention that under the classifications of evidence, a sub heading or mention of 
intelligence could be a bonus. Sometimes we look at computers and the evidence is insufficient 
for a prosecution, but we do gather intelligence from it, emails, contacts and financial records 
etc. 
 If I get a job I can use this on I will complete the questionnaire, but there is no case of ID theft 
outstanding yet and no warrants planned for the next few weeks. 
 Regards 
 Tim 
 
6th e-mail contact: DC Tim Williams, 27/05/2008 
 
Olga, 
 Attached is a questionnaire that I have completed in respect of a case that I had finished, but 
used the framework to review my work. It wasn’t a straightforward ID theft, but I used it just the 
same. There are some questions I couldn’t answer, either because I wasn’t sure of what was 
being asked, or it just didn’t fit with the job I had done. If some of the answers are not in context 
to the question, just put it down to me not understanding the question! 
Hope it helps out. Anything else, just drop me a line. 
 Tim 
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Appendix L 
EnCase Victim Report 
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??Victim 
  ??2 
    ??$Extend 
    ??Config.Msi 
    ??Documents and Settings 
    ? ??All Users 
    ? ? ??Application Data 
    ? ? ? ??Adobe 
    ? ? ? ? ??Acrobat 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??8.0 
    ? ? ? ? ?   ??Replicate 
    ? ? ? ? ?     ??Security 
    ? ? ? ? ??Updater5 
    ? ? ? ??Avg7 
    ? ? ? ??Mai lFronti er 
    ? ? ? ??Microsoft 
    ? ? ? ? ??Crypto 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??DSS 
    ? ? ? ? ? ? ??MachineKeys 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??RSA 
    ? ? ? ? ?   ??MachineKeys 
    ? ? ? ? ?   ??S-1-5-18 
    ? ? ? ? ??Dr Watson 
    ? ? ? ? ??HTML Help 
    ? ? ? ? ??IdentityCRL 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??production 
    ? ? ? ? ??Media Index 
    ? ? ? ? ??Media Player 
    ? ? ? ? ??MSDAIPP 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??OFFLINE 
    ? ? ? ? ??Network 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??Connections 
    ? ? ? ? ? ? ??Cm 
    ? ? ? ? ? ? ??Pbk 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??Downloader 
    ? ? ? ? ??OFFICE 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??DATA 
    ? ? ? ? ??User Account Pictures 
    ? ? ? ?   ??Default P ictures 
    ? ? ? ??Nero 
    ? ? ? ? ??DrW eb 
    ? ? ? ? ??Nero Conta iner 
    ? ? ? ? ??Nero8 
    ? ? ? ?   ??Nero BackItUp 
    ? ? ? ?   ? ??Cache 
    ? ? ? ?   ??Onl ineServices 
    ? ? ? ?     ??NOSW ebConfig 
    ? ? ? ?       ??MyNero 
    ? ? ? ?       ??MySpace 
    ? ? ? ?       ??YouTube 
    ? ? ? ??W indows Genuine  Advantage 
    ? ? ? ? ??data 
    ? ? ? ??W LInstaller 
    ? ? ??Desktop 
    ? ? ??Documents 
    ? ? ? ??My Music 
    ? ? ? ? ??My Playlists 
    ? ? ? ? ??Sample Music 
    ? ? ? ? ??Sample Playli sts 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??001CD0F4 
    ? ? ? ? ??Sync Playlists 
    ? ? ? ?   ??8EA3AF 
    ? ? ? ??My Pictures 
    ? ? ? ? ??Sample Pictures 
    ? ? ? ??My Videos 
    ? ? ??DRM 
    ? ? ? ??Cache 
    ? ? ??Favorites 
    ? ? ??Start Menu 
    ? ? ? ??Programs 
    ? ? ?   ??Accessories 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Accessib ility 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Communications 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Entertainment 
    ? ? ?   ? ??System Tools 
    ? ? ?   ??Administrative  Tools 
    ? ? ?   ??Creative 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Sound Blaster Live! 
    ? ? ?   ??Games 
    ? ? ?   ??Inte l Application Accelerator 
    ? ? ?   ??Microsoft Office 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Microsoft Office  Tools 
    ? ? ?   ??Mozilla Fi refox 
    ? ? ?   ??MP3 Wav Editor 
    ? ? ?   ??Nero 8 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Nero Manuals 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Nero Toolkit 
    ? ? ?   ??Startup 
    ? ? ?   ??VideoLAN 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Quick Settings 
    ? ? ?   ?   ??Audio 
    ? ? ?   ?   ??Interface 
    ? ? ?   ?   ??Video 
    ? ? ?   ??Winamp 
    ? ? ?   ??Windows Live 
    ? ? ?   ??WinRAR 
    ? ? ?   ??ZoneAlarm 
    ? ? ??Templates 
    ? ??All Users.W INDOWS 
    ? ? ??Application Data 
    ? ? ? ??Adobe 
    ? ? ? ? ??Acrobat 
    ? ? ? ?   ??7.0 
    ? ? ? ?     ??Replicate 
    ? ? ? ?       ??Security 
    ? ? ? ??Adobe Systems 
    ? ? ? ? ??Product licenses 
    ? ? ? ??Microso ft 
    ? ? ? ? ??Crypto 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??DSS 
    ? ? ? ? ? ? ??MachineKeys 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??RSA 
    ? ? ? ? ?   ??MachineKeys 
    ? ? ? ? ?   ??S-1-5-18 
    ? ? ? ? ??Dr W atson 
    ? ? ? ? ??HTML Help 
    ? ? ? ? ??IdentityCRL 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??production 
    ? ? ? ? ??Media Index 
    ? ? ? ? ??Media Player 
    ? ? ? ? ??MSDAIPP 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??OFFLINE 
    ? ? ? ? ??Network 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??Connections 
    ? ? ? ? ? ? ??Cm 
    ? ? ? ? ? ? ??Pbk 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??Downloader 
    ? ? ? ? ??OFFICE 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??DATA 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??Groove 
    ? ? ? ? ??User Account Pictures 
    ? ? ? ?   ??Default Pictures 
    ? ? ? ??Microso ft Help 
    ? ? ? ??Windows Genuine Advantage 
    ? ? ? ? ??data 
    ? ? ? ??WLInstalle r 
    ? ? ? ??Yahoo! 
    ? ? ? ? ??Messenger 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??Plugin 
    ? ? ? ? ?   ??4eb73995-f313-4f4a-
49a5-
1bc4d7c3ee68.yplugin 
    ? ? ? ? ?     ??MANIFEST 
    ? ? ? ? ??ytaggedbm 
    ? ? ? ??Yahoo! Companion 
    ? ? ?   ??Data 
    ? ? ?   ? ??902e1ii qv_o 
    ? ? ?   ? ??default 
    ? ? ?   ??Download 
    ? ? ?   ??Icons 
    ? ? ?   ??Media 
    ? ? ?   ??Modules 
    ? ? ??Desktop 
    ? ? ??Documents 
    ? ? ? ??Adobe PDF 
    ? ? ? ? ??Data 
    ? ? ? ? ??Example Files 
    ? ? ? ? ??Extras 
    ? ? ? ? ??Settings 
    ? ? ? ? ??Star tup 
    ? ? ? ??My Music 
    ? ? ? ? ??My Playlists 
    ? ? ? ? ??Sample Music 
    ? ? ? ? ??Sample Playlists 
    ? ? ? ?   ??001B99EB 
    ? ? ? ??My Pictures 
    ? ? ? ? ??Sample Pictu res 
    ? ? ? ??My Videos 
    ? ? ??DRM 
    ? ? ??Favorites 
    ? ? ??Start Menu 
    ? ? ? ??Programs 
    ? ? ?   ??Accessories 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Accessibility 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Communica tions 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Entertainment 
    ? ? ?   ? ??System Too ls 
    ? ? ?   ??Administrative Tools 
    ? ? ?   ??Creative 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Sound B laster Live! 
    ? ? ?   ??Games 
    ? ? ?   ??Intel Application  Accelerator 
    ? ? ?   ??Microsoft Office 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Microso ft Office Tools 
    ? ? ?   ??Mozilla Firefox 
    ? ? ?   ??Star tup 
    ? ? ?   ??Windows Live 
    ? ? ?   ??Yahoo! Messenger 
    ? ? ??Templates 
    ? ??Defau lt User 
    ? ? ??Applica tion Data 
    ? ? ? ??Microsoft 
    ? ? ?   ??Interne t Explorer 
    ? ? ?   ??Media P layer 
    ? ? ?   ??SystemCertificates 
    ? ? ?     ??My 
    ? ? ?       ??Certificates 
    ? ? ?       ??CRLs 
    ? ? ?       ??CTLs 
    ? ? ??Cookies 
    ? ? ??Desktop 
    ? ? ??Favorites 
    ? ? ??Local Settings 
    ? ? ? ??Application Data 
    ? ? ? ? ??Microsoft 
    ? ? ? ?   ??Media Player 
    ? ? ? ?   ??Windows Media 
    ? ? ? ?     ??9.0 
    ? ? ? ??History 
    ? ? ? ? ??History.IE5 
    ? ? ? ??Temp 
    ? ? ? ??Temporary Internet Fil es 
    ? ? ?   ??Content.IE5 
    ? ? ?     ??0PERWL27 
    ? ? ?     ??4DYFKT2J 
    ? ? ?     ??GHMR0X27 
    ? ? ?     ??W9Y3C1QN 
    ? ? ??My Documents 
    ? ? ??NetHood 
    ? ? ??PrintHood 
    ? ? ??Recent 
    ? ? ??SendTo 
    ? ? ??Start Menu 
    ? ? ? ??Programs 
    ? ? ?   ??Accessories 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Accessibility 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Entertainment 
    ? ? ?   ??Star tup 
    ? ? ??Templates 
    ? ??Defau lt User.W INDOWS 
    ? ? ??Applica tion Data 
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Victim Investigation – Evidential Files ScreenShots 
Figure 33: Victim's Hash Value 
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Figure 34: perfnw.dll 
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Figure 35:  e-mail addresses 
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Figure 36: My Documents folder 
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Appendix M 
EnCase Fraudster Report 
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??Fraudster 
  ??C 
    ??$Extend 
    ??Config.Msi 
    ??Config.Msi 
    ??Documents and Settings 
    ? ??All Users 
    ? ? ??Application Data 
    ? ? ? ??Adobe 
    ? ? ? ? ??Acrobat 
    ? ? ? ?   ??7.0 
    ? ? ? ?     ??Replicate 
    ? ? ? ?       ??Security 
    ? ? ? ??Adobe Systems 
    ? ? ? ? ??Product licenses 
    ? ? ? ??MailFrontier 
    ? ? ? ??Microsoft 
    ? ? ? ? ??Crypto 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??DSS 
    ? ? ? ? ? ? ??MachineKeys 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??RSA 
    ? ? ? ? ?   ??MachineKeys 
    ? ? ? ? ?   ??S-1-5-18 
    ? ? ? ? ??Dr Watson 
    ? ? ? ? ??HTML Help 
    ? ? ? ? ??IdentityCRL 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??production 
    ? ? ? ? ??Media Index 
    ? ? ? ? ??Media Player 
    ? ? ? ? ??MSDAIPP 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??OFFLINE 
    ? ? ? ? ??Network 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??Connections 
    ? ? ? ? ? ? ??Cm 
    ? ? ? ? ? ? ??Pbk 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??Downloader 
    ? ? ? ? ??OFFICE 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??DATA 
    ? ? ? ? ??User Account Pictures 
    ? ? ? ?   ??Default Pictures 
    ? ? ? ??Microsoft Help 
    ? ? ? ??Nero 
    ? ? ? ? ??DrWeb 
    ? ? ? ? ??Nero Container 
    ? ? ? ? ??Nero8 
    ? ? ? ?   ??Nero BackItUp 
    ? ? ? ?   ? ??Cache 
    ? ? ? ?   ??OnlineServices 
    ? ? ? ?     ??NOSWebConfig 
    ? ? ? ?       ??MyNero 
    ? ? ? ?       ??MySpace 
    ? ? ? ?       ??YouTube 
    ? ? ? ??nView_Profiles 
    ? ? ? ??Windows Genuine Advantage 
    ? ? ? ? ??data 
    ? ? ? ??Windows Live Toolbar 
    ? ? ? ? ??en-gb 
    ? ? ? ??WLInstaller 
    ? ? ??Desktop 
    ? ? ??Documents 
    ? ? ? ??Adobe PDF 
    ? ? ? ? ??Data 
    ? ? ? ? ??Example Files 
    ? ? ? ? ??Extras 
    ? ? ? ? ??Settings 
    ? ? ? ? ??Startup 
    ? ? ? ??My Music 
    ? ? ? ? ??My Playlists 
    ? ? ? ? ??Sample Music 
    ? ? ? ? ??Sample Playlists 
    ? ? ? ? ? ??000E87C9 
    ? ? ? ? ??Sync Playlists 
    ? ? ? ?   ??31C209 
    ? ? ? ??My Pictures 
    ? ? ? ? ??Sample Pictures 
    ? ? ? ??My Videos 
    ? ? ??DRM 
    ? ? ? ??Cache 
    ? ? ??Favorites 
    ? ? ??Start Menu 
    ? ? ? ??Programs 
    ? ? ?   ??AccessData 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Forensic Toolkit 
    ? ? ?   ??Accessories 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Accessibility 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Communications 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Entertainment 
    ? ? ?   ? ??System Tools 
    ? ? ?   ??Administrative Tools 
    ? ? ?   ??EDraw Flowchart 3 
    ? ? ?   ??Games 
    ? ? ?   ??Microsoft Office 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Microsoft Office Tools 
    ? ? ?   ??Mozilla Firefox 
    ? ? ?   ??Nero 8 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Nero Manuals 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Nero Toolkit 
    ? ? ?   ??Norton PartitionMagic 8.0 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Norton PartitionMagic 8.0 
Documentation 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Norton PartitionMagic 8.0 
Tools 
    ? ? ?   ??Startup 
    ? ? ?   ??VideoLAN 
    ? ? ?   ? ??Quick Settings 
    ? ? ?   ?   ??Audio 
    ? ? ?   ?   ??Interface 
    ? ? ?   ?   ??Video 
    ? ? ?   ??Winamp 
    ? ? ?   ??Windows Live 
    ? ? ?   ??WinPcap 
    ? ? ?   ??WinRAR 
    ? ? ?   ??ZoneAlarm 
    ? ? ??Templates 
    ? ??Default User 
    ? ? ??Application Data 
    ? ? ? ??Microsoft 
    ? ? ?   ??Internet Explorer 
    ? ? ?   ??Media Player 
    ? ? ?   ??SystemCertificates 
    ? ? ?     ??My 
    ? ? ?       ??Certificates 
    ? ? ?       ??CRLs 
    ? ? ?       ??CTLs 
    ? ? ??Cookies 
    ? ? ??Desktop 
    ? ? ??Favorites 
    ? ? ??Local Settings 
    ? ? ? ??Application Data 
    ? ? ? ? ??Microsoft 
    ? ? ? ?   ??Media Player 
    ? ? ? ?   ??Windows Media 
    ? ? ? ?     ??9.0 
    ? ? ? ??History 
    ? ? ? ? ??History.IE5 
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Figure 37: Fraudster's Internet Bookmarks 
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Figure 38: Victim's log on fraudster's system 
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Figure 39: malware.zip file from plugged in device 
